



# Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society

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PART I

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## SIR AUREL STEIN, K.C.I.E.

F.B.A., D.Litt., D.Sc., D.O.L., LL.D.

THE death of Sir Aurel Stein, at the ripe age of eighty, removes from the Central Asian scene one of the last of the great student-explorers who have written *Finis* on the exploration of the world in its widest sense. Of Jewish descent, he was born in Hungary, and was educated at Budapest, at Dresden and at the Universities of Vienna and Tübingen. In 1885 he came to London in order to pursue his study of Oriental languages and antiquities. He had from the first been inspired by the ambition to penetrate into the heart of Asia which, at that time, was almost a *terra incognita*. In London he met Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Henry Yule, the greatest figures of that period in the field of scientific exploration, and received from them fresh inspiration for the project he had at heart.

Appointed Principal of the Oriental College at Lahore, Stein at once grasped the opportunity to equip himself for his great career, alike by study and by field-work in Kashmir and on the North-west Frontier. Those who knew him at that time were impressed not only with his intense absorption in the field he had chosen for his life's work, but by the determination with which he sought from the authorities in India and England the necessary assistance in carrying out the scheme of exploration he set before them. In 1900 his efforts were successful, and he was given the mission of exploring the sand-buried ruins of Khotan in distant Chinese Turkestan. Many years later, the aged British Agent at that city told me that he had purchased manuscripts and other treasures from these areas, which had been deserted owing to the failure of the rivers to reach them with their life-giving water. These finds the Agent had sent to his brother at Leh, whence they had reached the Museum at Calcutta. There Stein had seen them, and had realized their immense importance. This, his first expedition, was conspicuously successful.

In his second expedition of 1906-1908, sanction for which he had gained with the same indefatigable determination, Stein traversed Chinese Turkestan and crossed the dreaded Gobi Desert to the borders of Western China and Tibet. Here he secured results of great historical importance by the discovery of the ancient Chinese fortified wall, which he followed for some 200 miles. He also gained access to, and possession of, a great deposit of ancient manuscripts and art relics. Unfortunately, in the ascent of a mountain in Tibet, which rose to an altitude of 20,000 feet, he suffered from frostbite, and finally the toes of his right foot had to be amputated.

Stein's reputation was now assured, and among the awards which he especially valued was the Founder's Medal of the Royal Geographical Society. Some years later he was honoured by the award of the K.C.I.E.

In 1912 Stein started on the third of his great journeys. After further exploration in Western China he stayed with me at Kashgar, where I

was acting as Consul-General, and, later, I met him on the Pamirs. This journey, the longest he undertook and geographically perhaps the most important, lay through the trans-Oxus provinces which had been surrendered to Russia some years previously by the Amir Abdur Rahman and were little known. From Russian Turkestan Stein entered Persia, and after discovering valuable frescoes in historical Sistan, he finally reached Quetta, thereby accomplishing a journey of some 11,000 miles. His archæological collections, most of which I had despatched for him from Kashgar, filled 182 cases.

A few years later Stein identified the fortress of Aornos in the Swat Valley. This, the site of a famous feat accomplished by Alexander the Great, had deeply interested the late Sir Thomas Holdich and many frontier officers, but at that period the area was strictly "out of bounds." I recollect Stein telling me that this discovery was the one that was nearest to his heart.

Yet it would perhaps be true to say that for him his last important discovery eclipsed even the identification of Aornos. In the seventh century of our era, the famous Chinese traveller Hsuan-tsang, in the classic record of his long journey, described his adventurous march down the gorges of the Indus. To quote his description: "The roads were very dangerous and the valleys gloomy. Sometimes one had to cross on rope bridges, sometimes clinging to chains." It might well have been thought that an explorer approaching eighty years of age, with the toes of one foot lacking, would have hesitated to travel by "the Route of Chains." But, indomitable as ever, Stein was determined to follow in the footsteps of one whom he was wont to describe as his "Chinese Patron Saint," and his successful accomplishment of this feat was, as might well be imagined, intensely gratifying to him.

As one who has learned much from him personally and from his invaluable publications, and who has travelled widely in some of the countries he explored, it is my definite opinion that Stein undoubtedly ranks among the greatest explorers of all time. He brought to his task not only a unique equipment of historical and archæological knowledge, but a systematic and scientific method of approach, which enabled him to overcome the physical obstacles of travel, and gave a unique value to his record of the results. But this is not all. With unflinching resolution he combined also a tact which greatly smoothed his path in dealing with Oriental authorities, and a simplicity of character which will leave an enduring memory in the hearts of his many friends. But, in their regret for his loss, they have at least the solace of reflecting that his end was one which he might well have chosen for himself. They know of his lifelong desire to be permitted to carry out exploration in Afghanistan—a desire which had more than once been frustrated when it seemed that he was about to achieve it. When at last the chance presented itself he set out immediately for Kabul. Death there cut short his project, but as he himself said in a parting message to a friend, he "had had a wonderful life and it could not have been more happily concluded than in Afghanistan." FINIS CORONAT OPUS.

An appreciation by Major-General L. C. Dunsterville, C.B. :

In the death of Sir Aurel Stein the Royal Central Asian Society and other learned bodies deplore the loss of a most distinguished explorer and archæologist, while the small circle of his intimate acquaintances mourns as well the loss of a very dear and devoted friend. I am honoured by being given this opportunity of paying my tribute to his personal character. My friendship with him dates back for fifty-four years, beginning at the period when he was the Registrar of the Punjab University in Lahore (1888-1899) and when I was a Lieutenant in the Indian Army stationed in the neighbouring cantonment of Mian Mir. I was at that time twenty-four years of age and he was twenty-seven—and the friendship formed in those early years endured without a break up to the day of his death.

He was quite single-minded in his devotion to his chosen profession of archæology and exploration, yet all who knew him realized his remarkable capacity for minor activities on the social side of life, and he possessed a charm of manner that endeared him to those of us who knew him intimately. It was doubtless this same charm that made possible his arduous journeys which were often undertaken among rather hostile peoples.

The end must have come quite suddenly, as the last letter I received from him was dated September 23, and in it he spoke in his usual happy way of his continuous travels and his plans for the immediate future.

Here is an extract from the letter : " I have moved about a good deal, first in the same desert of Bahawalpur again, and then, until March, in those hills of Las Bela and Makran where I traced Alexander's track again."

He then goes on to speak of a proposed visit to Kabul. That shows, indeed, a really marvellous spirit on the part of a man over eighty years of age.

The Royal Central Asian Society was always hoping to see him back in its midst, and he had more or less formed the intention of returning to London a year ago, but he could not tear himself away from his work. And now comes the last farewell : Goodbye, most loyal and trusty friend. In the few years that may be allotted to me on this earth your memory will be always hallowed.

# PERSIA

By ANN K. S. LAMBTON

Lecture given before a joint meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society and the Iran Society on September 8, 1943, Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., in the Chair.

MR. CHAIRMAN, YOUR EXCELLENCY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—It was with some hesitation that I accepted the invitation of the Royal Central Asian Society to lecture this evening, because it seemed to me that there was little that I could say which would be of interest to such a gathering. The reasons for my hesitation were twofold. If I was to approach my subject from the standpoint of an orientalist, it seemed to me that it would be presumptuous for one who is yet but on the threshold of oriental studies to address such an audience, and such tentative suggestions as I might make could only be put forward with the greatest diffidence. If, on the other hand, I was to describe the modern situation in Persia, it was again clear to me that there were many who had a far wider experience of Persia than I, and a deeper understanding of the problems which confront her. In the circumstances I hope that my listeners will regard with indulgence much that must appear superficial to them in this paper. In it I propose to consider certain aspects of the situation in Persia to-day and their background.

Professor Browne, in vol. iv. of the *Literary History of Persia*, has described the importance in the history of Persia of the rise of the Safawī dynasty at the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Christian era. He writes of this event that "it marks not only the restoration of the Persian empire and the re-creation of the Persian nationality after an eclipse of more than eight centuries and a half, but the entrance of Persia into the comity of nations and the genesis of political relations which still to a considerable extent hold good."\* It is not the place here to discuss whether the foundation of the Safawī empire, as Browne states, was really in fact a restoration of the Persian empire and a re-creation of Persian nationality. That the foundation of the Safawī empire marks a break with the past seems, however, obvious. It is also clear that, by the emergence of Persia as a national state in the Western sense of the word at the beginning of the sixteenth century, political developments in Persia had begun to some extent to coincide independently, at this relatively early date, with tendencies prevailing in the Western world. Up to this time Persia had formed part of a Great Society which included a larger area than that contained within the frontiers of modern Persia. Within this area, first under the Achæmenids, and then again, after the termination of the Hellenic intrusion upon the Syriac world, to use the terminology of Professor Toynbee, during the Umayyad and 'Abbasid caliphates, there had been an interplay of cultures which stimulated the peoples of this area

\* *Literary History of Persia*, iv., 1.

to achieve a high level of cultural, spiritual, and even material, attainment. The political unification of this area in Umayyad and 'Abbasid times was ephemeral, but its results on the social plane were more permanent. There was, as Professor Toynbee points out, from the eighth to the thirteenth century A.D. a "unison of movement of life from Andalusia to Transoxania, which declared itself in an active and rapid circulation of ideas and emotions and persons and commodities."\* The stimulus of this political association and the social unification which it involved seems to have been particularly fruitful among the Persian people, who played a prominent part in the life of this society. Their share in the life of the 'Abbasid caliphate and the renaissance of *belles-lettres* in Persia in the tenth century A.D. is too well known to require emphasis. I would merely recall that this development took place when Persia was part of the Islamic world and before she had become a national state in the Western sense of the word. After the disintegration of the 'Abbasid empire and its separation into two main societies, which Professor Toynbee has called the Arabic and the Iranic, Persia still showed little tendency to become an isolated national entity, and continued to form part of this larger society which stretched from Transoxania, through Khurāsān and Āzarbaijān, to Anatolia. It was not until the political and social vacuum in Western Persia, created by Tīmūr's imperialism, was filled by the Safawīs, and until a collision followed between the Osmanlīs and the Safawīs in the sixteenth century, that Persia emerged as a national state. The consequences of this collision between the Osmanlīs and the Safawīs were momentous and have been summed up by Professor Toynbee in an annex to vol. i. of *A Study of History*.† In the first place, the Iranic world was broken up into three separate fractions—one consisting of Transoxania and the Iranic "colonial" domain in India, the second consisting of Iran proper, and the third of the other Iranic "colonial" domains which had been created by the Turkish conquests of Orthodox Christendom. Secondly, the relations between the Sunna and the Shi'a were changed out of recognition, and the two sects, which had formerly lived cheek by jowl, geographically intermingled with one another, were now segregated geographically. "This schism of the Iranic Society on the moral and religious as well as the political plane severed all the threads that had previously knit the Iranic social fabric together; and this 'sawing asunder' took the life out of the Iranic Civilization and stopped its progress dead."‡ As Professor Toynbee points out, the empire established by Shāh Ismā'il fell short of its founder's ambitions and intentions, and I would suggest that it was perhaps this failure to establish a world-wide Shi'i empire that led the Safawī Government to isolate their subjects materially and spiritually from contagion with the neighbouring Sunnī countries, and thus brought about the emergence of Persia as a national state. Shi'ism became the national religion, and this national religion became "the matrix of a secular and political national consciousness."§ That Persia, when she emerged as a national state, should thus virtually turn her back on her past would seem to indicate some degree of disintegration of the Persian social

\* *A Study of History*, v., 240-1.

† *Ibid.*, p. 392.

‡ Pp. 388 *et seq.*

§ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

heritage. From now on Persia was to be deprived in large measure of the stimulus of close association with other peoples which had proved so fruitful to her in the past. Such a change in the basis of Persian life could not be carried through to a successful conclusion without a mental revolution. Persia had virtually contracted out of the main current of Islamic society. Was she to remain an isolated national unit, or was she to seek further stimulus in absorption in some other Great Society? But Persia was not situated in some remote backwater: the former alternative was thus hardly a practical one; and as Western Society pushed out its tentacles further and further it became apparent that Persia was destined to join this Great Society as a national state sooner or later. As the impact of the West increased, so the need for a mental revolution on the political and the social plane became more and more pressing. I would suggest that it is one of the problems of modern Persia to pursue this mental revolution to its conclusion.

The impact of the West upon Persia, which became increasingly important from the sixteenth century A.D. onwards, made itself felt in two main ways. First, on the political plane the Government perceived in the acquisition of Western technique a means of defeating its rivals, and in alliance with Western countries a means of reinforcement against the power of its neighbours; secondly, the intellectuals saw in the absorption of Western technique and theory the promise of progress and reform and increased amenities of life. In Safawī times contact with the West was mainly of the first kind. Shāh 'Abbās, for example, was aided in the reconstruction of his army by the Sherley brothers, who had brought with them to the Persian court at least one cannon-founder. Up to this time the Persian army had been handicapped in its wars against the Turks by an absence of artillery. With the help of the Sherley brothers this deficiency was remedied. Purchas's *Pilgrims* describes the consequence in the following words: "The mighty Ottoman, terror of the Christian world, quatheth of a Sherley fever and gives hopes of approaching fates. The prevailing Persian hath learned Sherleian arts of war; and he who before knew not the use of ordnance hath now five hundred pieces of brass and 60,000 musqueteers, and so that they, who at hand with the sword were before dreadful to the Turks, now also, in remoter blows and sulphurean arts, are grown terrible."\* From the Safawī period onwards contact with the West increased. The Safawī courts were visited by many travellers, merchants, and soldiers of fortune. In the seventeenth century the Persian Gulf became the scene of Anglo-Portuguese rivalry, and subsequently of Anglo-Dutch rivalry, until the eighteenth century, when Dutch influence disappeared from the Persian Gulf. The growing power of Russia under Peter the Great in the eighteenth century constituted a new danger to Persia, and the early part of that century saw a triangular struggle between Russia, Turkey and Persia, the final break-up of the Safawī empire, and the loss of territory by Persia both to Russia and to Turkey. These events impressed upon the Persian Government the advantages of the adoption of Western military technique, and taught them that temporary benefits might be obtained

\* See Browne: *Literary History of Persia*, iv., 105.

from alliances with European Powers. During the nineteenth century the interest of European Powers in Persia on the political plane became an important factor in the situation. The interplay of the policies of Russia, Great Britain, France, Turkey and Afghanistan, and the rivalries between Great Britain and France, Russia and Turkey, and finally Russia and Great Britain, form a complicated pattern which I shall not attempt to describe in this paper. It was especially the treaties of Gulistān and Turkomānchāi which brought home to the Persian Government the imperative necessity of the adoption of Western military technique to strengthen itself against the attacks of its neighbours and to enable it to avoid exploitation by Western Powers. By the terms of these treaties, concluded in 1826 and 1828 respectively, after disastrous wars, Persia lost to Russia all her territory west of the Aras River and accorded extra-territorial privileges to Russia.

It was, however, not only political necessity which was providing a stimulus to Westernization. Contact with the West was at the same time resulting in an awakening of the intellectuals. Thus, on the one hand, there stood the state, which had been taught by political events the desirability of the adoption of Western technique, and, on the other hand, the intellectuals, who had been impressed by the freedom of thought and the greater possibilities for development and material progress prevailing in the West. This awakening of desire for material progress among the intellectuals was accompanied, broadly speaking, by a tendency to transfer their interest from the religious plane, where it had been mainly centred in the early centuries and in the middle ages of the Islamic period, to the secular plane. The movement for Westernization among the intellectuals gradually increased in strength. Its growth was facilitated by the establishment of the Persian Press. The first Persian newspaper appeared in Tabrīz about 1816. In the period 1906-11, immediately after the grant of the Constitution, there was an enormous expansion of the Press. It is perhaps worth mentioning in passing that this growth in journalism during the early Constitutional period is paralleled by a similar expansion after the abdication of Rizā Shāh in 1941. The movement for Westernization was aided also by the founding in 1851 of the Dār ul-Funūn in Tih-rān, in which European sciences were taught. The cumulative result of these events was a stirring of the middle classes against the privileged landowning class, which was to result eventually in their enfranchisement and identification with the ruling classes.

During the period leading up to the grant of the Constitution in 1906 and the years immediately following\* it seems that, on the one hand, the Government failed to grasp the importance and the inevitability of the stirrings of progress among the intellectuals, while, on the other hand, the intellectuals failed to understand the full implications of the Westernization which they desired. The Government appears to have considered the progressive elements to be merely rather tiresome revolutionaries, and, when they were eventually forced to make concessions to them, they seem to have supposed that they could satisfy them with changes which were mainly nominal. Here again it is perhaps interesting to

\* For a full account of these events see Browne: *Persian Revolution 1905-1909*.

mention in passing a parallel in the developments after the abdication of Rizā Shāh, when the Government made merely nominal concessions to the popular demand for democratic government. The intellectuals, on the other hand, seem to have assumed that Western progress could be achieved merely by a change in the form of government. The material and intellectual progress of the West, which had awakened their interest and captivated them, seemed at this time to be at its height in those countries which had democratic Governments. Hence the intellectuals seem to have assumed that with a change from autocratic government to democracy they would automatically obtain the material benefits of Western progress, forgetting that both the democratic Governments of the West and the material and intellectual progress achieved under their ægis were the result of many long years of experiment and the fruit of a process of trial and error. Thus when Muzaffar ud-Dīn was at last forced to grant the Constitution in 1906 it was assumed that progress would automatically follow. When the millennium did not ensue there was naturally considerable disillusionment. Here again I would draw in passing a parallel with the disillusion which occurred when the millennium did not follow the resumption of so-called democratic government after the abdication of Rizā Shāh. It is possible, of course, that, had Persia been vouchsafed after 1906 a period of peace and quiet, she might have made the adaptations necessary for the successful working of democratic and constitutional government. Such peace, however, was not to be vouchsafed to her. Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia continued to exert a disturbing influence on Persian political life, and militated against stability in the affairs of government. Russian Tzarist policy, moreover, from 1907 onwards, appears to have attempted deliberately to weaken the central Government. This inevitably created a split in internal Persian politics between those who looked to Russia and those who looked to Great Britain. Further, when the Great War broke out, Persia became the cockpit of three rival armies and the field of endless intrigues. It is not surprising that in these circumstances the relatively newly established constitutional and democratic régime failed to work effectively and the newly won political freedom degenerated into licence.

Out of the chaos, which continued in Persia in the years immediately following the Great War, the figure of Rizā Shāh was thrown up. In 1923, when he became Prime Minister as well as Minister of War, which office he had held since 1921, Rizā Shāh became the virtual ruler of Persia, though it was not until December, 1925, that the Crown of Persia was formally conferred upon him. There was little real or organized opposition to his rise to power. The intellectuals had been disillusioned by the failure of their experiment in democracy, and the people were tired of insecurity and disorder. His energy offered the promise of a restoration of order, and this was undoubtedly welcomed by the broad mass of the people. In the circumstances in which Rizā Khān, as he was then known, rose to power there was, perhaps, no alternative to a military dictatorship in some form or other. Rizā Shāh, however, unlike the later Qājārs, who failed to understand the need for concessions, except in name, to the progressive elements, realized that he could only maintain himself



in power if he conformed with the desire of the intellectuals for Westernization. In spite of the disillusionment of this class with democratic government, which they had come to regard as synonymous with licence, their desire for material progress was still strong. Consequently, Rizā Shāh, although he had in fact established a dictatorship, intentionally preserved the outward forms of constitutional government and embarked upon a programme of Westernization and modernization. It is, moreover, true that much progress in this field was made during his reign. Communications were improved; a railway from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf was built; industrial development was begun and factories were set up; legal reform was carried out; the Capitulations were abolished; education was reformed and students were sent to Europe; women were unveiled; and the armed forces were expanded on the model of Western armies. It is also true that these developments in some cases were undertaken without any consideration of the economic needs of the country, and that their foundation was not always truly laid. This, however, is, for our present purpose, beside the point. What I wish to bring out is that this movement for Westernization and modernization answered, or seemed to answer, the desire and need of the intellectuals. By thus conforming to the temper of a potentially influential section of the population of the country Rizā Shāh was able to persuade the people to furnish him with such force as was necessary to impose his will. Realizing that he could control the mass only by acting through the minds of the people, he used the force with which he had persuaded the people to furnish him to create instruments to reach and influence the public mind, and in this his efforts were accompanied by a considerable measure of success. As time went on, however, the dictatorship became more and more severe and more and more cramping to the freedom of the individual. On the one hand, the citizen was finally deprived of all opportunity for effective and creative social action, while, on the other hand, the force which the dictator had acquired was used more and more to indulge his own lust for power and material possessions. It was unfortunate for Persia that by the 1920's when Rizā Shāh rose to power the better had not learned to control the worse, and thus it was that Rizā Shāh, by acting through the worse, was able to maintain himself in power. It was unfortunate, too, that the political judgment of the people had had by this time little opportunity to develop through experience; its defects were inevitably reflected in the dictatorship. External circumstances, no doubt, also contributed both to the rise of Rizā Shāh and to his success in maintaining himself in power. Anglo-Soviet relations and rivalry facilitated his rise, and the ill-founded and unfortunate, but widespread, belief that Rizā Shāh was the puppet of the British Government, who would therefore oppose any attempt to overthrow him or to limit his power, was an effective factor in the maintenance of his position. Nevertheless, the fundamental cause both of his rise to power and his ability to maintain himself in power must be sought in the internal condition of the country prevailing at that time, in the political incapacity and incompetence of the people, and the internecine struggles, which prevented effective co-operation for the common end of resisting brutal oppression. I would suggest, moreover, that Rizā Shāh

was the price Persia had to pay for undue delay in making the political and social adjustments which were implied by her incorporation as a national state into Western Society. In the early twenties Persia was ripe for some individual to seize despotic political power and "to accomplish by the same rough-and-ready method those social changes which had to be made somehow, but which the contending classes and parties were failing to accomplish by voluntary agreement."

As I have endeavoured to point out, Rīzā Shāh hastened the progress of Westernization. He brought about, also, some degree of union, but the superficial nature of this union became apparent as soon as his régime began to totter. I would suggest again that the accomplishment of changes by force during the reign of Rīzā Shāh had brought with it an inevitable penalty, which is seen in the virtual collapse of the structure he had created as soon as his hand was removed. Persia was left once more in a state bordering on the chaotic. In spite of the apparent progress achieved during the reign of Rīzā Shāh, and although Persia became more conscious of her new rôle as a national state belonging to Western Society, she had not yet found a sound basis for her new life, nor had she achieved a synthesis between the bases of Western Society and Persian tradition. The house had been swept of much of the past that remained, but nothing solid had been put in its place. Rīzā Shāh had failed to create a situation in which the unimpaired faculties of the people could find scope in effective and creative social action. They had been denied all share in political and social activities. No outlet had been left for the ambitions and capacities of the individual citizens. As a result the more sensitive natures had become even more quietist, while the less sensitive had occupied themselves with, and finally become engrossed in, the sordid pursuit of making money. The inevitable consequence had been a degradation on the moral plane. When Rīzā Shāh went, and with him the hollow régime which he had built up, there remained a spiritual vacuum.

It would be unfair, however, to attribute to Rīzā Shāh full responsibility for this vacuum. As I have tried to indicate, the contact between Persia and the West had already, before the reign of Rīzā Shāh, produced a social ferment and, to some extent, a spiritual torment, none the less real because it was not superficially apparent. Failure to resolve this torment had resulted both in the rise of Rīzā Shāh and in the spiritual vacuum left by him. The stirrings which had been going on beneath the surface for many years became more articulate towards the end of the reign of Rīzā Shāh, and after his abdication the social travail through which the country was going became fully apparent. Already during the reign of Rīzā Shāh attempts can be seen to escape from a present which, because of the disintegration of the Persian spiritual heritage on the one hand and the impact of the West on the other, had become unbearable. Traces of both archaistic and futuristic tendencies are to be found. Of these two tendencies, futurism is probably the stronger. Professor Toynbee has pointed out that the ethos of futurism is intrinsically totalitarian, and that the abandonment of a traditional style of dress leads on to a general revolution in manners. "Futurism," he writes, "may be

expected to invade the sanctity of religion sooner or later in any society in which this contagious way of life has once asserted itself in the trivial and frivolous spheres of dress and recreation; but in its victorious advance from the outworks of the citadel of the soul a futuristic movement has to traverse the intermediate zones of politics and secular culture.”\* This general sequence was followed in Persia during the reign of Rizā Shāh. When he gave orders for the abandonment of Persia’s traditional style of dress, he was, no doubt, aware of the great changes which would follow from this, and what an important part it would play in his policy of Westernization. The abandonment of the traditional style of dress was, in fact, an outward and visible sign of Persia’s enrolment in the Western world. This led on to other fields. The change in dress, in so far as this concerned headgear, was in itself an attack on religion, though Rizā Shāh did not in the beginning go as far as Mustafa Kemal in this respect. Whereas the round-brimmed hat which Turkish citizens were forced to wear prevented the believer from saying his prayers in the traditional manner, the Pahlavī hat was a compromise between the traditional Persian male headgear and the Western brimmed hat. It was not long, however, before the Pahlavī hat was replaced by ordinary Western headgear. Meanwhile, as part of the campaign of Westernization, the power of the religious classes was being systematically broken. Finally, in 1936 one of the most important and far-reaching steps in the Westernization of Persia was taken—namely, the unveiling of women. In the field of institutions similar traces are to be found. The division of Persia for administrative purposes towards the end of the reign of Rizā Shāh into *ustāns* instead of provinces known by their traditional names was, no doubt, a device to efface “the memory of the historic provinces with their persistent traditions of diversity and autonomy,”† and a means to increase throughout the country the unity and the uniformity which it was the aim of Rizā Shāh to produce. In a country which had become strongly nationalist, as had Persia under Rizā Shāh, it was only to be expected that the cultural debt of Persia to the society of which she had formerly formed part would be resented. There was under Rizā Shāh a tendency, which had not, perhaps, gone as far as Rizā Shāh would have wished by the time of his abdication, “to transpose her culture into a shape that could be certified as national.”‡ In this field Persia hovered between the Scylla of archaism and the Charybdis of futurism. In language there was an attempt to “purify” Persian of Arabic words and to revive Old or Middle Persian words and to form new words on the analogy of Old and Middle Persian. To accomplish this an academy was set up and a considerable number of words were put into circulation. It is perhaps interesting to mention in passing that since the abdication of Rizā Shāh the creation of new words has virtually ceased, and the academy is devoting itself largely to the promoting of cultural relations between Persia and foreign

\* *A Study of History*, vi., 106-7.

† *Cf.* the action of the makers of the French Revolution (see Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vi., 108).

‡ *Cf.* Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vi., 63, for a discussion of this tendency in states which have gone nationalist.

countries. The motive for the "purification" of the Persian language would seem to have been primarily a desire to efface the memory of the Arab domination of Persia rather than a consideration that the classical Persian literature, which is part of the Persian cultural heritage from the Islamic civilization of which she formed part, was no longer worth preserving, and consequently a desire to place this beyond the reach of the rising generation. If this had been the case, there would have been a strong movement to abandon the Arabic script. Here again Rizā Shāh did not go as far as Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, where, to quote Professor Toynbee, the change from the Arabic to the Latin script had placed "the classics of Arabic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish literature effectively beyond the reach of a rising generation of Turkish boys and girls, who might otherwise perhaps have been beguiled by the taste of these forbidden fruits into rebelling against the destiny of Westernization to which they had been devoted by their dictator."\* A common way of marking a breach with the past is to inaugurate a "new era."† Persia under Rizā Shāh did not take such a drastic step. The gradual abandonment of the use of the Arabic lunar year alongside the old solar year is, however, an indication of a tendency to make such a break. It is an indication also of the success of the attack on religion. In the field of architecture, while a strong tendency can be seen to repudiate the local traditional technique and to adopt Western technique, there was, at the same time, a tendency to archaism. In buildings such as the National Bank in Tihirān and the building in which the Police Administration is housed in Tihirān there is clearly a conscious attempt to throw back to an Achæmænian style. These, I submit, are some of the external signs of the spiritual travail through which Persia was going in her attempt to find some new background to her life. Her spiritual and her social heritage were no longer satisfying, and the mere imitation of Western forms of government and technique had failed to provide an adequate substitute.

To sum up, the result of this rapid speeding up of the process of Westernization by Rizā Shāh, coupled with the ever more severe restrictions placed upon the liberty of the individual, was to produce a sense of frustration and of "drift" among the educated classes. Their technical skill had been improved out of all recognition, yet their control over their environment and their faith in themselves were decreasing. There was little or no opportunity for the individual to devote his or her skill to the good of the community or to play an effective part in reconstructing the life of the country. The result of this loss of faith was defeatism, and it was only the strongest who could escape the moral degradation which accompanied the closing of all avenues leading to creative work.

Let us now turn to the present situation in Persia. Many and great are the difficulties which face the Persian Government and people in their search for a solution to their problems. Some, as I have attempted to show, are a legacy of the past. Others are caused or aggravated by the dislocation of the national economy due to the war. In so far as internal problems are concerned, I think it would be true to say that the funda-

\* *Ibid.*, vi., 112.

† *Cf. ibid.*, vi., 399, for a general discussion of this tendency.

mental Persian problem is a re-creation of faith, though it is not by any means the only problem with which she is faced. To a people who have suffered repeatedly from invasion and gone through many vicissitudes there is a natural tendency to regard the history of mankind, to use the words of the poet Abū'l 'Alā al-Ma'arrī, as "a poem in which the words change but the rhythm always recurs." This tendency is apt to express itself in defeatism. I have already mentioned the sense of "drift" which tended to possess the educated classes towards the end of Rizā Shāh's reign. His abdication was followed by a great surge of hope on the part of the educated classes that freedom and justice would automatically succeed the suppression and injustice of the past. When there were no signs that this hope was about to be fulfilled, their sense of "drift" deepened. The removal of the strong but oppressive hand of Rizā Shāh resulted, not in a revival of justice, but in political anarchy and the re-emergence of the old problems, which had been driven underground, but not solved, during the reign of Rizā Shāh. It is not surprising that political anarchy should have followed the abdication. For some fifteen years or more the Persian people had been deprived by espionage of the right to exchange ideas, to speak or to listen freely. As a result they were ill-equipped to solve the problem which faced them. This problem was no less than a reintegration of their social life and the taking of moral and political decisions concerning the future social status and function of the individual and the nature of legitimate power in Persian society. During the past two years I think it would not be untrue to say that the Persian people as a whole have ignored this problem, while the governing classes, in refusing to appeal to standards more stable than momentary exigencies, have refused to make a decision. It is clear, moreover, that this failure to make a decision is a stumbling-block to the reconstruction of the country.

On the political plane one of the most difficult problems facing Persia is a definition of the relations of the civil and military powers, a problem which has faced many other countries. This question can obviously not be settled satisfactorily until a decision has been made as to what is the nature of legitimate power in Persia. In form the Persian Government is constitutional and representative. Under Rizā Shāh, however, the military classes enjoyed, or had arrogated to themselves, special privileges. After the abdication certain sections of the army showed little disposition to give up their privileges. The absence of experience among the people in the working of representative institutions, coupled with the absence of any organizations for self-help among the people, had created a vacuum in politics into which the army tended to be drawn. The resulting struggle for power and the failure of the civil authorities to bring the army under their control, and to eliminate the influence of the army as an element in political life, inevitably makes for instability in the position of the Government.

It should not be forgotten that the solution of all problems on the political plane is inevitably affected by the presence in Persia of Allied troops, which cannot but limit the freedom of action and experiment of the Persian people and Government. In so far as Great Britain is concerned, British policy towards Persia is guided, as it has been guided

throughout the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth century down to the present day, by a desire that Persia should maintain and strengthen her independence and prosperity. This policy has, perhaps inevitably, been the subject of much misunderstanding, both in the past and in the present. When the exigencies of this war made necessary the presence of British armed forces in Persia, resentment was unavoidable, and when hunger and internal disorder coincided with this it is not surprising that the Persians should have failed to understand our difficulties and to have doubted our sympathy. It is to be hoped, however, that the statesmanship of both parties will succeed in dispelling such hostility as may exist, and in removing any cause for friction, and that the basis of post-war collaboration and friendship between Persia on the one hand, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on the other, may be laid during these difficult years.

For the war period and for six months after the armistice between the Allies and the Axis, relations between Persia on the one hand and Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. on the other are defined on broad general lines in the Tripartite Treaty. Numerous problems, however, which cannot be covered in a document dealing in broad general principles naturally arise in connection with the presence and activities of the Allies in Persia. It is especially on the administrative plane that the immediate problems facing the Persian Government are closely affected by the Allied occupation of the country. Among the problems awaiting solution is the problem of financial reform. The origins of this problem are to be found in the internal situation of Persia, but there is little doubt that its present urgency is due largely to the war and the presence and activities of the Allies in Persia. Inflationary tendencies had begun before the end of the reign of Rizā Shāh, although the fact that complete figures were not published disguised this tendency from the general public. Large Allied expenditure in the country since 1941, involving an increase in the note circulation, seriously increased this tendency. This considerable increase in the note circulation, coupled with the inability of the Government to impose an effective control over speculation and the distribution of supplies and the virtual stagnation of trade, has resulted in a disproportionately high rise in the cost of living. It is true that as a result of Allied activities in the country large numbers of people have obtained work, but the benefit of this has not offset the general dislocation of the economic life of the country. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the increase in the circulation of money and purchasing power has not been accompanied by an increase in the supply of goods. In such circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Persian people in general do not regard either Allied activities in the country or the piling up abroad in favour of the Persian Government of sterling and dollar credits, which are in effect blocked at the present time, as an unqualified blessing. Certain measures are being taken to put the finances of the country in order and to arrest the rise in the cost of living. Special powers have been given to the Administrator-General of the Finances, Dr. Millspaugh, including powers to control prices and rents, to commandeer stocks and to create Government monopolies of essential goods. An income-tax Bill increasing the

incidence of taxation upon higher income groups, while offering some measure of relief to the lower income groups, and making a distinction between earned and unearned income, has been presented to the National Assembly. The problem of balancing the Budget is nevertheless a difficult one, even if the strictest economy is exercised in Government expenditure. Revenue is not coming in as in peace-time. In large areas of the country difficulty has been experienced in the collection of taxes, and the Customs administration, as a direct consequence of the Allied invasion in 1941 and the presence of the Allies in the country since that date, has virtually broken down. Obviously, taxes can only be collected throughout the country if the authority of the central Government is undisputed.

Thus the financial problem is largely dependent on the restoration of security throughout the country. Clearly, the authority of the central Government could not but be weakened by the invasion of the country by the military forces of two foreign Powers, and even though the position was subsequently regularized in January, 1942, by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty between Persia on the one hand and Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. on the other hand, the presence of Russian and British and later of American troops, in certain areas of the country inevitably implies a limitation of the powers of the central Government. Rizā Shāh succeeded in establishing security throughout the country by means of a ruthless use of force. Immediately his hand was removed the problem of security re-emerged. From September, 1941, onwards in the outlying tribal areas the tribal leaders attempted, with varying degrees of success, to throw off the control of the central Government. The Governments coming into power after that date seem to have failed to realize the seriousness of the problem of security, or to have been too pre-occupied with immediate problems in the capital. The consequence was that the situation was allowed to drift. This enabled the tribal leaders to strengthen their position and to consolidate their authority. The immediate cause of the breakdown in security was, no doubt, the entry of the Allies into the country and the confusion caused by this, but the fundamental problem at stake is the problem of how tribal elements are to be incorporated into a Western nationalist state except by a military dictator.

As regards the questions of food and transport, which are to some extent interdependent, the difficulties in both connections are largely the result of the dislocation of Persian economy due to the war. The food problem concerns chiefly the distribution of adequate supplies of bread at reasonable prices throughout the country. The normal flow of foodstuffs within the country since 1941 has been gravely interfered with, and this, coupled with the absence of reserves in the country at the time of the entry of the Allies, failure to collect in all districts the harvest of 1941 or to make adequate sowings for the harvest of 1942 owing to the uncertainty prevailing at that time, smuggling into some of the periphery countries, where higher prices obtained, and hoarding, has caused local shortages during the last two years which have at times attained serious proportions. These shortages, whatever their cause, were only partially offset by the import of grain into the country by the Allies. In so far as transport is

concerned, article 3 of the Tripartite Treaty gives the Allies the unrestricted right to use all means of communication throughout Persia. This country is now one of the main Allied supply routes to Russia. Considerable road and railway development has been carried out by the Allies to facilitate the sending of supplies. It should not be forgotten, however, that these developments have been carried out in accordance with Allied needs, and hence it is not by any means clear whether such a greatly expanded road and railway system will be an asset to Persia after the war. If the expansion should prove to be either beyond the post-war needs of Persia or not in accordance with her post-war needs, it seems likely that the upkeep of this system will prove a social incubus rather than a social asset. Some of my listeners will no doubt recall the case of the roads built by the British authorities in the Ionian Islands during the British protectorate of 1815-64, which were partly abandoned or which at least considerably deteriorated after the incorporation of these islands into the Kingdom of Greece. The same fate overtook the roads that were built by the Allied armies in Greek Macedonia in 1916-18 and by the British force in East Persia from Mashhad to the British Indian railhead in Baluchistan during the same years.\* I do not think that this will be the fate of the development of communications by the Allies in Persia during this war, but I would suggest that, before any estimate of the benefit to Persia of these developments is made, they should be considered in relation to the post-war needs of Persia and not in relation to the war needs of the Allies. At the present time the railway is devoted almost entirely to the carrying of supplies for Russia. When this was coupled with what was, in effect, the pre-emptive hire of lorries for the same purpose, and a shortage of tyres and spare parts, it will readily be appreciated that internal transport was severely dislocated if not actually paralysed. A major crisis in transport in fact arose during 1942 and the early part of 1943. The situation has, however, been greatly relieved in recent months by the import of Lease-Lend lorries and the handing over of numbers of these to the Persian Government.

Questions of time prevent me discussing any further problems, but from this brief survey of some of the main aspects of the present situation in Persia and its background it will be seen that the problem before the Persian people is not an easy one. On the one hand is the imperative necessity of marching with material Western civilization in order to avoid exploitation. On the other hand is the equally imperative need on the political, social and cultural plane of producing a creative and not an imitative society. Soulless imitation of Western society, such as prevailed under Rizā Shāh, could not satisfy the stirrings of the educated classes or still the ferment that was going on under the surface. It may be, however, that the Persian people as a whole will seek some temporary compromise with this problem in the adoption of a secular Western system, which is likely in essence to be totalitarian, or in the resumption of a military dictatorship. There are already indications at the present time of exasperation in some quarters at the apparent ineffectiveness of the administration in certain fields, and perhaps even a hankering for a return

\* See Toynbee, *A Study of History*, iv., 41.



to dictatorship, but it would, I think, nevertheless be true to say that the educated classes in general are seeking a solution to their problems that will not be the unrestrained freedom and licence of the period immediately preceding the rise of Rizā Shāh, nor a dictatorship based on and supported by military power and devoted to the acquisition of material riches for the benefit solely of the dictator, but a government which will combine freedom with progress and an effective administration. How far they will succeed in finding such a solution will depend primarily upon their own efforts, but their success or failure will also depend to some extent upon the attitude of the Allies. As I have attempted to show, the presence of the military forces of the Allies in Persia cannot but affect the situation, but I would suggest, again, in conclusion that the fundamental problem is not one which concerns Persia's relations with external Powers, though obviously without the benevolent co-operation of the Allies she can do little, but is in essence an internal problem. It is only, I would suggest, by the re-creation or reaffirmation by the Persian people of their spiritual and social background, by the acceptance of responsibility, and by facing their difficulties, overwhelming though they may appear to be, that the Persian people can gain confidence in themselves and create an administration which will work for the benefit of the majority, and not for the selfish interests of a small minority. Only in this way can they reintegrate their social life and give purpose to the life of the individual. Without this reintegration all reconstruction is, if not impractical, at least meaningless. Until the individual is given the social status and function which he lacks to-day Persian society is likely to continue to disintegrate. The broad mass of the people will remain in a state of lethargy. Freedom without social meaning will appear to them as nothing but a threat and a burden, and they will flee its responsibilities as they have in the past.

Before the lecture commenced :

The CHAIRMAN said that before the lecture commenced he wished, on behalf of the Royal Central Asian Society and on behalf of the Iran Society, to offer congratulations to His Excellency M. Hajir, who had come over to this country—as the Minister for Communications—to arrange for the training of some Persian craftsmen and engineers who would take over the railway built by the ex-Shah and which had now been improved by the American and British personnel in Persia. It was a very fine piece of work, and he thought that the Persians would have a very good trade in transporting goods to Russia by the shortest route after the war.

He then introduced the lecturer. Miss Lambton was, in a sense, the successor of Gertrude Bell, who had held a great position in the study of Oriental languages. Miss Bell visited Persia and had admirably translated some of the odes of Hafiz. Miss Lambton had studied and been an official in Persia for five years. She had been in close touch with the literature, languages and different dialects of Persia, and therefore her lecture would be, he thought, of first-rate importance.

At the conclusion of the paper, the CHAIRMAN said that they had listened to a unique survey of modern Persia which had never been covered by a book. One of the difficulties in Persia was that there were always the wandering nomads. In his own case in South Persia, the Persian Governor had set up posts of sixteen men all along the main caravan route. He himself had thought that they would be no good. In the spring the women asked their husbands for sugar, calico and other necessities, and to get them the men raided the caravans. About a week later the nomads were attacked by his own forces, who managed to get back all the supplies. Up to that date there had not been a single caravan in sight, but within two weeks the place was swarming with 4,000 to 5,000 mules on the road. In Persia it was necessary to have someone dealing with the problem of the nomads who lived by raiding.

Another point about them was that the nomad chiefs always hated one another. A nomad chief never slept in one tent for more than three or four hours at a time because of the fear of being assassinated by his relations. Clearly, in Persia, it was necessary to take into account that extremely difficult problem.

What was more hopeful was the fact that the motor-car—the Ford—had opened up Persia considerably, and the new railway, which he thought His Excellency would see was well staffed and managed, would carry the products of India to Russia by a much more direct route.

He thought there was a strong feeling among the Persians who were working with the British that the interests of the two countries were common to both, and he hoped that that would have a good effect in the future.

# A REVIEW OF ANGLO-PERSIAN RELATIONS, 1798-1815

BY DR. S. F. SHADMAN

Lecture delivered before the Iran Society on September 23, 1943, at 74, Grosvenor Street, W. 1, Sir Ernest Hotson, K.C.I.E., in the Chair.

**I**N *The Devil's Disciple* George Bernard Shaw makes a rather unkind remark regarding history: Major Swindon, perturbed by the unfavourable turn of events during the War of Independence, asks: "What will history say?" General Burgoyne's answer is: "History, sir, will tell lies as usual." I earnestly hope that the account of the first phase of Anglo-Iranian relations which I am going to read before such a distinguished gathering as this will not entirely justify this remark.

A cursory glance at the map will reveal the importance of Iran's geographical situation. It is not insignificant that for some time, besides the United States of America, Iran was the only country outside Europe in which Great Britain had a diplomatic post, and for a while also the only European representative at the Shah's Court was that of Great Britain.

The Iran of the beginning of the nineteenth century was a country of great poverty, sparsely inhabited and not sufficiently acquainted with modern science and art, and especially ignorant of the new progress of European arms and military discipline. Missionaries, envoys, adventurers and merchants had come to Iran at intervals, and under Shah Abbas the Great the Iranians had fought and with British help defeated a European force, that of the Portuguese. But never before had Iran found herself so much in connection with Europeans as at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Within a short time they had to contend with the overtures, the presents, the bribes, the friendliness and the threats of Europeans. They paid dearly for their ignorance and weakness, and for relying at times almost too sincerely upon foreign support and counsel.

A great mistake of some British envoys and especially Sir John Malcolm was that they believed presents could perform all they desired. Their fury at their failure is the best proof that money was not such an important factor. Had the French been able to fulfil their promises regarding the restitution of the territories lost to the Russians, no presents, however great, would have influenced the Iranians against their French allies.

The honour of my country forbids me from defending the greed and dishonesty of some officials, but I do sincerely believe that, unlike the quality of mercy that "blesseth him that gives and him that takes," bribery is a curse both to the one who takes and the one who gives, and it is most unfair to criticize, as many European authors have done, only those who have been bribed. In fact, the giver is to be reproved as much, if not more.

The Government of Iran was based on the will of the Shah. There was no constitutional law, no Parliament, no Press. The Shah was not, as the Sultan of Turkey, the head of the Church, a fact that gave him more freedom of action. There was a Prime Minister who conducted general affairs and was responsible to no one except the Shah. There was no Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and usually the Prime Minister directed foreign relations.

Iran's foreign policy was not a complicated one. It consisted entirely of preventing the Russian advance and the restitution of the lost provinces. Considering their lack of means, and especially the ever-changing policy of the Europeans with whom they had to deal, the Iranians do not seem to have committed any grave error in the conducting of their foreign affairs.

The British, on the other hand, had their own methods in carrying out their policy with regard to Iran, which, although mainly based on the security of India, passed through various phases from 1798 to 1815.

The various aspects of Anglo-Iranian relations between these two dates are: (1) The incitement of Fath Ali Shah against Zaman, ruler of Afghanistan, whose intention was to invade India. (2) The confirmation of the above policy, and especially to secure Iran's alliance against the French which resulted in the Anglo-Iranian treaty of 1801 concluded by Sir John Malcolm, who wrote that one of the chief aims of his mission was "to counteract the possible attempt of those villainous but active democrats the French." (3) Believing that Iran would not accept French friendship, the British rather ignored her appeal for help against Russia until Napoleon procured the alliance of the Shah, and the treaty of Finkenstein was signed in 1807. (4) Alarmed at the close relations between the Shah and Napoleon, the British both in England and in India adopted an active policy to expel the French from Iran. From 1807 until the beginning of 1809, when General Gardane, Napoleon's envoy, left Teheran, it can be said that the only aim of the British was the expulsion of the French, which was duly carried out. (5) From 1809 the immediate menace to India by Napoleon was not alarming, yet the Emperor of the French was indirectly responsible for Anglo-Iranian relations. This period itself can be divided into two parts—one from 1809 till 1812, in which the British policy was to prolong war between Iran and Russia, as the latter was France's ally, and the other from 1812 till 1815, when the British tried to bring about peace between the two countries because Russia had resumed friendly relations with Great Britain.

Such were the main objects and different phases of the British policy, yet there were other points connected with the chief aims. These consisted of establishing a settlement in the Persian Gulf, maintaining friendly relations between Iran and Turkey, and making Abbas Mirza, the heir-apparent, a party to the definitive Anglo-Iranian treaty.

The methods adopted by the British officials of those days to carry out their foreign policy in Iran cannot be considered flawless. The irregularities which occurred with regard to the form and style of the first Anglo-Iranian treaties of 1801, and, still more important, that bitter strife between Lord Minto, the Governor-General, and Sir Harford Jones, the

representative of the Crown of England in Iran, would have been averted had the British realized from the start that with an independent and proud country such as Iran it would have been better to negotiate through the Foreign Office and not the British Government of India. Moreover, at a vital moment, when circumstances required extra vigilance, there was no British resident envoy in Iran for over eight years. Had one been at the Shah's Court most probably the French would never have succeeded in penetrating so far.

#### MISSION OF MIRZA MEHDI ALI KHAN, 1798-1800

It is indeed curious that in the year 1599 the Shah of Iran selected Sir Anthony Sherley as his ambassador to the various countries of Europe, those of England and Scotland amongst them, whilst in 1799, just two hundred years later, Mehdi Ali Khan, a man of Iranian origin, came to the Court of the Shah as the envoy of the British.

Relations between the Iranians and the British began mainly because of the Afghan menace to India. The idea of inciting the Iranians to attack Zaman's dominions was welcomed as the best means of checking the hostilities of that ambitious monarch, and this idea originated from Mirza Mehdi Ali Khan himself. Mehdi Ali was over-confident in thinking that he could accomplish his mission by merely corresponding with the Iranian Court without going to the capital. But the reports regarding the Afghan menace were so alarming that he received instructions to proceed in person to Teheran.

The plan submitted by Mehdi Ali for action against Zaman consisted of sending the two Afghan princes, then residing in Yazd under the Shah's protection, to Khorasan, where, joined by the Iranian Army, they would attack Herat. He estimated the expenses at two lacs of rupees. But if, as a second possibility, the Shah himself was to take the field against Zaman, the cost would be fifty lacs of rupees. Lord Wellesley had no objection to spending two lacs of rupees, but he thought the plan of subsidizing the whole Iranian Army too expensive for the occasion.

The Khan's activities before he left for the Court met with success. Fath Ali Shah approved the despatch of the Afghan princes to Herat, with a thousand horse, and gave orders to the chiefs of Khorasan to join them. All this occurred prior to Mehdi Ali's departure for Teheran. He stayed about forty days at the Iranian Court and returned to Bushire in May, 1800, where he met Captain Malcolm, who had come as the Governor-General's envoy to Fath Ali Shah. In an interview he explained to the captain that when at Court he discovered that the situation of the Khorasan campaign was such as to force the Shah to renew his attacks against Zaman without any engagements on the part of the East India Company, and he thought it advisable to avoid them. This led him to pretend that the only aim of his mission was to express the sympathy of the British Government of India on the death of the Shah's uncle and predecessor, and their congratulations upon his own accession. But being in charge of a letter from the Governor of Bombay to the Shah, which if delivered would have revealed the true motives of his mission, he chose to substitute for it another in order to produce the desired effect.

Mehdi Ali's mission was of a temporary character, the expenses of which amounted to more than two lacs of rupees. One item was a sum exceeding 7,000 rupees given to a poet for having composed a poem in praise of the King of England, the East India Company, the Governor-General, the Commandèr-in-Chief, and, last but not least, describing Mehdi Ali Khan's own mission.\*

Mehdi Ali did not negotiate any treaty, and the privilege of drawing up treaties between Iran and the British Government of India was left to his successor, Captain Malcolm.

#### FIRST MISSION OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM, 1799-1801

Of Malcolm's three missions to Iran, the first can be considered the most important, if not the most eventful. Lord Wellesley, who was a great ruler and, with the exception of Lord Curzon, said to be the best informed Governor-General, fully realized the importance of strengthening political relations with Iran. Although the danger from Zaman had not entirely ceased, there was a further factor which urged him to act, and that was the French menace, and the commercial part was by no means overlooked.

In August, 1799, Captain John Malcolm, assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad, was chosen by the Governor-General as his envoy to the Shah. The three chief factors of Malcolm's first mission were (1) relieving India from the annual alarm of Zaman's invasion; (2) counteracting the French menace; (3) improving trade relations between the two countries. With a suite of 500 men Malcolm arrived at the port of Bushire in January, 1800. While at Bushire he wrote one of his long letters to the Governor-General, in which, after relating a short history of the Persian Gulf and its trade with the Portuguese, the French, the Dutch and the English, he took the opportunity to explain his cherished idea by expressing most emphatically the necessity for a British settlement in the Gulf. He chose the island of Kishm as a suitable base, and, believing that the Shah would easily grant it to the British authorities, he drew up the plan of military and commercial administration of the settlement, and even mentioned details regarding the personnel, fortifications, salaries and other expenses, proposing that the settlement should be under the control and management of the Government of Bombay. On his way to the capital he was received with extraordinary ceremony at Isfahan. The son and brother of the Governor, accompanied by 10,000 horse and infantry and over 20,000 inhabitants, went eight miles from the city to meet him.

On November 16 Malcolm was presented to the Shah. A few days later he was again received by the Shah, at whose feet he laid the presents he had brought—jewelled watches, enamelled gold caskets, richly inlaid guns, pistols of curious construction, and above all a valuable diamond. Malcolm had now been in Iran for nearly one year without having concluded any treaty, yet this delay was not entirely useless. Events were moving swiftly in Afghanistan, and in fact before the signing of the Anglo-Iranian treaties Malcolm received news of the fall of Kandahar,

\* *Home Series, Miscellaneous* (India Office Archives), vol. 473, pp. 143-145.

and was at liberty to concentrate more freely upon the French problem. His idea was first to start commercial negotiations, leaving political points until he was more acquainted with the high officials at Court.

Malcolm, who thought it advisable to conceal the real aims of his mission, showed indifference with regard to political negotiations and first discussed commercial terms. But the Prime Minister insisted upon forming two treaties, one commercial and the other political, asking the British envoy to prepare their drafts. On December 3 Malcolm presented the documents, but amongst the commercial items there was a certain clause which aroused the suspicions of the Iranian Government. The British envoy had, curiously enough, stated in a commercial treaty that the English should be given the possession of the islands of Kishm, Hangam, and Khark, in the Persian Gulf, with permission to fortify and occupy them. The Shah himself became alarmed and Malcolm changed his plans about the islands, intimating to be sorry to have mentioned them at all. The two treaties were signed on January 28, 1801, and a few hours after receiving the copies of the treaties he left Teheran.

With regard to Malcolm's activities during his first mission various opinions have been recorded. Sir Henry Rawlinson thought that the treaties "were unnecessary in their nature, unsound in their policy and pregnant with evil consequences."\* Malcolm congratulated himself upon having concealed the real aims of his mission by first discussing commercial matters. But the Iranians were not so simple-minded as to believe that the captain with all his retinue and presents had come from India only to improve commercial relations between the two countries. His schemes concerning the islands not only proved to be unsuccessful but aroused deep-rooted suspicions in the mind of the Iranians which could not easily be allayed. In a military age as that of Napoleon it seems that the limited scope of political missions to Iran was scarcely wide enough to satisfy the activities of such an ardent soldier as Malcolm, and that is perhaps the reason why he always wished to add a military touch to his exertions, either by insisting on an establishment in the Persian Gulf or the necessity of an expedition there, when Iran, in the hopes of French help, was reluctant to receive him at Court.

One cannot help admiring this man, whose statue you can see in Westminster Abbey between those of Disraeli and Stratford Canning. Of all the foreign envoys who have visited my country Malcolm is one of the best known and by no means disliked in Iran, yet he had no sympathy whatever with the Iranians, and his despatches are full of abuses not only about some of the people but about the whole nation. He has not a good word for great and honest men such as Abbas Mirza and Mirza Bozorg, whose only aim was to safeguard the honour and integrity of Iran.

#### MISSION OF HAJI KHALIL KHAN, FIRST ENVOY FROM FATH ALI SHAH TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

Already in 1799, while Mehdi Ali Khan was still at Teheran, the Shah raised Haji Khalil, chief merchant of the country, to the rank of Khan

\* *England and Russia in the East*, p. 9.

and appointed him envoy to the Government of India. The Iranian mission in charge of letters and presents was to accompany Mehdi Ali Khan, but owing to the news of Malcolm's appointment the Shah decided to delay the Iranian mission's departure until after the return of the new British mission.

Haji Khalil, with his numerous suite of about a hundred and twenty persons, arrived at Bombay in May, 1802. Nearly two months later and a few days before his intended embarkation for Fort William to meet the Governor-General, Haji Khalil was killed at Bombay in an affray between his Iranian attendants and the guard of honour. In his concern at the Iranian envoy's sudden death the Governor-General directed Malcolm, then his private secretary, to go to Bombay in order to settle this question, and he wrote a very flattering letter to the Shah, promising to do his utmost for the relief of all surviving relatives and attendants of Haji Khalil. This letter to the Shah was to be despatched by Henry Lovett, the newly appointed resident of the Company at Bushire. The letter, which was written in August, 1802, was not, however, delivered until two years later, in July, 1804, and even then not by the person authorized to do so, but by Manesty, the Company's resident at Basra, who assumed an ambassadorial character.

#### SELF-APPOINTED MISSION OF MANESTY, 1803-1804

Manesty's activities in Iran read like a novel, and yet the details of his self-assumed mission are to be found in documents and despatches amongst the India Office archives.

Henry Lovett's ill-health and especially his indecision helped Manesty in his new adventure. Embarrassed by the Iranian officials' insistence about the necessity for his personal attendance, Henry Lovett at last accepted the suggestion made to him by Manesty, of exchanging his office of resident at Bushire with that of Basra, so that Manesty should perform the duty he was unable to carry out. This adventurous and enterprising man, without any permission from his superiors, assumed an ambassadorial character and wrote to the Governor-General that because of Napoleon's menace it would be advisable to have an authorized agent in Iran to procure detailed information, and the person he considered suitable for this post was none other than himself. The high opinion Manesty had of himself can be judged by what he wrote at the end of a letter he sent to Castlereagh: "I flatter myself that Your Lordship will rejoice that the nation has in the present critical moment an accredited agent in Persia, who has already there established a personal influence and reputation."\* Finally, in July, 1804, Manesty arrived at Fath Ali Shah's Court, and at last the Governor-General's letter regarding Haji Khalil's sudden death was delivered to the Shah.

In fact, in the very year in which Manesty was received at the Iranian Court the Shah's forces suffered a serious defeat at the hands of the Russians. Manesty's plan was to arrange matters so as to be able to proceed on a mission to London and eventually to St. Petersburg. In a

\* *Factory Records*, vol. 24. Letter from Manesty to Castlereagh, April 18, 1804.



letter to the Governor-General he wrote how essential it was for him to go to England "in order fully, clearly and effectually to explain to His Majesty's Ministers" the political situation of Iran and the consequences of the Russian operations. After a stay of six days at Court he left on July 8, 1804, charged with letters from the Shah to the King of England and from the Shah's eldest son to the Prince of Wales.

In a letter to the Governor-General he wrote of the cause of his accepting Henry Lovett's proposal. You will allow me to end the account of his mission by quoting a part of his letter: "I found that the British Representative character had at Bushire been reduced to the lowest ebb. My heart wept for my country, it wept for Your Excellency's station, but the drops it shed were the drops of elevated indignation, warming into an energetic determination."\*

#### MISSION OF MOHAMMAD NABI KHAN, SECOND AND LAST ENVOY TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 1803-1807

Mohammad Nabi Khan, who went to India to succeed Haji Khalil Khan, contrary to Manesty, had all his credentials and papers in order, but lacked those essential qualities requisite for a person who is to represent a nation. Mean, intriguing and avaricious, he was not worthy of the important mission entrusted to him. His connection with the British was of long standing and many-sided. His mother's first husband and that of one of his two sisters were both English.

Although originally the aims of Mohammad Nabi's mission were of no great significance, yet while in India he received from the Iranian Court a despatch of the utmost importance. In January, 1807, in answer to a letter he had sent to Teheran, he received a farman from the Shah dated May, 1806, in which, after a description of the latest battle between the Iranian and Russian forces, Fath Ali Shah touched upon another subject of no less import than the arrival at his Court of an embassy from France seeking his alliance, but if the British Government would cooperate with the Iranians against the Russians the French embassy would of course be dismissed. This was the second official appeal to the British authorities for help against Russia, the first being the farman from the Shah sent to Manesty.

#### FRANCO-IRANIAN RELATIONS

It was in the decisive year 1804 that a Russian army of 10,000 men and twenty guns marched on Erivan. They did not succeed in taking that city, but the Iranians suffered a serious defeat. Abbas Mirza made an attempt to treat with the Russian General, who haughtily informed the prince that he had already received instructions to take all the country from Erivan to the Caspian Sea. All this alarmed the Iranians, who in self-defence had no other alternative but to listen to the French overtures. In December, 1804, when Brune, French Ambassador at Constantinople, was on his way to France, an Armenian gave him a letter from the Shah to the French Government. In the beginning of 1805, Napoleon, having

\* *Factory Records*, vol. 24. Letter from Manesty to Wellesley.

received the Shah's letter, ordered Alexandre Romieu and Amédée Jaubert to proceed to the Iranian Court. Meanwhile Napoleon took yet a further step in the execution of his Oriental plans. He gave instructions to General Sebastiani, his Ambassador in Constantinople, to assure the Porte of France's goodwill, and to create an alliance consisting of France, Iran and Turkey against Russia.

The Shah, in need of French help, did not fail to send an envoy to Napoleon, but the person chosen was not a merchant, as in the case of the two Iranian missions to the British Government of India. Mirza Reza, the Shah's Ambassador, was an official of high rank and noble birth. The main object of the Iranian mission was the Franco-Iranian alliance. The negotiations took but a few days, and on May 4, 1807, the treaty of Finkenstein was signed. By this treaty of sixteen articles the Emperor recognized the integrity of the Iranian territory including Georgia. He also engaged to provide munitions for the Shah, and to send officers to discipline the Iranian forces. Then came the most important stipulations.

By Article 8 the Shah was to cease all diplomatic and commercial relations with England, to declare war on her, to recall his envoy from India, to order all British agents in Iran and the Persian Gulf to quit immediately, to seize all British merchandise, and to refuse to receive any representative of that nation. By Article 12 the Shah had, if Napoleon intended to attack India, to grant the French forces passage through his dominions.

It is said that the Emperor had intended to send as his Ambassador to Iran none other than Lucien Bonaparte, the most capable and distinguished of his brothers. Gardane, however, was destined for this post. Even previous to the signature of the Franco-Iranian treaty, an Imperial decree had been issued appointing Major-General Gardane, officer of the Imperial household, as envoy to the Court of the Shah. Indeed, five weeks after the instructions were issued, things took quite a different turn. The battle of Friedland broke the last line of the Russian defence, and Napoleon and Alexander met at Tilsit in June, 1807. The original objects of the French mission were thus reduced to hostilities with England, which Gardane failed to accomplish.

Gardane arrived at Teheran in December, 1807, and the French mission began its activities immediately. Gardane sent Trézel and Dupré to make an accurate plan of the Persian Gulf, and they surveyed Bandar Abbas, Bushire and many other places. On the other hand, French officers did their utmost to instruct the Iranian troops, 4,000 of whom were soon disciplined and a cannon foundry was established at Isfahan. The restitution of the Iranian territory under the Russian military control which Napoleon had engaged to bring about was a most difficult task and never took place. Neglected by the French Court and unable to convince the Russians to evacuate the dominions of the new ally of France, Gardane left Iranian soil in February, 1809, disappointed, and even suffered disgrace by Napoleon.

The British, however, having left the field for a while, began their activities anew, but this time, instead of one, two missions were despatched, one from the Crown and the other from the British Government of India.

It was this procedure that caused the bitter strife between Lord Minto, the Governor-General, and Sir Harford Jones, the representative of the Crown.

#### THE BEGINNING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CROWN OF ENGLAND AND THE COURT OF IRAN

In February, 1807, even before the conclusion of the Franco-Iranian treaty, Sir Harford Jones was selected to represent the King of England at the Court of the Shah. Previous to Sir Harford's proceeding to Iran, Malcolm had been sent on his second mission, this time from Lord Minto to Fath Ali Shah, but as the French influence had not yet entirely vanished the Iranian Government did not allow him to advance to Teheran and referred him to the Prince Governor of the province of Fars.

Harford Jones, the East India Company's resident at Bagdad, tried every means in his power to take Anglo-Iranian affairs into his own hands. Having judged the time ripe for proceeding to England, he went to London, where he had the opportunity to explain in detail his views upon Anglo-Iranian relations. Overjoyed at having obtained a post for which he had worked so hard, he left England in October, 1807. Among his suite was James Morier, the well-known author of *Haji Baba*, who accompanied him as private secretary. His ship anchored in the Bay of Capetown on January 4, 1808, and the mission was detained until January 27 because of repairs to the ship. This delay was of no little consequence. Had Jones been able to leave Capetown sooner he would have reached Bombay prior to Malcolm's hasty departure, and probably all the complications which occurred with regard to the strife between him and Lord Minto would never have taken place. Finally, on April 24, 1808, Sir Harford arrived at Bombay. He was surprised and disappointed at Malcolm's departure from Bombay on his second mission to Iran not more than a week before his own arrival.

#### SECOND MISSION OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM TO IRAN AND ITS FAILURE

To counteract the French activities, Lord Minto sent Malcolm on his second mission to Iran. His retinue, nominally an escort, was in reality nothing short of a small expedition ready for operation. On his way to the Persian Gulf Malcolm arrived at Bombay, which he left hurriedly to avoid meeting his rival, Sir Harford Jones. The declaration which he sent to the Iranian Government was intended to intimidate them. The alarm of the Iranians was all the greater as they had heard of the arrival of no fewer than fourteen English ships in the Persian Gulf, and, although they could not offend the French embassy by allowing the British envoy to come to the Court, orders were issued to the authorities at Shiraz to do all in their power to assure the British of the Shah's regard and esteem for them.

The officer whom Malcolm had directed to go to Teheran with a letter to the Shah was never allowed to proceed on his way to the Court further than Shiraz.

Malcolm's anxiety about his mission gradually increased as he saw

signs of failure, and after two months' stay at Bushire the British envoy left Iranian soil, disappointed at his failure, yet hopeful of returning with a larger force to carry out his ambitious schemes. He explained to the Governor-General in detail the dangerous results of the Franco-Iranian alliance, stating how, owing to French insinuations, the British were considered decadent, weak and friendless, and therefore he thought it necessary for the British to establish themselves upon Khark, one of the islands in the Persian Gulf. Malcolm thought it just and fair to take by force an integral part of Iran, which, left helpless at the mercy of the overwhelming Russian menace, had done nothing but endeavour to procure means of self-defence. He sailed from Bengal to carry out this approved plan and arrived at Bombay, where a very select body of nearly 2,000 men was assembled under his orders, and the whole expedition was entirely ready, but in the meantime an event took place which upset the schemes of both the Governor-General and Malcolm.

#### HASTY DEPARTURE OF SIR HARFORD JONES FOR IRAN AND BEGINNING OF THE STRIFE BETWEEN HIM AND LORD MINTO

Since arrival at Bombay, Sir Harford Jones had awaited his opportunity to proceed to Iran. The Governor-General, whose liberal ideas concerning Iran were altered after Malcolm's arrival at Calcutta, wrote to Sir Harford that as the extreme attachment of the Iranian Court to the French view had compelled General Malcolm to leave Bushire, the departure of the Crown mission should be delayed until further orders. Had Sir Harford Jones remained forty-eight hours longer at Bombay and received this despatch, the history of Anglo-Iranian relations would have taken an entirely different turn, because Malcolm might have carried out his military expedition, seized Khark, and founded a British establishment in the Persian Gulf. Jones, however, was not the man to lose the opportunity when it presented itself. This was his very chance, and now it was his turn to make all haste. He reached Bushire on October 14, 1808, and at once began work and announced his arrival not only to the Prince Governor of Fars but also to the Prime Minister. On November 17 Jones informed his staff of the important news that the Shah had given orders for the reception of the British mission.

The British mission reached Shiraz on December 30, 1808, and everything seemed promising, when on January 4, 1809, Sir Harford received a despatch from Lord Minto ordering him to devise some means to quit Iranian territory even if he had already assumed office. Determined to pursue his mission, Sir Harford wrote to Lord Minto most plainly that "I consider myself as having a trust in charge directly from the throne upon many points of which it was and is my duty to act to the best of my judgment."

#### CONCLUSION OF THE PRELIMINARY TREATY OF 1809 BETWEEN IRAN AND GREAT BRITAIN

During the last months of 1808, and at the beginning of 1809, when the Government of India was actually preparing a military expedition,

and, on the other hand, Sir Harford Jones was advancing towards Teheran, the French influence gradually declined. Indeed, the French Government had treated Iran most indifferently. Napoleon, who once showed such eagerness towards Iranian affairs, now even refrained from answering the Shah's letter. On February 12, 1809, General Gardane had his last audience with the Shah, and, leaving Joseph Jouanin and Andrea de Nerciat at Teheran, departed on February 13, and thus the period of intense French activity in Iran, which lasted nearly three years, came to an end.

Sir Harford Jones was not only fortunate in being permitted to proceed to Teheran, but also in finding that Napoleon's envoy had departed the very day previous to his own entry into the capital. Both Sir Harford Jones and the Iranian Government were anxious to begin negotiations immediately. In fact, the British envoy spent nearly the whole night of February 15 in conference with the Iranian Prime Minister. Next day the project of what was called a preliminary treaty was prepared, and on February 17 the mission was received by the Shah. Jones took the King's letter in his hands and, holding it above his breast, directed James Morier to precede him with the presents. One of them was a large diamond which, although it had cost the East India Company £10,000, the British envoy valued to the Iranians at £25,000.

The chief points of this treaty were: (1) The Shah to declare null and void all treaties he might have made with any European power, and not to enter into any agreements inimical to the King of England or injurious to British territories in India. (2) Not to permit any European army to cross Iran towards India. (3) In case any European army invaded the Iranian territories, His Britannic Majesty to provide the Shah with a force or in its stead with subsidy, ammunition and officers, the number of troops or the amount of the subsidy and ammunition to be regulated in the definitive treaty.

#### ANNULMENT OF SIR HARFORD'S MISSION BY LORD MINTO

Indeed promising was the outlook for Sir Harford Jones, who had finally attained one of his life's ambitions, yet he was totally unaware of the serious humiliation in store for him. Lord Minto, furious at the disregard of his orders, sent a very strongly worded letter to Sir Harford threatening him that if he did not return at once the Iranian Government would be advised that the British envoy's powers had expired and that no engagements contracted by him were valid. Even now Lord Minto's instructions were but partially carried out. Sir Harford Jones announced to the Iranian Government that his mission had been cancelled and that he wished to leave Iran. Until now it was not known in Iran that so serious a strife existed between the Governor-General and the British envoy. Little experienced as they were in European diplomacy, the Iranians must have been puzzled at this sudden change of affairs. The Shah, however, told the British envoy that the declaration concerning his powers could not be accepted, assuring him that he was decided to perform faithfully his part with regard to the treaty, and consequently dis-

miss Jouanin and de Nerciat immediately, and to despatch an envoy to London. Nor were these idle words. The two Frenchmen were sent away on April 29, and Mirza Abol Hassan was nominated envoy to England.

### THIRD MISSION OF SIR JOHN MALCOLM TO IRAN DURING SIR HARFORD JONES'S STAY AT THE IRANIAN COURT

Sir Harford Jones had still to face another humiliation, which was no less than Malcolm's third mission to Iran. One of the most important aims of the mission was to regain that regard of which the Government of India, in Lord Minto's opinion, had been deprived in the eyes of the Iranians. Unnecessary as it was, Malcolm's last mission seems as if Lord Minto, in appointing him, was determined to punish his Sovereign's representative for alleged arrogance.

The mission under General Malcolm was indeed an imposing one, consisting of no fewer than 106 persons, ninety of whom alone formed the escort. On June 23 Malcolm paid his first ceremonial visit to the Shah, and on July 1 he displayed his presents, among which there were ten pieces of cannon, made especially for the Shah, and decorated with his name and arms.

In July, 1810, Sir Harford was informed of his recall and the appointment of Sir Gore Ouseley as Ambassador to the Iranian Court, and he duly communicated the news to Lord Minto's envoy. This was indeed a most significant move on the part of the British Government, which showed General Malcolm that the Crown had intended to deal with the Iranian Government through the Foreign Office and not the British Government of India. On April 22, 1811, Sir Harford Jones left Teheran and thus ended a most interesting diplomatic mission, which, exclusive of the salaries of the envoy and his European personnel, cost £156,000.

This chapter of the Anglo-Iranian relations may be closed with part of a description written by Sir Harford Jones about his final audience with the Shah: "I found Mirza Shafi and Mirza Bozorg in attendance. His Majesty told me, as it was most probable we should never meet again, he had sent for me once more before I left Teheran. The Shah then began to talk to me in such terms both of himself and myself, that I could stand it no longer, and I burst into tears, and Mirza Bozorg fairly sobbed aloud."\*

### MISSION OF MIRZA ABOL HASSAN KHAN TO GREAT BRITAIN, 1809-1811

Abol Hassan was the first envoy from Iran to Great Britain since the beginning of regular diplomatic relations between the two countries. James Morier's description of the birthplace, life and origin of Mirza Firuz, a character of his well-known book *The Adventures of Haji Baba of Isfahan*, leaves no doubt that the author must have had in mind Mirza Abol Hassan; therefore what Morier says concerning Mirza Firuz's character is undoubtedly his opinion about Abol Hassan.

\* *An Account of the Transactions of His Majesty's Mission to the Court of Persia in the Years 1807-11*, p. 386.

As it had been arranged that the Shah's representative should accompany James Morier to London, Mirza Abol Hassan Khan left Teheran in the latter's company on May 7, 1809, and after almost seven months, on December 4, arrived in London, where he resided at 9, Mansfield Street, Portland Place, which may be considered as the first Iranian Legation in London.

Marquess Wellesley, who was Foreign Secretary, appointed Sir Gore Ouseley, who knew Persian very well, to attend upon the Mirza during his mission. Abol Hassan's diplomatic activities seem to have been concerned with four points: (1) In case of peace between England and Russia it should be stipulated that Russia should cease hostilities against Iran, and also make peace with her, restoring Tiflis and other cities seized from the Iranians. (2) The subsidy of 120,000 tomans per annum to be increased to 200,000 tomans. (3) Instructors, officers, artillery men, engineers, naval officers, shipwrights, watchmakers, typefounders, printers and munitions of all kinds to be sent to Iran. (4) That an Ambassador be sent to the Shah's Court, whose powers should be acknowledged by the Government of India.

The answer from the Foreign Office, which was received by Abol Hassan after several months' delay, not only announced the King's intention to send Sir Gore Ouseley as Ambassador Extraordinary with full power to conclude a definitive treaty, but also confirmed that the new envoy would, whilst at Teheran, engage for the annual payment of 200,000 tomans to commence from January 1, 1810.

Concerning the first and most important point—namely, the restitution of the lost Iranian territories and peace between Iran and Russia—the Foreign Office's reply stated only that "His Majesty's Ambassador will be instructed to explain fully to the King of Persia and his ministers the usages and customs of European powers, in peace and war, and in what manner such customs must operate with respect to His Persian Majesty's desire on the subject of Russia."\* Indeed, the British reply regarding this most vital point contained not even a single promise of help, and postponed the matter until the British Ambassador explained to the Iranian Government the usages of European powers in peace or war, which does not imply anything in particular.

During his stay in London Abol Hassan was well received both at Court and in society, and the East India Company in particular paid him special attention. He evidently became famous, as Charles Lamb writes: "The Persian Ambassador is the principal thing talked of now." Miss Eliot, Lord Minto's daughter, wrote to her father: "The new Persian Minister who came home with Mr. Morier is very handsome and extremely admired by the ladies. Some wise man asked him if he adored the sun in Persia; he said, 'No, not in Persia, but he should adore it in England if he happened to see it.'"<sup>†</sup>

After a stay of over seven months in London, Abol Hassan, accompanied by Sir Gore Ouseley, left England on July 18, 1810. In 1818 Abol

\* F.O. 60/4. Letter from the Foreign Office to Abol Hassan, March 6, 1810.

† *Lord Minto in India*, edited by the Countess of Minto, p. 136.

Hassan was again sent as envoy to England. He also became the first actual Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

#### EMBASSY OF SIR GORE OUSELEY TO IRAN, 1810-1814

Sir Gore Ouseley's diplomatic activities in Iran took place when circumstances were entirely different from those under which Sir Harford Jones had to act. He was neither to concern himself with the expulsion of the French, who had already left, nor to contend with the Governor-General, with whom he was on excellent terms.

The main object of his mission was to conclude a definitive treaty at Teheran, the chief points of which were agreed upon during Abol Hassan's stay in London.

The main items of these instructions to Sir Gore Ouseley were: (1) To exchange the ratified preliminary treaty of subsidy and alliance of 1809 and conclude a definitive treaty together with a commercial one. (2) To obtain accurate knowledge about the army, finance, principal productions, trade, wealth, number of population, history, arts and antiquities of Iran. The British Ambassador to be allowed to purchase any Persian or Arabic manuscripts at moderate prices and "to expend a sum of money for that desirable purpose not exceeding £600 per annum." (3) To pay particular attention that the annual sum of 200,000 tomans be economically spent on the maintenance of Iranian troops.

On July 18, 1810, Mirza Abol Hassan Khan and Sir Gore Ouseley with their suites embarked on board H.M.S. *Lion* at Spithead, on their way to the Persian Gulf by route of Brazil and India. They reached Rio de Janeiro on September 13, and the Prince Royal of Portugal received most graciously both the Iranian and British envoys. Abol Hassan seems to have been the first Iranian to land in the New World. The British embassy, after a journey lasting more than seven months, reached Iranian soil in March, 1811. Sir Harford, not desirous of meeting his successor at the Court of Iran, had left Sheridan in charge of British affairs and quitted the country.

The definitive treaty of 1812, concluded by Sir Gore Ouseley, is most significant because it reveals an entirely new phase in Anglo-Iranian relations. It shows that the British were now concerned with a more permanent policy than merely the exclusion of the French from Iran. In Sir Gore Ouseley's own words, when chosen Ambassador he was told that "strengthening and consolidating the power of the Persian Empire and organizing of its military resources were the plans best calculated to make it a bulwark to the British Empire in the East."\* The definitive treaty of 1812 was mainly based on the preliminary treaty of 1809 concluded by Sir Harford Jones and on the Iranian requests laid before the British Government by Mirza Abol Hassan Khan.

It is to be noted that on the conclusion of the definitive treaty the Iranian Government gave 5,000 tomans (about £4,500) to be distributed as follows: Perceval, Prime Minister of England, 1,000 tomans; Marquess Wellesley, Foreign Secretary, 2,000 tomans; and 2,000 tomans to be

\* F.O. 60/6. Letter No. 7, Ouseley to Wellesley, March 15, 1812.



divided between Hamilton and Culling Charles Smith, Under-Secretaries, and the clerks "according to custom."

EFFORTS OF SIR GORE OUSELEY TO BRING ABOUT PEACE  
BETWEEN IRAN AND RUSSIA \*

Sir Gore Ouseley's name will always be remembered in the diplomatic history of Iran, not because of the conclusion of the definitive treaty of 1812, which was the chief object of his embassy, but for the important part that he played with regard to the negotiations of peace between Iran and Russia, and especially the conclusion of the treaty of Gulistan.

Fath Ali Shah's were not idle words when he said to Sir Gore Ouseley that he would entrust to him the management of his foreign affairs. The prestige of the British in Iran could be gauged by a farman which gave the Ambassador full powers to negotiate and conclude, in conjunction with Abbas Mirza, the Crown Prince, treaties with Russia and Turkey.

Within a few months after the conclusion of the definitive treaty Great Britain became the ally of Russia, and on November 1, 1812, Major-General Kotliarevsky, commanding the Russian Army in Karabag, took Abbas Mirza's forces by surprise and the Iranians suffered a very severe defeat at Aslanduz. The battle of Aslanduz is all the more important with regard to Anglo-Iranian relations as for a while it caused a considerable decrease in British popularity in Iran. Public opinion seems to have been greatly shocked by the news of this terrible misfortune. It was said that the English were united with the Russians to destroy Iran and that a large army had actually landed at Bushire. So rife were these rumours that, as James Morier writes in his diary, "the treachery of the British to the Persians was the common talk from one end of the country to the other, and had gained a considerable degree of credit even in Turkey."\* Indeed, there is no shred of evidence that the British ever betrayed the Iranians, yet Sir Gore Ouseley cannot be justified for having abused Mirza Bozorg, Minister to Abbas Mirza, whom he thought to be responsible for anti-British activities.

Mirza Bozorg was a true patriot, and even James Morier, no admirer of the Iranians, writes: "The opinion that those who have long had opportunities to know him have formed about him is that he really has the welfare of his country at heart."†

The point is whether the British envoys who were so sincerely trusted by the Iranian Government, as they themselves admit, ever sought Iran's welfare during the negotiations with Russia. Although Sir Gore Ouseley tried to obtain favourable terms for the Iranians, yet he was working hard to bring about peace in order to release the East India Company from the payment of the subsidy and not because he believed that peace was beneficial to Iran. Sir Gore Ouseley seems to have had no sympathy whatever with a nation who had suffered such a terrible defeat at Aslanduz, and to have merely awaited some pretext in order to strike a further blow. In his letter to Castlereagh he writes: "Probably before the receipt of Your

\* *Diary*, vol. 4, fol. 113.

† *Ibid.*, fols. 42, 43.

Lordship's reply to this despatch, some documents may fall into my hands which would not only justify our asking the cession of Khark or Bushire (I mean always in case Russia completely defeats the French) as a depot for our troops and as formerly wished for by the British Government in India, but even acquit us of any infraction of treaty, were we to take either place by force, in the event of purchase, bribe or menace not succeeding."\*

Nothing can better show Sir Gore Ouseley's real opinion with regard to Iran than these words: "It is now my sincere opinion that, having the safety of our Indian territories solely in view, it would be better policy to leave Persia in her present state of weakness and barbarism than pursue an opposite plan."†

In the beginning of 1813, having suffered a second defeat at Lenkaran, Fath Ali Shah consented to comply with Sir Gore's desire of making peace by agreeing to send an envoy to the Tsar. The British Ambassador used his influence so that Abol Hassan Khan should be nominated. Fath Ali Shah and his ministers desired peace, whilst Abbas Mirza and his minister, Mirza Bozorg, were against it.

The treaty of Gulistan, in the conclusion of which Sir Gore played an important part, was signed on October 24, 1813. By this treaty the river Araxes, with the exception of the territory of Erivan, became the boundary of the two Empires, and Iran recognized Russia's sovereignty over vast and important provinces and cities, amongst which were Georgia, Mingrelia, Karabagh, Daghestan, Ganja, Shirvan, Baku, etc. The treaty of 1812, however, did not meet with the approval of the British Government. In April, 1814, when the Foreign Office spoke of altering this treaty, Russia had become the ally of Great Britain and Napoleon, the Terror of Europe, had abdicated. Nearly all the important points, such as promise of British help for the establishment of a naval force in the Caspian and the employment of British officers in the Iranian Army, were to be omitted.

The treaty of 1814, which was signed on November 25, is the first definitive treaty between the two crowns of Iran and England which was ratified, and lasted until 1857, when, after the Anglo-Iranian war, a treaty of peace was signed between Iran and Great Britain in Paris on November 4, 1857.

At the time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1814 Great Britain's intense activities in Iran seem to have come to a close. In a letter to James Morier, granting him permission to leave Iran, Lord Castlereagh wrote that, as it was no longer necessary for a Minister Plenipotentiary to be at the Shah's Court, Henry Willock, the bearer of the ratified treaty of 1814, was to be presented to the Iranian Court as *chargé d'affaires*. Willock arrived at Teheran on September 16, 1815, and James Morier left Iran on November 1.

Thus ended a period of over fifteen years of Anglo-Iranian relations. Great Britain, the wiser and by far the stronger party, achieved all that she desired in checking the Afghan and French threats to India and in maintaining either peace or war between Iran and Russia, as the circumstances

\* F.O. 60/9. Letter from Ouseley to Castlereagh, October 25, 1814.

† *Ibid.*

required. Iran, on the other hand, was left after the treaty of Gulistan a weaker and poorer country.

Relations between the two countries, apart from diplomatic consequences, had indeed far-reaching effects. Books and despatches written at this time form part of the most reliable sources of information regarding Iran. It was to England that the first Government students were sent. Still more important was the intention of Abbas Mirza, the Crown Prince, to send his son, the future Shah of Iran, to be educated in England. But strangely enough the British Government did not encourage the idea.

After their contact with Europeans the Iranians seem to have been quite eager to take full advantage of modern science and art. Not only did the social life of the people gradually change but the methods of administration were also influenced by these European connections.

Perhaps no country in the world has seen so many victories or suffered so many defeats as Iran during her long history of twenty-five centuries. Paradoxical though it may sound, it is through defeats, and especially her decisive defeats at the hands of Alexander the Great, the Arabs and the Mongols, that Iran has shown her extraordinary powers of survival. There is, however, an enemy that may endanger our very existence, and that is the superficial imitation of European civilization. To arm against this foe we have to study European culture most carefully and adopt what is compatible with our own civilization.

The friendship existing between the Iranians and the British will, in my opinion, be much strengthened if cultural relations are encouraged between the two peoples, and I hope that one day a convention respecting the relations of learning and culture, similar to the one signed between England and Greece in 1940, will be signed between Iran and Great Britain.

Today Iran is a member of the United Nations and an ally of Great Britain, who is fighting this war to defend the freedom of all nations great and small. Believing in the future of my country, I have no doubt that Iran with the goodwill of her powerful friend will take her rightful place in the community of nations.

# ARABIA AND THE FUTURE

By LIEUT.-COLONEL GERALD DE GAURY, M.C.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on October 27, 1943, the Rt. Hon. the Earl Winterton, P.C., M.P., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: To an instructed audience like this, it is hardly necessary to say much about our distinguished visitor to-day, but perhaps I might just recall to your notice that Colonel de Gaury first went to Riyadh in the summer of 1935, and later went with Sir Andrew Ryan, then H.B.M. Minister in Jedda, when Sir Andrew presented King Ibn Saud with the G.C.B. on behalf of His Majesty King George V.

On the outbreak of war, Lt.-Col. de Gaury, who had spent some years in other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, was sent to Riyadh in order to be with King Ibn Saud at his Court. The British Legation is at Jedda and was considered to be too far away for war-time, when a closer touch is desirable. Colonel de Gaury was accorded the rank of First Secretary. He stayed with King Ibn Saud during the first winter of the war, and when the King went to the Pilgrimage, accompanied him as far as the Holy Area of Mecca. He was then posted to the Legation at Teheran, but on the outbreak of the troubles in Iraq he became Chargé d'Affaires for that country.

When the war was carried into Syria, Lt.-Col. de Gaury was called upon to raise the Druze Cavalry, and afterwards appointed Liaison Officer with the Minister of State's office in Cairo and was able to make three more journeys into Ibn Saud's country. He arrived home a few weeks ago.


I am sure we are all going to listen to his lecture with the keenest interest.

Perhaps I might add this observation, as one who has had some acquaintance, official and unofficial, with the Arabian Peninsula for the last twenty-five years. As or when the armistice comes into sight—and personally, without seeming pessimistic, I cannot persuade myself that it is anywhere near in sight yet—there will be a number of fish swimming into the shoal of post-war problems, and I hope that the position and future status of the Arabian Peninsula will not be regarded as a small or unimportant fish.

If we are to judge from the experience of the last war, as and when we approach the period of the peace negotiations, there will be a great deal of manœuvring for position among all sorts of small countries, perhaps greater than was the case at the end of the last war, because the power and prestige of the British Commonwealth and Empire is greater than ever it was.

I would suggest with respect to an audience like this, so many of whom have had great experience of the Arabian Peninsula for the last quarter of a century, that it behoves those of us who are no longer in official positions to see that due and proper consideration is given to the future of that country. It would be, I think, hypocritical to deny that we are entering a period of power politics, and the position and prestige of the Allies, if they win the war—as we know they will—will be enormous. It behoves us to see that the position of the Arabian Peninsula is taken into due consideration, that all the questions, political, religious, even ethnological, of the different races comprised in it are given their due weight in the counsels of the Allies.

I am not sure that they are receiving their due weight at the present time,



**ARABIA**  
 Scale of Miles  
 0 50 100 150 200

and I am not sure either if people's minds are being sufficiently directed to the immensely important questions with which the British Commonwealth and Empire will be faced from the Persian Gulf right away to the Straits of Gibraltar after the war.

I suggest, with respect, that it is the duty of a Society like this, quite apart from any party political question, to give attention to these vast problems which mean so much to the future of the British Empire.

**I**F I may use a rather disrespectful simile about the mysterious, the great and romantic peninsula of Arabia, it is like a fly being released from amber, for since the tenth century it has taken no part in great economic or political movements. For nine centuries the currents of trade have swept past its shores, through the Persian Gulf, down the Red Sea, across its foot by the Indian Ocean; and the old caravan routes for frankincense, gold, cinnamon, slaves, myrrh, and the luxuries of the East have been more frequented by small parties of pilgrims than by rich convoys of merchants. This decline in Arabian trade, which set in with Hippalus' discovery of the secret of the monsoon storm, and was completed by the tenth century—by the dark ages—is being brought to a dramatically sudden end, and the vast peninsula—for we sometimes forget it is about the size of India—is coming into its own again.

There are three reasons for this :

Firstly, a change in world communications, that is to say, its geographical position, in an age of air transport, together with the facility with which cars, it is now found, can cross desert country.

Secondly, internal security, given it by its present ruler, which has every appearance of having come to stay.

Thirdly, and as the result of this new security, the discovery of oil, of unusually good quality in unusually great quantity, and of gold, through the enterprise of the North Americans.

To examine these three in a little detail may be of interest.

If you wish to go direct by air from North-East Africa, from say Cairo or Asmara, to India, Persia or Iraq, you would, if you were allowed, cross Arabia, and because of the size of the peninsula, the time and petrol you would save in doing so would be well worthy of consideration. At present the only airline working is the B.O.A.C., which calls fortnightly at Jedda. That is something quite new and they use a hangar put in by the Italians. Of further immediate air development not much can be said yet, except that there is not likely to be any in the Central Hejaz, near Mecca and Medina, because Christians would not be allowed to fly near either of these places. Avoiding them, however, there is still an immense area over which the Saudi Government may require or permit transit services to operate at some time in the future. At the present moment there are no meteorological stations, and in a country subject to the "simoun" and electrical storms they would be essential before regular flying could be undertaken.

As to roads, with regard to the facility with which cars cross the deserts the existing main tracks are already quite extensive. There is to-day a total of not less than 14,400 kilometres of good motor tracks.

With comparatively little expenditure they can be made very much better, because most of them are across open deserts, with a good natural surface and only occasionally some bad patches. There is already one metalled road, from Jedda to the gold mine. The whole journey from Jedda to Riyadh, the Saudi capital, has been done in a saloon car, on the natural surface of the desert, in as little as 36 hours total time. The "bad patches" on the way there are the sand dunes of Nafud Qunfidha and Nafud as Sirr, and these could, of course, have a surface laid on them like that over the Sinai sands. Cars to-day go grinding over them in low gear, because a stop usually brings a delay of hours to get them out. Spates in *wadis* which sometimes hold up cars for 24 hours or more can be overcome by bridges. East of the capital the Dahana sand belt forms a similar obstacle between Riyadh and the Persian Gulf shore or Iraq.

On the road linking the Northern Frontier forts there is a good deal of very difficult going over the great stony desert of al Hajara, and there is, I remember, a particularly difficult corner for large lorries coming down through rocks into the Jauf depression and the important oasis of Dumat al Jandal, the Roman and Nabatean caravan city, mentioned, incidentally, in Genesis xxv. 13 and 14.

On the Red Sea coastal road there are stony mountains which are a serious obstacle, and a black volcanic rock area, one of the Harra, to negotiate, but even the latter need not defeat modern engineers, and an example of how they can be built over by road-makers is already to be seen on the Jerusalem-Baghdad road, in the Syrian desert. From the Saudi frontier you can go via Hodeida to Sana and Aden, thus there is nothing to prevent a journey by car to Baghdad from Aden except that you would require permission from the governments concerned. The general plotting of the roads at present is, as you will see, one main transcontinental road, 1,000 kilometres long, from Jedda via Mecca and Riyadh to the Persian Gulf at the Oil Company's centre at Dhahran. This is linked up with the secondary transcontinental road along the Northern Frontier posts from Amman to Basra, via the Jauf depression, by three north and south tracks, one, hardly used, up the Hejaz from Mecca to Jauf, a second from near Marrat via Hail, and a third from al Hasa via Qaryat al Ilya. Diagonally across the country runs the Pilgrims' road, put into repair, and given water cisterns at frequent intervals, by the Empress Zobeida, widow of the Caliph Haroun ar Rashid, and now again repaired by Ibn Saud. The Government maintains petrol filling stations at the forts and citadels on these routes, and once you have their authority for travelling, all ordinary supplies (when there is not a war-time shortage owing to lack of shipping) are available.

To sum up this section, it seems certain that, as soon as the war difficulties are over, there will be improved main roads and better side roads, owing to the Oil Company and because the Government itself will require them. Generally speaking, cars will move freely everywhere in Saudi Arabia.

With regard to internal security, you will, of course, know, or can imagine, that there is an armed security force, police or army—there is not much difference, and perhaps gendarmerie is the best description—ready

to maintain order, distributed over the country in well-found new forts, built under Ibn Saud's orders within the last three decades. There is a network of wireless stations over the country, put in originally by Marconi's, which could give warning of any disaffection, and do give news of any individuals who may take to marauding. Punishment of such men is severe, so that there is very little raiding or stealing. In fact, it is said that a bag of coffee dropped by a caravan will not be touched until the caravan returns, perhaps months later. Security in Arabia is probably now the best in the world.

To assess the work of the King who has brought this about, we have only to go back to the stories of British travellers in the last century, and up to the beginning of his régime, for it was the British among the Western people who penetrated Arabia first. Our first traveller, if we exclude Captain Robert Sadleir, who crossed the country very rapidly, and Pelly, the Resident from the Persian Gulf, who also made a short stay, was Charles Doughty. It is the hundredth anniversary of his birth this year, and it was he who led in our knowledge of Arabia, who stayed long years with the Bedouins, and with the uncompromising stubbornness of the Bedouins themselves, in spite of three attempts on his life, held fast there to his faith and his principles. Strange mixture of poet and practical man of action, it was he who noted down unceasingly everything to do with the Arabs—whether it were raiding, mines, the weather, the character of the people, and to whom we owe the knowledge which was so valuable later, he who paved the way for any later venturers. He raised for a little the curtain which is now at last going up on Arabia.

If internal security is very different from what it was in Doughty's day, it may be asked whether there can be external attack. Attacks from over the borders are not very likely, for all neighbours are Arabs; and the capital is well situated deep in the heart of the country. The accession to the throne is well assured—the King, whose pedigree shows him as descended from Adnan the Ishmaelite, has some thirty-odd sons, the same number of girls, and numerous other relations. There is a strong family affinity, and marriages between the Saudi clan and other leading Arabian families, such as the Sudairi family, make for strength of the ruling family, which is not likely to forget soon that the return of the dynasty to power was from exile and only by almost superhuman activity of the King. Moreover, the existing security, under a central government, has, for the first time since the Arab Empire, enabled the Oil Company and other commercial enterprises to take root, bringing a still stronger tendency to peacefulness and industry. The two companies already established are the Oil and Gold Companies, the C.A.S.O.C., and the S.A.M.S., both American directed. There seems now to be no doubt of the very valuable nature of the Oil Company's field. It is accepted as likely to be one of the finest in the world; a most exceptionally prolific field, which will outdo most of its earlier established rivals, for example, that of the American Company at Bahrain. The income from such a field to the Saudi Government will enable it to undertake enterprises which may bring about important changes in a comparatively short time.

The Gold Company is also likely to have success. It has established



itself halfway between Mecca and Medina, and my enquiries lead me to believe that the mine—an old one, the spoil from which has turned out to be valuable with a new vein below the old mine—is that which was formerly known as the Beni Sulaim mine.

If so, it is the mine which the Prophet Muhammad gave in fief to his henchman Bilal ibn al Harith as a reward. This and other old mines were worked until about as late as the tenth century, by which time the stability and purchasing power of Europe had passed away. They were no doubt at their working heights at the time of King Solomon bin Daoud, and at the height of the Roman Empire. Now another country of fabulous richness, the United States of America, is beginning to arrange exploitation.

To turn to agriculture the U.S. Government recently sent two of its experts, an agriculturalist and an irrigation engineer, to do a prolonged survey of Saudi Arabia. They went about under the direction of the consulting engineer of the Gold Company and travelled some 10,000 miles.

They found first that the country is by no means flat and desiccated, as is most of the Syrian and a great part of the Libyan Deserts. There are chains of oases; there are great wadis, through which spates run annually; there are mountains, 8,000 to 9,000 feet high, with woods near the summits, and I am not surprised to hear that their expert conclusions go to show that a very great improvement can be made. Generally speaking, they found that the present cultivation can be doubled at least. Damming of wadis, sinking of artesian wells, and attention to certain agricultural improvements will present no great difficulty. One of the recommendations of the mission is for the importation of bees into Eastern Arabia. There are honey bees in the Hejaz, but they are lacking in Nejd, and so very few fig, pomegranate, lime, citron or peach and almond trees there are giving as much fruit as they should. Afforestation in Arabia is not unknown. The tamarisk is planted to keep back sand dunes, and there has long been a system of rotation of camel grazing areas. I think perhaps that this is not much known. I remember a correspondence in *The Times* some years ago, arising I think out of Jarvis Bey's description of Sinai, about the damage done by goats and the carelessness of the Sinai Arabs in cutting down trees to the roots. The final letter, from the late Sir Arnold Wilson, came to the conclusion that there was little hope for grazing in the Arab lands as long as they were on the "goat standard." This is not the case in Central Arabia. There are few goats, and there are always Himiat or reserves, which year by year are changed. The penalty for cutting down a tree is most severe. In consequence, and because of the better rainfall, the grazing in Nejd is much better than that over her northern borders. The Central Arabians devised their own system of keeping the desert at its best for their cattle, and this is now traditional.

Irrigation projects, such as that already under way at al Kharj, some 70 kilometres south-east of Riyadh, can be repeated elsewhere at al Hofuf, Leila, in Nejran, and so on. There are at al Kharj several immense pools of water in limestone vaults with Crossley engines pumping out the water to irrigate some thousands of acres of what was a few years ago

barren desert. Considerable improvement can be made not only by opening up such new water supplies; but by conserving the old ones, which are sometimes wasted through lack of some simple device like a spring head with tanks and valves, or a dam with sluices and concrete canals. Not much machinery is required, but, of course, it is almost impossible for shipping space to be made available nowadays for anything not clearly connected with or part of the war effort.

To sum up, the export of camel hair and wool is a trade which will lend itself to expansion and improvement. Agricultural development is likely to be most noticeable within a comparatively short time.

There should soon be a better supply of vegetables and fruit, and there seems to be no reason why eventually the country should not be almost self-supporting, even in respect of wheat and rice, provided the right kind of far-seeing help is at hand.

The King, at first soldier, then theocrat, is now taking a great interest in the internal development and economy of his State and he has found a ready helper in the Americans.

Another matter for Arab national planning is the exploitation of the fish in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Both, and the latter in particular, really teem with fish. This enormous and excellent food supply is very little exploited so far. It seems to me pitiable that while these great shoals of succulent fish go migrating round the Persian Gulf unharmed, there are thousands of human beings in nearby countries who are hard put to it to find cheap and sufficient food.

Archæology can hardly be considered as connected with the future perhaps, but it is possible that the Saudi Government would at some time in the future permit an expedition, now that there is security: and if they did, the areas most likely to see them at work are, I imagine, Nejran in the south, and possibly the northern Hejaz. The southern field might well produce much of value on the Sabeian, Minæan and Himyaritic Empires, about which we are, I believe, still not at all well-informed. There have been some finds from time to time by Arabs, and there is an archæological "seepage," as it were, down there.

What then will be the effect on the people? Assuming that all goes forward well on these lines, we can expect certain changes; for instance, I have been surprised in the physical alteration in Nejdīs who have been working regularly for some months at the oil fields. They are probably the hardiest race in the world, but their food is scanty, and their ordinary life does not call for regular muscular exercise. When they do get it, and it is coupled with plenty of food, the effect is often astonishing. When I first saw some of these men, I asked to what race they belonged. They were unlike the Arabs I knew. Imagine then what will be the effect in a generation if it is as noticeable as this after a year.

They have a natural grace and poise and another characteristic which is most marked is their selectivity. They seem to see much more clearly than many other peoples what is genuinely useful to them and what can be neglected. They are not easily deceived by newness and strangeness. The immediate and early establishment of wireless stations in Arabia was a case in point. Lady Anne Blunt found a house telephone system working in

the castle at Hail in 1880—and she had then never seen a telephone elsewhere.

We are now apt to be fearful of the effects of our industrialization on foreign countries, and we usually mention our civilization with a deprecating little laugh—to indicate that it is, in our minds, not always a blessing to foreigners. I do not think that we need to be very afraid in the case of Saudi Arabia. They will take what is good for them and leave the rest. I think indeed that it may even be the other way round, and that the closer contact with the Western world will be to the benefit of the Western world. The Arabs preserved for us some valuable things when the dark ages came upon Europe, such things as Arabic translations from the Greek. At the time they would not have seemed of any interest to the warring barons in Europe, and so it is difficult for us to recognize the value of something not even as tangible as an old manuscript—the attitude of the Arabs to one another, that extraordinary mixture of hard practicality on the one hand, and a brotherliness and hospitality which exceeds anything known in Europe.

It is not by chance that three great religions, including our own, have come out of the Middle East. I would not attempt to embark on so deep or so difficult a subject, but in speaking of Arabia, which until now has hardly changed since the days of the Bible, and of the future, I would not like to pass it over entirely. Perhaps there is to be found in old Arabia—in the spirit of Arabia—something as valuable or even more valuable than oil and gold and archæological data.

A MEMBER: I quite appreciate that flying over the Holy City is resented, in fact impossible, but do you think King Ibn Saud would be prepared to be represented at an international conference to discuss airways across and in Arabia and for the benefit of Arabia?

Colonel DE GAURY: That is a question for the Saudi Arabian Minister to answer, but I should say off-hand that it could certainly do no harm to ask the King to send representatives and that he would like to do so. I am sure that His Majesty would like to know what is going forward in that way, and I should say, therefore, that the answer is “yes.”

A MEMBER: You have described him as a realist, and probably he is well aware of the fact that if he excludes air communication from Arabia it will not be to the interest of Arabia?

Colonel DE GAURY: Yes, it does seem so.

Miss HUSSEY: What part of Arabia is the gold mine in?

Colonel DE GAURY: The gold mine is, roughly speaking, halfway between Mecca and Medina, *i.e.*, west central as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned.

The Countess of CARLISLE: Does the lecturer know anything of the future of women in Arabia?

Colonel DE GAURY: I can say at once that I think it will be a very long time before they march in threes and look like the A.T.S.; but apart from that, there is this which you may like to hear. The Americans have sent lady doctors to the centre of Arabia, and they have been into the harems and have done a great deal of good in telling the people what they can do

to improve the health and the well-being of themselves and their children. A great deal has been done about that in the oases and in such distant places as the provincial capital of Hail. The Americans, who are doing all they can, are encouraged to do so by the King.

The CHAIRMAN: Probably more than one of us felt a great nostalgia in seeing again pictures of Arabia and its sunshine after having been compelled for four years to live in this "damp, moist, unpleasant" island of ours. It falls to my pleasant lot to express on behalf of everyone in this audience the very great pleasure we have all experienced in listening to Colonel de Gaury's brilliant lecture with the admirable slides with which it has been illustrated.

# TURKEY : A RECORD OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROGRESS IN THE LAST QUARTER OF A CENTURY

By GEOFFREY CRABBE

This paper was the basis of a lecture to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, October 6, 1943, the Hon. W. W. Astor, M.P., in the Chair.

**T**HE object of this talk to-day is to give a rough sketch of what has transpired in Turkey between 1918 and 1943, which, within a few days, is a quarter of a century.

The Mudros Armistice was signed on October 30, 1918, between Britain and Turkey with the situation roughly as follows :

Iraq was occupied by British troops, Syria by British and French, with British and French troops in parts of Thrace as a preliminary to the occupation of Stambul. The Turks were in a desperate situation. It had not been a question of four years of war with them as it had been for us, it was something like seven. Those years of war had swept the country bare. There were no cattle, sheep, horses or bullocks for cultivation, and the mobilization of almost every man capable of bearing arms had brought about neglect and desolation in the fields, and there seemed little that they could do about it to better the situation, for granaries were empty. The Armistice had been signed with no other alternative. They could only hope that their adversaries would be generous not only with the terms of armistice but in their application.

I cannot remember the Turks feeling unduly bitter about the outcome of the war; their bitterness was more directed toward that small minority of politicians in the Committee of Union and Progress that had betrayed the country. They were apathetic regarding the Padisha and the Caliphate, for they had plenty to worry over in other directions. At that time, of course, there was no question of abolishing either the Sultanate or the religious side of things. The whole country was in a state of complete disorder with the civil administration completely disorganized. Demobilization was going on irrespective of the conditions of armistice, which alone led to disorder and a great deal of local brigandage by individual bands of soldiers making their way home as best they could. Communications were very bad, and only with difficulty could the railways under Allied military control be kept operating. In the large towns such as Stambul and Smyrna the minorities, that is to say, Greeks, Armenians and Jews, were all making the best of the new situation, and a great deal of profit was made from the occupation troops and so on. From this occupation the Turks had neither the inclination nor ability to benefit.

This state of affairs went on until the Greek occupation of Smyrna. The Turks were becoming resigned to an Allied occupation and stoically accepted the outcome of defeat in the field, but the events relative to the

occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks were too much for them. With the publication of possible terms of peace, some time in March, 1920, repressed tempers could no longer contain themselves and the whole country seemed to flare into flame.

The terms of the Sèvres Treaty were terribly harsh for Turkey. The Greeks were to occupy that part of Western Anatolia from Edremit in the north, down to the Aydin Railway in the south, with undefined limit towards Afyon Karahisar in the east. There was the usual massacre as an outcome of that occupation and the airing of hysterical political views with great disorder throughout the occupied zone. In addition to the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks the Italians were to benefit from a zone of influence reaching from Antalya down to Mersin on the west and south-west coast of Anatolia and northwards to Konya and Afyon, Karahisar and beyond. The area from Mersin, including Adana, eastward along the Baghdad Railway and northward towards Diyarbekir, was to be under French influence, and French troops were already in occupation of the principal towns in that zone. The eastern vilayets were to become an Armenian republic with not very clearly defined limits except on the Soviet frontier (where they were very definite indeed). The north coast of the Black Sea with its hinterland from Trebizond to Zonguldak was planned out as a Greek zone of influence with British backing. The immediate vicinity of both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles was to be demilitarized and put under the control of an inter-Allied Commission.

Map No. 2 shows this general arrangement of partitioning as a result of the Treaty of Sèvres, and I do not think it possible for anybody to work out a crazier scheme. It could not have worked with the wildest imagination. There were then some 14,000,000 Turks to take into consideration, and yet it would seem that their very existence had been almost completely ignored. The great bulk of them would never consent to live a continued existence in the occupied zones where the spirit of revenge of a century would make itself felt by the newcomers for many a long year. They (the Turks) would be excluded from trade such as there was and any participation in its development, and it would mean that they would become a vassal people unless they migrated to the Anatolian plateau, which was about all there was left to them. As an outlook it was depressing and to all intents and purposes hopeless.

While all this was going on Kemal Pasha had been sent to Samsun and Erzerum by the Government to carry out an inspection of the remnants of the Turkish armies in Eastern Anatolia. At Samsun he decided on an endeavour to set up a resistance movement and to bring such military pressure as could be built up to get the proposed peace conditions modified. A conference was held in Erzerum consisting of representatives of all elements in the country able to attend. It was evidently a noisy affair with everybody wishing to have the final say in the matter. Kemal Pasha was not a man to tolerate having his ideas complicated readily and he was not very good at diplomacy, and there is no doubt he had an extremely difficult time in keeping the various elements together. He could only tell the delegates individually that everything they aimed at would be taken care of as and when conditions rendered this possible


and leave it at that. In the meantime, in Stambul the Sultan was still a power and the Chamber of Deputies still operating. Many of the deputies and old adherents to the Committee of Union and Progress were working up schemes of their own and playing up to the Allied High Command, although an important section of them, inspired by the efforts being made by Kemal Pasha in the interior, produced a form of National Pact which it was hoped would unify the people, give them something to aspire to, and enable a strong front to be built up against the peace conditions.

The so-called "National Pact" did not appear to have carried much weight with Kemal Pasha: Anatolian politics therefore remained static for a time, until the Sèvres Conference produced more comprehensive political demands and the remnants of the Turkish Army had been more completely reorganized.

The Allies were commencing to feel repercussions from this reorganization. There had been several risings throughout the country and Turkish troops, regular and irregular, had been demonstrating in a hostile manner before British and other posts in the interior, as a result of which there was a great deal of fuss locally among the Allied High Command and a political stir was created in London. The French particularly had had trouble. Local bands had attacked a French garrison in the south and got away with it, resulting in the retirement of French troops from Urfa. Irregulars had successes elsewhere, all of which gave courage to the Nationalist movement.

While this was going on the principal railway from Stambul southward was being systematically sabotaged by the Turks to prevent the movement of reinforcements to Allied posts in the interior. Bridges and culverts were going up all over the place and communications very soon came to a standstill. Hardly a major bridge of any size was left intact on the Anatolia Railway. I was stationed at Eskishehir at the time and telegrams were coming in by the hundred for several days reporting that bridge after bridge had been destroyed and station installations damaged. In a very few days the situation worsened and Allied posts in the interior were withdrawn to avoid armed conflict and took up a line across the Ismid Peninsula, some 90 kms. from Stambul.

In the meantime Kemal Pasha and his staff were working overtime on military schemes to keep up with the ever-changing situation, which was invariably in their favour. The Allies were squabbling and the Greeks were very sure of themselves, and there was also fear at home of the war re-opening in Turkey, which all parties in London wished to avoid at all costs. Kemal Pasha had produced, as a result of a conference at Sivas, a not unattractive front against the Allies. An appeal to all Anatolians had brought together many of the dispersed troops, and ammunition dumps were being raided. Arms and ammunition were taken away under the very noses of Allied control, or such as was left of it. The peasants, women included, threw their heart and soul into the task of collecting war material. Heavy shells were being carried by women, and on foot, from Ineboli on the Black Sea to Ankara and other points. Transport was collected with such few horses, donkeys and bullocks as remained in





1918

100 KILOMETRES

TURKEY

AK DENİZ





the country and were put into service. When, therefore, the Allied terms were known the Kemalists were in a position to snap their fingers and refuse to accept them.

In March, 1920, the Allies officially occupied Stambul, had some unfortunate military clashes with Turkish guards in the city, and declared martial law. Suspected deputies were rounded up, good and bad together, and transported to Malta. Government troops—that is to say, troops of the Central Government in Stambul—were sent to Ismid by sea to start operations against the Kemalists. They had not been there long before the whole contingent went over to the Kemalists, weapons and stores included.

Under the benevolent eye of the Allies Greek troops swept over Western Anatolia. The Italians, fearful of being trapped, withdrew from Konya and, as has been mentioned before, the French suffered really serious military reverses in the south. The Greek advance brought the Hellenic Forces into sharp conflict with the Kemalist or Nationalist troops and there was a long period of gain and loss on both sides until with Allied backing the Greeks occupied Afyon Karahisar and Eskishehir on the Anatolian Railway. They subsequently pushed forward to the Sakarya River within a few miles of Ankara. This was the great test for the Turks and after bitter battles the Greeks finally gave way, scorching earth as they retired. The final battles of İnönü, where Ismet Pasha, now President of the Republic, distinguished himself, followed by the battle of Domlupunar and the capture of the Greek Commander-in-Chief with his staff, brought about complete chaos among the Greek troops, and the retreat to Smyrna was catastrophic. Turkish troops headed by Mustapha Kemal Pasha then entered Smyrna, resulting in the destruction of that fine city and the classical massacre. It has never been determined who was responsible for initial incidents resulting in the destruction of Smyrna and the subsequent massacre, but I do know that every effort was made to keep the victorious Turkish troops under control. It is more than likely that incendiarism started through looting by robber bands during the period between Greek forces retiring from the town towards Chesme and the time of entry of the Turkish troops. It would appear that the massacres started through sniping and the crazy situation inevitable in such circumstances. The Greek army fled northward to Thrace, and what remained in the south got away by ferrying themselves to Chios and from there back to Greece. At this point the Allies took a belated hand and endeavoured to mediate between Turks and Greece.

The situation as regards the Turks had now entirely changed. The Kemalists, or Nationalists as they were called, were a victorious entity and they held a powerful position at the conference table of Mudanya, where the meeting between General Sir Charles Harrington and Ismet Pasha took place. The massive bulk of H.M.S. *Iron Duke* lying in the small bay had little effect on the Turkish delegates. They knew what they wanted and they were going to get it, and they knew, furthermore, the political situation was such that the British public were not inclined to tolerate any more British casualties for the sake of a squabble in Anatolia. The Mudanya Conference resulted in a Turco-Greek Armistice. Franklin Bouillon went behind the backs of the British and signed an

agreement with the Turks in Ankara which placed British troops stationed at Chanak in a tricky position. The Greeks retired from Thrace to the Maritza. Refet Pasha entered Stambul, but not until Vahededdin, the Sultan, had got away on H.M.S. *Malaya*, an episode which closed the book of the Osmanli Dynasty. The Caliph Abdul Medjid remained at Dolmabagche. Refet rode a very high horse in Stambul, and notwithstanding the Allied armies of occupation did pretty well what he wished—rather too much, for he incurred the displeasure of Ankara.

In the middle of 1923 the Conference of Lausanne was concluded and Ismet Pasha successfully withstood the bullying and high diplomacy from all sides. As a result the Turks acquired complete independence, annulment of the capitulations and a number of political and economic advantages. Allied troops evacuated Turkish territory after a short delay and all the Turks had then to think about was putting their house in order.

The situation in November, 1918, was bad enough, but now in 1923 it was infinitely worse. Trade there was none, and with the exception of some 4,000 kms. of semi-derelict railways there were no real communications. The Greek campaign had brought about the destruction of everything of value in the West. The Government possessed four or five old vessels, ill-conditioned and of very little real use, with which they managed to maintain coastal communications between Mersin, Smyrna, Stambul and Trebizond. Travelling to and from the interior from Stambul was largely by sea and then by road until one came to a stretch of railway on which a locomotive could operate. It was vitally important to recommence a workable system of communications if any trade was to be resuscitated or developed at all. The difficulties appeared insurmountable, hundreds of bridges and culverts had been demolished, locomotives and rolling stock were destroyed or in a decrepit state and there was no internal organization or engineering works of importance capable of carrying out reconditioning. It meant that everything required—machinery, rolling stock, steelwork and rails—would have to come from abroad, and this meant an expenditure of a vast amount of money which did not appear to exist. Many projects were produced by the newly constituted republican Government now centred in Ankara, most of which fell through because of the lack of finance and no doubt brought about many of the changes in Government between 1923 and 1925, but Saracoglu Sukru Bey, now Prime Minister, found a solution.

The Turks were determined to avoid foreign entanglements through direct loans from abroad, and the only alternative was to prise up the hearthstones in one direction and make the Evkaf or Ministry of Pious Foundations disgorge some of the ecclesiastical wealth in another. An accusation (directed from abroad toward the Nationalist Government) of having pan-Islamic tendencies through the medium of the Caliph resulted, not without some local apprehension, in abolition of the Caliphate, and early one morning the Caliph Abdul Medjed and his family were unceremoniously packed aboard the Orient Express at a small station in Thrace, never to return to Turkey. That was the end of Turkish connection with the Osmanli Dynasty. The Sheriat was liquidated and the

Evkaf taken over by the State. The theological schools were abolished and the various Dervish sects dissolved. All of which the country took very calmly. Subsequently one or two uprisings, fanned by a few irresponsible fanatics, were rapidly and ruthlessly repressed.

As a result of a certain amount of disquietude among the population and some apprehension regarding the future, Ghazi Kemal Pasha, who had now been elected President of the Grand National Assembly, toured the country to sound the feelings of the people, ascertain their possible reactions to certain reforms he had in mind and generally plan a civil campaign for the future. I well remember his enormous grey Mercèdes with its train of smaller but no less noisy cars roaring along over atrocious roads and in all weathers at never less than about 30 miles an hour during those visits from one town to another. In his talks to the peasants he had the great faculty of getting down to the meat of his subject without lengthy or flowery phrases and with a great depth of understanding, which got them to view favourably the ideas he had in mind. One result was the mute acceptance of European headgear. Kemal Pasha had previously worn a *kalpak* of grey or black astrakhan during his tours until he suddenly appeared in an ordinary trilby hat, which rather staggered his audiences. When he explained, however, that the *fez* was not Turkish in origin and was a futile piece of headgear anyway as compared to the European style, it was taken for granted that what he said were words of wisdom. Almost overnight the country turned from the *fez* and *kalpak* to caps, hats, balaclavas and all manner of headgear outside the *fez*. The Army and Navy had previously adopted a modified form of a hat, but without a vizor. These services immediately adopted the British type of service headgear.

I was staying in Ankara at a place called the Sebat Hotel, one of two quaint auberges where there was any possibility of getting a bed in those hectic days. My room companion was the Austrian Minister. Very early one morning he pulled me out of bed to show me an amazing sight. The *muezzin* was calling the faithful to prayer in a peaked cap. It was difficult to understand, but later in the morning it was more difficult still, for almost everyone in the street, if they wore any headgear at all, was sporting a hat of some sort—large hats, small hats, caps and even top hats of every shape and size; in most cases the small hats managed to get on to the big heads and *vice versa*, but then, as always the few days' wonder passed by, hats got sifted out properly, and things became normal. Somebody made a great packet of money in shipping unwanted *fez* down to Syria and Egypt, and the profits made from importing hats into Turkey must have been terrific.

Later on we came to the change in written characters. Arabic characters were dropped as being redundant and there was a switch-over to Latin letters. This change was preceded by a switch-over from Arabic numerals to those familiar to us, together with the Gregorian calendar. The main change over, revolutionary as it was, came about quite quietly and in a very simple and efficient way. A great part of the literate population were civil servants, and a start was first made in the direction of making it obligatory for European characters to be used in all Govern-

ment correspondence. This was no mean task and the answer was found in the purchase of thousands and thousands of typewriters. It was a very sensible solution to the problem. When the machines were first brought in the clicking of keys was at a very slow rate. It took hours to get even the simplest letter typed, but in an amazingly short space of time the rate became reasonable, and in a year pretty nearly every civil servant could carry out his or her correspondence in the new characters and tolerably neatly at that.

At the time of the change-over from Arabic to European characters the amount of illiteracy throughout the country was appalling. Probably less than 5 per cent. knew how to write Arabic script legibly, and as a result nearly all peasant activities were entirely controlled by a few scribes and the village intelligentsia. The compulsory change to European characters put scribe and peasant alike on an equal footing. At the outset of the change over the Press were given instructions to produce their newspapers in Latin characters. There were to be no more Arabic characters under any circumstances, although under certain conditions they could be used as a form of "shorthand." The sudden change-over was spectacular. Where all the European type came from in such a short space of time is hard to imagine. Most journalists and typesetters, however, had had experience with publications printed in European characters and they were not slow to purchase linotype machines from Europe.

The Turks are very keen on their morning paper, without which they are lost. It was before the time of wireless on any big scale, and if they were to know anything of what was going on around them it had to be gleaned from the papers, and the only way to do that under the new circumstances was to learn the European characters without delay. On many occasions I have seen families poring over their favourite journal, old people and young children alike trying to work out the sense of various articles, with the children incidentally holding pride of place. The Turkocagi centres which had been created throughout the country started classes at which the young generation rapidly assimilated the new characters and in turn helped their elders. It led to a great expansion in the whole educational system and some 500-odd schools were established in a very short space of time. The standard of education became immediately higher, it broadened the outlook of the population, let them know what was going on in the world outside their own country, made them understand and appreciate more readily propaganda from Ankara, and was generally the most beneficent step made during Kemal Pasha's régime.

The abolition of the Sheriat and disestablishment of the Church had brought about great changes in domestic life, particularly among women, and about this I must be very careful what I say, for I think that although the changes were important they have been greatly exaggerated. My actual contact with the Turkish domestic side of things goes back to the very early days, and in the main cities and towns, at any rate, there was a great measure of freedom of both action and thought, and the veil was not so prominent as we are often led to believe. Daughters of the better-class families attended local European religious schools, principally the French Capuchin, and if more did not attend it was not through any

religious repression but more because the schools were not large enough to absorb the number of those seeking for education. The development of schools and education generally throughout the country brought about a great change in domestic outlook, and many a Turkish husband has cursed the influence of Hollywood film spectacles and Parisian couturiers and fashion establishments. It is the young women that have developed in parallel with their European counterpart rather than those of 35 and over, whose emancipation lay more in the direction of piling up the husbands' debit balance. Before the new régime came into being I saw no more of polygamy than exists in the West End of London. The average husband had enough trouble with one wife without being such a lunatic as to chase trouble by acquiring more.

We now come to the point where Atatürk and General Ismet İnönü got together to solve the industrial and communication problem. They realized that no practical development could take place in the country until industry and communications were developed in a thorough way. They and their lieutenants drew up one of the most spectacular economic and industrial programmes that had ever been conceived by any country in the East. The railway coming into Stambul from Europe had been acquired by a French company; the line from Haydarpasha south to Nisibin, with its section from Eski Shehir to Ankara, originally German but now acquired by an international financial group; the Smyrna-Kassaba line from Panderma down to Smyrna and east to Afyon Karahisar was owned by a French company; and the Ottoman Railway from Smyrna to Aydin and Egerdir by a British company. All these lines were in a bad way, and what was worse, interchange of traffic from the German-built lines to the Smyrna-Kassaba and Smyrna-Adyin lines was impossible because of differences in overall dimensions, brakes, and couplings. There was no direct communication from, for example, Stambul to Smyrna by rail, although the track was there; goods had to be transhipped and the cost was high. There was also the burden of kilometric guarantees to take into consideration. The French and German lines had a guaranteed revenue per kilometre. The Orient line amounted to some 22,000 francs and the Anatolian Baghdad Railway 15,000 francs. Although they were not paying these guarantees, in view of the existing situation, they felt that they would definitely be called upon at some stage to meet pre-war obligations when the foreign shareholders began to press their demands. The Ottoman Railway was outside the ring of guaranteed lines and therefore not affected.

The alternative, and a reasonable one, I think, was to re-purchase the 4,000-odd kms. of railway left to them by the Treaty of Lausanne and save the payment of such guarantee charges by paying an approximately similar sum annually for the re-purchase of the various lines over a period of years. They bought up the Anatolian-Baghdad Railway, then the Baghdad line, and subsequently the French Kassaba and the British Ottoman Railway and finally the Orient Railway from Adrianople to Stambul. The line running into the Erzerum from Russia, partly 5 ft. gauge and partly 2 ft. 6 ins., had already been acquired under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Having acquired these lines the Turkish Government

immediately set about reconditioning and standardising them and at the same time providing the country with lengthy extensions towards the east. To meet payment for these new works revenues from the highly developed tobacco, spirit and salt monopolies were earmarked, which brought in, if I remember rightly, some £3,000,000 (sterling) annually. That was the time when the British, had they the vision, might have stepped in and carried out a substantial amount of those important works at a period when British industry was in a bad way and needed orders from abroad. That opportunity, however, was lost and Swedes, Belgians, Americans and Germans came in and swept up four important contracts amounting to some £40,000,000.

The first large contract was given out to a Belgian group covering construction of a line from Kayseri through Sivas to Samsun. Incidentally, that company blew up about six months after having started construction and the Government took over the work. The line from Ankara to Kayseri had previously been constructed by the Government mainly with Turkish troops. Following that contract a Danish-Swedish group took on 1,000 kms. of line rated at \$50,000,000. One section was to connect Ankara with Filyos on the Black Sea, and the other the Baghdad Railway at a point near the Gulf of Alexandretta to Diyarbekir in the eastern vilayets.

Having concluded arrangements with the Swedes, a further contract was accorded a German group covering a line from Balikesir on the Smyrna-Kassaba line to Kutahya on the Anatolian line. The Americans carried out some of the final work on the Ankara-Olu-Kishlar line, including provision for workshops at Kayseri, the latter being subsequently cancelled in favour of extensive railway development work in Ankara and Sivas. Thus the Turkish Government had got under way, through foreign enterprise and with their own financial resources, 1,500 kms. of line complete with all equipment, in addition to reconditioning 4,000 kms. of foreign pre-war railways purchased by them.

In continuation of the foregoing important programme it was decided to push out the line from Sivas to Erzerum with a branch to Malatya to link up with the Swedish-constructed line—work carried out entirely by Turkish engineers and enterprise. This terminated, the Government possessed a railway system covering over 7,000 kms. of broad-gauge line well equipped, operating entirely with Turkish personnel and having all the good features of a well-run European system. *Wagons-lits* had been introduced on a large scale and two long-distance express trains operated daily comprised of *Wagons-lits* sleepers. Dining-cars operated on all passenger trains equipped with comfortable first, second, and third class coaches which were run with a high degree of personal comfort. Short stretches of track were operated by motor coaches where conditions permitted. Only one thing had been left out, and that was coastal terminals and ports, to which I will refer later.

In the meantime great progress had been made with road communications. The young generation of Turkish engineers, locally trained, had acquired a great deal of useful practical knowledge in railway, road and bridge building from the Danes and Swedes, and an extensive road and

concrete bridging programme was put in hand and successfully concluded. The Turks had constructed their part of the International Road through Europe which, however, fell into disrepair as the Bulgarians had done little or nothing about their part and the expected traffic did not eventuate. A fine road known as "Transit Yol" was built from Trebizond through Erzerum to Bayazid near the Persian frontier, intended to carry transit freight and passengers over the old Black Sea-Tabriz Road. Although great improvements in road communication had been carried out the country was still behind in the matter and much more remained to be done when this present war started.

New construction of railways brought with it a very heavy increase in traffic on the main Anatolian line to such an extent that the railway administration had seriously to consider doubling the line from Ankara to Istanbul, work entailing the enlarging of tunnels and bridges and involving enormous expense with inevitable delays to traffic. A rather novel solution was found that not only economized in the cost of construction but opened up a rich tract of country hitherto undeveloped through lack of communications. The solution took the form of a second line from Ankara roughly parallel to the first, which is now under construction, although held up owing to the war. Simultaneously with the development of communications, technical schools were opened up, staffed by experienced experts, for the purpose of training engineers, foremen, and railway employees to staff the new lines. These schools were very complete and contained the most modern technical equipment.

Industrial activity commenced about 1928, but did not get really into a swing until 1930, when a plan for national industrial development was drawn up by an American firm of consulting engineers, which was known as the "Hines Plan." This plan covered provision for beet-sugar factories, a glass industry, coal and metallurgical development, mineral research and the development of the country's mineral resources. Development of the leather, silk and carpet industries, provision for cellulose and paper mills, textile works, and a number of other industrial improvements also formed part of the plan. German and other Continental specialists were engaged to work upon the application of this plan, and much of the work tendered out to German firms had its origin in these German specialists and their influence. Several years passed, however, before the industrial plan became evident in a practical way, but in 1935 it was well in hand. Construction of four large sugar beet factories was well under way, together with a large spinning and weaving plant, financed, constructed and directed by the Russians at Kayseri. Textile works were also commenced at Eregli (near Konya), Nazilli, in the Province of Aydin, Malatya, and Istanbul. On completion these works had a combined output of products calculated to reduce the adverse trade balance due to imported materials very considerably. In another direction the old-established silk industry of Bursa was very considerably modernized, together with the State and other carpet factories at Hereke, Sparta, and elsewhere. In the meantime, owing to the general improvement in local conditions, private industries of a smaller but similar nature were making progress, particularly in the Stambul and Smyrna districts. The



Kutahya ceramic industry was reorganized and glass works were constructed on the Bosphorus. Forestry development and sawmills opened up at Ayanjik and Kunduz on the Black Sea and in the Taurus range near Mersin. A British concern did remarkably fine work in developing a local refined olive oil and soap industry in Smyrna with a great future before it.

The mineral deposits of the country were receiving intensive probing by some of the best international mineralogists procurable, operating through an organization known as the M.T.A. (Maden Tetkik ve Arama Komisyonu), which resulted in opening up the famous copper deposits of Ergani and the chrome deposits of Gulamen. Other less important mineral developments were the Murgul copper deposits and those of Kuvartzana near the Russian frontier.

The national wealth of the country was reaching such a state of development that the financial side called for serious thought. Rightly or wrongly, the Turkish Government decided upon creating three autonomous State Banks—one known as the Eti Bank, which was responsible for the development of all mineral wealth proved by the M.T.A. as being economically exploitable; the second, the Sumer Bank, which undertook the exploitation and development of the textile industry, metallurgical development, and the cellulose and paper industry; the third bank was known as the Deniz Bank, to which was transferred all State shipping, port and harbour works and their development, together with docks and repair yards. This latter bank failed to operate successfully and was liquidated, its assets being transferred to the Ministry of Communications. The banks have been successful within certain limits.

Agricultural and experimental schools and laboratories were opened up, equipped with the finest appliances procurable, and an example of some of their investigations is that of jute. It has been found possible to cultivate high-class jute on a large scale in the Antalya district, comparable to the best Indian jute.

We now come to the part played by British interests in Turkey. Until 1935 there was only a small volume of trade in consumable products. No capital goods had been imported, or at any rate none of any value. The first serious effort made since 1914 was in the direction of an endeavour to secure for British interests a contract for the construction and equipment of a complete spinning and weaving mill for Nazilli, valued at £1,000,000, but it did not come to anything. It was positively impossible to reconcile British views with Turkish requirements and the German influence was very highly developed. So much time and trouble had been spent in pioneering for the textile job that the obvious thing to do was to search around in the Turkish field of enterprise for a similar scheme. After considerable effort the idea of creating an iron and steel industry took practical shape, and a tentative plan received such encouragement from the Turkish authorities that Export Credits Guarantee Department was approached with a view to securing the necessary credits. After considerable negotiation credits to the tune of £3,500,000 sterling were granted, but as a scheme it was not very successful in my opinion. In its application the main idea covering a comprehensive plan

of heavy industrial development was lost sight of, and it was a long time before it became possible to get the right elements, British and Turkish, together to enable a practical project to be developed that would not only benefit a wide section of British industry but be of real service to the Turks at the same time.

With some well-known British consulting engineers taking the leading part, a very comprehensive national industrial development plan was drawn up covering the provision of ports and harbours, shipbuilding and engineering works, coalfield development, and a wide range of smaller but no less important improvements, the total of which reached a figure approaching £10,000,000 sterling. But for political changes and administrative reshuffling at Ankara this plan would have been well under way at the outbreak of the present war and of immense benefit to Turkey, whose position it would have strengthened considerably.

I will give you a general outline of the plan. First of all, there was to be a port at Trebizond to link up with Iran via the transit road, with the possibility of a railway to follow. At Samsun, an open roadstead, there was to be a terminal port for the Samsun-Sivas Railway. At Ineboli there was to be a small port to serve the hinterland, and at Chatal Aghzy a very large port had been designed to handle the coal traffic and to act as a general port for the metallurgical works and for the interior. Then, at Ereğli, harbour refuge works were to be provided because of the wild nature of that part of the coast.

At Istanbul the estimated cost of port improvements reached 6,000,000 liras. Engineering works and shipbuilding yards were to be put up and an intercontinental bridge at a cost of £2,000,000 sterling was under consideration. In Smyrna port improvements were to be carried out at a cost of 5,000,000 liras, and at Mersin the estimate reached 10,000,000 liras, with works at Iskenderun to cost 2,000,000 liras; altogether a formidable programme. The high priority features were Trebizond, Chatal Aghzy, Istanbul and Smyrna, followed by the proposed railway from Diyarbekir across to Kotor on the Iran frontier, with a connection down to the Baghdad line.

In addition to land and sea communications the Turks got on very well with their air services. They made an arrangement with de Havilland's and purchased a number of four- and two-engined planes. Aerodromes were constructed and a service was put into operation from Istanbul to Ankara, Ankara to Smyrna, and Ankara to Adana. Other air connections were being developed when the war started, but the difficulty of supply of planes ruled them out.

Just before the war there was a fight between Deutsche Lufthansa and Imperial Airways for international flying rights over Turkey. If everything had gone normally, Imperial Airways would have probably created connections from Athens to Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbekir and Baghdad.

Now, without quoting too many figures, I would like to give you an idea of some overall dimensions regarding Turkey :

The population of Turkey is 17,869,901.

The area of the country is 777,547 kms., of which 1,170 kms. is marshland.

The land frontiers are 2,537 kms.  
 The sea coast is 3,311 miles long.  
 The population of Istanbul is 770,619.  
 The population of Izmir is 184,366.  
 The population of Ankara is 155,544.

When hostilities ceased between Britain and Turkey in 1918 the country was bankrupt and had not a cent. Yet to-day the local capital invested in national industries is 331,074,675 L.T., in addition to :

	<i>L.T.</i>
A national investment in railways of new construction	420,000,000
In the acquisition of pre-1914 railways ... ..	250,000,000*
	670,000,000
Add to that the investment in national industries ...	331,000,000
	1,001,000,000
Total ...	1,001,000,000

For a country that had nothing to start with this implies wise central control and hard work : a fine effort. It becomes more so when we take into consideration the vast amounts spent on rebuilding the armed forces and the public services to bring them to their present state, without which the country would not have been able to maintain its position among the great Powers of the world to-day.

\* How much of this account has been actually paid is not known with any accuracy.

# THE KURDS

By MAJOR H. M. BURTON

A lantern lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on December 16, 1942, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., in the Chair.

In opening the lecture the Chairman said: This Society has recently had two or three lectures on backward or difficult tribes; these have been within the British Empire. To-day Major Burton is lecturing on an ancient people, who form a minority in the three countries surrounding them—Persia, Turkey and 'Iraq. They have kept their tribal identity to a remarkable extent, in no case taking on the characteristics of their neighbours. They are a turbulent race and not easy to govern, but they have qualities which make them attractive to us—the spirit of independence and the love of sport.

Major Burton, who already spoke fluent Arabic and Turkish when he was sent up to Kurdistan as a Political Officer in 1932, soon learnt not only their language but their dialects and so was able to get to know them thoroughly and to understand their thoughts.

**I**N these days, when maps of the Middle East are much studied by the public in this country, the word Kurdistan may be noticed sprawled across the map, covering parts of Eastern Turkey, Northern 'Iraq and Western Persia. This probably means very little to anyone who has not visited the country, and as Kurdistan lies in an area of great strategic importance in the present war, some account of it and of its inhabitants may be of topical interest.

Kurdistan, or the Land of the Kurds, lies in three countries—Turkey, 'Iraq and Persia. In Turkey the territory chiefly occupied by Kurds lies generally east of the upper reaches of the River Euphrates around Lake Van; in 'Iraq to the north of the Jebel Hamrin and all country between the River Tigris and the 'Iraqi-Persian frontier; and in Persia the western provinces of Azerbaijan, Ardelan and Luristan. Although the Kurds predominate in the regions just described they are not the only inhabitants, whilst scattered settlements of Kurds also exist in other parts of Turkey and Persia, as well as in Northern Syria and in the Caucasus. To-day I shall speak almost exclusively about the Kurds of 'Iraq, since I have no personal experience of Turkish or Persian Kurdistan.


The Kurds are essentially a race of mountaineers, and nearly all the territory they occupy lies in mountainous or hilly country. There are a few exceptions, such as the great Dizai tribe who inhabit the vast grain-growing plains around Erbil, but they have migrated from the mountains in comparatively recent times. It will be seen from the map that Kurdistan lies generally on a north-west-south-east axis, conforming to the general trend of the mountain ranges. It will be noticed that this general north-west to south-east plane is continued in the trough of the Persian Gulf, and examining a map on which the Middle Eastern oilfields are

marked one notices also that they, too, lie in the same general direction, at the foot of the hill country, stretching from the Island of Qishm near Bandar Abbas on the north shore of the Gulf, through the Anglo-Persian field in South-West Persia and the 'Iraq Petroleum Company's fields around Mosul and Kirkuk to Siirt in Turkish Kurdistan, where the Turkish Government announced in 1940 they had struck oil.

In 'Iraq the mountain ranges rise gradually from south-west to north-east, and vary from an altitude of about 3,000 feet up to 7,000 and 8,000 feet. The most rugged and mountainous and inaccessible part of 'Iraq lies in the north-eastern corner, where the peaks rise to 10,000 and 12,000 feet. In Eastern Turkey the mountains are even higher, peaks rising in many places to 12,000 and 15,000 feet, and culminating in Mount Ararat (17,000 feet) at the junction of the Turkish, Russian and Persian frontiers. Lake Van, in Turkey, lies at over 6,000 feet above sea-level. The scenery is wild and most impressive, vast gorges and precipitous cliffs with a sheer drop of several thousand feet in some places. In the spring-time, with the valleys carpeted with flowers, grass and shrubs, and the mountains covered with snow, the country is seen at its best. The climate varies from extremes of heat and cold, though it is never so hot as the plains of 'Iraq. In the winter many of the villages are snow-bound for months on end.

It is quite impossible to estimate the present Kurdish population with any degree of accuracy; opinions of experts vary by as much as a minimum of 2 millions to a maximum of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  millions. Events in various parts of Kurdistan during the past quarter of a century have tended to decrease the population, and it would not be prudent to assume the maximum total of all Kurds as exceeding 3 millions at the present time, of which perhaps  $1\frac{1}{2}$  millions dwell in Turkey and about  $\frac{3}{4}$  million each in 'Iraq and Persia. The discrepancy in the estimates of authorities can probably be accounted for largely by the differences of opinion that exist as to whether certain tribes and districts should be reckoned as Kurds—for instance, some maintain that the Lurs and Bakhtiaris are Kurds, whilst others stoutly oppose this theory.

The ancient history and origins of the Kurds are subjects of considerable speculation, since the Kurds themselves have no written records or national traditions. We therefore have to rely on the information supplied by the records of neighbouring nations, of which there is fortunately a good deal. It seems to be generally agreed that the Kurds are of Aryan origin and possibly of the same original stock as the Pathans. At all events, they must have one of the longest and purest genealogies of any race in the world. The earliest references to the Kurds are supplied by Sumerian inscriptions, which often mention the land of Gutu or Gutium (Assyrian Gardu or Kardu), inhabited by a warlike race which used to come down from the mountains and attack the Sumerian cities. These people even occupied a part of Sumeria and established their rule in Southern 'Iraq for about 120 years, approximately in the second half of the third millennium B.C. (say *circa* 2200-2080 B.C.). The Babylonians also complained of attacks by the people of Gutu, whilst nearly all Assyrian monarches from 1300 B.C. onwards refer to campaigns against



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CÖL

Sirmidz  
Balad Sinjar  
Wardiya

Julamerk

Rezaieh (Urmia)

Nazirat ibn Omar  
Pirak Demka  
Rush Arush  
Orat

Oramar  
Nerivek  
Mukanish  
Herki

Ushnu

Faish Khabur  
Zakho  
Khabur

Amadiya

Ushnu

Telbuwan  
Simel

Great Zab  
Piris O

Ushnu

Eski Mosul  
Tall Afan

Dohuk  
Sheikh Adi

Ushnu

Alqosh  
Kandalah

Aqra

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Hamam Ali  
Arij

Bardarsah

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the unruly and insubordinate Gutians. We hear of these campaigns down to the time of Asshurbanipal in the seventh century B.C. After the fall of Nineveh in 612 B.C. the Kurds coalesced with the Medes and were later (about 400 B.C.) known as the Gordyene. Xenophon mentions them as the Carduchoi, and records that they gave much trouble to his ten thousand warriors during their famous retreat. The Prophet of the Zoroastrian religion, Zerdusht (*circa* 600 B.C.), is said to have been a Kurd of the Province of Azerbaijan, and although the Kurds are to-day nominally Muslims, certain traces of their Zoroastrian origin still linger. The Zoroastrians revered Fire as the Symbol of Purity, and many tribes all over Kurdistan still show a reverence for Fire. The connection may also be traced in the sanctity bestowed on trees—wood being regarded as an agent in the production of fire. Zoroaster preached the protection of dogs as the friends of man, whereas the Muslim regards the dog as unclean. But the Kurds place much value and trust in their magnificent sheep-dogs, and especially prize the “tanjiy,” a kind of saluki used for hunting. I remember once arriving at a village in Kurdistan where a mad dog was running about snapping at people, dogs and other animals. The village headman raised no objection to my shooting the mad dog, which was a pariah, but begged me to spare a “tanjiy” which the villagers told me had been bitten.

The Kurds themselves have a quaint legend about their origin. They say that King Solomon sent for four hundred fair maidens from the East, and on their way they fell into the hands of the devils in the mountains, the progeny of this strange union being the Kurds. This possibly accounts for their remarkably handsome appearance and martial instincts.

The Kurdish language is often loosely described as a rough dialect of Persian—a kind of Persian “patois”—for in some parts of Kurdistan it might appear as such to anyone acquainted with Persian. This theory is, however, disproved by examination of the numerous dialects, which differ so much as to render some tribes mutually unintelligible. But underlying all these different dialects is a basic syntax and grammar common to all, but with little relation to Persian. There is some affinity between Pushtu and Kurdish; the latter, whilst retaining much of the original Sanskrit, has borrowed some words from Persian, Arabic, Chaldean and Armenian, according to their local contacts and the influence of Islam, but the syntax has remained remarkably pure. The oldest form of the Kurdish language is that spoken by the Mukri tribe in Lahijan, south of Lake Urmia, and at Sauj Bulaq in Persia, the headquarters of the Mukri tribe. This is the country where Zoroaster was born and commenced his teaching, and the language spoken by the Mukri tribe is probably one of the oldest forms of Aryan speech in use to-day. The Kurdish language was never written before the last war, so that no standard form has been brought into general use. Now it is written with Arabic characters, which are just as unsuitable for Kurdish as they were for Turkish, both languages being based on vowel sounds as opposed to the Semitic use of consonants. The meaning of a Kurdish word may be altered completely by a slight change in its pronunciation and inflexions of certain vowels. This makes it very difficult for foreigners to acquire a perfect accent. In 'Iraq it is spoken

in a rather attractive lilt, somewhat like the Persian rhythm. Contrary to popular supposition, a considerable Kurdish literature exists. One of the best-known modern authors is Shaikh Riza, a member of the Talabani family of Kirkuk, who wrote poetry in four languages. Sulaimani has produced many poets in the two centuries since it was founded by the great Baban family, whilst in Turkey we may notice Idris, the historian, a Kurd of Bitlis, to whom Sultan Selim I. entrusted the organization of Armenia and Kurdistan after defeating Shah Ismail in 1514. Another Kurd from Bitlis, Sharaf ud-Din Bey Hakkari, produced their best-known literary work, the famous history of the Kurds known as the *Sharaf-Nama*, though it was not written in the Kurdish language. Folk-songs, mostly dealing with the popular themes of love and war, are common all over Kurdistan, and with these and interminable legends and anecdotes the Kurds while away the time during the long winter months when their villages are snowed up.

The Kurds are generally known to the outside world as a race of bloodthirsty brigands, whose principal pleasure in life consists in slitting the throats of any unfortunate travellers who may be obliged to pass through or near their territory. They have also been described as treacherous and unbalanced. That such sweeping generalizations are totally misleading I can vouch for from personal experience, for during my two years in Kurdistan I travelled extensively in remote districts with only a small escort of 'Iraqi policemen. That brigandage has existed, sometimes on a large scale, in various parts of Kurdistan at different times cannot be denied, but this state of affairs has been due to economic factors and the ineffectiveness of Government control as much as to any natural inclination on the part of the Kurds. They share, however, with many other highland races a martial spirit, strengthened and developed, no doubt, by their tribal organizations, on which they have always relied for their security in preference to the protection offered them by alien Governments. The Kurds are intensely proud and extremely loyal to their tribal chiefs. They have a strict code of honour and, like many other Eastern races, both Christian and Muslim, show hospitality towards strangers which is at times almost overwhelming. The guest house is a great feature of Kurdish social life. Every Kurdish Agha, or chief, maintains one of these institutions, in which he entertains all and sundry on as lavish a scale as his resources permit. His reputation, indeed, depends very largely on the degree of generosity he displays in the maintenance of his guest house. Every traveller, whatever his position, is entitled to free board and lodging at the Agha's expense, though if the visit be an extended one it is usual for the visitor to make some contribution in the shape of flour, tea, coffee, sugar, etc.

The Kurdish peasant may appear rather dour and dense to a stranger, with a somewhat slow sense of humour. Like many other highland races he is extremely taciturn, but though ignorant and unsophisticated he possesses plenty of natural intelligence and common sense, as illustrated by the following anecdote: An officer of the R.A.F. was showing one of the Aghas of the Pizhder tribe over a big troop-carrying aeroplane. After explaining in detail the wonders of the machine, its size, weight and



speed, and the number of armed men it could carry, the officer, thinking to impress the Agha, whom he probably regarded as a primitive savage, concluded: "And the whole of this vast machine flies." He was a little taken aback by the Agha's laconic reply: "Well, I suppose that's what it was made for."

All Kurds have violent tempers, which can be roused easily and sometimes unexpectedly. Rich, an early traveller in Kurdistan, relates a story of a chief of the Khushnao tribe who became so enraged with a fly that would settle on his eyelid that, drawing his dagger, he struck at his eye and blinded himself. Every Kurd carries a "khanjar," or long curved dagger, in his voluminous waistbelt, and when travelling from place to place, or accompanying any of their chiefs, or even lounging about in the guest houses, many of them wear bandoliers stuffed with ammunition and rifles slung over their shoulders. Some of the more fortunate possess revolvers. The simple Kurdish tribesman does not understand the subtlety of words peculiar to a bureaucratic form of administration; his own speech is simple and direct, so that when he feels he is being led into a trap in a discussion with one of his more "civilized" fellow-creatures he instinctively resorts to his weapons for protection—regarding them as his most reliable friends when he finds himself in a corner.

Kurdish society is based mainly upon a tribal system, but, although this form may have been maintained from time immemorial, the present tribal organization cannot be traced to any very remote past. In a list of eighteen principal tribes drawn up by the Arab historian Masudi in the tenth century only two or three names can be recognized to-day. A fourteenth-century list contains a number of identical names, and it is probable that certain Kurdish families can trace their descent from the Omayyad Caliphs. Many of the present-day tribal chiefs, or "Aghas" (as they are called in Kurdistan), belong to quite a different class from the ordinary tribesman, and probably represent a powerful family which at some period has invaded tribal territory and seized the tribesmen's lands. In this case the Agha is a landlord and the system prevailing is feudal rather than tribal. But in the remoter mountain districts the tribal chiefs are of the same stock as the tribesman, being the head of a family which has won its position through military prowess. The position of the tribal Aghas is much the same as that of a feudal baron in mediæval England. Justice under the tribal system is administered in accordance with the ancient code of tribal law, based largely on Koranic precepts, and the law of retaliation—"an eye for an eye . . ." With the extension of control amongst the tribes by an external authority in the shape of the Government, tribal institutions and the powers of the Aghas are being gradually limited, though it is interesting to note that in 'Iraq the Government still draws a distinction between a murder committed in accordance with tribal custom and one which is not, the former cases falling under a special code for which the maximum penalty is two years' imprisonment, the latter under the ordinary criminal code which prescribes death for a murderer.

The Kurds may be classed as sedentary, or settled, semi-nomadic,

and nomadic. In the first class are the settled dwellers in towns and villages, many of whom are non-tribal, usually tenants of some Agha or dignitary living in a town. They will, however, generally place themselves under the protection of the nearest tribal Agha when trouble arises. The semi-nomadic tribes are those which make seasonal migrations from their villages in search of pasture for their flocks. Most Kurdish tribes are to some extent semi-nomadic, at any rate those living in the mountains, for they nearly all desert their villages in the spring or early summer for pasturages higher up in the mountains, where the melting of the snows reveals fresh grass after grazing lower down has been used or burnt up by the summer heat. Amongst the purely nomadic tribes in 'Iraq one of the largest and most important is the Herki, whilst some sections of the Jaf, in the Sulaimani district, are also nomadic. The nomads live all the year round in tents. The Herki tribe has a great reputation for bravery and physical endurance. Each year they descend from the high mountains along the Persian frontier between Lake Urmia and Rowanduz, with their vast flocks of sheep and cattle, to the lower slopes in 'Iraqi territory, on both banks of the Greater Zab River. One of the most frequent causes of trouble in Kurdistan arises from the question of grazing rights, and these migratory tribes are a real problem to the Government authorities in this respect. Largely for this reason, and because a bureaucratic administration naturally finds it difficult to deal with nomads, the Governments of the various countries concerned have placed more and more obstacles in the path of these annual migrations, gradually compelling them to abandon their normal summer pastures, which frequently lay across the frontiers of a neighbouring country. The tendency, therefore, is for nomads to become semi-nomads, and for semi-nomads to become settled. To anyone who has lived amongst nomads, whether Kurd or Arab, and learned to appreciate their healthy care-free life, the settling of the tribes is distasteful, especially when one realizes that the more "civilized" they become the less happy they are likely to be; for my own conviction, based on experience of primitive races in both Asia and Africa, is that the happiest of mortals are those who lead the most primitive lives. But the natural instinct of man to strive for the achievement of what he believes to be progress, combined with the whole process of evolution, carries us farther and farther away from that idyllic primitive state in which one may truly say that ignorance is bliss. The fact is that modern constitutional Governments inevitably mean the end of the nomad, for with the gradual spread of education and communications more and more people become settled on the land, which means less land for the nomads to graze on. The increase in Government control means a tightening-up of the taxes which the nomad has to pay for grazing and water rights; furthermore, as noticed above, the nomads' movements are now severely restricted by frontier regulations so that he cannot pass to his ancient grazing-grounds. His life therefore becomes impossible economically, and he is gradually compelled to abandon his nomadic habits.

The Kurds have never attained any political cohesion or independence as a nation, though from time to time outstanding chiefs and leaders have

formed independent states comprising only a part of Kurdistan. Such states have seldom survived the lifetime of their founders, the most notable exception being the administration set up by Idris, the historian of the Hakkari tribe (referred to earlier), which continued until Sherif Bey was captured by the Turks in 1849. The princes of Bitlis remained independent throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and controlled all the country round Lake Van and up to Erivan and Bayazid. In the nineteenth century several rebellions in various parts of Kurdistan aimed at the establishment of local autonomy. In 1806 Abdur-rahman Pasha, one of the famous Baban family of Sulaimani, conducted a stubborn campaign against the Turkish forces, but was finally defeated in 1808 at the Bazian Pass, the scene of so many bloody battles throughout the history of Southern Kurdistan. In 1826 Muhammad Pasha, known as the Blind Pasha (also of the Baban family), established a powerful and autocratic rule from Rowanduz, his sway extending as far as Kirkuk and Erbil, and away to the north as far as Zakho, Amadia and even Mardin. Many remains of buildings and forts erected by him are pointed out by the Kurds in the Rowanduz district to-day. His power was short-lived, however, for in 1838 the Turks lured him into a trap and he was put to death. In the 1840's a rising by Badr Khan Bey was firmly suppressed, and in 1880-81 the famous Shaikh Obaidullah attempted to found an independent Kurdish state under the protection of Turkey. This was at first favoured by the Ottoman Government as a reply to the Russian Government's projected formation of an Armenian state, but later the Central Government reasserted its authority. In 1891 the Sultan strengthened the position of the Kurds by the formation of a body of Kurdish irregular cavalry known as Hamidieh, after the Sultan Abdul Hamid. This was done as an offset to Armenian aspirations and led to minor disturbances, culminating in the Armenian massacres of 1894-96, in which the Kurds took a prominent part. After the Turkish Revolution of 1908 the Kurds generally remained loyal to the old régime. Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds terrorized the country round 'Urfa, Diarbekr, Mardin and Nisibin, while Shaikh Said of Sulaimani and the Shaikh of Barzan led rebellions in Central and Southern Kurdistan. Shaikh Said was murdered in Mosul in 1908, and his son, Shaikh Mahmud, carried on the state of rebellion, which he has continued ever since, right up to the present day. After the last war a form of autonomy was envisaged for Kurdistan under the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 10, 1920, but never ratified, owing to the rise of Republican Turkey. On the signing of the Armistice with Turkey in 1918 Major Soane, as a representative of the political department of the British Expeditionary Force in 'Iraq, was sent to Sulaimani, which he knew intimately from his remarkable travels in Southern Kurdistan before the Great War. He appointed as governor Shaikh Mahmud, and instituted a form of local autonomy. Shaikh Mahmud promptly showed his gratitude by seizing and imprisoning all British officials in Sulaimani, and defeated a small British force near Sulaimani in May, 1919. He was, however, defeated and captured the following month at the Bazian Pass. Although condemned to exile on this and several other occasions, he has always been allowed to

return to the Sulaimani district, where he invariably recommences his intrigues against Government authority, culminating in acts of violence. He commands tremendous respect and authority amongst the Kurds in the Sulaimani district on account of his religious connections and antecedents. The term "Shaikh" in Kurdistan denotes a holy man, often the leader of a sect of dervishes. These men acquire great power over their followers, and it is more often they than the tribal Aghas who resent the increase of Government authority, which they know means a curtailment of their own personal power and prestige. One has frequently heard that the numerous rebellions which have taken place in Turkish Kurdistan from 1925 onwards were due to the hostility of the Shaikhs towards the religious reforms carried out by the Republican Government, which of course entailed the abolition of the power of the Shaikhs. Kamal Atatürk realized that he could not carry through his programme of modernization without first abolishing all dervish sects, which he most wisely proceeded to do.

Quite apart from any political or economic objections to the formation of an independent state of Kurdistan, the very character of the Kurds themselves renders it impossible, at any rate at the present stage of their development. Not only are there incessant intertribal feuds, but even more bitter quarrels between sections and sub-sections of the same tribe, which latter practically amount to family quarrels. This characteristic is no doubt derived from the manner in which the Kurds have, from time immemorial, been cut off from each other and from the outside world by mountains, each family or sub-section of a tribe being self-contained within their own valley. Any stranger attempting to penetrate their domains was regarded as a potential menace to their security and economic welfare, to be destroyed before he could do them any harm. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Kurds have never taken kindly to the rule of alien Governments. All the great empires that have risen and fallen around them, the conquerors passing from east to west and *vice versa*, have failed to tame the Kurds and impose their civilizations upon them. Assyrian, Greek, Roman, Parthian, Persian, Arab, Mongol and Turk have in turn tried and failed to subdue this virile race of mountaineers. The Kurds must be the only race that ever massacred Mongols, for it is recorded that Hulagu Khan despatched one of his lieutenants to deal with the Kurds, who retaliated by massacring 20,000 Mongols before the gates of Erbil!

Unfortunately little love is lost between the Kurds and the ruling races of the countries in which they live. The Arabs and Kurds in particular dislike each other, possibly due to the one being Aryan and the other Semitic. Certainly they are poles apart in temperament. The Kurd looks down from his snow-capped mountains on the plain-dwelling Arab, whom he regards as an inferior creature, whilst the Arabs' opinion of the Kurds is shortly expressed in their saying, "There are three plagues in the world—the Kurd, the rat and the locust." Paradoxically, Kurdish chiefs, who attach great importance to their ancestry, always try to prove their descent from an Arab, preferably one of the early adherents of the Prophet.

In my opinion, the development of communications and spread of education are the keys to the settlement of the Kurds as peaceful and law-abiding citizens. Attempts to break up the tribes and exterminate the Aghas by force of arms only harden resistance to the Central Government, cause unnecessary suffering and impoverish the country. That the Kurds are an able race is proved by the records of individual Kurds throughout history, from Cyrus the Great, who conquered Babylon in the sixth century B.C., and Saladin, who opposed the Crusaders, down to the numerous Kurds who have rendered distinguished service in the Ottoman Empire and in the service of the present 'Iraqi Government. The Kurds are traders by nature, extremely industrious and thrifty. I believe that these qualities will find far more scope, and an outlet more profitable to the Kurds themselves, through co-operation with larger nations than by seeking to maintain a precarious state of independence in their native mountains. The levelling-up of the whole world to a common standard of living and civilization appears to be inevitable, and indeed essential, for the future welfare of mankind and the maintenance of peace. Nevertheless, those of us who have travelled and lived and worked amongst the primitive races of the earth will not witness this process without a pang of regret, coupled with sympathy and a certain admiration for peoples who, through their physical courage and sturdy independent spirit, have been able to maintain their own way of life throughout the ages.

In closing the meeting the CHAIRMAN said: The Kurds and their problems form a most interesting subject for study, but we must remember that their settlement is not our responsibility and that the interests of nations other than our own are closely involved. I am sure I express the minds of all present when I thank Major Burton most warmly for his talk to us to-day; it has not only been very informative but extremely interesting.

## WANTED: A FRONTIER POLICY

By LIEUT.-COLONEL E. NOEL

**T**HE title of this article implies that the Government has no frontier policy. A reaction to such a criticism may ask, "Why should it?" Government has, in the past, dealt with each frontier situation as it arose, and will continue to do so.

If it is true that Government has no frontier policy it can be said that it has evolved a system of frontier administration. A defence of this system appeared about three years ago in a series of articles that appeared in the *Statesman* of Calcutta. The articles were obviously written from the point of view of Government and gave reasons justifying what Government had done. The articles showed that Government's action on the frontier can be classified as follows :

1. Stationing troops in tribal territory against the wishes of the people. Waziristan is the only example. It may be objected that Razmak was occupied with the consent of the Wazirs. It was not a genuine or spontaneous consent. It was obtained by Government's pressure, using as a lever the enmity between the Wazirs and Mahsuds.

2. Stationing troops in tribal territory with the consent of the people or with their subsequent acceptance. The examples are Malakand, Kurram, Miranshah and the Khyber.

3. Leaving the tribes alone, as in the case of the Orakzai, the Afridis, the Mohmands and the Hazara border tribes.

4. Support to independent rulers—*i.e.*, the Wali of Swat, the Nawab of Dir and the Mehtar of Chitral.

It is clear that the one method that has signally failed is the first—namely, stationing troops in tribal territory against the wishes of the people.

The *Statesman apologia* thus boils down to the defence of the move to Razmak in 1923.

The author (a former Resident in Waziristan) nowhere stated clearly the arguments in favour of this move, but by implication they would appear to be: (a) The turbulence of the tribesmen. (b) That the only alternative, which, to use the author's own words, is "a continuous barbed-wire line with tanks and men standing shoulder to shoulder," is impracticable and not likely to succeed. (c) That the system in Waziristan worked well till 1936 and that there are hopes that it will again start functioning successfully provided we persist and don't lose heart.

The first contention is answered by the admitted ability of the Mahsuds and Wazirs to govern themselves in the past.

The following are extracts from the *Bannu District Gazetteer* :

"These events were followed by a period of comparative peace (1871-1881). The years of the second Afghan War were undisturbed by any tribal risings on the Bannu border, and stores were regularly

despatched to Thal via Gumatti and Zerwam without even a military escort."

There was a slight ebullition in 1881, but this was again followed by seventeen years of calm, which the *Gazetteer* describes as follows:

"The period 1881-1894 was comparatively uneventful. Border offences were not infrequent, but were never so serious as to call for military action, and most of the cases were satisfactorily settled by means of the tribal *maliks* or *jirgahs*."

The second begs the question. A reply is contained in the author's own words when he says "the temptation to occupy Mohmand country in 1915 was resisted." The result was that the Mohmand problem was solved by other means. It is not explained why the temptation to occupy Razmak in 1923 was not also resisted. The author might have mentioned that the move to Razmak was sponsored by the Commander-in-Chief and the Viceroy and was unsuccessfully resisted by the Chief Commissioner.

It might also be mentioned that in 1935 the temptation to interfere in Tirah was on the point of not being resisted. However, the reactions of the Afridis were sufficiently patent to preserve us from a repetition of the 1923 decision.

The third argument is wishful thinking and requires no answer.

The political status of tribal territory—*i.e.*, the areas between the settled districts and Afghanistan—cannot remain static. The alternatives are: (a) Absorption in British India; (b) absorption in Afghanistan; (c) some form of self-government which must contain the seeds of progress.

This note is based on the assumption that the last solution is the most desirable.

Before making any suggestion regarding frontier policy it will be advisable to state the elements of the problem.

1. There is among Pathans a strong desire for independence. The presence of troops amongst them against their wishes is, therefore, provocative.

2. The Pathans are by nature democratic. They may occasionally accept dictators, but the power of these dictators is usually of a religious nature. Pathans use dictators in the struggle for independence.

3. The tribal system has in the past functioned more or less successfully—*i.e.*, in the days previous to the British occupation and for some time after it many Pathan tribes did govern themselves. There is, therefore, no justification for saying that Wazirs and Mahsuds are incapable of repeating what they and other Pathan tribes have done in the past.

4. The Kurram, Malakand, Miran Shah and the Khyber, in which garrisons are maintained, are different from other tracts. The Kurram, because the Shias rely for protection on Government from surrounding Sunnis; in Malakand and Miran Shah, owing to the existence of rich fertile lands, the presence of garrisons is accepted; in the Khyber, the tribesmen realize the need for an international highway.

5. In large tracts of Swat and Dir, Pathans are in minorities, and these minorities are isolated. Behind them are the peaceful tribes of

Central Asia and not an Afghan hinterland, as in the case of the rest of the frontier.

6. The two terms "Forward Policy" and "Close Border System" are portmanteau words which are differently interpreted. "Forward Policy" really connotes control of the tribesmen by troops stationed in their country; the "Close Border System" is control through the "Economic Weapons." Many look upon the words "close border" as synonymous with complete segregation. This is not so. Normally, intercourse between the settled districts and tribal territory would be entirely free. There is, however, always the threat of the economic weapon—*i.e.*, segregation. To make that threat effective a continuous "barbed-wire line" may in some cases be necessary. It was for the Mohmands. The line has since almost disappeared. In the case of the Orakzais no such line has been found necessary. The presence of the continuous line makes the blockade or Brampta effective and thus brings into play the economic weapon.

7. In Waziristan, before 1923, the economic weapons failed because no continuous line was built. If a fraction of the money spent on Waziristan had been applied before 1923 to the construction of a continuous line, the economic weapon would have been as effective as it was against the Mohmands in 1915 and the Afridis in 1931.

8. The *Statesman* article alleges the failure of the "Close Border System" in the case of the Ahmadzai salient. Here the economic weapon could not be applied owing to the absence of a continuous line. It might also be mentioned that the sponsors of the 1923 move to Razmak maintained that it would bring under control from the rear areas such as the Ahmadzai salient.

Now that the elements of the problem have been stated, it is time to turn to criticism of the present methods and suggestions for the future.

The author of the *Statesman* articles maintains that Government has got a policy which is to "teach, help, induce or finally make the tribesmen control themselves."

As a statement of policy this is admirable, but Government has never laid down how this policy is to be carried out. Every Political Agent, every Chief Commissioner has had his own ideas.\* Different systems exist all along the frontier which are mostly the result of a combination of opportunism and drift. The general trend of the present methods is to break down the tribal system and thus unfit the tribesmen from ever controlling themselves.

The following examples can be quoted of how the present administration does not support the tribal system and, therefore, does not prepare the tribes to control themselves.

1. Tribesmen, owing to the weakening of their tribal system, approach a Political Agent, admitting their inability to settle a feud, and ask Government to impose a truce, with the condition that whosoever breaks it will

\* Of Chief Commissioners two—namely, Sir Frederick Cunningham and Mr. Merk—were full-out "Forward Policy" men. Supporters of the "Close Border System" were Sir Donald McNabb, Sir Harold Deane and Sir John Maffey. Two of them resigned because their views were not accepted.



be fined. The Political Agent agrees, whereas he should have persuaded them and, if necessary, made them settle it themselves; in other words, govern themselves. The Political Agent should have warned tribes that if they failed to settle the dispute and raiding in British territory ensued, then the economic weapon—*i.e.*, blockade—would be applied against them to force them to come to a settlement, a necessary preliminary to resuming “self-government.”

2. The tribal system is based on the village *jirgah*. A number of villages are grouped together into a *tappah*, which in its turn has its own *jirgah*. All village disputes are settled by a village *jirgah*, and in case of disagreement by the *tappah jirgah*, which also decides inter-village disputes. This system has been in many cases ignored and in others not properly supported. Subordinate staffs are particularly to blame, especially in cases where, owing to the Political Agent's other pre-occupations, non-representative persons have been allowed to come on to these *jirgahs*.

3. All Pathan tribes at one time had well-defined customary law. We have not made sufficient efforts to record it and insist on *jirgahs* observing it. If *jirgah* follow customary law there is much more likelihood of their keeping straight, and thus making the tribal system a success. Political Agents, partly through want of a policy and partly because of the too numerous Indian staff, allow *jirgahs* to decide questions of fact instead of *rawaj*.

The following is a concrete example :

A. murders B. because he is his wife's lover. The Yusafzai *rawaj* is that A. must declare at the time his wife's infidelity with B. and is then entitled to kill both B. and his wife. If the case goes to *jirgah* the latter does not settle the question of fact—*i.e.*, whether A. murdered B.—but, according to *rawaj*, imposes oaths on A., who, with two of his relatives, has to swear on the Quran that his wife went wrong with B. If the *jirgahs* stick to *rawaj* their decisions will be accepted by the tribe.

Allow *jirgahs* to decide on questions of fact and the way is opened to corruption and the play of faction.

4. A tribal *jirgah* proves recalcitrant and refuses to come and see the Political Agent. Negotiations are opened up with individual members of the *jirgah*—in other words, a wrench is deliberately thrown into the delicate democratic machine of the tribal system.

5. In many Agencies the subordinate staffs are far too numerous—*e.g.*, in North Waziristan there are no less than twenty-two Moharrirs and in South Waziristan seventeen. It is this extensive subordinate staff which interferes with the tribal system.

6. When an officer is appointed Political Agent for the first time he has nothing to guide him. The result is that every Political Agent has his own ideas regarding the *jirgah* system. The Co-ordinating Authority—namely, the Chief Commissioner (now the Governor)—changes. Each change brings in new ideas.

7. The system of paying large allowances to so-called tribal leaders tends to undermine the tribal system. An outstanding example is that of the Afridis' Maliks, who for long years have severed most of their connections with the tribes and live in Peshawar.

8. The payments to the tribes of allowance; Khassadari and Inaams which are mainly personal do not assist the setting up of a strong and independent tribal Government. A larger proportion of the present payments should be devoted to schools, hospitals, etc.—*i.e.*, to the nation-building activities.

The cardinal note of the Government's frontier policy should be the re-establishment of the tribal system with a view to the tribes controlling themselves. The weapon used will be the economic one, and would only be applied when conditions in tribal territory result in offences being committed in settled districts or in Afghanistan. This weapon will be used to make the different sections of a tribe compose their differences sufficiently to stop raiding. In no cases will Government take sides or support a so-called "loyal" section by either money or military action. The function of the troops is to prevent, if necessary, tribesmen from entering British territory and thus to allow the economic weapon to work. Protection from raids is an incidental duty.

In every problem the Political Agent must continually ask himself the question, "How can tribal authority be supported?" He must resist the temptation to "divide and rule," and also the temptation to interfere, even if both sides ask him to. In the past there have been many occasions where the attainment of the immediate object, and with it kudos for the Political Agent, was obtainable by exploiting tribal jealousies and the judicious expenditure of money. But, as such methods must inevitably weaken the tribal system, the temptation to have recourse to them must be firmly resisted.

It may be asked how practical effect can be given to the views here enunciated. Clearly, the section of the frontier where present methods have most gone astray is Waziristan. How, then, are we to "teach, help, induce and finally make the Wazirs and Mahsuds control themselves"?

The following suggestions are only tentative :

A careful preliminary survey of social and economic conditions is essential, and a policy based on principles has to be modified in accordance with conditions. As, however, Mr. Everyman likes to see the practical application of principle, the following outline is put forward.

Big and representative *jirgahs* of Mahsuds and Wazirs would be held to announce to the tribes Government's new policy of tribal independence and self-government, and Government's willingness to withdraw garrisons on conditions that the tribal system is restored and tribal *jirgahs* accept responsibility to stop raids. (The question of refusing an asylum to offenders from settled districts need not at this stage be raised. It will be sufficient if tribesmen guarantee that such offenders will not commit offences in British territory.)

*Rawaj* will be modified and the tribesmen helped to draw up a tribal constitution based thereon.

Tribes will be warned that Government will refuse to intervene in their domestic quarrels, which they must settle themselves. If they fail to do so, and as a result they raid into British territory or Afghanistan, then Government would impose the blockade to force them to compose their quarrels and restore the tribal system.

Government will no longer be under any obligation to pay Khassadari and other allowances, as the tribesmen no longer accept responsibility for the safety of persons from British territory in their country. Government, however, in order to set up strong and independent tribal Governments, will be ready to continue the same measure of financial assistance provided it is used for nation-building activities—namely, hospitals, schools, etc.\*

It is very possible that a large number of tribesmen would oppose the withdrawal of troops, especially if coupled with a proposal to convert Khassadari and other personal allowances into subsidies for education, health, etc. But what an asset would it be if we could use the threat of withdrawal to build up the tribal system.

Eventually the presence of troops in Waziristan might be generally accepted, as at Landi Kotal or Malakand. A decision to retain garrisons would on principle be resisted, and if accepted would be contingent on overwhelming tribal support.

\* It may be asked how schools and hospitals can function in tribal territory under a close border system—*i.e.*, when the tribes accept no responsibility for the safety of persons from the settled districts. The reply is that schoolmasters, doctors, veterinary surgeons, agriculturalists, engineers should be recruited from the tribesmen themselves, and after receiving their training in India will go to their own country to look after the schools, hospitals, etc., which are set up. This is, of course, a long-term policy. Immediate application may be difficult. This difficulty is another example of Government's lack of policy in the past.

# THE CAMPAIGN IN AND EVACUATION OF BURMA

By T. L. HUGHES, C.B.E.

A shortened account of a lecture given at a Members' Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society on November 3, 1943, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., in the Chair.

SO much arrant nonsense has been talked and written about the Burma campaign that I welcome this opportunity of throwing some light on the events which actually occurred there, and I think you may take it that the material for this address is the result of considerable and careful research into the various reports dealing with the civil side of the Burma campaign. I will first attempt to convey to you something of what happened in that unfortunate country from the time of Pearl Harbour. I then propose to examine some of the criticisms which have been levelled at the Burma Civil Government. Before I do so I would like to utter a word of caution against accepting too much of what has already been written and published by alleged eyewitnesses or first-hand observers. In a book published not so very long ago dealing with the events in the Far East, for example, it was claimed that all the photographs appearing in the book were taken by the author, a newspaper correspondent. Now, four of the photographs show the destruction of Rangoon on March 7, 1942, and since on that date the author was, on his own admission, in Maymyo, some 450 miles away from Rangoon, I think the accuracy of his claim is open to grave question; either that or he must have possessed a singularly remarkable camera! Two other bloomers are noteworthy in that they are completely false. One concerns "hostile" Burmans setting upon the Rangoon demolitionists when, in fact, no Burmans were about, and I know, for I was there; and the other concerns the alleged ramming of a country boat containing Japanese and Burmans by an officer who had left Rangoon fifteen days before it was blown. I could add many more examples to indicate that the author of this particular book had collected much of his information in the bar of Calcutta's leading hotel, but time is short, there is a lot of ground to cover, and all I would ask is that next time you happen to read an alleged eyewitness's account of the Burma or any other campaign you should bear in mind the three large grains of salt which I have just presented to you.

Invasion is an ugly thing. Let no one who has not been the victim of an invasion enter hastily the ranks of those critics who, after the fighting has died down, sit back in their armchairs and say *this* was not done and *that* should have been done. Inevitably invasion casts a wide net of confusion before it. In these days of totalitarian warfare invasion is not merely a military concern. As the invaders sweep on the whole population of the country becomes involved. Communications break down,

precise information is scanty, a new enemy—rumour—makes his appearance. All these factors, together with the almost insoluble problem of moving a horde of refugees, beset the civil administration during the invasion of Burma. It would be idle to pretend that under these circumstances every move was carried out with precision or that mistakes were not made. Just as from a military viewpoint Burma was ill-prepared to resist an invasion of such dimensions as Japan employed against her, so was the civil administration not fully organized to cope with 100 per cent. efficiency with all the problems which arose. Burma was not thinking in terms of defeat. The whole emphasis was to continue the export from Burma of supplies which the United Nations urgently required and to encourage the maximum flow of war material from Rangoon to China.

The situation in Burma can be likened to that which existed in Great Britain at the time of the fall of France. The idea that this great country would or indeed could be invaded seemed quite fantastic. Apart from anything else, our sea moat was there to protect us. Our Navy was intact. We have only got to remember the amount of hasty preparations which was embarked upon after Dunkirk to realize how little was done before that crucial moment. Great Britain's hastily improvised defence measures were, thank God, never tested by the reality of invasion, and she was given time to face up to this new threat; not a moment of that time was wasted. Burma, on the other hand, was given no such breathing space. Invasion came almost at the same moment as the realization that invasion was a probability.

Japanese troops invaded Burmese soil on December 9, just two days after Pearl Harbour, when a strong force marched on Victoria Point at the extreme southern end of Tenasserim. Victoria Point, the headquarters of a sub-division, fell to the enemy on December 15. Its fate was shared shortly afterwards first by Tavoy and then Mergui. Meanwhile, Rangoon had come in for its share of attention. On December 23, 1941, a few minutes before ten o'clock in the morning, with the streets thronged with people on their way to work or on shopping expeditions, the sirens sounded for Rangoon's first air raid. In spite of the heavy toll taken of the Japanese by the A.V.G. and the R.A.F. (the score was eleven enemy planes destroyed as against three of ours) they succeeded in breaking through to the Mingaladon aerodrome and to the city itself. In the city very great damage both to life and property resulted. The main enemy objectives appeared to be the river front and the power station. Along the Strand Road hundreds of Indian coolies were interested spectators of the dog fights overhead, and on these unfortunates stick after stick of fragmentation bombs rained down. Small wonder that there were over 2,000 deaths in this raid alone, for fragmentation bombs do a lot of damage to sightseers.

Rangoon's Christmas present from Nippon duly arrived in the shape of some eighty bombers and twenty fighters. The R.A.F. and A.V.G. again went up and accounted for fourteen fighters and seven bombers with four probables. Our own losses were negligible.

The effect of these raids on the city was electric. They were followed by a general dispersal of the bulk of Rangoon's population of half a

million people, three-fifths of whom were Indians. Hence the grim spectacle of a continuous procession of Indians—men, women and children—streaming out of Rangoon. At the beginning of the New Year upwards of 100,000 people were either congregated at Prome or on the road thereto. Open spaces on the perimeter of Rangoon attracted many more thousands, particularly of the labouring class. Thus around the Royal Lakes, under the shelter of the trees, there were estimated to be 5,000 people cooking their food, bathing, drinking and excreting without a thought for the rudiments of sanitation. On the life of the city itself the effect of this mass exodus was paralysing. It is true that light and water services, telegraphic communications, food distribution, and rail and river services were with difficulty maintained, but conditions otherwise were truly chaotic. The Indian labourer had hitherto provided the motive power for the city's manifold activities. He it was who loaded and unloaded most of the ships in the harbour, who manhandled food supplies, who disposed of the night conservancy. Without him work in the port came to a full stop, the distribution of food supplies ceased and those quarters unblest by water-borne sanitation became places to avoid. Public transport had ceased to function, bazaars remained closed, shops were shut and trade was at a standstill. Subordinate employees of Government and commercial houses were among the absentees; hospital menial staffs disappeared, as did many of the nurses. Many private servants, including cooks, left their situations overnight and their employers in the lurch. Something had to be done, and that quickly, to start the city functioning again, and to cater for the strange and varied problems created by the exodus.

In order that there should be an officer to cope with such an emergency as had now arisen the post of Chief Liaison Officer had been created earlier in the year, and this officer immediately got down to the task of creating order out of the existing chaos. He became the virtual dictator of Rangoon, assisted by a selected body of secretaries to Government and a representative of the British commercial firms. This body immediately achieved fame as the "Soviet," and right well did it perform its task. It met every morning to discuss the events of the preceding day and to devise emergency measures for dealing with the new problems which were continually arising. In late December the need to get essential workers back on to the job in the shortest possible time was the most pressing problem, for it would indeed have been a serious matter if the life of the city had closed down merely because of two air raids. In dealing with the refugee labour problem the policy adopted was—

(i.) to organize camps in which refugees could be assembled and cared for;

(ii.) to send out reliable Indians to live with and to talk to the refugees while they were resting and readjusting their minds to a situation quite beyond their comprehension; and

(iii.) to try to persuade the refugees to return to camps near Rangoon, where transport facilities could be provided to take them to and from their work and where they would be properly looked after.

This policy produced good dividends. By the end of December the

refugees were showing an inclination to return to Rangoon and to take advantage of the free transport which was provided for their return journey. This was only six days after the second raid. By January 2, 1942, the flow-back was more marked and incoming trains were full to overflowing. As one vernacular newspaper happily put it: "The city is returning to normal; daylight burglaries have started again."

While the seas were still open maximum efforts were made to build up imports of essential commodities so as to ensure a state of self-sufficiency, while exports of products of value to the imperial war effort—*e.g.*, timber, tin, wolfram and rubber—were expedited. The "Soviet" kept this policy very clearly before it when engaged otherwise than in hastily improvising plans to meet fresh emergencies. In the midst of these manifold activities the enemy thrust at Moulmein took place.

When the first shock had passed, a whole series of new moves had to be initiated. Many of these were in active opposition to those previously arranged. Instead of encouraging as many as possible of Rangoon residents to stay put, for example, it became imperative to urge all except the bare minimum to clear out, for any eleventh-hour evacuation would irrevocably choke up all arterial communications and, just as in the case of the French debacle, seriously embarrass if not immobilize troop movements. The "Soviet" was therefore directed to consider plans for the evacuation of Rangoon, and three clearly defined stages of evacuation were evolved. They were:

(i.) The "E" label stage. The "E" or essential vehicles label was intended to be displayed on essential civilian motor vehicles—*e.g.*, those employed on vital civil administration, the supply and distribution of food, fuel, water, etc.

(ii.) The second or warning stage was intended to signal the immediate departure of all persons desirous of leaving Rangoon, except civil personnel required for demolition or denial work, civil defence and essential Government port and railway personnel, which must remain to the end.

(iii.) The third and final demolition stage would be reached when the enemy was outside the gates of the city, and would signal the destruction of oil refineries and installations, the power-house, the telephone and telegraph systems, etc.

It was a military responsibility to decide when the appropriate moment for each stage had been reached.

In the event, the forecast of the time at our disposal proved to be pessimistic, but even so time was all too short for the many tasks to be performed. Evacuation of the non-essential elements of the population was encouraged in divers ways, and Government offices, save for certain essential nuclei, were removed to prearranged destinations up-country. The Indian trader had all but disappeared, and such commerce and trade as was essential to the continued working of the port and the military machine was being carried on by British commercial houses. With their ready co-operation stocks and supplies essential to the continuance of the civil and military effort in Upper Burma were, as far as the transport situation permitted, removed thence.

By this time morale amongst the labourers was much improved, and, owing to vigorous efforts with convict labour and with the assistance of Chinese labour, congestion on the wharves was relieved. There is little or no truth in the story that much lend-lease material was abandoned to the enemy. Then came two setbacks: (i.) Singapore capitulated on February 15; (ii.) closely pressed by the enemy, our forces which had withdrawn from Moulmein were forced in turn to retire to the River Sittang.

In view of the serious threat to Rangoon thus created, the military authorities decided to hoist the "E" label on February 20, and owners of non-essential vehicles were given forty-eight hours in which to get them out of Rangoon or render them unserviceable. Forty-eight hours after the hoisting of the "E" label Rangoon was a deserted city. Save for an occasional vehicle displaying the "E" label, the streets were empty except in the vicinity of the Mogul Guard, where Civil Headquarters had been established.

Considerable publicity has been given to what is described as the premature release of criminals and lunatics in Rangoon, and I am happy to provide the authentic story of what happened. Outside Rangoon, at Tadagale, was a mental asylum containing normally some 1,000 lunatics. An attempt was made to move the lunatics up-country at a comparatively early stage in the proceedings, but even then transport was at a premium. Many of the more harmless lunatics were released in charge of their relatives; others were discharged. When the "E" label was hoisted there was no transport to remove the remaining lunatics and no rations to feed them. Moreover, the Indian staff was clamouring to leave. The young civil officer who was then Judicial Secretary accordingly gave the superintendent written authority to release any criminal or civil lunatics who might properly be released. By this time the inmates of Tadagale had been reduced to fifty of the more serious cases who could not be moved.

The position with regard to criminals was that after the raids of December, 1941, there were still about 400 convicts in the Rangoon jail who were employed as a labour corps and did magnificent work in cleaning up the town. From the Insein jail, politicals and those convicted of the more serious offences had been back-loaded to up-country jails, and when Rangoon was bombed the remaining convicts formed the nucleus of a second prison labour corps. With the hoisting of the "E" label orders were given that all convicts both in the Rangoon and Insein jails were to be released. When it is remembered that the original intention when the "E" label was hoisted was that the second or warning signal should follow within forty-eight hours and when the panicky state of the jail warders is recollected, there would appear to have been no alternative to the release of these convicts once the "E" label went up. There is no doubt that the release of these criminals in Rangoon had been given publicity far in excess of its due. To what extent they were responsible for the looting and incendiarism which occurred in Rangoon towards the end of February it is difficult to judge. My own opinion is that their activities made very little difference. At any time Rangoon has a large population of riff-raff eager to join in any lawlessness that may be offer-



ing. Be that as it may, the young and able officer responsible for the release of the convicts and lunatics took the criticism so much to heart that he later shot himself.

The position of Rangoon at that stage was undoubtedly precarious. There were indications that small Japanese forces were infiltrating across the Pegu Yomas in the direction of Tharrawaddy and were thus in danger of cutting the only line of retreat available to our forces. So it was that on February 28 the warning signal was hoisted. People other than those required for demolitions and other essential services who wished to leave Rangoon were advised to leave forthwith, and orders were given for the withdrawal of civil administration from the delta districts. It was proposed to start demolition work the following day (March 1), but it was decided to alter these instructions. Demolitions were therefore delayed.

Only a few handfuls of civilians were now left in Rangoon, and they found it convenient to establish themselves in messes close to the Mogul Guard, where a daily meeting of "last-ditcher" representatives was held. Of the behaviour of this gallant band, predominantly European but including representatives of all communities, I cannot speak too highly. They were living from hour to hour on top of an unexploded mine liable to detonate at any moment, but each man did what was required of him, and more, cheerfully and uncomplainingly.

Japanese forces had by now crossed the main Rangoon-Mandalay road both north and south of Pegu. On the evening of March 6 it was decided to put the demolition plans into operation. Furthermore, it was decided that the evacuation of the "last-ditcher" contingent would be by sea to Calcutta.

Demolitions were timed to commence at 2 p.m. on March 7. At that hour the "last ditchers" began to put into operation their carefully prepared plans; after their task was completed, and while passing down-river in their small launches, they were treated to a memorable spectacle. The power-house was well ablaze; port warehouses were charred and blackened skeletons; dynamite had caused the quayside cranes to lean over at drunken angles or to topple into the river; columns of smoke in the interior of the city marked the funeral pyres of the Mogul Guard, the Rangoon telephone exchange and the telegraphic office. At Dunneedaw billowing black smoke arose from the Burmah Oil Company and Indo-Burma Petroleum Company distribution plants. As the refineries at Syriam, Thilawa and Seikkyi were reached, huge columns of black smoke in which the flicker of flames rose and fell filled the heavens to a height of 12,000 feet or more. By then darkness had fallen and the spectacle was magnificently awe-inspiring. Farther down-river a body of very tired and indescribably grubby people scrambled on board the B.I. cargo boat standing by to take them to Calcutta. In view of the preposterous stories of "last ditchers" being left behind on the quayside and being cut to pieces by Burmese hooligans, I might here remark that the only casualty reported among the "last-ditcher" contingent was one officer who accidentally fell overboard and was drowned.

In the Irrawaddy Valley, south of Prome, very severe fighting took place before our forces were able to withdraw to Prome. During this

engagement some Japanese were found to be wearing Burmese clothes, and there is reason to believe that Burman elements were actively assisting the enemy.

A further withdrawal was ordered to the Minhla-Taungdwingyi line covering the direct approach to the oilfields. In the process, the civil districts of Tharrawaddy, Prome and Thayetmyo were successively abandoned.

And so the retreat went on until early in April enemy columns were crossing the Migyaungye-Taungdwingyi road and thus directly threatening the oilfields, and by April 14 conditions on the front had so deteriorated that orders were issued for the destruction of the Yenangyaung oilfield. That the whole series of denial operations was successfully carried out without injury to personnel reflects the planning and careful rehearsing which had been carried out beforehand. A few days later the denial of the Chauk, Lanywa and Yenangyat oilfields was carried out, and when the small band of denial personnel left Chauk by launch, travelling between the blazing oilfields of Chauk and Lanywa, nature aided the lurid and infernal scene by conjuring up a duststorm, thus providing a fitting finale to the drama of the preceding few days.

Much of the work of denial involved hard manual labour, and was carried out under trying hot weather conditions. It therefore imposed a severe physical, as well as mental, strain on those taking part, but except for one unfortunate death from heat exhaustion there were no casualties among the denial personnel. The highest praise is due to that devoted band of civilian Europeans and Anglo-Burmans; sparing no exertion, cheerfully and conscientiously they played a soldier's part in denying to the enemy for a considerable time to come the petrol and oil he so badly needed. The Burma oilfields are now verily scorched earth.

With the rolling-up of their districts, civil officers, both European and Burman, became available in increasing numbers, and the district administration of those districts still in our hands was strengthened by the additional officers now available. None was permitted to remain idle, for civil administration was passing through an extremely busy phase. The refugee problem was taxing the resources of the civil administration to breaking-point. By the end of March over 100,000 refugees had congregated in Mandalay and vicinity, and although large numbers were vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera, these dreaded diseases inevitably appeared, and at the height of the epidemic cholera alone was claiming 600 victims every day. All this time, be it remembered, the safety valve which might have eased the refugee situation—namely, evacuation by the Tamu road—was all but closed by military orders.

In the face of innumerable difficulties, a service for the evacuation of civilian refugees by air from Shwebo was inaugurated in early March, and over 3,000 persons of all nationalities and classes were actually despatched by air from Shwebo before the service had to be transferred to Myitkyina before the advancing tide of battle.

Mandalay's first air raid, a very light one, was on February 18. A

second, and severe, raid occurred on Good Friday, April 3. Great damage was done, the fire brigade being wiped out from a direct hit, and the town was gutted. There were upwards of 400 casualties in the raid, many of whom were either blown into the moat around the fort and drowned, or wounded and trapped, swallowed up in the fierce flames which devoured at least three-fifths of the town in the matter of a few hours.

Early in April I was through Mandalay, and never have I seen such a pathetic sight. All the British officials were on duty, and it was clear that they had worked manfully in an endeavour to clean up the almost incredible mess. The life of the town had ceased. Both food and water were extremely difficult to obtain. Because of this, and on account of the heavy bombing, there had been a large number of defections among the junior grades of Government officials and from the ranks of the police. The disposal of the dead bodies, both human and animal, was thereby rendered difficult.

Meanwhile, the headquarters of Government had been established in Maymyo, and the months of March and April were a period of improvisation in the face of necessity, when each day brought its crop of problems, each problem vital, and each apparently insoluble. And overshadowing all the problems of failing supplies and the unprecedented hordes of refugees were ever present. But a Forest Officer, who had been given dictatorial powers as Evacuation Commissioner, performed the apparently impossible. He coped with the cholera and smallpox epidemics, and he organized the removal of the remaining refugees to stage camps farther north.

What, then, of the military situation? British forces had by now been forced back to a line running through Meiktila. The Chinese army was responsible for the defence both of the Toungoo front and the Shan States. A determined Japanese thrust in the Loikaw Valley met with little resistance, and soon Taunggyi, Loilem, Hsipaw and Lashio were overrun by an outflanking movement and there was nothing to stop the enemy from pushing on to Bhamo and Myitkyina. The decision to withdraw to India was not taken until the end of April, and not the least important repercussion from the civilian angle was on the evacuee problem. By then, stage camps up the river and the railway line towards Myitkyina were full of these pitiable people. The fit and able-bodied were immediately started off on their long trek to India. The evacuation air service was still running from Myitkyina, but might stop at any moment. So long as Myitkyina was held, however, there was every prospect of air-borne evacuation continuing.

But the enemy had other plans. On the morning of May 6 Myitkyina aerodrome was bombed, and the only two available machines for taking off refugees were put out of action. Meanwhile, Bhamo had been occupied by the enemy, and the threat to Myitkyina was very real. Evacuation was, therefore, decided on, and there was only one practicable way out—through the dreaded Hukawng Valley. Twenty thousand people undertook that trek, and some 5,000 are believed to have laid their bones on the way.

A considerable time has elapsed since the events referred to in this address took place. In the interval a number of criticisms of the civilian administration have been voiced. Certain of these are valid and valuable in that they bring out lessons which must be learned if we are to avoid similar mistakes in the future. Others are the result either of ignorance of the facts or a somewhat vicious desire to feed an already satiated public with bigger sensations. Others again arise from a not unnatural desire to seek a scapegoat when a disaster occurs. Some of these criticisms emanate from competent observers, others come from those whose competence to criticize is not so obvious.

It is idle to deny that the loss of Burma was a first-class disaster. By conveniently forgetting the problems, many of them insuperable from the beginning, which faced both the civil and military authorities, there is much to criticize in the handling of the situation. Now that the curtain has been rung down on the drama and the actors have left the stage, now that it is possible to work out leisurely and unhurriedly the cause and effect of every move, much that occurred might have been altered and omissions might have been remedied. But at the time this omniscience was denied to us. The fog of war was even more blanketing than the pre-war fog of complacency. Being wise after the event is easy; it is less easy and more charitable to attempt to put oneself into the place of the man on the spot who had to take decisions based on such information as was available to him at the time, and who frequently found that decisions taken to-day had to be reversed to-morrow, so rapidly did the situation change.

Let us not forget what was achieved by the Burma campaign. Our military forces in Burma fought a stubborn rearguard action for five vital months, vital insomuch that this breathing space enabled India to prepare for the threat of invasion. Such actions or omissions for which civil administration was responsible had no influence whatsoever on the result of the campaign. But if it can be maintained that the civil administration utterly broke down, utterly failed to adjust itself to the impact of war, or utterly failed to co-operate with the military, then some portion of the odium for the loss of Burma would deservedly attach to the civilians.

First of all, can it be contended that civil administration broke down? Before attempting to discuss this knotty problem an effort must be made to define precisely what is meant by "civil administration." If this term is interpreted to mean the maintenance of the normal life of the country, then the answer must be that civil administration collapsed. But I question whether the term can be so interpreted.

The sequence of events in the greater majority of the districts in Burma was something like this: (a) Bombing, or the threat of it, had the immediate effect of bringing the normal life of the district virtually to an end; (b) the shortage of transport following on the requisitioning of all forms of transport for military purposes, and coupled with the fading away of subordinate staff, had the effect of closing civil and criminal courts, since summonses could not be delivered and witnesses—even if they had been willing to—could not attend; (c) in consequence of (a) and (b) lawlessness spread rapidly, the more so since the police were

depleted in numbers and had to deal with well-armed deserters in addition to dacoits; (d) difficulty was experienced in obtaining information or orders owing to the partial paralysis of normal communications; (e) bazaars remained shut, traders disappeared, and food supplies became difficult to obtain, thus contributing to the desertion of personnel, who went off in search of food; (f) as the tide of invasion advanced, senior officials had few or no staff to assist them and practically no civil population to administer, since they had all disappeared.

The question which must now be asked is what effect, if any, did these events have on military operations? Did it matter in the least whether civil courts operated or not? The general weakening of authority, coupled with the inability to bring criminals to justice did, it is true, tend to undermine morale, but not to anything like the same extent as the continued retreat of the army and the freedom of the skies enjoyed by the enemy. Those were the factors which counted.

That law and order must deteriorate in such conditions is obvious. As the enemy advanced and deserters became more numerous and audacious, such of the police as remained staunch, devoid as they were of transport, poorly equipped as they were with weapons and outnumbered as they were by organized bands of criminals, frankly gave up the unequal contest. The Indian elements joined in the trek to India; Burmans betook themselves to the safety of the jungle where their families had already gone, and the family tie in Burma, it must be remembered, is strong.

There is some validity in the criticism that reliable information was difficult to come by and orders failed to reach their destination. Nor is this surprising. Communications, even in peace-time, were barely adequate for our needs. When the desertion of personnel was allied to the destruction of equipment by bombing, communications were maintained only with the greatest difficulty with the aid of a staunch and resolute nucleus of Europeans and allied races. The lack of information and orders to District Officers is thus explained. There was, perhaps, among certain officers, a tendency for initiative to have been sapped by excessive control from the centre. But I am happy to record that for every officer who sat back bemoaning his helplessness in the absence of instructions, there were numbers who toiled and sweated to keep the creaking machine going; many who spared not themselves in fighting fires, removing corpses, driving lorries, and all the thousand-and-one essential tasks normally outside their province; and many others who gave their lives in order that the ship of State might not founder.

The picture I would try to draw of the life of the country would, therefore, comprise three broad belts of varying depth. In the foreground, nearest the enemy, the few senior officials of Government, both European and Burman, hanging on until the last moment, affording such assistance to the military forces as was possible in an area deserted alike by many of their subordinates and the civil populace; and then a withdrawal, often together with, and sometimes following, the army, after consultation with the local military commander as to the time of their departure. In the middle distance an area where bombing had caused

the forces of disintegration to set in; where desertions were occurring and the civil population was vanishing; where morale was low among those remaining and where food was hard to come by. In the background, an area as yet free from bombing but where morale was jumpy; where the influx of refugees had led to epidemics, a food shortage and transport problems; where lawlessness was on the increase and could not be checked; and where rumour might at any moment cause panic and stampede.

Sombre-hued though this picture may be, it would be the greatest mistake to read into it a breakdown of civil administration. On the contrary, it is my submission that the administrative machine kept going until the end, in spite of the numerous missing cogs in the wheel. Looked at from a military point of view, to what extent did the desertions among subordinates hamper the military effort? In nearly all cases the military could rely on finding the senior civil officers still on the job, eager to help in so far as they could. Indeed, in a number of cases civil officers clearly stayed on in order to be of possible service to the military, even though, with the departure of the civil population, their normal administrative functions had ceased.

The evacuation of refugees was undoubtedly the biggest problem facing civil officers. After the fall of Rangoon, the various Departments of Government were settled in to their several scattered headquarters in Upper Burma. Communications were by then beginning to show signs of cracking, and events—to wit, the Japanese advance—were moving fast. But our forces were by no means defeated and had not given up hope of resuming the offensive. Receptive to this atmosphere of optimism, civilian plans concentrated more on the day-to-day administration than was perhaps justified by subsequent events. Food supplies were an ever-present problem; rice mills had to be kept going to supply the military forces, both British and Chinese, as well as the civil population. Petrol production had to be maintained, and supplies distributed and rationed. Indian refugees, now concentrated in Mandalay in their tens of thousands, had to be housed, fed and doctored; and plans had to be made for their disposal. Concentrated work had to be done on the Tamu road. And there was the vast project of building a road through the Hukawng Valley, using a labour force of some 80,000 Chinese coolies. Even then we were not contemplating or planning for the event of total defeat. Had civil officers ignored every issue save that of evacuation, it is not improbable that the provisioning of the various evacuation routes with food and medical supplies would have made greater progress. But what an edifying example they would have set to the military forces; to the essential workers on whom the conduct of the campaign depended no less than on their brothers-in-arms; and to the Burmese themselves. The balance was very difficult to strike between, on the one hand, a calm concentration on long-term administrative problems, connected with the holding of Upper Burma, and, on the other hand, an urge to drop everything and concentrate on evacuation. Only with the decision to withdraw to India did the realization come that our days in Burma were indeed numbered.

On no aspect of the campaign has there been so much misconception as on the part played by fifth columnists in Burma. That a minority—a small minority—of the Burmese actively assisted the enemy cannot be gainsaid. But we had no lack of friends in adversity. There was, in my judgment and experience, little active hostility among the villagers; indeed, there was much kindness and co-operation from them. Isolated instances of vicious attacks on refugee stragglers have been reported, but for these the criminally minded element, always strong and ever growing stronger as the retreat continued, was to blame. There was a considerable amount of arson, notably in Rangoon and Mandalay, and here again the same criminal element was responsible, hoping in the subsequent confusion to indulge in some profitable looting. Throughout the progress of the campaign there was no sign of revolt behind our lines; there was practically no sabotage and definitely no rioting or civil disobedience. And there was little that could fairly be described as fifth column activity among the Burmese. It is interesting in this connection to recall that in April, 1942, when our forces were defending Prome, the military authorities estimated that there were some 4,000 Burmans actively supporting the Japanese. This figure represents three per ten thousand of the Burmese race, estimated at 12,000,000. As the Japanese drove our forces northwards, recruits flocked to join what appeared to be the winning side, and it is estimated that at the height of its career the Burma Independence Army reached a strength of 30,000. This figure represents two and a half per thousand of the Burmese race; it compares not unfavourably with the percentage of fifth columnists in most European countries overrun by the Nazis.

Now, a final word regarding the evacuation from Burma. It is not possible to state with certainty how many civil evacuees attempted the journey from Burma to India, but from statistics compiled at the various evacuation centres on the Indian frontier it would probably be a conservative estimate to put the total number of evacuees who reached India at 400,000. It was a migration that took place within a few weeks, and it possessed certain features which cannot be paralleled in any previous migration of which a record exists. The evacuation took place over extremely difficult and unhealthy country; to reach safety in India the evacuees had somehow and somewhere to cross the sparsely populated hills over which neither road nor railway existed, and the mass of the many thousands had no choice but to walk many weary miles, finally crossing on foot range after range of mountains, and this in a tropical country where exhaustion rapidly afflicts the overpressed traveller, and where disease abounds.

It was a migration which had to be carried out under rapidly changing conditions of war, when a victorious enemy was swiftly overrunning the country, when communications had almost broken down, when administration was functioning with difficulty and when all civilian interests had to be set aside so that the military effort might not be impeded.

The supreme handicap in dealing with this pitiable mass of refugees was the uncertainty of the military situation. At first it was considered that there being no reason to fear the loss of Rangoon, all labour should

be retained and evacuation should be prohibited; then it was suggested that Rangoon might fall, and evacuation had therefore to be encouraged. After that the expectation was that Upper Burma would be held; evacuation through Tamu was discouraged on the argument that the Tamu road would be completely metalled before the monsoon broke, and that meanwhile evacuation would only impede the roadwork. As the situation deteriorated it was still hoped that Northern Burma would be held, and that not only would the Tamu road be open for large-scale evacuation, but that Myitkyina would remain a safe airport.

How many casualties there were during the evacuation cannot be known. Deaths on the Taungup route were perhaps 4,000. On the Hukawng Valley route, perhaps 5,000. On the Tamu route, very few. On the Homalin-Tonhe route, perhaps 500. These figures would give a total death roll of about 10,000, or  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the total number of evacuees. Such a casualty list is surprisingly small, but it does not, of course, include those—and there were many—who died in the cholera epidemics at Prome and Mandalay or those who died in India after their arrival. The tale of that terrible trek, when it is told, will be at once a story of great disaster and great achievement, great heroism and great cruelty, animal selfishness and immortal chivalry. Some there were to whom the hardships and dangers were as a spur to their endurance. Others, again, showed cowardice in the face of danger, indifference to the needs of their comrades, greediness when supplies were limited, violence to the weak. But in the main the ordinary man and woman, many of whom were unaccustomed to walking long distances, unacquainted with and afraid of jungle travel, badly equipped for many weeks on the road, showed a courage beyond praise. Their care was for the weaker members of the party, the old people and the young. Their cheerfulness caused many to carry on where it would have been easier to have given up the struggle. Their sheer guts in the face of disaster entitles them to a place on the same civilian roll of honour as the people of Britain, who, in the dark days of 1940, showed Hitler that this little country of ours still produces a race of men—and women—worthy of their heritage.



# A MANUAL OF SAFAVID ADMINISTRATION

By PROFESSOR V. MINORSKY

IN 1924 the British Museum acquired a lot of Persian books said to have belonged to the late Sultan Abdul-Hamīd. Among them was the MS. under the anodyne title of *Tadhkirat al-mulūk*—"A Memorial to Kings." In fact, it proved to be a complete account of the administrative system of Persia under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722). The outward aspect of the small MS. (130 ff.) suggests that it was a presentation copy, or even the original, of an official report. As among other matters it contains information on the revenue and military forces of Persia—subjects long considered confidential and secret—it is a moot question how the manuscript had found its way into the Sultan's personal library. In any case, we must be thankful to the fate which once again has protected the book on its Western journey and thus enabled us to increase our historical knowledge of Persian affairs.

Ever since I read the first announcement of the acquisition of the book I have been interested in the contents of this unique MS., but only in 1943, thanks to the liberality of the E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Fund, did I succeed in publishing the result of my protracted studies.\*

The *Memorial to Kings* belongs to the disturbed period following the overthrow of the great Safavid Dynasty by the usurpers of Qandahar (1722). The Afghan conqueror of Isfahan Mahmūd became insane and in 1725 was succeeded by his nephew Ashraf. This young ruler ascended the throne coming straight from the prison into which he had been thrown by his uncle. As he lacked all experience of state affairs he requested one of the Persian dignitaries to prepare a brief report on the kingdom which he was called to rule. Who exactly the author was is unknown, but he surely belonged to the previous régime, under which he must have occupied some considerable administrative or financial post, for he not only quotes the official sources and the declarations of the heads of departments, but he adds to them some remarks out of his own experience.

The time and circumstances in which the report was prepared make it impossible to compare it with the description of the Mughal administration in the careful and elaborate *Āyīn-i Akbarī* of the learned Abul-Faḍl 'Allāmī. However, it will be no exaggeration to say that the *Memorial to Kings* occupies a special place among the historical and political works in the Persian language. Its brevity and numerous technical expressions greatly complicate the interpretation of the text, but there are few redundant phrases in it and, on the whole, the *Tadhkirat al-mulūk* adds enormously to the understanding of the political, economic and social relations of the period.

\* *Tadhkirat al-mulūk*. A Manual of Safavid Administration (circa A.H. 1137 = A.D. 1725). 218 pp. + 130 ff. of facsimile. 1943.

The treatise consists of five chapters and three appendices. The former describe systematically the duties of eighty-four denominations of officials—namely, the religious authorities, the fourteen highest amirs having the title *‘ālī-jāh*, the category of the officials called *muqarrab*, the staff of the financial administration, and the group of officials specially connected with the province of the capital Isfahan.

It must be realized that up to now we have been inclined to treat the references to ranks and offices as a somewhat fanciful element in our sources. The historical personages appeared to us as individuals standing on their merits, rather than connected with definite functions or fitted into a social hierarchy. Even in quite recent works the titles have been translated literally without any consideration of the historical conventions. Thus it is common to see *Mihtar-i rikāb-ḳhāna* explained as the “chief of the stirrup-holders,” whereas the gentleman in question, usually a eunuch, was the Master of the Robes, whose influence resulted from the fact that he was a chamberlain who helped the king to dress and in the morning was the first person to whisper the news into the sovereign’s ear. Many of the titles are of Turkish, and even Mongolian, origin, and are important as fossil remains of the régimes out of which the later amalgam of administration grew. Thus *yūz-bashi* was the “centurion (of the young eunuchs)” and not a “keeper of panthers,” as has been recently suggested through the confusion of the Turkish *yüz*, “a hundred,” with the Persian *yūz*, “a cheetah.”

The *Tadhkirat al-mulūk* is the only Persian work which explains the functions of the highest officials, such as Grand Vazir, the commanders of the old and reformed army corps, the head of the royal household, who was in charge of the important *buyūtāt* (royal kitchen and all kinds of shops producing stuffs, equipment, and even books and paintings, etc.). The Safavid administration was a highly organized system, under which every official was controlled by the others and every document was sealed and registered by several responsible instances. All these details are fully developed in the book.

One of the most interesting paragraphs is that devoted to the Controller of Assay, as we have to translate his title to differentiate it from the English “master of assay,” whose functions were more limited (see Rev. R. Ruding, *Annals of the Coinage of Great Britain*, 1840, I, 38). In this section the author explains the organization of the mint and the nine processes through which the making of a coin passed. On the same occasion the complicated problems of the standards and weights of the contemporary coins are explained, together with the expedients to raise the seignorage. This paragraph will be of great interest to the numismatist. The coins of the British Museum on which I tried to check these data confirmed the indications of our author.

The three appendices of the book, which have slightly suffered through the fault of the copyist, contain some entirely new material. The first of them gives a detailed enumeration of the salaries and the mode of remuneration of all the amirs and state employees. These indications are valuable as throwing some light on the economic problems of the cost of living. The second table enumerates all the provincial governors and their

deputy governors, and the emoluments and the number of armed men (*mulāzimān*) attached to each of them. There exists no special geography of the Safavid kingdom, and this new table enables us to trace the territorial organization, the frontiers of the kingdom, and the extent of the areas under the direct control of the royal household.

The third appendix is still more important, for it gives us a clear picture of the Safavid budget, both as regards revenue and expense. At first sight the tables looked a perfect puzzle, but a patient examination led to the discovery of the system and its component items. The sum total of the revenue was 785,623 tomans, of which 608,652 tomans were cashed by the general treasury and 176,971 by the royal household. The yearly expenditure was 625,273 tomans, of which 507,400 tomans were the general expenses and 117,873 those of the royal household. Single items indicate the cost of maintenance of every category of state servants (amirs, doctors, workmen, etc.) and of each of the army corps. The text contains a great number of terms referring to various taxes, financial operations, deliveries in kind, etc.

These details give an idea of the original text. To have translated it without explanations and commentary would have been an unpardonable omission, and I have tried to complete the original text with the help of all the parallel sources, both Oriental and European. Of the first I have particularly used the great histories of the Safavid Shahs, which contain a prodigious mass of scattered data on all kinds of subjects. With the *Tadhkirat al-mulūk* as a background, these long-neglected facts begin to sparkle as real gems. Under the Safavids many excellent European observers lived in Persia for long periods of time (P. della Valle, du Mans, Chardin, Kaempfer, Sanson, Le Brun, etc.). Above all towers the great French Huguenot Chardin, who finished his days in the service of England and lies buried in the southern aisle of Westminster Abbey. It is a pity that what goes in the English version under the name of his "Travels" omits the highly important part of the French original, which contains the record of Persian institutions. This remarkable account I have quoted profusely in relation to the corresponding paragraphs of the original Persian source.

I have come to the conclusion that there must have existed some official list of dignitaries, etc., which the more enquiring Europeans had access to, for there is some parallelism in their descriptions. But no one like Chardin has gone so deep into the very springs of the Safavid machinery of which he, on many occasions, expresses his approval and even admiration. Many misprints in the ten-volume edition of Chardin (by Langlès, 1811) can be rectified in the light of the *Tadhkirat al-mulūk*; thus, "le bonnet de *souahy*," which had disturbed my peace of mind for a number of years, has proved to be "le bonnet de *souphy* (*ṣūfi*)."

It was felt that a running commentary on the single paragraphs of the highly technical text would tax the attention of the reader, if he were left without general guidance as to the foundations of the Persian polity under the Safavids.

Very often the Shī'a creed of the Safavid kings has been taken for the master key opening all the sesames of the epoch. Such a method is surely

too simple, for the religions themselves can be understood only in the frame of their historical background, and the Safavids who began with mystic extremism, which their Ottoman and Central-Asian rivals rightly condemned as a heresy,\* gradually adapted their beliefs to the new needs. The Sufi guards and the Turcoman tribes, on whose shoulders Shah Ismā'il was carried to the throne, became such a danger as prætorians that the later Safavids strove to abate the ardour of their original supporters. Already Shah Abbas I. promoted a new class of aristocracy, chiefly of Caucasian origin, and still later the mystic exaltation was canalized into more orthodox channels. Under the last Safavid ruler, theologians of purely Iranian origin definitely triumphed over the sufis connected with the tribal organization of the Turcomans.

Here, in the field of the internal evolution of the Safavid power, lies the chief task of the future historians. As the Turcoman tribes were weakened and disbanded, their place was taken by the new army corps, depending directly on the Shah and more adequately equipped with new weapons (match-locks, guns). This reform needed funds, and gradually we see the Shahs spreading the tentacles of their household treasury on the provinces, which previously had been governed by autonomous governors, having their own budgets, militias and provincial courts. The loose system of connection with the capital was favourable to the feudal aristocracy as giving manifold chances to the tribal chiefs and their entourage. On the contrary, the new tendency to centralization was bound to create disaffection in these circles. Meanwhile, the discipline of the new troops and aristocracy was apparently less efficient than the former religious principle, which made the tribes cling to their sovereign whom they considered as a living god, in the literal sense of the word.

This scheme of evolution helps us better to account for the spectacular fall of the ancient dynasty under the blows of the vassals of Qandahar. The subject needs much further research, but even now it has seemed useful to sum up the facts already known and to blaze a new trail of investigation.

In analysing the interrelations of the various classes of Persian society I could not help laying stress on the "magic" origin of the royal power recreated by the Safavids. To assess the importance of the changes in the ranks of the aristocracy, I have for the first time used the lists of dignitaries which Persian historians annex to the accounts of each separate reign. These dry catalogues are absolutely invaluable for the study of social changes, individual careers and the evolution of single offices. In two special annexes I study the interplay of Turkish and Iranian elements in the history of Persia, and more particularly trace the origins of the personalities who supported Shah Ismā'il at the various stages of his career. This study shows how the local Iranian elements were reasserting their rights with regard to the Turcomans, who represented the remnants of the tribes of the Qara-qoyunlu and Aq-qoyunlu rulers and whom the patient propaganda of the Safavids succeeded in uniting on the extreme Shī'a platform.

\* The extracts from Shah Ismā'il's own *divān* which I have recently published fully confirm the nature of his claim to be an avatar of God.

There are far fewer data for defining the position of the middle and lower classes, but by combining the Eastern and Western sources one can even now draw some interesting conclusions. The silk trade of Persia, carried on chiefly through Armenians, would in itself merit a special dissertation. Very interesting are all the facts on the organization of the royal "shops," among which there were some small-scale factories. With regard to the peasants, Chardin, who surely had before his eyes the picture of the French villages under the *ancien régime*, comes to the significant conclusion that the Persian *ra'iyat* enjoyed considerable advantages.

In another chapter I study the basic problems of Safavid administration, such as its division into the "state" and the "household" branches; the immunities and assignments of lands in remuneration for services rendered; the numbers and the organization of the army, with its old and modernized troops.

Several questions which at present cannot be studied exhaustively have been outlined in separate annexes (special traits of land tenure in Persia, the formulæ and the channels of official correspondence, etc.).

On the whole, it is hoped that the present edition of the new text, with the accompanying commentary, will serve as a general guide to Safavid institutions. The editor will be particularly happy if the *Tadhkirat al-mulūk* succeeds in stimulating further contributions to the study of the highly important epoch and in promoting the application to Persian history of the methods which have been long adopted by the historians of Western lands.

## REVIEWS

**The Making of the Indian Princes.** By Edward Thompson. Pp. 304, with Bibliography and Index. Oxford University Press. 20s.

The author has taken for his subject a cameo from the history of the East India Company in India and their relations—or more correctly those of several Governor-Generals—with the Marathas. For the high lights in his picture he has cast the three prominent diplomatists, John Malcolm, Mountstuart Elphinstone and Charles Metcalfe, and he has treated what used to be known as the Maratha Wars, and which he dignifies as Anglo-Maratha Wars, and the Pindari Campaign, scientifically and with skill. He has made a readable story (though he might have spared us occasional lapses into modern phraseology), and quotes extensively from correspondence to which he has had access and to a considerable bibliography; and he has had the valuable assistance, which he acknowledges, of a number of authorities whose acquaintance with the Maratha people is intimate and wide. Yet with all this the cameo is perhaps at times too clear-cut, for it largely ignores the existence of factors outside the Maratha orbit, which undoubtedly had an important influence upon policies and actions. “Mulk giri” expeditions, for instance—which were nothing short of mass banditry—led to the necessity for English influence to be extended into Kathiawad and Gujarat, yet reference to them is meagre, and Kathiawad does not even find place in the index.

It cannot be said that the Princes of India are limited to those who were definitely in touch with the Maratha Confederacy in the early years of the last century, and it must not be forgotten that, formidable nuisances as the Marathas were during those years, Maratha ambitions were really defeated at Panipat by the Mahomedan power in 1761. It is, therefore, not altogether clear what the object of the book is, for, despite subsequent augmentation and revision, it cannot supplant Grant Duff for contemporary history, while the title does not correctly describe the subject-matter. Still, the work is erudite and too technical to be described as a “pot-boiler,” and it has a value of its own for the enquirer after Indian knowledge; it is mainly for this reason that it can be welcomed.

Towards the end of the book the author indulges in reflections which are really extraneous to his subject. For instance, Chapter XLII contains what purports to be a study of the British military officer and soldier of the times during which the States took concrete shape, and he appears to conclude that his heroes were of nobler mould than their successors, whom he compares with John Knox. He suggests that from 1843 onwards a change for the worse occurred, though he clearly finds it difficult to compare, say, John Malcolm with Henry Lawrence to the latter's disadvantage. As to the private soldier, the author considers that he was “brutalized” by the existence of flogging in the disciplinary methods then prevailing, and therefore—though this is left to be deduced—did more harm than good, and the conclusion come to is that those upon whom responsibility for the conduct of the Army depended were wanting in imagination and good sense. But military discipline, though in our view brutal, was not generally considered so throughout society 140 years ago, when the comparatively minor crime of sheep stealing was, in the civil courts, punished in the most savage manner. And who can say that in the early part of the nineteenth century the British soldier was not the splendid man that his officers always considered him to be? Without courage, endurance and comradeship, all of a high order—and are not these virtues to be set off against the concomitants of a rough and strenuous mode of life?—the 39th would not have brought themselves glory at Plassey, nor the 76th glory in many another hard-fought fight to bring peace to India, and to enable the foundations of justice to be laid, and this is to take but two out of a host of examples. Even with flogging in the background the British soldier does not seem to have been divorced from that kindness which has characterized him in the past no less than in our own days. Chapter XLII had been better unwritten, for it seeks to traduce not so much the times as those who laboured and fought so wonderfully for England in those times. Besides this, the author appears

to have overlooked the fact—perhaps, indeed, he is ignorant of it—that the number of British units who fought in the Maratha Wars was exceedingly small—scarcely more than a dozen—and his comments with their implications are somewhat out of place.

In his concluding chapter the author comments disparagingly on the Political Officers of the present day, suggesting that, whereas a century or so ago their predecessors were the friends of the Princes, now they are disliked by them. There is much evidence to show that this is not a true picture, and it also displays the author's superficial knowledge of those of whom he writes. Of late years certain Princes have desired that their Political Officers should exercise merely the diplomatic functions which are usually exercised by Diplomatic Representatives in independent countries. Such an arrangement would certainly make the responsibilities of the Political Service less onerous, but it would not represent the relationship which exists between the Crown and the Indian Princes. Some Princes have been impatient of the restraint imposed upon them, and, appositely enough, on p. 286 is enumerated a number of instances justifying political interference. Naturally the rulers concerned "did not like" those who were instrumental in curbing their activities. The writer does not wish to suggest that the "great Maharaja" mentioned on the same page—it is, of course, His late Highness of Bikaner—came within this category, but it is both unwise and unfair to judge a whole body of men in this way. His Highness's remark is, indeed, evidence that Political Officers in Rajputana were not unmindful of their duties. It must be remembered that the majority of Princes three or four generations ago could hardly write their names, and that subsequent education and travels abroad have tended to make restraint irksome. To add to this, of recent years publicists who have been in some cases little better than adventurers have been only too ready to air "grievances"—for handsome consideration, of course!—of Princes who have employed them for the purpose. Are they to be considered reliable critics? Again, certain Princes have not hesitated to invite to visit them personages who, when they have gone to their States, have been hoodwinked into believing that all was rosy in the garden—except the Political Officer. Was there not a few years ago at least one State where a "suppliant" used regularly to be stationed to present a "petition" when the ruler was taking his guest for a drive, this to give the impression that the subject had ready access to him, which was quite the reverse of the truth! The fact is that the members of the Indian Political Service have a sense of their responsibility, while they and the Crown Department are scrupulous in their exercise of diplomatic reticence. That is why the service is so trusted—it never lets the Princes down. The loyalty and friendship of the States are evidence of the success of these endeavours. The Princes have no quarrel with the paramountcy of the Crown, nor with those who are the medium through which paramountcy is exercised, and in suggesting otherwise the author suggests what is untrue. But it is at least pleasing to find him on p. 285 rightly differing from an extravagant statement made with regard to paramountcy by another writer.

H. W.-B.

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**British Economic Interests in the Far East.** By E. M. Gull. 8½" × 6". Pp. vii + 272. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University Press. 1943. 16s.

It is perhaps dangerous for a critic to start with an analogy, yet there is a somewhat close parallel between the study of affairs and the study of medicine in that both are arts based on factual knowledge. Mr. Gull has written a book which may well be compared to a first-class textbook on anatomy. His book provides a study which is bound to be of value to anyone who has to deal with affairs which concern the Far East, whether cultural, diplomatic or commercial.

Another reviewer has said that the author's connections with China are such that "there is thus a good measure of authority behind it"; whether the book be exact in every detail or not is immaterial provided that the facts are set out in such a way that the reader can form a clear picture of the changes in economic trends which have occurred during the period covered by his study.

Mr. Gull is to be congratulated on having had the courage to start with an analysis of the earliest European trading ventures with the Far East. He touches only lightly on the changes in economic theory which have occurred in the West during the period he has included in his study. This is a matter for regret, because from his notes and conclusions it is clear that Mr. Gull has a predisposition in favour of some of those theories which were current in the nineteenth century—a disposition which may cause those who do not share his outlook to look askance at some of his other conclusions, however sound they may be.

It is of great importance that we should remember the past and the historical outlook of other nations with whom we have to deal. The English historical memory is proverbially short and our neglect of the lessons of the past has many times led us to take action which may have appeared wise in view of the circumstances of the time, but which has proved unsuccessful because we have forgotten a past which to other nations is still living history. This has occurred in our relations with Ireland and may well occur also in our dealings with the peoples of Asia.

In dealing with the period 1843-1914, Mr. Gull, basing himself on Professor Remer, uses the terms "entrepreneur" and "rentier" investment in a new sense. If we accept his definition his comment is sound, but surely this problem did not arise before the inter-war (1918-39) period, though it is one which may well have increasing importance in the future. Both this point and that of the amortization dates of loans and their bearing on the balance of trade would appear to have more relevance to Mr. Gull's final conclusions than random extracts from *20th Century Economics*.

He makes some pertinent observations on the Japanese standard of life and the psychology of the people and brings out clearly in his text some of the main causes of the clash of interests which occurred between Japanese and British interests after the occupation of Manchuria in 1931. He appears to accept the Tanaka Memorial as genuine; if it were so, it may well be that some of the failures of the Japanese policy in her dealings with both China and Great Britain lay in the fact that she found it impossible to implement the Tanaka policy fully by building up a firm base for her heavy industry in the Gulf of Peichili because it was impossible to do so owing to the lack of the necessary raw materials.

Of Chinese psychology he says little; of China's future he appears optimistic. The Japanese retained their old forms of thought and learned from the West only the mechanical arts which gave Europe power; China looked for the source of that power in the culture of the West and so is faced by the same problem which faced O'Neil in Ireland in the sixteenth century—the reconciliation of two opposing cultures within one nation. O'Neil failed, Chiang Kai-shek may succeed, but his task may prove one of increasing difficulty, for he has to rebuild a nation in which two cultures are already in conflict, and where his northern neighbour possesses a culture which is not fully compatible either with the historical culture of China or with the more modern cultures of Europe and the United States. That he will succeed is Mr. Gull's belief, that he should succeed is in the interest both of China and of those other countries of the world who have had close ties with her during the last two centuries and who hope that these ties may continue into the future to the profit both of China and themselves.

E. A.

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**Forty Years in China.** By Sir Meyrick Hewlett. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. 259. Map. Macmillan. 1943. 12s 6d.

Sir Meyrick Hewlett has written an unique account of his forty years in China. His sympathy with the black-haired people, as they call themselves, is profound, and he knows no class nor distinction beyond honesty of heart. He came through three anti-foreign periods with his sympathy unbroken.

The account of the siege of Peking is very well told. Close on half a century separates us from that period, during which time the country has endured every kind of misfortune. She is now our ally, and is being tried in the same blood bath as ourselves, although she has endured it for a longer period.

Beginning with the Boxer outbreak, the author came round many tight corners, and has depicted the scenes from the part of a participator. He has painted a very



vivid picture of the course of Chinese history with which he came in contact. Sir Meyrick has had a very full life in China. He won the hearts of Chinese, official and unofficial, not by any namby-pamby methods, but by sincere sympathy and a faculty for putting himself in the other man's place. A friend to all humanity, high and low, he won the hearts of those with whom he came in contact, who were able to appreciate the difference between honesty and dishonesty. His sympathy went far beyond ordinary bounds. Many times he saved the situation by peaceful procedure, where most people in his position would have been driven into exasperated action.

Altogether Sir Meyrick has spent an adventurous time, and has told his story in an intriguing way.

All who know China, and many who do not, will appreciate reading his account of forty years in that country.

A. F. A.

**Traveller from Tokyo.** By John Morris. Pp. 163. The Cresset Press. 1943. 10s. 6d.

John Morris was among the 1942 repatriates from the Far East who were best endowed with relevant local information and insight to offer their fellow-countrymen at home; and in *Traveller from Tokyo* he documents his daily life and observations in Japan during the previous four years in detail. A scrupulous regard for accuracy, and for the need to warn the reader against generalizing from one or two instances, ought not to be so rare as to deserve first mention in a review. But as one tries to select the tallest sheaves from a rich harvest, the author's conscientiousness and restraint are conspicuous at every turn.

"Prologue, 1937," frankly mirrors a mood of disenchantment: "I had lost my curiosity; and when that happens to the Englishman in India it is time for him to leave. . . . Sooner or later there comes a time when one must accept either the standards of one's own people or those of the Indian; drift into a narrow social rut or become a native of the country" (p. 9). He sums up fifteen years with sweeping verdicts, on British and Indian alike, of just the kind that he avoids elsewhere, and the reader could certainly not infer that the author was leaving behind him a successful career in Queen Alexandra's Gurkha Rifles, exploration and mountaineering in the Himalayas, basic works on Nepal, and a close analysis of the Sikkim Lepchas. But confronted with another Asiatic culture, Mr. Morris regained his curiosity and his cultural resilience. In spite of the obvious contrasts between his own tastes and temperament and those of the Japanese, and the evident imminence of war between the two nations, he grew "extremely fond of the Japanese people" and found, as so many before him, that in "normal times Japan is a pleasant country to live in; especially if one does not share the usual Anglo-Saxon prejudices and conventions, and is prepared to go at least some way through the looking-glass" (p. 101).

The times were not normal, however, and the author shows how the ruthless and systematic control which the army and the military security police exercise over the people intensified until the attack on Pearl Harbour could be launched in secret, without fear for the home front. Mr. Morris, as an Englishman and a man of firm principle, found himself spiritually pushed back through the looking-glass, and his close analysis of the internal situation results in as sharp a condemnation of Japanese action, political morality and processes of reasoning as the most bitter outside critic or victim has produced.

With a lectureship in English in one of the Tokyo universities he had combined the post of adviser, in technical matters, to the Japanese Foreign Office. It had been understood that in the event of war he would be granted the equivalent of diplomatic immunity, and he therefore called during the morning of December 8 to ascertain his exact position. "I found the office in a turmoil; indeed, the officials with whom I spoke seemed just as much surprised and stunned by the news as the ordinary man in the street" (p. 105). Though doubting whether the whole truth will ever be known, Mr. Morris believes it not unlikely that the armed forces acted without the previous sanction of the Government, as they had done in Manchuria in 1931.

Nearly half the book describes aspects of life in Japan, but especially in Tokyo, at a period when the long aggressive war on China had already changed normal standards and habits in a profound, if not spectacular, way. Many parts of this section are of general and permanent interest, but their chief value is to those who already know the history and traditions of the country and have lived there in the past, yet lack up-to-date information. A reader without such a background might be misled by some of the author's anecdotes and witty observations into believing that the Japanese were so peculiar that their culture was not really viable, and that their military efficiency represented only a freak characteristic which could be extirpated, leaving a house of cards.

What will be left when the army and navy are defeated is, of course, unknown, and the author, although he inclines towards optimism, is too honest to pretend that he has a definite answer. His account of education, the English language in Japan, the Press, literature, the stage and cinema, radio broadcasting, and Western music (which has a great symbolic importance, representing the forbidden fruit in a form still not taboo) nevertheless provides a solid basis for estimating the task that lies ahead of spiritual reconstruction, whether it is stimulated from without or within.

In a postscript, Mr. Morris commends the diagnosis of Japanese military strength and morale by the former American Ambassador, Joseph C. Grew, in his *Report from Tokyo* (1943). The duty to recommend a constructive policy is also faced, and Mr. Morris summarizes it as: Defeat, Occupation, Demilitarization, Opportunity. The length of occupation would depend on the ability of the Japanese to produce a new form of government; he believes that a nucleus exists, as the "country has always possessed liberal-minded statesmen in sufficient quantity" (p. 160) who dare not voice their feelings through fear of assassination, or at the very least imprisonment or torture. Perhaps the most valuable part of *Traveller from Tokyo* consists in its exposition, based on imprisoned foreigners' evidence, of Japanese police methods and criminal procedure, which do not seem to have been so fully described before. Yet, in common with those attempting to forecast the course of events in post-war Germany, the author realizes that if the occupation lasts too long it will no longer protect a liberal government, but render it odious to the people and thus strengthen again the patriotic secret societies which have long held much power. Any attempt to discredit the Emperor would, in his opinion, be disastrous; the people must be convinced that the Emperor has been led astray by his military advisers.

As for the final stage, Opportunity, Mr. Morris anticipates the Cairo decisions by assuming that Manchuria will be returned to China and that Korea will probably be granted independence under some sort of international protection. He exposes once more the shallowness of Japan's old arguments about need of *Lebensraum*. But we "must be careful not to injure the foundations of Japan's economic life; our task is to show her how to build a better structure upon them" (p. 161).

E. J. LINDGREN.

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**Anadolu Ağızlarından Toplamalar.** By Dr. Phil. A. Caferoğlu, Professor of History of the Turkish Language, University of Istanbul. Published by Burhaneddin Basimevi, Istanbul. 150 kuruş.

This collection of Anatolian songs and tales, published under the auspices of the Turkish Language Institute, is the fruits of research travels made by the author on behalf of Istanbul University. It is the fourth of his publications of material gathered in various regions of Anatolia over a period of seven years—that in the present volume was the result of his 1939-42 investigations. He restricted each year's travel to one particular region.

Amongst his difficulties, Dr. Caferoğlu found that villagers when relating a tale would lapse from a literary into a vernacular style as the story warmed up, but that, contrariwise, when pressed to speak, would promptly abandon the natural idiom of their speech which served their everyday life, thus effectually defeating the object of the observer.

To his critics he observes, a little plaintively, "Please, come and let us record in writing our dialects, the wealth of our mother tongue together." But to this there had been no response.

The material is arranged according to its regional origins. Prayers for rain come from Kastamonu and Nigde. There are selections and vocabularies in the Tinkers' *Argot*, and in the Secret Language of the Geygel Nomads, which is differentiated sharply from the *Argot*, as having been created specifically to hide the life of the tribe. The author acknowledges his indebtedness in this section to Professor Ritter and Enno Litmann.

This book and its predecessors are likely to be of interest to philologists and students of folklore.

A. B. CARSON.

**Review of Guerilla War in Abyssinia.** By W. E. D. Allen. (Penguin.)

Here at last is a straightforward, accurate account of a guerilla campaign by one who is both a good writer and a man of action. Not that this book has had put on it any literary frills. It is, to the reviewer's way of thinking, in this time of war, all the better for that.

At times the author, no doubt deliberately, uses the current speech of the army; for example, on page 13, he says, "everyone turned up at the station well oiled," but such phrases are rare and serve to quicken the attention, making one feel that the author has written quickly and sincerely. When he writes of his companions in the campaign there comes out of his pages good measure of that something few men have successfully conveyed in writing, the spirit of the Army. Mark Pilkington, Bill McLean, Ringrose and Wingate, Ernest Thesiger, Johnson and Nott, Hugo Boustead and all the officers and non-commissioned officers who so distinguished themselves in the campaign are described in a way which those who knew them will appreciate as admirable. They are scattered now, but something of what they felt and most of what they did is recorded here. There is a convenient map and some extremely good photographs taken by the late Captain Pilkington. There are also sketches to illustrate particular actions.

This book can confidently be recommended to every member of this Society, whatever his personal interests may be, for it describes, as the story marches on, some of the best of our officers seizing upon the kind of opportunity for which every good officer longs.

After the war, when correspondence has become easier and paper less scarce and Captain Allen is once more home, it is much to be hoped that he will have time to make a new edition in durable form. In the meanwhile this Penguin edition is one everyone will be very glad to have and to keep.

G. G.

**My Travels Through Chad.** By Pierre Olivier Lapie, Croix de Guerre, M.C., late Governor of Chad. Translated by Leslie Bull.  $8\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ . Pp. 198. John Murray. 1943. 10s.

The regions with which this work deals are little known to the British public. Their place names are unfamiliar, and few works in English mention them. But in 1940 they constituted the core of the French colonial resistance to Vichy and Hitler, and it was very largely owing to a Frenchman of African descent, M. Eboné, then Lt.-Governor of the Territoire-du-Chad, that we and the Americans were both able to establish the vital air routes from Lagos, Takoradi, or Bathurst, on the West Coast of Africa, via Kano, Maidugguri, and Fort Lamy to Khartum, East Africa and beyond, which replaced the Mediterranean as the air highway to the East. The French Chad Colony—Territoire-du-Chad—stretches from the eastern shores of Lake Chad, north to Fezzan and Libya, east to Darfur, and south to the edge of the Congo basin—Ubangi-Shari, as it is called. It extended in 1940, therefore, from regions which were remote from the war—regions of tropical forest—to the verge of the fighting in Libya. From this Chad Colony were organized the famous desert sorties or expeditions to Murzuk and Kufra respectively in 1941.

The more northerly regions of Chad Colony have a long and interesting history, for from about 900 A.D. they were the seat of the famous kingdom of Bornu, which from 1000 A.D. down to 1800 A.D. dominated the Sudan from the Niger to the Nile.

Its influence still lives in the modern political units of Wadai, Kanem, and the British Emirate of Bornu, which covers a considerable area in North-Eastern Nigeria.

This work, written by Captain Lapie, who was Military Governor of the Territoire-du-Chad in 1941-42, is simply a record of his impressions of the places and people which he saw during a sequence of official visits to the Middle Shari, Bagermi, Wadai, Kanem, etc., omitting any discussion of current problems, military or civil—omitting, in fact, the sort of local colour which to the general reader is the most entertaining part of books of travel.

On the other hand, objective descriptions of places and a miscellaneous collection of information about them and their inhabitants are entertaining and concise, and give a good picture of the varied assortment of countries and peoples comprised in the Chad Colony.

For instance, the description of Lake Chad, though of slender scientific value, is a very good and true account of Lake Chad as it appears to the casual traveller or official. Similarly, the accounts of Fort Lamy and of the Lower Shari, of Wadai, and of a visit to Darfur, in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, are good living pictures of regions which have changed less than most parts of Africa in the last fifty years. The account of the French expedition to Kufra in 1941 is also interesting, and contains information not accessible from other sources to the general public.

It is interesting to note that on Hitler's birthday, April 20, 1941, Captain Lapie, at a conference of Chiefs of Departments of Chad Territory, "invited them, here in Chad, to sow the seeds of the rebirth of France," *inter alia* by "the formation among the Chiefs of an élite capable of collaborating with us in a system of government by the Chiefs which will be halfway between direct rule (necessary at the outset of colonization) and indirect administration, a loose and dangerous term only too often interpreted as an invitation to slackness."

One may perhaps be inclined to doubt whether the stimulating effects of such a conference on the material side of the Fighting French war effort will have much direct connection with the "rebirth of France," but it is indirectly of great interest and importance not only to the France of the future but to the world in general that these hitherto rather remote regions of North Central Africa and Chad have sprung so prominently into notice, as evidenced by the publication of this book. Assuredly the Sudan belt, already an important route for war transport, will in future be one of the most frequented air routes in the world, for there is probably no part of the earth's surface equal to the Sudan in extent which enjoys like advantages in the way of water and supplies; settled weather for most of the year; and absence of any appreciable obstacles to land transport and the creation of aerodromes.

From Brazil or even from the West Indies the natural stepping-stone to Africa has been since Elizabethan times, and is now more than ever, the coast of Guinea. From Guinea the next stepping-stone on the voyage east is the Territoire-du-Chad—the main topic of this work. From Chad the routes diverge to Egypt, to the Nile at Khartoum, or to East Africa.

The work, in short, is essentially propagandist in inception and execution; it owes its existence to General de Gaulle, who told the author, "You must write down everything you've told me!" It is, in fact, a very readable tribute to the men of many races and cultures who in this part of Africa kept France in the war.

H. R. P.

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*The West China Border Research Journal* for 1943 is full of scholarly studies on a slowly developing but most important area of China. Its editor is to be warmly congratulated on having surmounted so many difficulties and at having kept it at its exceedingly good level.

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*Foreign Affairs.* The October number has an article on "India's Minerals" by C. H. Behre, Jun., which should be carefully studied by everyone who speaks hotly in favour of "partition." It is accompanied by a map and is a practical contribution to the understanding of India's problems, and one which is almost wholly overlooked by politicians.

## OBITUARY

LIEUT.-COLONEL M. C. LAKE, C.M.G.

THE death of Lieut.-Colonel M. C. Lake, C.M.G., on July 26, 1943, is a cause of great sorrow to his many friends in this country and in Aden and the Aden Protectorate. Colonel Lake had a long and useful career which has thus regrettably been cut short by death. His devotion to Southern Arabia and his work for its people are well known, and as Representative of the British Council in that area he had a new and promising field of endeavour which he eagerly welcomed and in which it was hoped that he had before him many years of continued activity.

Morice Challoner Lake was born in 1885 and was educated at Wellington College and Sandhurst. He entered the Army in 1904, when he was attached to the 1st Battalion of the Somerset Light Infantry. In the following year he joined the Indian Army, and as an officer of the 109th Indian Infantry he went for the first time to Aden in 1913. The Four Years' War brought him into direct contact with the Arabs of the Aden Protectorate and the Yemen, from whom he raised and commanded first a Labour Corps and then a military unit named the 1st Yemen Infantry. After the conclusion of the war this force was disbanded, and Lake reverted for a time to military duty in India. But his heart by now was in Arabia, and it was in that country that he wished to work.

It was not long before the way was opened to him. In 1928 it was decided to raise a force of Levies from the Aden Protectorate, and Lake, who knew more about the Protectorate Arabs than any British person then available, was naturally selected first to advise on and then to raise, organize and command the new unit. This he did with complete success, and the Aden Protectorate Levies, greatly expanded since those days, remain a model as a regular British military unit for other Arab local forces which have been formed on a lesser scale for service in various parts of the Protectorate. In recognition of his work in forming the force and of his constant interest in its development Lake became Honorary Colonel of the Aden Protectorate Levies some years after he had ceased to command them.

Lake's value to the Aden Administration was not limited to his military capacity. His love of the wild mountainous country that lies inland from Aden and of the tribes that live in it was the outcome of many journeys, often on foot, which had brought him into personal contact with the people and had given him an intimate insight into their customs and their characters, their beliefs and their prejudices, their virtues and their faults. There is much to be deplored in the Aden Protectorate, but there is also much to like and to admire, and to a man of Lake's temperament the manliness, cheerfulness and sense of humour of the Arabs made a strong appeal. Such people know when they are liked and they repaid Lake's interest and affection by admiration, respect and great fondness for him. These were assets that made Lake an invaluable Political Officer, and it was as such, and later as Political Secretary at Aden, that he rendered outstanding service up to his retirement in 1940. In addition he acted as Resident and Commander-in-Chief at Aden in 1935 and 1936 and as Governor and Commander-in-Chief for parts of 1937, 1938 and 1939, and on several occasions he visited the neighbouring Arab kingdom of the Yemen, where he was a welcome guest of the Imam.

Lake's retirement from Government service did not end his work in Southern Arabia. In 1940 he was appointed to be the Representative of the British Council in Arabia and the Persian Gulf. In this capacity he once more made his headquarters at Aden, where he helped in founding a British Institute and in promoting other beneficent projects of the Council.

Lake continued his work for the British Council until a serious illness ended in his lamented death in South Africa when on his way to England, where he had hoped to regain his health.

Lake's varied services brought him official recognition and honours. He was

mentioned in despatches in 1918, was awarded the Macgregor Memorial Medal in 1927 and the Star of Ethiopia in 1933 (on the occasion of the Emperor of Ethiopia's visit to British Somaliland and Aden), and in 1936 he was made Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George. In the memory of his British and Arab friends he lives as a man whom they knew, trusted and loved for his integrity, his modesty, his kindness and his unflinching devotion to his duty.

B. R.

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The Council deeply regrets the deaths of Mr. W. H. Lee-Warner, of Lieut.-Col. Charles Milnes-Gaskell, one of the few Englishmen with real knowledge of Russia and Central Asia, of General Sir Charles Powell, of Mr. Oppenheim in Morocco, Dr. Kharagat, Major Greatwood and Mr. H. S. Ashton.

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#### THE TIBETAN LANGUAGE

Sir Basil Gould and Mr. Richardson have done a great service to those who wish to study the Tibetan language in their three books: *Tibetan Word Book*, *Tibetan Sentences* and *Tibetan Syllables*. These three books will be reviewed at length in the next number of this Journal; in the meantime they can be seen in the library. There are also phonographic records, which have not yet arrived, of the sentences and syllables so that officials and travellers visiting Tibet can go with a working knowledge of the spoken and written language and need not be entirely dependent on an interpreter. The books are published by the Oxford University Press in India.

## CORRESPONDENCE

THE EDITOR,  
"JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY,"  
8, CLARGES STREET,  
LONDON, W. I.

COLONEL W. G. ELPHINSTON,  
P.I.C.M.E., G.H.Q., M.E.F.  
November 25, 1943.

SIR,

My attention was called to-day to the review in your Journal for September of a book called *The Golden Carpet*, by Somerset de Chair. I find that, without my permission, the author has attributed to me a statement regarding Lawrence and Allenby.

I was serving in 1918 in a very humble capacity as commander of a squadron of Indian Cavalry, and, though I did meet Lawrence in the Victoria Hotel one day, and it was an Indian officer of my squadron who detained him for a few minutes for identification and thus earned a not very favourable mention in the *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, I was not in a position to know what transpired between Lord Allenby and Lawrence.

I have no recollection of having made any statement to Captain de Chair, and certainly never made any statement for publication. The only fact connected with the story which he relates of which I can speak with first-hand knowledge is that, when riding through Damascus the day after the city was taken, we passed the hospital and saw a considerable number of naked corpses piled in the courtyard in heaps, five or six feet high, apparently—from their condition—comparatively recently dead and thrown from the windows of the upper storey.

It was not surprising that such a sight gave rise to considerable comment, and it was said that General Allenby was exceedingly angry about it. When it was known that Lawrence had left for England there were those who connected his departure with this incident, on what authority I do not know.

When, after our recapture of Baghdad on May 31, 1941, British forces remained on the right bank of the Tigris and attacks were made on Jewish life and property in the city on the other bank, I was reminded of Damascus in 1918 and may have mentioned it to de Chair, to emphasize the importance of adequately policing a newly captured Arab city until its normal administration has been restored. That such gossip should be repeated in print is, in my opinion, quite unjustifiable, and I hope Captain de Chair will expunge from his book all reference to this statement, for which, as far as I know, there is no justification whatever.

I am extremely annoyed that any such statement should have been published in regard for Lawrence, for whom I have always held the greatest admiration, and I am particularly annoyed that it should have been attributed to me. If, as it appears, Captain de Chair was influenced to print this statement by some unguarded remark of mine, I am extremely sorry.

Yours sincerely,  
W. G. ELPHINSTON.

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MINISTRY OF PRODUCTION,  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
LONDON, S.W. I.

December 1, 1943.

DEAR SIR,

In the preface to the limited edition of *The Golden Carpet* I made a passing reference to a remark of Colonel Elphinston's about Lawrence and the Turkish hospital at Damascus. This suggested that Lawrence's abrupt departure for England

was due to Allenby's dissatisfaction with what he saw there. I have since discussed this with my friend Lord Winterton and am glad to be able to say that he and Peake Pasha, for both of whom I have a high regard, are convinced that there is no substance whatever in the suggestion that Lawrence was given a "single ticket home" by Allenby; and I am only sorry that an isolated reference to Lawrence, among several which were complimentary, should have caused pain to his old friends.

I also owe an apology to Colonel Elphinston. Owing to the delay in sea mails to the Middle East, I was not able to consult him about the reference, which I certainly should have done had I known that it was going to attract the attention of Sir Percy Sykes to the exclusion of nearly everything else in the book.

As regards the remark about the Brigadier kicking Lance-Corporal "Bloody" Stammers, I must rest upon the fact that the book was censored by the Brigadier in question.

In the popular edition of *The Golden Carpet*, which is now being printed, I have left out the reference to the Turkish hospital, and hope that the sunshine of the Royal Central Asian Society will therefore be able to play more freely over the events of the Iraq campaign itself.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,  
SOMERSET DE CHAIR.

*(This correspondence is now closed.)*





# Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society

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PART II

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## NOTICES

THE Council wishes to thank Lady Swayne for a generous gift of books which she has presented to the Society in memory of her father, Sir Thomas Holditch, who was one of the early Chairmen.

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Mr. Furmston very kindly offers to lend any of the following to members:

Vol. IV, No. 2, Summer, 1938, of *Hungarian Quarterly*, articles on Marc Aurel Stein and Alexander Csoma de Körös. *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Magyarischen Sprache aus Chinesischen Wurzeln*, Paris, 1877. *Anthropos*: "The Ainu Problem," by Professor Dr. Leo Sternberg. *The Aboriginal Inhabitants of Formosa*, by Father José M. Alvarez. *Root Words of the Dravidian Languages*, by Rev. S. Gnana Prakasar. *Le Dialecte des Mongols Urdur (Sud)*, by Antoine Mostaert.

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Any statements made, or opinions expressed, in papers, discussions or reviews in the Journal are purely individual, and the contributors only are responsible for them; also for their spelling of place-names.

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# THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE AGGRESSION

By OSWALD WHITE, C.M.G.

The first of a series of three lectures on the Far East.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on November 17, 1943, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., in the Chair.

IN the course of these remarks I shall dwell rather insistently on some of the more unpleasing traits of the Japanese character, and it may be thought that in common fairness I should also note their better qualities. I hasten, therefore, to disclaim any attempt to give you a picture of the Japanese character. Militarism has been described as a form of national disease. To adopt this analogy for a moment, the physician whose duty it is to combat disease looks first at the symptoms and then studies the underlying causes and the condition that forms its growth. Having made his diagnosis, he tackles the disease and endeavours to eradicate it. It is the first stage of this process that I am attempting to-day—to diagnose the disease of Japanese militarism. I shall not attempt to suggest the remedy, since that will be dealt with later in this series of talks.

You will not want me to describe the symptoms. The history of Japanese aggression during the last half-century lies open before your eyes. I shall go straight to the background—the form of government and the manner in which it has moulded Japanese character and made of it a malleable instrument and, finally, the views of the Japanese themselves as to their rôle on the stage of Asia first and the world next.

The record of Japan's aggression in the last fifty years reminds one forcibly of Hogarth's "Rake's Progress." Beginning in a small way with the seizure of Formosa, Japan proceeded to overcome Corea and then, in 1931, by a *coup-de-main* to snatch Manchuria. Up to this point it was always possible to discern extenuating circumstances. Even in the case of Manchuria apologists could make out a colourable case, though by this time Japan's own disingenuous explanations had worn threadbare. It is probable that if she had at this stage turned over a new leaf, Japan would have eventually been left in secure possession of her spoils; but she had, as it were, "got away with murder," and success had gone to her head. No sooner was Manchuria within her grasp than Japan began systematically to detach Inner Mongolia and Northern China from China, and here she made the first false step in her career of crime: she roused Chiang Kai-shek to fight to preserve the integrity of China. Here, again, for a time all went well. Before long she had overrun the greater part of China's seaboard. But the victory was barren, for China resolutely refused to come to terms. Then occurred the second Great War, and Japan decided to stake all on the gambler's throw—everything or nothing. If she succeeded

she could control the whole of East Asia and the Pacific. If not, she courted absolute disaster.

These facts are too well known to require elaboration. I want to-day to examine the background of this career of aggression. To what extent have Japanese political ideas, her system of government, her traditions, the will of her people, contributed to this result? In a word, how does Japan "get that way"?

Now, in attempting to answer these questions, I am treading on controversial ground, and I can but put before you my own personal views, with which you may or may not agree.

I think, however, that most people would agree that from the twelfth century, if not from a much earlier period, down to the Meiji Restoration, the Government of the country was predominantly military. As regards the position of the Emperor during the second half of this period, I cannot do better than quote to you what Professor Kuno has to say in his book on Japan's continental expansion: "Iyeyasu considered carefully the national tradition of the divine origin and powers of the Emperor. He then completely secluded the Emperor, the imperial family and the imperial court from human affairs and human contacts, thus making it impossible for the Emperor even to be seen by the people. This policy of seclusion was adopted in order to prevent the Emperor from exercising his divine influence upon the people, and men of power or ambition from aspiring to render service to the Throne" (page 2). "In Article I. of the Code of the Imperial Household, Iyeyasu defined the duties of the Emperor as being exclusively to learn how to compose poems that would be contributions to the national literature and to study Japanese poetry as a fine art." Under this system the *Tokugawa Shoguns* governed the country autocratically for 260 years.

The object of the Meiji Restoration was to restore to the Emperor the powers that were considered his by divine right. Was this object achieved? I think not. All that happened was a transfer of power to a bureaucracy. The fiction continues to be observed that decisions are made by the Emperor, but it must be obvious that he still does no more than allow his seal to be attached to the decisions of the Cabinet.

The Constitution of 1889 seemed to promise popular government, but it was so framed that the Diet was always ineffective. The Cabinet was responsible not to the Diet but to the Emperor, and two members of the Cabinet—the Ministers for the Army and for the Navy—have direct access to the Emperor. No Government has been able to stand which opposed the policy of these two Ministers, whose loyalty is given not to the Cabinet but to the Services that they represent. It is these two Services, then, that determine the policy of the country.

There was a time in the nineteen-twenties when Japan seemed to be moving gradually towards popular government, but appearances were deceptive. The Army soon tired of what it considered the feeble fumbling of politicians and diplomatists. The so-called Manchurian and China incidents followed, and from then on the military took the bit between their teeth and, making common cause with the Navy, eventually plunged the country into the present war.

The truth is that just as Iyeyasu astutely used the divine origin of the Emperor to further his own ends, so the fighting Services have, since the restoration, continued to use his name to justify their usurpation of power. Once the Imperial sanction has been obtained, then it becomes rank treason to suggest that the course they are pursuing is wrong.

There is another weapon of which unscrupulous use is made—assassination. The record of assassination, particularly in recent years, is a melancholy one. Almost without exception the men who have been done to death were men who, by our own standards, would be regarded as patriots. Their sole crime has been that of trying to restrain the hot-heads. But the most heartbreaking feature of this revolting system is the attitude of the Japanese themselves to these assassinations. Were there any public condemnation of these crimes one might hope that in time the system would die out, but, so far from any horror being shown, popular sympathy tends to centre on the assassin. The trial usually drags on interminably. Counsel for the defence covers the whole ground of internal and external policy, animadverts on the wickedness of foreign powers that are plotting Japan's downfall, deplors the Government's weakness in foreign affairs and its apathy in the face of crying evils at home, and finally castigates the corruption of high officials and the decadence of the public generally. The picture presented, in fine, is of a pure-minded patriot of vision and foresight whose action has had the effect of saving his country from alarming dangers. The effect is generally enhanced by the sentence of the court, which, as it were, condemns him more in sorrow than in anger. So long as this "hooley," to use a convenient American expression, is condoned, assassination will continue as a convenient political weapon.

Behind the assassin lurks the secret society. The most famous is the Black Dragon, at the head of which is the notorious Toyama Mitsuru, whose power is feared by high and low alike. The platform of these societies is composed of extreme chauvinism, hatred of the foreigner *qua* foreigner and thorough-going aggression. They are entirely unscrupulous and would as lief murder a whole Cabinet as not. There is only one limit to their ruthlessness: they would not lay hands on the Emperor or his family. It is not always necessary for them to proceed to extremities. A word of warning is sometimes sufficient. Shidehara, who as Foreign Minister made a courageous effort to settle outstanding difficulties with China by a policy of moderation and consideration, was forced into retirement and lived immured to his villa "for the good of his health."

Pausing for a moment to summarize my remarks up to this point, I would say that in so far as the Meiji Restoration professed to restore to the Emperor his rightful position as ruler and to confer a Constitution on the Japanese people, it was an entire failure, if, indeed, it cannot be regarded as a gigantic bluff. Power rests in the hands of a predominantly militaristic bureaucracy, with the military so strongly entrenched that they can at will brush aside the civilian element in the Government and abrogate such slender constitutional rights as the people in general are supposed to possess.

The next question to study is this: What do the Japanese people as a whole think of this state of affairs?

The great mass of the people take it as a matter of course. The ideal of freedom—liberty of thought and speech, liberty of action, etc.—has never flourished in Japan. The very idea is alien to their whole manner of thought, for their education, their training, their environment, all point inexorably to duty and discipline. Right through the fabric of society runs the recurrent thread of obedience—the submission of the child to the parent, the wife to the husband, the members of the legal family to its head, of the servant to the master, of the inferior to the superior. And so the Japanese political structure is like the American skyscraper—carried on a broad base and set back at intervals until it terminates in the apex; the base is composed of the masses, and each successive stage is subservient to the stage immediately above it until the last stage but one is, in theory, subservient to the Emperor at the top, who, being divinely inspired, can make no mistake. Only, unfortunately, the service is given not to the Emperor but to an imaginary entity (the State), whose good is arbitrarily decided by the *de facto* rulers as seems good to them.

Obedience, then, is second nature to the Japanese, and it would never occur to him to question the wisdom of any order. The order may seem strange, not to say arbitrary, but no doubt there is some good reason for it and the only thing is to obey. Not that there have been no instances of revolt, such as the rice riots during the last war, but the reaction is not against the Government, only against the immediate superior who is supposed to have misinterpreted or abused the orders he himself has received, and, even so, it is recognized as disobedience for which punishment will be received in due course.

If the implicit obedience of the governed be the ideal of the administrator—and Heaven forbid that we should admit it—then the system devised by the Tokugawa Shoguns is the most perfect system ever seen, for the people not only submit but are quite contented to do so. Public opinion, as we understand it in this country, does not exist in Japan. Obvious abuse of popular rights is accepted. For centuries the people have been taught not to argue but to obey, so that submission has become automatic. Under such conditions policemen and gendarmes develop into petty tyrants. Nor do the public show any disposition to intervene when the weak are bullied by the strong. It is not their business and interference is much too dangerous.

So much for the masses. It may be helpful at this stage to push this survey a step farther and study certain sections of Japanese society. What of the intelligentsia—the thinking people, the teaching class, the scholars, the students? What part do they play in the scheme of things?

In one way their rôle is a simple one. It is their task to assimilate the knowledge of other countries, their science and their learning, and make it available to their country, just as the business men, the manufacturer, the engineer, the merchant must be *au fait* with the trade and industry of the world, so that between them they may keep Japan abreast, if not ahead, of other countries in the technical side of modern progress. For this purpose, then, learning is not only desirable, it is also necessary, to



Japan. But it has also its dangers. Authority has always been a little nervous of it, for, however useful it may be when it is canalized and turned to practical purposes, learning encourages thought. It has no frontiers but embraces all knowledge. Nor is it content to stand still, but wants to throw new light on dark corners and to re-interpret old beliefs in the terms of newly acquired knowledge. This is inconvenient, to say the least of it, in a country where beliefs are stereotyped and settled for all time by Government order.

It was the scholars who put their finger on the weak point in the Tokugawa régime—the fact that the Emperor had been stripped of all his supposed functions. It was the men of affairs who brought down the *shogunate*, but it was the scholars who furnished them with the weapon. In more recent times the scholars have been busy with the ancient records—the *Kojiki* and the *Nihon Shoki*—which purport to tell the early history of Japan. They have not ventured to question their authenticity, but they have done what may ultimately prove just as dangerous. They have made an exhaustive study of the chronology which, as pointed out by foreign students—notably Bramsen and Aston—is untenable. In the event, they have proved that the dates assigned to the early Emperors have been expanded to conform to an early theory of year cycles, and they would, therefore, place the reign of the Emperor Jimmu not 600 B.C. but about the beginning of the Christian era. Similarly, the archæologists have studied prehistoric culture in Japan and Corea and have formulated theories as to the origins of the race. So long as these remain, as it were, side branches of study, no particular harm is done, but the time must come when adventurous spirits wish to co-ordinate the results of these studies and note what light they throw on the authenticity of the ancient chronicles. They will want to rationalize their stories and teachings in an attempt to bring them into line with modern knowledge. An instance occurred a few years ago when a Professor Minobe enunciated the bold theory that the Emperor was an organ of State and not the State itself. The Government reacted violently and the unfortunate professor suffered for his temerity. I believe, but am not certain, that he spent some time in prison. The teaching profession, then, is highly regarded in Japan, but it has to watch its step very carefully.

The student class is for the most part only interested in learning for the profits it brings and is docile enough, but there is a small percentage that is attracted by foreign theories of government, notably of communism. From time to time reports are given that “cells” have been rounded up. Usually the proceedings are held *in camera* and only a brief report is published, from which it appears, however, that the investigations take many months. It is probable that the authorities handle these outbreaks as they would an outbreak of plague—by the isolation not only of actual victims but of all who have come in contact with them—in an attempt to stamp it out entirely. On the whole, I imagine that these essays in the direction of new forms of government do not go very deep and that these students are merely playing with fire.

I turn next to the business class. In the course of my work I was for a number of years in touch with the business men of Osaka. In my

position it was not possible for me to discuss with them the foreign policy of their Government, but I formed a very distinct impression that they mistrusted the activity of the military. They understood all too well that one requisite of commerce is goodwill and confidence, and that these assets were not to be acquired by military aggression. Moreover, they had learnt from experience that when the military were in control trade and industry were ringed round with restrictions that tended to develop into a strait-jacket. The merchants' impulses, therefore, were initially in favour of peaceful methods of penetration.

The merchant, however, suffered from an obsession of his own. He was convinced of the superiority of Japanese goods, of Japanese technique in their manufacture and sale. He thought that all the markets of the world should be thrown open to his products and that other competitors who could not meet his prices should stand aside even in their principal markets. He pictured himself as the benefactor of the nations of the great undeveloped countries of the world, whom he persisted in regarding as oppressed by the white races. These ideas were encouraged by the great increase of Japanese exports from the end of 1931 as the result of the depreciation of the yen. He overlooked the fact that the ever-increasing flood of Japanese goods was dislocating the economy of the countries whose markets were being swamped, and when drastic steps were taken to stop the flood his rage knew no bounds. So the merchant also came in time to regard the British, Americans and Dutch as standing between him and his birthright, and though he might have misgivings as to the risks entailed, his own fancied interests tended to bring him into sympathy again with military aspirations. He was, moreover, well aware of the danger of opposing the military and knew that his only hope of remaining in business was to keep on the right side of the Army.

We come then to the military. They have always been the "top dog" in Japan. Up to the Restoration, society was divided into four classes in descending order of importance—the *samurai* or warrior-gentry, the peasantry, the artisans and the tradespeople. The *samurai* had his own code—unquestioning obedience to his feudal superior. Japanese writers such as Nitobe and foreign writers who have followed their lead have conspired to give the world an entirely fictitious picture of Japanese chivalry—*Bushido*. Writing in 1912, Chamberlain had this to say: "Chivalrous individuals of course existed in Japan, as in all countries at every period; but *Bushido*, as an institution or a code of rules, has never existed." However sweeping this assertion may seem to be, it is, I think, justified. The record lies plain in the history of the feudal period. Instances there are in plenty of chivalry, but there are also all too many instances of the blackest treachery. I will give you but one. Iyeyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the warrior-statesman, swore loyalty to Hideyoshi's son, Hideyori, on the former's deathbed, and yet, in the fulness of time, Iyeyasu forced a quarrel on Hideyori and, not content with having compassed his downfall and death, proceeded to do to death his infant son and daughter after publicly degrading them.

And what of the warrior's attitude towards the Emperor, the supposed fountain-head of his authority? Here is the record. Emperors have

been deposed; at least one, if not more, was assassinated. Emperors were exiled and came to violent ends in exile. One escaped from his island exile hidden under a load of dried fish. For fifty-eight years there were two rival Emperors, and eventually it was the Northern or illegitimate Court that won the day. One Emperor made a living by selling his autographed poems. I might go on multiplying instances, but my time is short. The story is written in Japanese history for all who care to read.

One is tempted to say that apart from his immediate duty the warrior had one ideal—his sword. It had a marvellous cutting edge, and the warrior practised and practised with it until he could cut through a pile of copper coins without nicking the edge. To make a clean cut through a human neck was child's play, and, though the practice was frowned upon by authority, it was common enough for the gentry to test a new blade or to try out a new technique in this way. The expert studied human anatomy in order to make an absolutely clean cut.

The warrior had one business, and that was to fight. The immediate cause was not his affair; that was decided for him by his chief. That idea persists to the present day. The Army exists, not to defend the country against aggression, but to fight for the glory of Japan. It may be thought strange that I should maintain this view in face of Japan's entire seclusion during more than two centuries, but this was an entirely artificial policy adopted by the Tokugawas, and, as I shall endeavour to prove to you, the idea of carving out an empire by the sword was always present.

During the second half of the nineteenth century the country was in a state of flux, but by the turn of the century Japan had set its house in order and the Government set to work to build up the new Japan. I speak of a new Japan, but actually it was only old Japan in a new guise. The material side of Western civilization was adopted and an entirely new machine was built up, but the Japanese spirit remained the same as ever. I propose to return to this point later, but for the moment I wish to speak on the subject of the Japanese idea of "empire." For the purpose it is necessary to touch on the subject of Japanese origins.

The obscurantism of the Japanese Government has prevented any exhaustive study of Japanese origins, but it is generally accepted that there are two main strains in the Japanese race—one a Malay type and the other a Mongol type, the former reaching Japan via the chain of islands that stretch up from the equator and the latter via Corea. It is not surprising, then, to find the Japanese a seafaring nation. It is true that the Tokugawa Shoguns, for reasons of their own, shut off Japan from the outside world, but just previously to this unnatural policy the Japanese had established trading centres as far afield as India, the Malay Peninsula, Siam, Annam, Java, Sumatra, the Philippines, Borneo, etc.

During the time of the Ashikaga Shoguns, Japanese pirates ravaged Corea and the China seaboard, and the third Shogun bought for himself the title of King of Japan from the Ming Emperor by promising to check Japanese piracy and by subscribing himself a subject of the Ming Emperor.

A result of their partly continental origin was that the Japanese always considered themselves as entitled to intervene in the affairs of Corea. At the dawn of history Japan was inhabited by a number of warring tribes,

many of which were as nearly related to the tribes struggling for supremacy in Corea as they were to each other. There were Japanese settlements in Southern Corea, and up to the end of the seventh century Japanese forces regularly crossed the straits to take a hand in the struggle. When they were finally worsted and withdrew from the peninsula, numbers of Coreans emigrated with them and were assigned districts in the neighbourhood of Osaka and Yedo, still popularly known as Kudara and Korai from the old Corean kingdoms of those names. To this era is to be assigned the legend, enshrined in their mythology, of the conquest of Corea by the Emperor Jingo. In defiance of all evidence to the contrary the Japanese firmly believe in this legend, and it has undoubtedly strengthened their colonial aspirations.

When Hideyoshi rose to power in the sixteenth century he formed the ambitious project of establishing an Asiatic Empire. This campaign was envisaged by him in six stages (I quote from Professor Kuno's book): (1) Before the end of May, 1592, he would make a triumphant entry into the Corean capital; (2) before the end of 1592 he would occupy Peking; (3) in 1593 he would assume the title of *Kampaku* (Imperial Regent) of China; (4) in 1594 the Japanese Imperial Court would be removed to Peking and the Emperor of Japan would ascend the throne of the newly created Empire; (5) when China, Japan and Corea were thus united into the *first unit* of the great Asiatic Empire, Hideyoshi would establish himself at Ningpo; and (6) the military leaders would extend their operations into India and other Asiatic countries.

As is well known, Hideyoshi's armies got no farther than Corea and the two Corean campaigns brought Japan no material gains, but the ease with which the Japanese forces had overrun Corea was remembered in Japan and encouraged the hope that better planning was all that was required to bring success the next time.

When the power of the Tokugawa Shoguns was waning and opposition to Japan's policy of seclusion was gaining ground, Japanese scholars revived these ideas of an Asiatic Empire. We find Yoshida Shoin, for instance, advocating that Japan should occupy Yezo and Sakhalin and undertake the conquest of Kamchatka as well as the domination of the Sea of Okhotsk. Loo Choo and Corea were to be made tributary, Manchuria was to be conquered, and then Japan should turn southward and continue her expansion on the continent and among the southern islands. Several other writers also maintained the thesis of a Greater Japan. The Shogunate found their writings awkward and lopped off their heads, but they are honoured to-day as founders of the Empire.

On one point these armchair strategists differed. One school advocated an alliance with Russia and the other an alliance with Great Britain. It is curious that these two schools continued in existence until 1902, when the problem was finally settled by the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In the meantime, Japan had entered the family of nations and had shown herself an apt pupil of Western diplomacy. She no longer talked of expansion, of conquest, of empire. She now spoke glibly of the peace of the Far East, of the integrity of Corea and of China, of the open door, of the protection of oppressed nations, of free trade, of the right of

self-defence, of all the hundred and one clichés that would throw dust in the eyes of the West. She fought Russia to preserve the integrity of Corea and promptly annexed the country; she engineered a *coup d'état* in Manchuria and set up a sham Government; she introduced anarchy into North China as part of her policy to dismember that country piece by piece, and, when war broke out with China in consequence, made terms with the arch-traitor Wang Ching-Wei, who was prepared to sell his country in the hope of attaining power thereby. She seized the opportunity of France's defeat by Germany to acquire a stranglehold on French Indo-China, bribed Siam to come in on her side, and eventually, when Britain and the United States were fully occupied elsewhere, nailed her colours to the mast and overran the whole of East Asia.

If we pause for a moment and look back over the past, I think it must be apparent that Japan's actions have been perfectly consistent. The Japan of to-day is the Japan of Hideyoshi. The outward trappings have changed but the spirit has remained the same. It is Japan's mission to control the whole of East Asia and the Pacific. Nothing less will satisfy her. Where we in the West have made the mistake is that we have listened to Japan's words and not judged her simply and solely by her actions. The latter have been eloquent enough in all conscience.

It is no wish of mine to criticize British policy in the past. I think myself that we have had our hands too tied elsewhere and were, therefore, compelled to hope for the best. But one criticism of British policy should be dealt with—I refer to the accusation that we drove Japan into her present course by renouncing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. I submit that the whole of history disproves this claim. We have, first, Japan's past record, which, as I have tried to show you, is one continued aggression. We have the fact that, under the ægis of the alliance, she destroyed the independence of Corea, and next we have the attempt made in 1916 to reduce China to a state of vassaldom. In case you have forgotten the famous *twenty-one demands*, I would remind you that in the height of the European war Japan suddenly, out of a clear sky, when she thought the West was too busy to intervene, secretly presented demands to China the acceptance of which would have tied her hand and foot to Japan. China, by a calculated indiscretion, made known the facts to the world, and Japan was compelled to wriggle out of a difficult position as best she might. But the military did not renounce their aims. They merely bided their time and made fresh plans. If Britain has any regret, it must be that we ever allied ourselves with a nation that has made a mockery of treaty pledges.

One other instance may be given of Japan's technique in foreign aggression. It has always been a sore point with the Japanese that by their policy of seclusion the Tokugawa Shoguns lost the golden opportunity of founding a Japanese Empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the time of Hideyoshi's death Japan was the finest fighting machine in the Far East—at least, the Japanese now are convinced it was, and for all I know they may be right. A forward policy then would have seen Japan firmly established as the dominant power before the Western powers had time to secure a foothold.

Nothing will convince the Japanese that they did not sell their birthright, and they bitterly resented—though until recent years they cloaked their feelings—that Britain, the Netherlands and the United States should have stolen a march on them while they were sleeping. To their own people the Japanese militarists did not openly admit their aims, which were to snatch the prize from the hands of their rivals. They took a more pious line. Asia had been enslaved by the Western powers. It was Japan's sacred mission to rescue the races of Asia from their oppressors and restore to them their liberty. Incidentally, the experiences of Corea, Manchuria and China show what is meant by liberty under Japanese protection, and I have little doubt that when the curtain is rolled back from the occupied areas throughout East Asia the story will be the same.

In Japan's eyes, then, Britain, the Netherlands and the United States were the real enemies, and of these probably Britain appeared the first and so Japan began an insidious campaign against Britain. In 1939 extraordinary anti-British demonstrations broke out suddenly in Japan, Corea, Manchuria and North China. To all protests Japan indignantly replied that the movement was spontaneous and that therefore the Government would not be justified in interfering. I was at Mukden at the time. Subordinate local officials volunteered to me the statement that Mukden had no desire to demonstrate, and all evidence pointed to the truth of their protestations. Presently, however, orders came that Mukden must show its solidarity, and so a committee toured the principal offices and ordered that a fixed number of the staff of each should join the parade. The daughter company of the B.A.T. had to provide its contingent, and lots were drawn to select their representatives. The parade then took place with much noise and little result. From all parts the story was the same. The demonstrations were entirely organized and in so far as the participants were concerned, their feelings were of annoyance and fear. I think that psychologically the Japanese made a mistake in organizing this campaign. It was uncomfortable to the British, but the Coreans and Chinese, at all events, were well aware that the movement was an entirely artificial one. But probably the aim of the authorities was to accustom the public to the idea that in some way the British were the enemies of the Japanese and that sooner or later a war would break out.

I have now attempted to show you that Japan's form of government leads naturally to militarism, and that Japanese leaders and thinkers have always cherished the dream of a greater Japanese Empire. I have also tried to show you how the Japanese system of government has created a people eminently docile and malleable. It only remains to show how these conditions have been used to implant in the minds of the people that it is their sacred mission to fight any and every country that may stand in their path.

In some ways the technique is similar to that employed in other militaristic countries. There is the same glorification of war, which is represented not as a disagreeable necessity when peaceful methods fail but as something ennobling and purifying. To die in battle is the supreme privilege of the Japanese patriot. Soldiers leaving for the front are addressed in terms which would suggest that ever to return is disgraceful.

The Japanese Government does not formally admit the existence of Japanese prisoners of war. In theory they have died, though in practice the fiction obviously cannot be maintained.

But Japan has also methods that are peculiarly her own. The Germans have laboriously built up a theory of racial superiority. The Japanese not only claim superiority; they go one better and prove it! Early in this present century foreign observers noted and ridiculed the movement to build up a new religion. Early records were taken down from the shelf, sifted, and solemnly given forth as authentic history. That Shinto had never been more than a primitive nature cult and that the so-called history was nothing more than myth and legend was calmly ignored. To the outside world it seemed incredible that the Japanese people could be made to believe that, for instance, the islands of Japan came into existence as a result of the physical union of a god and goddess—Izanagi and Izanami—and that Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, should be born from the left eye of the former and that the present Japanese Emperor is descended in direct line from the Sun Goddess or her brother, the Moon God—the point is a little obscure—but that is part of the creed the Japanese child is taught and believes. How is it done?

In the first place it should be understood that the average Japanese does not study the records in the original. They are contained in a language that is so archaic that even the advanced student can understand it only with the greatest difficulty. The version given to the Japanese child is a bowdlerized edition that omits the *naïvetés* of the original and presents the broad outlines in rationalized language. The impressionable child is given the story largely in picture form. The Sun Goddess, Emperor Jimmu, Empress Jingo, Prince Yamato-dake appear to him as powers of light overcoming the powers of darkness. That they should triumph is not only inevitable, it is necessary, for otherwise evil would reign in the place of right. And—here comes the lesson—just as the divine progenitors of the race fought to establish right on earth so must the Japanese, who has succeeded to this wonderful heritage, carry on the sacred mission of his race.

The connection between the ancient gods and goddesses and the present Emperor is driven home by the practice of bowing towards the Imperial Palace on all ceremonial occasions, and the essential relation between these beliefs and the Shinto religion is enforced by the practice of proceeding to the local Shinto shrine and bowing before it on the principal holidays. It is probable that when the Japanese grows to years of discretion certain features of this creed must strike him as crude and improbable. In his heart of hearts he may even discard them, but the essential outlines will remain. That the whole story must be either true or false is apparent to the foreign observer but not to the Japanese, for no discussion of the subject is allowed. Conduct is a matter of habit and character is largely a matter of custom. Whatever he may come to think of the creed, two beliefs have been firmly implanted in the mind of the average Japanese—one that he belongs to a superior race and the other that whatever his country does is right. It is unfortunate that other countries should have a wrong standard of values and refuse to acknowledge these

obvious truths, but if they oppose, Japan must fight them, secure in the knowledge that right will triumph over wrong.

From 1931 onwards the military proclaimed the existence of a *hijōji*—a state of emergency. What was the danger was never explained, but the public were gradually prepared for the belief that Japan was encircled by dangerous foes and that the time would come when Japan would have to take her sword in hand. No doubt the average Japanese is a little hazy in his mind as to how it has come about, but of one thing he is convinced and that is that he is engaged on a just war.

And that is the note on which I wish to conclude these remarks. It is the military and the military alone who have brought Japan into this war, but we could make no greater mistake than to think that we have only to remove the military and the Japanese people will then see the error of their ways. It is the whole of the Japanese race with whom we have to deal, a people that is convinced that it is Japan's sacred mission to carve out an Empire in Asia and the Pacific.

Mr. H. VERE REDMAN said he would like to pay a tribute to Mr. White's lucid and comprehensive survey. The question which had been revolving in his own mind while Mr. White was speaking was as to how, in the light of these unchallengeable facts in their history, the Japanese could be induced to become reasonable members of the community of nations. Mr. White had talked of political assassination; the Japanese had been very impressed by the great bravery of these assassins who would risk their own lives in assassinating someone they considered harmful to the State, for they took their lives in their hands, and if they were not killed themselves they would often commit suicide in order to prove the sincerity of their act. This was a state of mind which must be taken into account.

Mr. Redman continued: "That leads me on to what I think myself is the essence of the Japanese problem, which is the difficulty of making them accept universal standards of right and wrong. They believe that their Emperor is of divine origin and that they are therefore governed by different moral standards from the rest of the world. It is lawful for them to do what others must not. The whole myth is, of course, childish, but, after all, we should most of us be willing to say with Gibbon that all religions are to the believer equally true, to the unbeliever equally false, and to the magistrate equally useful. Our problem, then, is hardly to convince the Japanese of the absurdity of their myth, but rather to get them through it in some way to accept the universal moral standard. If we can do this we shall have gone a long way to solving the Japanese problem."

Mr. Redman went on to say that the Japanese were in the habit of comparing their civilization with what they saw as ours. Theirs inculcated hardihood, frugality, extreme loyalty to the State and absolute obedience combined with hard work, while what they saw as our ideals were short hours of work, a certain amount of luxury, plenty of money and a great number of free privileges for everybody. Before they accepted our standards they must be convinced of the superiority of our ideals, and



it would be our task to carry that conviction to them. We should be the better equipped for that task as the result of Mr. White's masterly survey of the Japanese character as revealed throughout the nation's history.

The CHAIRMAN, when he closed the meeting, thanked Mr. White, and said he thought that the first thing to do was to beat the Japanese both on land and at sea and to see that they knew they were beaten. He thought that then the first part of the problem would be solved.

## FAR EASTERN POLITICS, 1894-1941

By SIR JOHN PRATT, K.B.E., C.M.G.

Based on a lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on December 1, 1943.

IT does not often happen in these days that anyone is asked to give a lecture on the historical aspects of any of the burning questions of the day. The average Englishman thinks that history is unnecessary. The Chinese philosopher Laotzu, who was an older contemporary of Confucius, preached the doctrine that, if you want to keep the people happy, you must keep them ignorant. The same idea seems to underlie a pregnant saying by G. M. Young on the subject of history. "No worse affliction," he says, "can a nation be cursed with than a historic memory. The great happiness the English people enjoy is due to their habit of forgetting everything that happened last week, and assuming that everything before that was a win for our side."

I was reminded of this saying of G. M. Young's a few days ago, when I had the privilege to be present at a discussion by distinguished officers of the problems involved in combined operations. We were told how a brilliant staff of officers is kept constantly at work studying these questions, and we were told something of the elaborate machinery for placing all the expert knowledge that they accumulate at the disposal of the Commanding Officers actually conducting the operations. We were told that by means of lectures, articles and books all this expert knowledge would in time be brought within reach of all grades of officers with gradually improving results as regards the conduct of the war.

Towards the end of the lecture and discussion a very distinguished retired Admiral got up and said that he had listened with great interest to the brilliant exposition of the technical problems involved in combined operations, but that he would like to say that there was nothing new in anything that had been said that evening. Weapons changed, but fundamental principles remained the same, and all the principles of combined operations that had been so brilliantly expounded by the serving officers present had been known to and had been applied by Wolfe in his celebrated campaign in Canada in the eighteenth century. He deplored the fact that the lessons of history were so quickly forgotten. All the mistakes avoided by Wolfe in Canada were made at Gallipoli. The lessons at Gallipoli were forgotten and the same mistakes were made again at Dieppe, and he had no doubt they would continue to be made in this war and in all future wars.

He wound up by begging the serving officers present to encourage their young officers to study history and to be guided by its lessons.

Ignorance of the historical causes that have produced any particular situation is one of the chief causes of error both in the political and in the military world. Officers had not bothered to learn the lessons of Wolfe's

campaign, and therefore easily avoidable errors were committed at Gallipoli and again at Dieppe and in the Mediterranean, and in exactly the same way ignorance of the circumstances in which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was negotiated, ignorance of the meaning of splendid isolation, will in the political field be responsible for grave errors in dealing with the existing situation in the Far East.

It is only through a correct interpretation of the events of the last fifty years that it will be possible to arrive at correct solutions of our present difficulties. Let us begin by recapitulating the salient facts of the present situation in the Far East. The present war between China and Japan broke out in 1937. By that time there was no longer even the simulacrum of any system of collective security. The utmost therefore that the democracies could do was to promise to give individually as much help as they could spare to aid China against aggression. The help that China has thus received from England, Russia and America has never amounted to more than a mere trickle, but Japan was able to obtain all the essential war materials that she required. No less than two-thirds of this came from America.

Two years later, in 1939, the European war broke out, and our position was greatly weakened by the fact that Japan was no longer our ally but was indeed bitterly hostile. Another two years passed, and in 1941 there came the attack on Pearl Harbour. The power basis of Britain's position in the Far East had silently crumbled away, and her whole Far Eastern Empire had collapsed.

This was a bitter disappointment to China, who had pinned great hopes upon the entry of England and America into the war. But China continued to fight on, and is still as confident as ever of victory. The two great snags in China's situation are the collapse of her currency and the danger from the Communists. The Communists are gaining ground in occupied China, and this raises a difficult question as regards the possible attitude of Russia in Manchuria and North China when the Japanese collapse takes place.

The most salient fact of all in the Far Eastern situation is, of course, the presence of an aggressive and all-conquering Japan. Our chief immediate problem is how to defeat Japan, and our chief post-war problem will be how to prevent future Japanese aggression. This will not be so difficult as the corresponding problem presented by Germany in Europe, though it is unlikely that Japan will again be attended by the extraordinary good fortune that has enabled her in the last fifty years to become a powerful military nation.

The impact of the West fell upon both China and Japan at about the same time in the nineteenth century. It was a favourable moment for Japan, for she had just emerged from two hundred and fifty years of profound peace and seclusion, but it was a very unfavourable moment for China, for the impact of the West caught China at one of her periods of decay. At the end of the nineteenth century China had reached the very lowest point of her long decline, but Japan had succeeded in transforming herself after the Western model into a powerful military and industrial State. She achieved this without arousing any suspicions, for in the

nineteenth century Russia was the great aggressor State, and the advance of Russia across Asia to the Pacific was a menace to both Japan and China. It seemed only a reasonable precaution, therefore, when Japan in the nineteenth century built up powerful armaments.

The first Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 was directed not so much against China as against Russia, with the object of keeping Russia out of Korea and Manchuria. After the war no suspicions were aroused when Japan proceeded to treble her army and quadruple her navy and to build up a steel industry. These moves were indeed applauded by England and America, for a powerful Japan seemed to be a useful instrument with which to check Russia. This idea underlay the decision to make the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and it was only after the crushing defeat of Russia three years later that it was perceived that the alliance had effected a disastrous change in the balance of power in the Far East, a change which was as damaging to China as it was to England and America because Japan was a far more dangerous aggressor than Russia had ever been.

It is very unfortunate that no English historian has yet made any study of the origins of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Even eminent historians have only a vague general idea of Far Eastern politics, and Far Eastern specialists are not historians and are not competent therefore to fit Far Eastern developments into their proper perspective in world events. Slapdash rationalizations therefore take the place of historical research, and it is still glibly repeated that in 1902 the rise of Germany caused the abandonment of splendid isolation. We wanted, it is said, to restore the balance of power by supporting the weaker side, and we felt that it would be dangerous to remain isolated any longer without any friends.

These plausible arguments fall into the elementary error of confusing splendid isolation with something resembling American isolationism. Splendid isolation never meant that England dissociated herself from the affairs of the Continent. Lord Salisbury played an active and effective part in everything that happened in Europe, but he wisely kept his hands free and refused to chain himself to the chariot wheels of one country or of one group. England was therefore courted by all, for the support of England was a great prize in European politics. In order to win our support, European countries had to frame policies calculated to win our approval. We were thus able to control and to some extent to guide developments. It is quite untrue that splendid isolation left us without any friends, for Europe was so disunited that at least half Europe was always on our side. It was quite impossible for the whole Continent under any circumstances, as was amply proved during the Boer War, to combine against us. It was only after we lightly abandoned the tradition of five hundred years and reversed the policy of Canning, Palmerston, Gladstone and Salisbury, it was only after we had tied a millstone round our neck in the shape of an ally that this country ran for the first time into mortal danger.

The abandonment of splendid isolation had nothing whatever to do with the rise of Germany. It was really due to the disastrous intrusions into foreign policy of that forceful politician Joseph Chamberlain. During the winter of 1897-8 Joseph Chamberlain was thrown into a sudden panic

and conceived the idea that the British Empire could only be saved by an alliance. His panic had nothing to do with the rise of the German navy, for in its initial stages from 1898 to 1906 German naval expansion caused no great anxiety in England. Ludicrous as it may seem now, Joseph Chamberlain's panic in 1898 was over the battle of the concessions in China, he thought that the seizure of Kiaochow and Port Arthur threatened us with dangers "as great as when the great Napoleon laid an interdict upon our trade."

His remedy was, not to join the weaker side, as some slapdash writers still maintain. He looked for the strongest possible ally in the market, and for nearly five years he made public overtures for an alliance to both Germany and the U.S.A.

The disgust that these tactics inspired was expressed by Asquith in a biting speech in the House of Commons: "What have we done, what have the people of Great Britain done and suffered that, after bearing as we have done for nearly fifty years the ever-growing weight of Empire on our own unaided shoulders, without finding the burden too heavy for the courage, the enterprise, the self-reliance of our people, what have we done or suffered that we are now to go touting for allies in the highways and byways of Europe?"

In 1902, however, Lord Salisbury had lost his grip upon affairs, and Joseph Chamberlain's ideas at length prevailed. If we had stood aside, a true balance of power would have been maintained, because the ambitions of Japan and Russia would have cancelled each other out.

Unhappily the ideas of Joseph Chamberlain prevailed, and this was the greatest piece of good fortune that befell Japan, for the alliance was signed, and it launched her on her career of aggression. The full scope of Japanese ambitions was revealed ten years after her victory over Russia. In 1915 she presented the twenty-one demands to China and clearly indicated that her policy was to exclude both England and America from the Far East and turn China into a vassal state.

The next great landmark in the Far East is the Washington Conference of 1921-2, and here again Japan was attended by extraordinary good fortune. The Washington Conference was, at the time, hailed as a triumph of statesmanship and of the results that might be achieved by Anglo-American co-operation.

In ten short years, in 1931, it was already possible to view it in the perspective of history as one of the most disastrous of all failures. The Washington Conference was called under the influence of the ideas which dominated the world in the inter-war period, ideas that were Utopian, self-deceiving and incapable of standing any real test. It was believed that Japan could be persuaded to abandon her deep-rooted ambitions as regards the continent of Asia; that she would be willing to join with England and America in a self-denying policy that renounced competition in favour of collaboration for the purpose of the rehabilitation of China.

There were, in fact, some plausible reasons for these beliefs. The army was out of favour in Japan because aggression, tempted by the collapse of both the Russian and the Chinese Empires, had overreached itself and had disastrously failed. For a brief period the Japanese seemed to

believe that in future there was going to be a League of Nations world, in which aggression would no longer be either practicable or profitable. She therefore came to the Washington Conference, signed the Nine Power Treaty and agreed to the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the abolition of spheres of influence in China.

But here again Japan was lucky, because in the arrangements made at Washington three important points were overlooked. In order to secure Japan's consent to the Nine Power Treaty, measures of disarmament were agreed upon, which placed Japan in an impregnable position in the Pacific. Spheres of influence were abolished in name, but nothing was done in fact to minimize or sterilize Japan's special position in Manchuria; and this, as the Lytton Report showed ten years later, when it was too late, was certain to lead to conflict between China and Japan and further aggression.

The third point that was overlooked at Washington was the strength of the nationalist feeling in China, with the result that all the arrangements were made on the supposition that the rehabilitation of China could only be effected under foreign tutelage.

The foreign Powers were soon to learn all about the strength of China's nationalism, for the Washington Conference was followed almost immediately by what is known as the Kuomintang-Comintern flirtation. The Kuomintang is the Nationalist party of China. The Nationalist revival began at the end of the nineteenth century. It brought about the revolution and the expulsion of the Manchus in 1911, but for twenty years it suffered frustration. This was partly due to the constant interference of Japan, whose aim was to keep China disunited, and partly due to the fact that the Nationalists were groping after ideal constitutions, copied from Western democracies, which were quite inapplicable in China.

They were rescued by the Comintern from this floundering. The Bolshevik revolution took place in 1917. The Chinese revolutionists were greatly interested to see that the Soviets had succeeded in conducting their revolution to a successful issue. Each revolution took a great interest in the fortunes of the other, and eventually in 1923 Comintern emissaries from Moscow arrived in Canton furnished with vast sums of money. This started the Kuomintang-Comintern flirtation, which lasted about five years (1923-8). This is a very crucial period in world history, for it was crowded with dramatic events which had far-reaching effects on the evolution of Modern China and on Chinese relations with England, Japan and Russia.

The first step in 1923 was the reorganization of the Kuomintang, or the Nationalist party, and the adoption of the idea that there should be a dictatorship by a single party—*i.e.*, the party should establish and control the Government, and that in both party and government affairs the committee system of administration should be adopted. This reorganization was extremely successful, so that almost immediately after the Washington Conference the Powers were faced with a rising tide of nationalism.

Great Britain was the first to see the implications of this movement—namely, that the time had arrived to liquidate the encroachments on China's sovereignty effected by the unequal treaties and to leave control

of Chinese affairs in the hands of the Chinese themselves. This new policy was announced in a memorandum issued by the British Government in December, 1926, and its adoption was attended with extraordinary success. The ground was cut from under the feet of the Communists, and when it was discovered that the object of the Comintern had been to capture the Chinese revolution for Communism and world revolution, the Comintern emissaries were expelled.

The National Government of China was established at Nanking in 1928. The success of the Nationalist movement coincided with Japan's disillusionment with the post-war world. In constructing the new League of Nations world, the statesmen at Versailles had neglected to construct an economic framework within which nations could live together in harmony. Japan suffered severely from the restrictive policies adopted by other nations, both in the political and in the economic spheres. Japan was hard hit by the slump and the general dislocation of industry in the first decade after the war. Between 1928 and 1931, for example, the price of raw silk, on which in the last resort both industry and agriculture in Japan were dependent, fell from 1,450 to 570 yen per picul. During the whole decade Japan's difficulties were aggravated by the restrictive policies of other nations until eventually she decided that her economic future could only be secured by gaining political control over the regions from which she drew her raw materials and which were the markets for her manufactured goods. Japan thus returned to the dream that manifest destiny led to empire on the mainland of Asia.

When Japan attacked Manchuria in 1931 many people believed that there was a system of collective security in existence, and that it was only necessary to proceed to Geneva and touch the button and the system would begin to operate. When this did not happen hysterical accusations were made that it was England's fault, that England had killed the League.

America was not a member of the League, but those who blamed England were anxious to excuse America. A myth was invented to the effect that America had offered to take strong action to restrain Japan but that England had refused. There was no truth whatever in this story, for no such offer was made. It was impossible to restrain Japan, because ten years before Japan had been placed in an impregnable position at the Washington Conference, and the utmost that America could do was to mobilize the moral opinion of the world by means of the non-recognition doctrine. Nevertheless, this mythical story of America's offer was eagerly taken up by isolationists in America and their dupes in England, because it supported the isolationist thesis that America must never co-operate with England, for England was sure to let her down.

That the story is false has been demonstrated up to the hilt. Nevertheless, it continued to be an article of faith in isolationist circles in America. In the recent debate on the Conally resolution in the Senate, Senator Nye said:

"Shall we forget that we had an agreement with Britain, on which we wanted her to follow through with us when Japan moved

into Manchuria? Must we forget that Britain would have nothing to do with our expressed purpose when we asked for her co-operation in enforcing that agreement? Is it unfair to ask why, if Britain would not co-operate then, we can expect her to co-operate now under some new plan or agreement?"

The story of Japanese aggression in the decade after 1931 is familiar to us all. The seizure of Manchuria was followed by a few years of uneasy truce, during which the young officer group obtained control of Japanese policy and elaborated a plan for detaching the five northern provinces of China from the control of Nanking. From 1935 onwards, China made a most remarkable recovery, which was largely due to the help she received from Great Britain in reforming her currency. She was rapidly forging ahead, when in 1937 Japan struck again before she could become too strong and united.

In 1937 the League was already dead, and America had plunged still further into isolationism. There was therefore no possibility of bringing collective aid to China. In 1938 Japan thought that peace was in sight and announced her plans for a New Order in East Asia, but China continued to fight on. On several occasions during 1939 and 1940 there was extreme danger that Japan might launch an attack upon Great Britain, leaving America on one side. The turn of the tide, however, came at the end of 1940. Great Britain had won the Battle of Britain, and as a result of the Presidential Election President Roosevelt was confirmed in another four years of office.

Up till that time it had been America's policy to propitiate Japan in order to keep out of the war. President Roosevelt was now able to pursue a more constructive policy. The first signs of this were seen in the Lend-Lease arrangement of January, 1941, and six months later came the freezing of Japanese assets in America and the British Empire, which was the direct prelude to the attack upon Pearl Harbour in December, 1941. In spite of initial disappointments, this has made China's ultimate victory certain.

The most serious factor in China's present position arises from the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Comintern. We must therefore go back and trace developments that followed the Kuomintang-Comintern flirtation of 1923-8 and their effects upon Russia. The Comintern emissaries rendered a very valuable service to China at that time, but they also did her a great injury. When they were expelled they left behind them Communist groups which developed into independent Soviet Governments. For ten years from 1927 to 1937 there were continuous attempts to suppress these independent governments. In 1937, in the face of Japanese aggression, an arrangement was patched up, but in practice it has since broken down. There have been clashes between the Kuomintang and the Comintern armies in the field and much mutual recrimination, each side accusing the other of being more anxious to enhance its own influence than to defeat the Japanese.

There is no doubt that Chinese powers of resistance have been greatly weakened by this conflict. There is no great difference in the social



programme each side has in view, but the Communists insist upon maintaining a separate government, army and administration, and their first loyalty and obedience are given to another State.

At the present moment it seems that the Communists are gaining ground in the rural areas of occupied China. This is a source of anxiety to the Kuomintang, for when the Japanese are defeated and begin to retreat, they fear that the Communists may establish themselves in the chief towns as well. This may make it difficult to re-establish Kuomintang rule over large areas of Manchuria and North China, especially as there are doubts as to the attitude that Russia might take up.

Russia has an important strategic interest in these areas and would be glad to see them under an administration which was friendly to Russia and sympathetic with Soviet ideals. The Japanese are fomenting doubts in Kuomintang circles whether the Kuomintang, even if they win the war, would be able to recover Manchuria. The Japanese no doubt hope that by fomenting such doubts they will weaken the Kuomintang determination to resist. There are, however, no signs of this propaganda having any success and no signs of defeatism in Free China circles. There are, indeed, good grounds for hoping that a solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem will be found. It has long been clear that Russia has no desire to foment separatist tendencies in China or to split her into different sections. Their policy and attitude has been perfectly correct, for it is a Russian interest no less than a British interest not only that Japan shall be defeated but that a united and prosperous China should emerge from the struggle.

In each major crisis of her history in modern times the Kuomintang has turned to Russia. The Kuomintang is greatly influenced by the Russian example, for apart altogether from questions of ideology, Russia has been faced with the same kind of problems as China and has dealt with them with conspicuous success. In 1923 the Kuomintang turned for guidance and inspiration to Russia, and it is likely that she will do so again. The solution of the Kuomintang-Communist difficulty will probably therefore be found in a process of evolution within the Kuomintang itself, which will give rise to a Kuomintang administration closer to and more friendly to Russia.

The main lesson to be learned from the history of the Far East during the last fifty years would seem to be that the fundamental interest of Russia, China, England and America is the same—namely, that Japan should be defeated and confined within her four islands, so that the cycle of aggression shall not start up again, and that China should be helped to solve her constitutional and economic difficulties and emerge a united and a prosperous nation from the present struggle.

**A MEMBER:** What shall we do with the population of Japan?

**SIR JOHN PRATT:** I think that is a problem for the Japanese themselves to solve, but I see your point. The idea is that the population of Japan is rapidly expanding and the people have to find an outlet somewhere. Emigration to various countries is the solution of the problem that is usually put forward, but emigration has never been a solution of the

Japanese population problem. The people have never been able to emigrate in sufficiently large numbers to make any real difference. In recent years the population of Japan has increased at the rate of a million a year, and not more than a few thousands can emigrate. In spite of this rapid increase in their population, the Japanese have hitherto found no difficulty in absorbing their excess population into industry, and there has not really been any population problem. Fairly good evidence that the Japanese themselves do not fear the prospect in front of them can be seen in the fact that about three years ago they passed a law involving certain measures designed to increase the population from its then figure of about 75,000,000 to 100,000,000.

I think the solution of the Japanese population problem is to be found in industrialization, and the responsibility rests upon us, when we make peace this time, to construct a world with a sane economic framework, so that if Japan is forbidden to develop her heavy industries, on which she can build up armaments, at any rate she shall be allowed to build up her light industries. If she is allowed to do that, she will do it with extraordinary success, and, if she has access to raw materials and the tariff policies of other countries allow her to export her goods to those countries, I do not think we shall have any difficulty with the Japanese population problem.

A MEMBER: Does Sir John Pratt think that there are in China elements which will produce a stable central government in the future? So much of the future of the Far East seems to depend on the existence of a stable national government in China.

SIR JOHN PRATT: That is a very difficult question to answer. I think the Chinese will have a sufficiently stable government for their own purposes, but I do not think they can ever overcome their excessive decentralization and their excessive suspicion of centralized control. I think they will still derive their great power and force from the fact that they are a homogeneous people, that they are a vast mass of 450,000,000 people who all think the same thing and do the same thing at the same time. That is an extraordinary fact which it is very difficult for the rest of the world to appreciate. But, whether the Chinese have a stable centralized government or not, I think they will have to be left to control their country in their own way, and we shall have to accept any kind of government that they institute and find a way to deal with that government.

A MEMBER: I should like to ask a question with regard to the relations between Russia and China after the war. I gather that Sir John Pratt thinks that Russia will not interfere in the internal affairs of China. The question I wish to ask is what is Sir John Pratt's view of Russian aspirations with regard to Mongolia and Manchuria.

SIR JOHN PRATT: Those two countries stand in different categories as far as Russia is concerned.

With regard to Mongolia, I think there will always be an element of dissension between Russia and China over that country. The Chinese have got it into their heads that Mongolia ought to be part of the Chinese Empire. It was brought into the Chinese Empire by the Manchu con-

quest. The Mongols came in as equal allies with the Manchurians and therefore became part of the empire over which the Manchus reigned. When the Manchu Empire became the Chinese Empire, the Chinese got into the way of thinking that Mongolia was part of the Chinese Empire, and when the Chinese begin to think a thing like that they go on thinking it for hundreds of years. The Russians are quite determined that Mongolia shall not go back to China but shall be orientated more towards Russia, and I think that is also the desire of the Mongols. I do not think that anything that China can do will disturb that arrangement, which is going to last, but it will have the effect of creating a certain suspicion between the Russians and the Chinese.

With regard to Manchuria, the Russians flooded into that country in 1900; they seized the whole country, and it was the Japanese and not the Chinese who turned them out. But Manchuria is far more part of China than is Mongolia. As was pointed out in the Lytton Report, the immigration of 30,000,000 Chinese peasants into Manchuria made it unchallengeably part of China. The Chinese feel very bitterly indeed about this, and the one thing for which they are going on fighting this war is that Manchuria shall once more be incorporated into China. If they saw no chance of that happening it would very greatly weaken their determination to go on fighting. I think the Russians are very well aware of the strength of Chinese feeling on this point. I am inclined to doubt whether the Russians will think it worth their while to have such a terribly acute cause of contention as that between themselves and the Chinese. I do not see what the Russians have to gain by trying to seize Manchuria for themselves. What the Russians do want is a government and an administration in Manchuria that will not be a menace to them. The Japanese in Manchuria are a standing menace to them, but there is no reason why a Chinese administration in Manchuria should be a menace to them.

A MEMBER: What does Sir John Pratt think about Korea?

SIR JOHN PRATT: I think that Korea is a completely insoluble problem.

A MEMBER: Does Sir John Pratt think that the Chinese have any aspirations in regard to French Indo-China?

SIR JOHN PRATT: They have aspirations. I doubt very much whether they want to incorporate French Indo-China into the Chinese Empire in the same way as they want to incorporate Manchuria, but I think they would like to be the Suzerain Power. I think it will be found at the Peace Conference that the Chinese very strongly favour the idea of an international body to which the administration of such regions is accountable, the reason for that being that, if the Chinese play their part in an international body of that sort, it will enable them to have a finger in the pie in Indo-China and Malaya. In Malaya there are large Chinese communities, and for the last thirty or forty years or more China has regarded those communities as an integral part of the Chinese State. The Chinese in Malaya are entitled to have representatives on the Council in Chungking and to nominate people on the Administrative Council, all of which tends to make them a little *imperium in imperio*. The Chinese like that sort of thing, and the only trouble is that our Colonial administrators do not react at all kindly to it. The same kind of thing happens

in Indo-China too. I do not know who is going to govern Indo-China, but it will be a difficult task if the Chinese act in this way.

A MEMBER: What does Sir John Pratt think about Sinkiang?

SIR JOHN PRATT: Sinkiang is a very peculiar case. The Chinese have suddenly re-established control there, and the Russians have withdrawn. Sinkiang is separated from China by over a thousand miles of desert; it is most inaccessible, and there is no trade between the two countries, yet in some mysterious way the Chinese manage to maintain their control in Sinkiang. The Russians were entrenched there very strongly and controlled the administration completely; there was a Chinese government there, but it was entirely in the pockets of the Russians, who were developing the country. Then suddenly there were some political murders and the Russians cleared out of the country, bag and baggage. The Chinese then got control of the country again, but the Russians took away everything they could; a friend of mine was told that they even took the panes of glass out of the windows.

A MEMBER: Have the Chinese any aspirations with regard to Tibet? I saw in a recent publication that the China Summer School included Tibet as part of the present Chinese dominions.

SIR JOHN PRATT: You may be interested to know that in a pamphlet which I wrote the Oxford University Press put a map, without my knowledge, and on that map Tibet, Manchuria, Mongolia and China were all coloured in different colours. Two or three days ago the Chinese Government complained about this map because it conveyed the wrong impression that Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria were not parts of the Chinese Empire.

A MEMBER: Is it true that the British Government continues to pay the tribute that Burma used to pay to Chungking?

SIR JOHN PRATT: We annexed Burma in 1885. At that time Burma was one of the tributary States of China and used to send tribute to China every five years. When we annexed the country we incautiously took over all its international obligations. In looking at some old archives I found that Lord Rosebery, when he was Foreign Secretary, suddenly discovered that he was under an obligation to send tribute to China from Burma the following year, and the result was that there were frantic negotiations to get rid of this obligation before it materialized. I do not think that Burma pays tribute now.

The CHAIRMAN: We have been extremely fortunate in hearing from Sir John Pratt such a brilliant historical sketch, in which cause and effect were traced in so lucid a way. We do not often have instruction given to us so charmingly, and I should like to offer to Sir John Pratt, on behalf of everyone present, our most sincere thanks.

## RESHAPING THE FAR EAST

By THE RIGHT HON. SIR ROBERT CLIVE, P.C., G.C.M.G.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on December 15, 1943, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: This is the third of our series of lectures on the Far East, which began with Mr. White, was continued by Sir John Pratt, who brought us up to date, and to-day Sir Robert Clive, who was our Ambassador in Tokyo and who can indeed speak with very great authority, is going to take a glimpse into the future.

IT somehow seems to me that this talk is rather redundant. It is called "Reshaping the Far East," but in the Cairo Conference, or rather the Mena House Conference, a good deal of the Far East has been reshaped, certainly so far as Japan is concerned; we were told that Japan will have to hand back all the territory she acquired from China during the last fifty years since the China-Japan war. But there still remain some other points. It is such a vast subject, the reshaping of the Far East, that no single charter, no single communiqué, could cover the whole subject.

Another thing, this talk of mine is rather unlike the ordinary talks of this Society, because unfortunately I am not dealing with facts. I am attempting to surmise the future, a most dangerous thing to do on a most contentious subject.

I propose to divide my talk under three headings: first of all, the attitude of the Soviet Union to the Pacific Charter; secondly, the possible Japanese reaction as soon as it becomes clear that Germany having been defeated, Japan cannot win this war; and, thirdly, an outline as to what may happen to all those other territories now occupied by Japan which were *not* part of the Chinese Empire when this war began.

First, Soviet relations with Japan. Those relations are to-day what in diplomatic language is called friendly. Friendly has a definite diplomatic meaning, for it means practically everything short of a state of war. About two and a half years ago M. Matsuoka made a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union for a period of five years, to last until April, 1946. But with reference to these friendly relations, which might perhaps deceive the unaware, it may be of interest if I just read to you what a Japanese historian writing in 1939 has to say of Soviet-Japanese relations. This is what he says:

The nation that surprised and awakened Japan from her long sleep was neither England nor America but Russia. Japan gradually came to realize the seriousness of the situation and the impossibility of longer maintaining seclusion. For a period of nearly 125 years beginning in 1781—that is not long after the first contacts of the Japs and Russians (the first was actually in 1739)—and ending in 1905, Russia was regarded as a menace to Japan. Throughout this long

period Japan planned and conducted her national affairs and defensive measures with Russia in mind. Russia was always regarded as a nation which threatened the very existence of Japan—in fact, Russia and the Russians were a nightmare to both the Government and people of Japan. The ever-increasing advance of Russia in the Far East was a source of apprehension among Japs of all classes. This natural fear reached its climax in 1904, although it practically ceased with the successful termination of the war in 1905. Yet even at the present time (he was writing in 1939) fear of the propagation of communism in Japan is acting directly and indirectly on the minds of leading Japanese, creating for them a Russian menace in a new form.

So much for the Japanese point of view. And now what is the Russian view about the Japanese? The Russo-Japanese War ended in 1905, and until the Bolshevik Revolution Russo-Japanese relations were not too bad. Then in 1925 the Japanese recognized the Soviet Union. But 1931, that vital year, when the Japanese seized Manchuria and really broke with the world, put a big strain on Russo-Japanese relations. It was about that time, I cannot remember the exact year, that the Russians got hold of various secret documents issued by the Tokyo Ministry of War, outlining a Japanese scheme for conquering the whole of Eastern Siberia right up to Irkutsk. The Japanese naturally denied this, but there is little doubt about their authenticity.

The Russians have certainly not forgotten this. Four years later, in 1935, they were not strong enough to stand up to Japan, and had no option but to sell to the Japanese at an infinitesimal price compared to what it cost the Chinese Eastern Railway passing through Manchuria.

The following year came the Anti-Comintern Pact, which the Russians at once concluded, and which everybody realized, could only have been directed against Russia.

In 1937 Japan attacked China. The whole sympathy of the Russians was on the side of China, and they did their best to aid them with arms, ammunition and so on. Since 1935 there had been increasing friction, with frequent clashes all along the Chinese Manchurian frontier, which culminated in a really big battle in the spring of 1939, when the Japanese admitted the loss of 10,000 men.

It was only due to German intervention after the war started in 1939 that things were patched up between the two countries. So we must not be deceived by this neutrality pact of Matsuoka's into overestimating "friendly relations" between the two countries, because I have shown you what the Japanese historian thinks about Russia, and I have tried to indicate what the Russians are likely to think about Japan.

Now as to the Russian interest in the Pacific pact. It seems inconceivable that that pact was concluded by three of the leaders of the four great United Nations—*i.e.*, by the British Prime Minister, the American President and General Chiang Kai-shek—without the head of the Soviet Union being kept fully informed if he did not actually give his approval to the charter. We may not know for a long time. But it is difficult to believe

that these three leaders could have made this pact about Manchuria—especially about Manchuria and Korea—without Russian approval, because, after all, the Russian-Manchurian frontier of some 4,000 miles is, I believe, the longest in the world after the American-Canadian frontier.

When you think that the Russo-Japanese War, which started in 1904, had its origin in the fact that the Russians refused to admit the Japanese interest in Manchuria, it seems obvious that the Russians must desire to see Manchuria returned to China instead of having such an extremely unpleasant neighbour as Japan.

And what about Korea? Korea is different from Manchuria, because Korea is to regain her independence "in due course." "In due course" may mean a long time, but, supposing the Japanese have to leave, it is very doubtful whether the unfortunate Koreans, who for the past forty years have been allowed no say in the government of their own country, would be fit to take over the government immediately. Somebody will have to be responsible, and it is unbelievable that any European country, or the United States or China, alone could be responsible for the government of Korea without Russian goodwill and assistance. Therefore we have every reason to assume that the Russians must have been privy to the pact, and in the interregnum period they are bound to play an important part.

In fact it comes to this, that the country which holds the key to the whole situation in the Far East, and which in the last resort will call the tune, must be the Soviet Union, and it is very necessary to realize that. The Americans are thousands of miles away; we are thousands of miles away; while the Soviet Union, with their vast interests in the Far East and their enormous frontier with Manchuria, are next door. It seems obvious, therefore, that they are really the Power that is going to have the big say.

However, we are assuming that Japan is going to be beaten. People who have lived in the Far East and are interested in that part of the world realize the extraordinary ignorance in this country of the Far East. Many people think that, once the war is over in Europe, it is only a matter of a short time before the Japanese must be knocked out. It is a very dangerous feeling, though perhaps a natural one, because the war there is so terribly far away and so remote from here.

And, now, what is likely to be the Japanese reaction to the present events? The Japanese at the beginning of this century, as Sir John Pratt pointed out a fortnight ago, attempted to come to an understanding with Czarist Russia, and failed to do so. They then switched over and came to an understanding with this country which went far beyond their hopes. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded in 1902 and lasted for twenty years.

Why is it that the Japanese were so anxious to have an alliance with a European Power? It was a complete reversal of previous Japanese history. You remember their period of seclusion, which lasted for over two hundred and fifty years. At the end of the last century they realized that no great country could remain friendless in the modern world. It was absolutely essential to have a friend, and if possible an ally.

Well, the Japanese secured an ally in Great Britain, and when the alliance came to an end at the Washington Conference it came as a frightful blow to the Japanese. It was to them a tremendous loss of face. They were again, so to speak, up in the air, isolated.

For the nine following years the Japanese appeared to the world at large to be on their best behaviour, but in 1931 the military hierarchy again took charge and upset everything. They realized, however, that they must try and get another friend. Having antagonized all the other eight members of the Nine-Power Treaty, there were only two possible friends left—Germany and Russia.

But when the Russians seized those Japanese secret plans to which I referred earlier, Russia was excluded. There remained only Germany, and four years later, in 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. It was not quite an alliance, but it brought Japan and Germany very close together in antagonism to Russia.

I was in Japan at the time. Mr. Araki, the Foreign Minister, asked me to go and see him. He handed me a copy of this Anti-Comintern Pact and said, obviously with his tongue in his cheek, that he looked forward to my communicating it to my Government and hearing that the British Government had also joined the pact. That was a Japanese way of saving their face *vis-à-vis* the British Government. Araki knew, of course, the proposal was absurd. The Anti-Comintern Pact was the first stepping-stone on the way to an alliance with Germany.

That alliance came in 1940. Germany and Italy and, later, various satellite countries came into the alliance, and Japan again felt safe and happy, because she was allied to the greatest military power in the world.

To-day the Japanese must be contemplating the possibility of that great military power being defeated, which would shatter all their hopes.

In the past, Japanese policy has always been extremely cautious. Japan is not governed like other countries. It is really governed by a series of committees. You have the Cabinet with the Prime Minister, but behind the Cabinet there is the Privy Council, consisting of about twenty-five elderly gentlemen, none of them less than sixty. Behind the Privy Council there were, until recently, the Elder Statesmen. Now there are no longer any Elder Statesmen, but you have in their place a sort of committee of ex-Prime Ministers who may be called in for consultation.

Before any really big step is taken, not only have all these committees got to be more or less in agreement, but also a committee of all the generals and admirals. Everything is most carefully thought out. The Japanese always try to bank on an absolute certainty. When they attacked Pearl Harbour in December, 1941, they thought it was an absolute certainty, but I think history will record that it was one of the greatest miscalculations ever made.

It is always useful to look back on history. What has happened on previous occasions? At the end of the seventeenth century, when Hideyoshi, their great conqueror, died, the Japanese dropped all their schemes for Asiatic conquest, withdrew their armies from Korea and came back to their own country. When some years later the Japanese got nervous about the Spanish and Portuguese missionaries, nervous at the power



which these Christian countries possessed in the way of modern firearms, what did she do? She shut herself off from the world altogether.

It may be of interest if I read to you a short extract from a book I was re-reading the other day, written by Hugh Byas, who was for many years *The Times* correspondent in Tokyo, a man for whose judgment I had a great respect. He wrote an admirable little book called *The Japanese Enemy*. This is what he says :

History repeats itself—not in situations which change with circumstances, but because character repeats itself. The qualities, the inner forces, that impel a man or a nation to act in a particular way in a crisis will make their power felt again when new crises impose new tests. We look to a nation's history for some knowledge of what it is likely to do under strain, just as we refer to a man's record and character.

Japan shut itself off from the world for two hundred and thirty-one years. No despot could have done that if the nation had not been willing to be shut up. When Japan in 1854 signed its first treaty with the United States, it threw off seclusion and, like most nations in a state of revolutionary emotion, it thought it had thrown it off for ever. But action and reaction follow each other. Japan also threw off military government, but the wheel has come round again to military government, and Japan's recent policy reveals a revival of a deep national urge to be again shut up and secluded.

There seems to be a sub-conscious feeling that many of the distinguishing features of Japanese civilization cannot survive contact with the world. The Sun Goddess, the Shinto mythology, the Emperor's divine descent, the uniqueness of Japan, the Imperial Way, the fables that are taught as national history—these are the things that make the Japanese pulse beat faster, and all of them suffer change and decay when the sceptical air of the modern world touches them. The Japanese mind is uncomfortable in the new world of Western free thought. As the Japanese big-business man goes home from his office at night and tries to lose his modern self in the tea ceremony—a ritual of barren and fantastic politeness—so the race seems impelled by its character to seek another era of seclusion.

That is a very pleasing thought, that the Japanese should shut themselves up again. It would settle a lot of very awkward questions. We can hardly hope for it to happen quite like that, but a man of Byas's experience, with his long knowledge of the Japanese, would not have written that if there was not something in it.

It may well be that the Japanese are beginning to realize that their military leaders have led them along the wrong path. It is no use to expect a revolution in Japan, a revolution against the military. That is inconceivable. In fact, another Englishman with recent experience of Japan, Mr. Morris, wrote in his book, *A Traveller from Tokyo*: "The Japanese would never give in. They would go on to the very last gasp rather than give in at all."

Mr. Grew, the last American Ambassador, has said more or less the same thing. It may be true. On the other hand, you have got these historical precedents of the Japanese suddenly doing something unexpected. I have told you that they withdrew their armies from Korea in 1597; that they shut themselves off from the world some twenty years later; again in 1905 they had reached almost their last gasp in the Russo-Japanese War when President Theodore Roosevelt intervened and offered his mediation, which they were thankful to accept.

It is said that the Japanese will go on indefinitely unless means can be found by which their civilization can be assured. But that has been done in the Pacific Charter. Nobody wants to take any part of Japan. What we want to get rid of is that pernicious military government and the perpetual threat to the future. If ways can be found to let the people realize that they may again have freedom of speech, of the Press and of Parliament, I still have hopes that the Japanese will not necessarily go on to the very last gasp.

Finally, what about these various countries and dependencies which are now in Japanese occupation and about which a settlement will have to be come to when Japan is defeated? The first one is the International Settlement in Shanghai, a subject on which there are people here who have expert knowledge and can express an opinion, which I would not venture to do.

The future of Hongkong is a matter which rests between China and this country. It does not seem to be a question in which other countries have any claim to intervene; it is a matter for us to settle with the Chinese, and I do hope some satisfactory settlement can be found.

Then Indo-China. It seems hardly possible that Indo-China can be just handed back to the French without any condition at all after the ignoble way in which the Vichy Government handed over that country to the Japanese to serve as a base with which to attack us in Singapore and the Americans in the Philippines. However, it is a delicate question.

Then you come to Burma. I do not know whether the Burmese prefer to be under Japanese or British rule. I have never heard of any people who liked being under Japanese rule. I can only suppose the Burmans, like every other Asiatic people, would infinitely prefer to govern themselves, however badly, to being governed by an alien race, however well. But the future of Burma is an obvious concern of this country more than of any other.

As to Malaya—my own feeling is that Singapore has got to come back to this country and it is not for any other country to intervene: Singapore must be British again. The Australian and New Zealand Governments have the same interest. There is no other country which has the smallest claim to Singapore, and it seems to be absolutely vital to the British Empire and to our strategic position.

The Dutch East Indies is a question which perhaps it is hardly suitable for this Society to discuss.

The only thing one can be certain of is that in all these countries after this war things are bound to be different. This war cannot be treated just as an unpleasant interlude. There are bound to be funda-

mental changes everywhere, and probably in the Dutch East Indies as well.

Finally, the Philippines and the mandated islands. With the Philippines the Americans made a treaty in 1935, under which in ten years' time the Philippines were to regain their independence, but one can hardly imagine that the Americans can just clear out of the Philippines after the war, or that the Philipinos would want them to do so. Therefore it is likely that the Americans will remain there in some form or other, and if they remain there, it is obviously America more than any other country which has the greatest interest in the future of those groups of islands which most unfortunately were handed over as a mandate to the Japanese after the last war. Somebody has to look after those islands, and if the Americans retain their interest in the Philippines, it is certain that they are the Power chiefly interested, because they lie in the direct route between Honolulu and Manila.

That is about all I have to say. It is a very big and contentious subject, and I am sure there are several people here who can speak with great knowledge on the various points I have referred to or on others I have not raised at all. So now I look forward to hearing what other people have got to say.

The CHAIRMAN: We have been fortunate. We have had three members to speak to us with very expert knowledge—Mr. White, Sir John Pratt and now Sir Robert Clive.

I will call on Mr. Hubbard to open the discussion.

Mr. HUBBARD: We ought to be grateful to Sir Robert, not only for his excellent outline of the reshaping of the Far East, but more particularly for having at the beginning of his talk taken us right to what I feel is the heart of the problem—namely, the position of Russia. It is very apt to get overlooked by those people who discuss the future of the Far East, partly, of course, because it is very difficult to form any opinion as to what Russia's attitude and policy will be. We do not even know whether she is going to finish the war as an enemy or as a "friend" of Japan, but the fact remains that, as Sir Robert says, she is really the supreme element in the situation, at all events in the Far Eastern section.

I have a feeling that in the Far East, as I think also in Europe, in thinking about the situation at the end of the war and the problems that will then arise, people are a little bit too inclined to make them revolve round our present enmities, what is to be done to Germany and to Japan and the countries which they occupy, and very naturally not to look to the further step ahead, to what sort of disequilibriums will arise after you have settled with your immediate enemies.

In the case of the Far East we are assuming obviously for the purpose of to-day's discussion that Japan has been unconditionally defeated. In any case I would say nothing further about Japan. It would be presumptuous of me to do so following Sir Robert's address.

I would like to take that step further forward and ask whether, having settled the problem of Japan, you will have left a situation which

is more or less stable and free from anything like the immediate seeds of future conflict? When you look at that portion of the world I think you are bound to have a certain amount of doubt, and even at this stage it is just as well to face up to the sort of problems which may arise very soon after Japan's defeat.

Sir Robert pointed out how much the Russians have had to give way to Japan in the past—all their enormous investment in Manchuria and all their dreams of development in that part of the world. I certainly hope, and I believe that Sir Robert is right in thinking, that the Russian Government have agreed in principle to the return of Manchuria to China. But I cannot help feeling that there will be some qualifications to that agreement. If I were a Russian at the end of a successful war, and more particularly if Russia had come into the war with Japan towards the end and was one of the victors, I should feel something was due to me in the way of getting back some of the cost which Russia had incurred in the past.

In the case of Korea, I have a feeling that it will not be too easy to find that interim government of Korea which presumably must be something of a mandatory sort, to find a mandatory power in Korea who will be acceptable equally to China and to Russia, and there will be a very difficult problem in regard to those extremely useful ports which the Japanese since their occupation of Korea have built on the Korean coast.

As you move farther to the west, you get the question of Outer Mongolia. We know China has not entirely surrendered her claims to Outer Mongolia, and we equally know that Russia is very unlikely to be ready to diminish the connection which at present exists between the Outer Mongolian Republic and the Soviet Union. And perhaps, when you go still farther west to Sinkiang, you get to a part of the world where there is even more possibility of tension. At the present time, according to such information as we have, the Chinese Government are recovering to a very considerable extent their authority over Sinkiang and over the local authorities. We do not know how the Russians regard that, though there are rumours at any rate that they are reacting rather strongly; they had already established a very considerable authority over the Sinkiang Government, which they are not at all willing to relinquish. I think it is a mistake not to look forward a little bit farther and see the sort of problems which will have to be faced by any sort of organization which will be set up eventually for maintaining peace and general security in that area.

There is one other subject I would like to mention. The southern portion will present very different problems. The specific problems of the various countries occupied by Japan were dealt with by Sir Robert, but there will also be the question of setting up some sort of international organization for co-ordinating policies and helping to prevent conflicts in the Far East; in fact, the planning in that has already advanced farther than the similar planning in regard to Europe. You have the scheme for a Pacific zone council which was launched by Lord Hailey, which has been to some extent endorsed by H.M. Government in a speech by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. But one thing which, I think, has not

been sufficiently taken into the picture is this, that, side by side with these plans for having a regional council in the Far East on an international basis, there are plans going forward—and I would refer particularly to some articles which many of you will have read in the *Spectator* by Sir George Schuster—which foresee a commonwealth organization for defence in that part of the world centred more or less on India.

Merely as a problem for people to reflect upon, I would throw out the suggestion that it will not be simple to co-ordinate these two ideas—the idea of a general Far Eastern or Pacific international organ and a commonwealth system. I do not say they are incompatible, but I do think the integration of the one into the other is going to be one of the major problems.

Sir JOSIAH CROSBY: I have only one comment to make. It is on that part of Sir Robert Clive's address in which he referred to the future of Indo-China.

I admit that the future of Indo-China is a very difficult one. It is so difficult that I believe the United Nations have been careful to make no commitment on the subject, but I think there is something to be said for the eventual restoration of those territories in a suitable manner to a French mandate, not a mandate for a Vichy Government, but a mandate for the new France as represented by General de Gaulle and those brave men who are keeping the flag of liberty flying even in occupied France to-day.

These people will certainly demand from the United Nations the right to return to Indo-China, and I think that it will be a reasonable demand, provided they go back there and adopt the policy which all the Western Powers who have enjoyed colonial domination in Asia will have to adopt—the policy of bringing the native populations along the road to full autonomy.

I was next door to Indo-China when the disastrous overrunning of that country by the Japanese took place. I have nothing but contempt for the attitude of collaboration of the present Governor-General, Admiral Decoux, but I have a great admiration for his predecessor, General Catroux. The acquiescence of Decoux was ignoble, but let us remember that there was some resistance offered by the French when the Japanese first came in. There were French troops who then died on the field of honour. Therefore, I am not inclined to blame the French for letting the Japanese in when they could not hope to keep them out. I blame the Decoux Government, but it is not true to say that the country was entirely given over to the Japanese. Even Decoux resents the presence of the Japanese there.

Let us lay this lesson home to ourselves. We were not there in force to keep the Japanese out of Malaya, let alone out of Indo-China. Therefore I scarcely think we have the right to throw stones at the French for having let the Japanese in. (Applause.)

Mr. OSWALD WHITE: I should like to take up one or two points raised by Sir Robert.

In the first place, I am afraid I am a bit of a pessimist. I cannot agree that there is a possibility of the Japanese giving up half-way. I fully

admit that in the war with Russia they were very lucky to get out when they did, but they were able to do so and get away with what they wanted. I think that in this present war Japan will certainly do her best to get away with, say, half the swag. If the Allies were prepared to leave Japan a certain amount of what she has got now, then she would probably be only too pleased to make peace, but there lies the danger. She is likely to put forward plausible peace suggestions in the hope that we will be duped once more.

Personally, I think that the only possible way to deal with Japan is to clip her wings. Not only must she give back Manchuria, Korea and other parts where she has no business to be, but also she must hand over all her investments in Manchuria and elsewhere. If Japan merely leaves the territory and still retains the control over the South Manchuria Railway, over the various mines in Manchuria and in Korea, and in the various factories which she has set up there until she has made Manchuria practically a military arsenal, if she retains those and similar investments in North China, then it will only be a few years before she has carefully stored up the provision for another attempt.

I do not think it could be regarded as spoliation if those investments were taken from Japan. If we think of the misery that she has caused in China, and the evil that she has done for which she can never pay back, then it is only right that she should pay some form of indemnity. Therefore I would say that, subject to the rights of foreign bondholders in these various Japanese investments, they should be handed over to China.

If I am not talking too long, there is another point I would like to refer to, and that is the southern part of Eastern Asia. Sir Robert pointed out that conditions will be very different. I would like to elaborate that a little. We have to remember that the Japanese have preached various insidious doctrines—the expulsion of the Westerners from Asia, Asia for the Asiatics, liberation, freedom and so on. We can assess those at their true value, but I am not quite sure that the various native races before whom those ideas have been put can do so. I think that when the Japanese have left, quite a large proportion of the evil they have done will remain behind them. We have also to remember that those areas have been under Japanese complete control for two years now and may be I do not know how long yet.

They make use of local officials. No self-respecting Burmese, or Malayan, or Dutch East Indian for that matter, or Chinese will serve under the Japanese. So it only follows that the good men in those countries have gone into oblivion. Bad money drives out good, and the result will be that the only people left will be the officials that have been trained up under the Japanese.

When we remember also that the prestige of the white man in those parts has suffered a disastrous blow, I think we must agree that we have got to make our plans in advance. The present is a time for stocktaking. I think perhaps it is overdue. In the past in our Colonial administration we have concentrated on justice—quite rightly so—and security. But when we thought of security we merely thought of security from bad men. We never thought of economic security. As a result, most of the

colonies at one time or other have suffered from the fact that they have been dependent on outside markets. We need more economic planning.

Sir JOHN PRATT: It is so much easier to see the snags than the solutions of all these problems. One thing I do most earnestly agree with, and that is Japan has to be completely defeated and that she has to be made to return to her four main islands. If Japan is allowed to retain a foothold on Asia the whole cycle of aggression will start all over again. Japan is equally the enemy of Russia, China, England and America, and it is a vital interest to all four countries that she be not allowed to break out again.

The most difficult of all the problems of the Far East is China. If China were an orderly and powerful country, it would not be difficult to fill the gap that will be created by the removal of Japan from Asia. China is a great country, but the great difficulty is that she is not organized in the way that Western countries expect a great country to be organized. But even though the Chinese do not quite reach up in certain directions to our standards, in other directions they reach to standards that we cannot attain; it would be wise, therefore, to treat them as if they were a great and orderly country, for that is the only basis on which our future relations with China can be conducted. All the great firms who have built up big businesses in China in the last hundred years or more have made up their minds to go back and rebuild the position they held before on an entirely new basis; that is the most hopeful thing I have seen yet. It is the right spirit in which to approach the whole problem. If we succeed in rebuilding our former position we may be able to bring sufficient reinforcement to China to enable her to carry out her rôle of a great and orderly country.

It is unlikely that the trouble with the Communists will lead to a split or a big civil war. I am inclined to think that some accommodation will be found between the Kuomintang and the Communists. The Communists are not really Communists. Both parties are seeking the right solution of the various grave problems with which the country is faced, and the Communists incline to a radical solution, whereas the Kuomintang lean more to the right.

I have been impressed with the fact that, however much the Kuomintang may be right-wing inclined, yet they cannot help but be attracted by the Russian example. However much they dislike the Communists, the Kuomintang cannot help but look to the Russian example and draw closer to Russia. The solution of the Kuomintang-Communist conflict may therefore come about through some process of internal evolution which may bring the Kuomintang more into sympathy with Soviet Russia and make the Russians content to have a Kuomintang government in Manchuria.

Manchuria is going to be a terribly difficult problem, for the withdrawal of Japan is going to leave a very big gap. How are all the factories and industrial undertakings which Japan has set up in Manchuria to be run? Where is the personnel to come from? I raised that question about a year ago at a conference which I attended in America. I asked the Chinese delegates: "How do you propose to carry on those mines

and railways? Are you going to retain the Japanese personnel and keep them under your control?" They did not like this suggestion at all, which rather sounded as if the Japanese should keep Manchuria—though that, of course, was not at all my idea. So they said, in their airy Chinese way: "Oh, we have plenty of technicians for all that will need to be done." It is, of course, doubtful whether the Chinese can in fact fill the vacuum, but this will present us with a great opportunity, for we may play a great part in training the Chinese technicians that will be required. Developments along that line are in fact making good progress, for there is talk of no less than five hundred Chinese technicians coming to continue their studies here.

The CHAIRMAN: This series of lectures has now come to an end. Mr. White stressed the growth of the Japanese megalomania. Sir John Pratt told us how everything seemed to conspire to increase that idea in them and to give them the conviction of the possibility of gaining greater power in the Far East—the China war, Korea, Manchuria, the lessening of the British naval power, the mandated islands and the like. Incidentally, with regard to Korea, you will remember that when Sir John was asked what he thought was going to be the future of Korea, I greatly admired him when he said you could not possibly expect any historian to answer that question. I presume, then, that the British Government cannot be classed as historians, because two days afterwards they told us exactly what they were going to do with Korea, but in the very dim future.

We have the guidance of two very wise men: Mr. Churchill said that we had got to give Japan a lesson which she would remember for a thousand years. Without looking so far ahead as a thousand years, let us be convinced that the first thing that has to be done is to give Japan such a lesson that she will have at any rate a change of heart and see that the military direction in her country which has brought her to her present state has got to give place to something else. Whether it will be the seclusion that Sir Robert suggested one cannot say.

We have had to our great interest in this hall to-day so many suggestions as to what might happen and what will be done. We have always to remember that, whatever solution you come to, you have got ninety million Japanese to whom you have to give some place in the world.

We must remember what General Smuts said in his advice some months ago. He said that the mistake that we made last time was that we looked too wide and we looked too large. Perhaps it would be wiser and more beneficial to take the problems just as they happen to come.

We are very lucky indeed that we are able now to renew our thanks to Mr. White and to Sir John Pratt for all the profound interest they gave us. And I think you will agree that we owe a deep debt of gratitude to Sir Robert Clive for having finished this series in so entrancing a way.



# GREATER SYRIA AND THE FOUR FREEDOMS

By J. W. CROWFOOT

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on January 26, 1944, Brig.-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., in the Chair.

**T**HE title of my lecture is "Greater Syria and the Four Freedoms." I am afraid that when I sit down some of you may think that you have been brought here on false pretences, because I am only going to deal with one part of my title.

Greater Syria is a phrase used by the adherents of the Pan-Arab movement and others to describe the whole area which has been administered for the last twenty years or so under mandates by Great Britain and France. The phrase implies generally in the mouth of the Pan-Arabs a unitary government, constituted of a number of more or less autonomous provinces, varying in religion—one predominantly Christian, another predominantly Jewish, most of the others mainly Moslem—and it implies that the mandates will be surrendered and the knots which were tied at the end of the last war loosened. Personally I hope that this will be so, but there are a number of difficulties to be ironed out in the process, and if I began to discuss them I am afraid we should never get to the second part of my title, the four freedoms, which are not perhaps so acutely controversial at present.

At the end of the last war the favourite phrase was self-determination. The four freedoms—freedom from fear, from want, of religion and of expression—is a new and revised version of that; a better one, because it is more concrete and rather more limited. What I wish to ask now is how these four freedoms are to be implemented in the area about which we are going to talk.

About twenty years ago I was sent to Beirut to discuss certain matters with the authorities in the American University there. When my business was finished, I went to Damascus and other places with letters from young Syrians who belonged to each town, who had been previously in Beirut. At Damascus my guide took me into a room which had been decorated by King Feisal. It is a room I have never been to since, though I have been frequently in Damascus. It was used at that moment as a sort of museum. He pointed out to me with great pride an Arabic inscription which ran round the room, put up by the King. The words in the inscription, to which he drew my attention, were a statement: "Freedom is not something which is given to a people: it is something which is won by them." When we had read this together, I think the same thought struck both of us—this was about 1923—that freedom might be won by a people, but it was something which might be also taken away from them. The Syrians under Feisal had enjoyed freedom for a year or two, and then their power had fallen, their independence had gone.

because "the armed strength of the country was insufficient." Syria is in a very dangerous position geographically and from time immemorial it has been one of the cockpits of the world. It has been overrun from every quarter and reduced again and again to the state of a subject province. Once only, and that only for ninety years, from 660 A.D. to 750 A.D., was it a real centre of power with Damascus as capital. The dangers, of course, were clear enough in 1919. As the framers of the mandate said, Syria was one of those places "which could not stand alone in the strenuous conditions of the modern world," conditions which were very much less strenuous in 1919 than they are to-day. Even in Syrian eyes, in spite of the distrust and opposition which they aroused, this fact to some extent justified the mandates, though few Syrians would have admitted so at that moment.

The surrender of the Iraq mandate in 1932 created a new situation. It was aggravated in the next few years by the aggressions of Germany, Italy and Japan, and although opposition to the mandates during the last decade was intensified both in Syria and Palestine, in Syria at any rate it was attended by grave preoccupations as to the future, as to what would happen when the mandates were surrendered.

In Turkey, Atatürk tried to meet the new situation by a series of pacts—the Balkan Pact and, more important from our point of view, the Saadabad Pact, made, I think, in 1935. The Saadabad Pact—Saadabad is a small place in Persia—included Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Atatürk, of course, could not approach Syria itself or the other parts of Greater Syria because they were under mandates; and if he had approached them it is rather doubtful what reception he would have had, for, in any case, Syrians were not inclined to look to Turkey as a saviour.

Many of them placed their hopes rather on the Pan-Arab movement, a union with other Arab countries, certainly with Iraq, possibly with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Others had more qualms; one of the more intelligent of these was a certain M. Rabbath, who was a lawyer by profession. He was an enthusiastic Pan-Arab, but he was also a good Syrian, and as such he was rather afraid that Damascus might have to play second fiddle to Baghdad. He was also a little afraid of Saudi Arabia, also of Egypt. After all, Syria had been overrun from all those places repeatedly, especially from Egypt. He was still more afraid of Turkey, and beyond these, more threatening still, loomed the great mechanized armies of Europe. The Syrians are not a warlike race, and he realized that no Arab confederation would be of the slightest use if Syria were seriously attacked. So, after reviewing all these things, he concluded that the only hope of Syria lay in the League of Nations. I think it was a sane conclusion at that time. His book, *Unité syrienne et devenir arabe*, was published in 1937.

Two years later, in 1939, the Sanjak of Alexandretta was ceded to Turkey by the French. This cession violated the mandate, and it was defended at Geneva, like other acts of appeasement at the time, as being the only way to stave off war and secure the independence of the rest of Syria.

The result we have seen. The geographical position of Syria, its

strategic importance, now as of old, is the overriding factor; it cannot be blinked, and in order to secure the first of the four freedoms, freedom from external fear, I submit that it is difficult to resist the conclusion that, in Syrian interests as much as in their own, the Powers will have to maintain naval and air bases in this area analogous more or less to Gibraltar, Malta, Aden and so on. I suggest this should not offend the most sensitive Syrians when they consider the arrangements we have made with the United States and the West Indies. It is essential too in the interests of the Powers: how could we have coped with the defence of Iraq, Palestine and Egypt if the Amman and Habbaniya air stations and the harbour at Haifa had been in the hands of a Vichy General?

But, of course, these bases, if they are to be justified in the eyes of Syria, must not be used as spring-boards from which to interfere with the domestic concerns of the country. They will be the means, and they can only be justified as the means, to enable Syrians to cultivate their own garden.

This brings us to the other freedoms. Freedom from want—want, famine, unemployment—is the first of the other three freedoms.

Syria was once a very rich country, both industrially and agriculturally, but it is poor in mineral deposits, and the old industries of late have been very much depressed; they have suffered, partly from foreign competition, especially competition with Japan, partly from new circumstances which were introduced by the mandatory régimes. Under the Turkish Empire all the Middle East countries except Egypt enjoyed the benefits both of free trade with one another and a common currency, and the restoration of these should be one of the first aims of the Arabs, in agreement, if possible, with Turkey. But I do not imagine it will be very easy to make these arrangements. A few years ago there was a mission sent by Egypt to Palestine to talk about oranges. They talked for a long time as to whether oranges from Palestine could be exported free into Egypt. They ultimately signed an agreement that only for certain months in the year this free trade should carry on, and those months, I think, were months when there were no oranges to export.

Agriculture has suffered mainly from the destruction of old irrigation schemes which were there in ancient days. They were destroyed largely by incursions of Bedouin Arabs and general misgovernment about three or four centuries ago. But there can be little doubt that the valleys of the larger rivers could be again developed like the Tennessee Valley in America with dams and power stations. French engineers and scientists have made some preliminary studies in this direction, but French capital has been shy, probably wisely, of the security offered by a mandate and serious work has not been started. In Palestine the great Rutenberg Works have shown what can be done. This is not an irrigation scheme but a power station, and there is no doubt in my mind that the people of the country—Syrians, Jews, Armenians in particular—are very well competent to undertake such works. Syria might be made as rich as Egypt and support an enormously increased population; most recent shortages, indeed, have been caused by food-hoarding and profiteering.

It would be the more necessary in this case to take the agrarian situa-

tion in hand and see that the new wealth thus created was better distributed than it is in the Nile Valley. This agrarian question has been raised more than once before the Permanent Mandates Commission, to which a report had to be presented every year by the Mandatory. M. de Caix, who was the regular representative year after year of the French Government at this Commission, reported that the old landowners had been mostly replaced by absentee moneylenders from the towns. (We speak of them, of course, as moneylenders and usurers here, but no doubt they might claim to be business men who have simply invested hard-earned savings in the best securities they could find.) The result, according to M. de Caix, is that the people, the peasants and cultivators, have been reduced to the condition practically of serfs. It is one of the causes why emigration was so rife in the past. That is so particularly in the Lebanon, but not only in the Lebanon. It is also the case in Syria, except where the land is held communally, more or less on the old strip system which once prevailed here, a system which in Syria has been said to combine all the worst features of Communism and private ownership. The French have done some good work in this sphere by introducing a proper survey, verifying titles and regrouping small holdings. The Turkish Government left things in a chaotic condition, which encouraged all forms of chicanery by the lawyers of the towns. The French scheme may provide a good foundation on which to build.

Taking these things into consideration, the economic prospects of securing freedom from want do not seem to be discouraging. The assets are there. The people have got the land, water in sufficiency, and there is plenty of labour.

The freedoms of religion and expression raise other problems. Fears about religious and national minorities bulked very largely at the time the mandates were drawn, and great play was made with them. All sorts of regulations were introduced into the various treaties and other instruments that were drawn up at the time. The Syrians protested from the beginning, especially to the Commission which was sent by America to visit them, that these fears so far as they were concerned were groundless, that they were as competent and trustworthy in these respects as various European States whom they named. They said that past tensions, which had culminated in notorious massacres, had been fomented by foreign intriguers and without the foreign intriguers would not have taken place. In this they had a strong case. The worst massacres which have been connected with Syria were those which took place in the middle of the last century, when Maronites in the Lebanon and other Christians in Damascus were massacred on a large scale. In both cases the origin of those troubles was not religious at all, not a question of Christian versus Druse or Christian versus Moslem; in the Lebanon, in particular, it was an agrarian question, and at the beginning of the troubles the big Christian landlords, who still existed then, were on good terms with the big Druse landlords. Those massacres were admittedly the result of Turkish intrigue. There are several other considerations we should bear in mind which support the Syrian case. I will run through a few of them.

Syria, as you know, is a perfect museum of fossil religions. There is an enormous number of sects. The list, which the French used to publish every year, fills a long page. There are, I think, six different types of Christian Catholics, Christians who are in obedience to the Pope. There are Maronites, Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, Chaldeans and Latins, all following different rites, all in obedience to the Pope, and as many, or more, Christian sects who are still observing the more ancient Eastern form of religion. There are also many dissident Mohammedan sects. The total list fills a long page even when no attempt is made to distinguish between different Protestant sects.

The fact of the survival of all these sects side by side is some evidence for a generally tolerant spirit.

The political activities of most of the older sects are confined nowadays to acting as pressure groups, out to grab a share, however humble, in the spoils of office. How often when one picks up a paper in Beirut, one finds a complaint from the head of some small religious community, saying that this is the first time for many centuries that the particular sect to which he belongs has not had any paid officials in the municipal organization, and so on. It seems to be a standing feature in Syrian newspapers. The present arrangement in the Lebanon, where the President of the Republic is a Maronite and the Premier a Mohammedan, is typical of the country. It is an outcome of the Turkish *millet* system, which some of my friends would like to revive. It means that the older sects have reached some sort of equilibrium and get on tolerably well together as integrated parts of the same body politic.

There are some new developments which are also promising in this connection. In the Syrian Republic, where the majority attend Government schools, children of widely different confessions sit side by side and there is little or no friction between them; Moslems, Christians and Jews form friendships which last long after their school days. In the Lebanon, where most of the schools are confessional, the same tendencies are at work. They are at work even in Palestine; I have heard from several missionaries who run advanced schools which are attended by Christians, Jews and Moslems, that all the children get on quite well together and make firm friendships.

Quite recently there have been some rather notable expressions of this toleration and more than toleration. There has been far more friendliness than bickering between the different sects, both in Syria and the Lebanon. It was particularly noticeable during the agitations in the last decade. Moslems, Christians, Druses all made common cause, and it is a significant fact that when the Arabs held a great Nationalist Congress at Bludan one of the first persons they asked to preside over this Congress was the Greek Orthodox Patriarch. He did not accept the invitation, but the invitation was given him and was a pretty good proof of the feelings between Moslems and Christians then.

I should not like to say that there was so much friendliness in Palestine at the present moment, but even in Palestine normally there is not much feeling between individual Jews and individual Moslems. I can speak with some experience in this matter, because I was working for about four

years, from 1931 to 1935, close to Nablus. I was doing archaeological work, employing two to three hundred men most of the time in what the newspapers used to call the Red Triangle; the most strongly Moslem part of the country. I always had two or three Jews on my staff, and there was never the slightest ill-feeling between them and the surrounding Mohammedans, labourers or others; they got on perfectly well together.

I remember a conversation I had with a *fellah* there, a rather intelligent man. He had been working with a Jewish company as an omnibus conductor and had just been dismissed. He might have had a grievance, but he had none. He said the company had tried hard to keep him, but had been overruled by the local Jews who said that they must have his post for a Jew. The company did not want to dismiss him because they had to pay a Jew £9 whereas they would get the Arab for £4 a month. The Arab recognized that the company had done its best for him, and he recognized also that the Jew, owing to his standard of living, was entitled to a higher wage than himself.

The different sects can get on with one another if they try.

At the same time, I would not wish to suggest for a moment that everything is lovely in the garden. A recent broadcast by Nahas Pasha was not wholly unseasonable. The large majority of Syrian Moslems are Sunnis, and there is a section of Sunnis which is disposed to adopt an intransigent attitude, based on the letter of the religious law. Such an attitude is out of date in a modern mixed community. A compromise has been reached in States like Turkey and Egypt, and a similar compromise will have to be reached in Syria.

It must be remembered that matters in Syria and the Lebanon are not as they were at the end of the last war. After the draft treaty between France and Syria was agreed in 1936, the High Commissioner and other French officials abstained from using the powers of veto which they still in theory possessed, and for nearly three years the Syrian Government in Damascus enjoyed a genuine measure of Home Rule. Circumstances outside their control created many difficulties. Politicians in Paris refused to ratify the treaty. The mandatory power decided to appease Turkey in the matter of the Sanjak of Alexandretta, and the franc, to which their currency was tied, was heavily devaluated. The Syrians too, of course, were raw as administrators. Consequently it was not altogether a happy period, and there were many troubles. Yet the Damascus Government did good work both in the fields of education and agriculture, and at the end of it M. de Caix assured the Permanent Mandates Commission that there was good reason for the belief that the Syrians would learn from experience in matters of administration. The measures of autonomy granted both to the Druses and Alawis were generous; they were allowed 90 or 95 per cent. of the local revenues to expend in their own districts.

No one who knows how much Egypt and the Sudan have owed to Syrian officials, especially in questions of finance, can doubt the capacity of the country to throw up men of statesmanlike calibre to carry out their own policy. And the men there will have the support of women, who are highly cultured and have already played a great part in the politics of the period. There are some quite interesting accounts to be read of the

part women played in Damascus. They had long processions and the most highly cultured, wealthiest and oldest families sent their women out in motor-cars to interview the authorities and protest against their actions. In one case there was a French officer who rose to the occasion nobly. When the procession was advancing, he raided the nearest florist's shop and filled the first cars with bouquets, which was a much better way of saying things than saying them with bombs, as M. de Jouvenel had done a few years before.

What is the conclusion? Surely there is no reason to treat Syria differently from the rest of the world. Their sovereign rights should not be more limited than other people's, but the largest conjoint union would be the best. One does not want to see separate diplomatic representatives of Transjordan and of Palestine, of Syria and of the Lebanon in every capital in the world; the country could not afford it.

We do not yet know how far it is proposed to implement the four freedoms all over the world; whether, for instance, President Roosevelt imagined that the time should come when the Bedouin are freed from hunger, and Armenians and Jews have no grievances. One ought to, I suppose. Is there any means of helping on the millennium? One might conceive a regional organization parallel to the International Labour Office or the Health Office of the League of Nations, both of which, I take it, will continue. It would be an organization something like the old Permanent Mandates Commission but run on regional lines, which should receive petitions from all and sundry; but how far that would be a practical matter I do not know. It would not be unreasonable to say to the local governments to be established, "You are protected. The Powers protect you from aggression, from defeat, and this is a *quid pro quo*."

There is one question which is perhaps more immediate and less difficult to answer. Various cultural institutions have been started in Syria, especially by the French and the Americans, some for research in economics, sociology and history, some for popular education. The French Institute at Damascus, the research departments in the University of St. Joseph's and the American University at Beirut, the bulletins and journals in which their work is to be found, are of general scientific interest, and every effort in reason should be made to keep these alive. They are good for the Syrians in particular, but also for all intelligent people all over the world. The foreign educational establishments, among them the British Council, stand on a rather different footing. They too are good so far as they promote friendly relations, but it does not seem to be the business of the Powers to Anglicize or Gallicize or Americanize Syrians. The older Churches which have been operating in this region, the English Church and the Roman Church, seem to have taken up a happy line in that matter. The English Church at one time tried to convert people and there is a small Arab Church now in Palestine; but the Anglican attitude to Syrians, Assyrians and Copts is quite different now. Similarly, the Roman Church in early days, a hundred years ago or so, used to convert Oriental Christians to the Latin rite. About fifty years ago that was absolutely prohibited by the Pope of the time being, and

any priest who converted an Oriental Christian to the Latin rite was liable to be unfrocked. The small body which now follows the Latin rite is a dying body, rather like the Arab Anglican Church in Palestine. At the present moment I am told that, so far from tending to be Gallicized or Americanized, the Syrians are looking rather to Egypt for guidance. It is Egyptian films and broadcasts which have most vogue in Syria. I can quite believe this. It is not a new phenomenon. The same year in which I first visited Damascus I went also to Aleppo with a young Syrian. I asked him to take me into some of the local entertainments in the evening. He took me to the best music hall of the place. The principal woman, an Egyptian, seemed to have an appalling voice and was certainly an appalling-looking object, the sort of figure one would see only in a very humble *café chantant* in Cairo. Yet she was being paid £50 a week by the people of Aleppo to give these performances. One would like to see the Syrians using their new freedom to look farther afield for their entertainers. One rather distrusts a culture which is based entirely on a language like Arabic which, however fine and interesting historically, is still medieval and stereotyped in form. But that, after all, is their affair. They must settle that question for themselves.

A MEMBER: Mr. Crowfoot referred to the Armenians. When I was through Syria in 1931 I was told that the Armenians were making great headway, especially in the matter of industry and retail trade, and they were gradually cutting out the indigenous people. I think there were about 30,000 of them. Have they increased?

The LECTURER: I think they have, and I imagine there has been a further increase since the Sanjak of Alexandretta was handed over. Five or six years ago most of the shops in Aleppo were getting into Armenian hands. I was in Alexandretta about that time, and they were thinking that the cession was likely to come. The Armenians were all going farther south in that case. There were a great many of them also about Beirut. I do not know whether they are all there still. They did introduce some good into the country. One may regard both the Armenians in Palestine and the Jews as pacemakers for the rest of the people. They do raise industry wherever they go, but they are not necessarily popular for that reason.

A MEMBER: The speaker has given a very interesting survey. Would it be possible for him to speak on the situation at the moment? For instance, he talks about Greater Syria. What does Greater Syria include? Does he agree with General Nuri's idea, which is that the Arabs and Jews get on quite well together provided they are not provoked by propaganda and other methods from outside?

The LECTURER: I rather deprecated entering upon those questions, but my personal hope is that those countries will all combine together, perhaps on the lines that Nuri Pasha suggested. I do not wish to enlarge very much on it because of these thorny questions, particularly the question of the Jews in Palestine. I hope it will be met by a more or less autonomous province such as the Lebanon.

M. MOYINE AL ARAB: May I be allowed to ask two questions? The



first is this: Is the lecturer aware what Oriental music as sung in Egypt conveys? It has one characteristic which is most important to the hearers. It is this: that the singing should strike a direct note to the heart with its plaintiveness. It seems to me a short cut and goes straight to a rhythm of emotions and of heart. If it does this, then it has fulfilled its purpose. Did the lecturer feel this note?

The LECTURER: I am afraid I am not a musician, so I cannot answer that question. I have heard a good deal of Egyptian music at one time or another, and I am not prepared to say that I have not been moved by some of it. The music I was referring to in Aleppo was not of that character. I have certainly heard good Egyptian singers.

M. MOYINE AL ARAB: The other question is this: Is not the Arabic language a good vehicle to bring about this plan between abstract and concrete things; and is not one of the great ambitions of the Middle East, and of Egypt in particular, to plan abstraction with concreteness, and that in the world in the future the best world planning will be the planning of abstraction and concreteness, all the things necessary for the equilibrium and synthesis of education and every moral outlook all together?

The LECTURER: There was a general feeling that Arabic presented great difficulties for the expression of modern scientific terms. The tendency at that moment was, for instance, in medical science for them to use simply the European terms.

A GUEST: The question is not to develop these countries to be like a European country. Their mission is to develop what will be useful to the world.

*Since mention has been made of the difficulties encountered in adapting classical Arabic to modern needs it may interest all readers of this lecture to see a note sent by Lady Drower:*

The sudden death of 'Abdul Messih Wazir has deprived Baghdad, indeed all Iraq, of a notable and genial figure. The *'ustādh*, "professor," as he was affectionately called by his friends, with his mop of grey hair, his ready smile and his modest manners, was not only mourned by his compatriots, but also by the British community, for he was always a staunch supporter of the Allied cause, a clear thinker and an honest man. His countrymen owe him a debt of gratitude for, with infinite care and painstaking erudition, he was employed in the compilation of a dictionary of military, technical and scientific terms. His life-work was neither completed nor published, for he aimed at extending his scheme to embrace modern technicalities of speech in the widest sense, and did not wish his labours to be given to the world in what he considered to be an imperfect state. The MSS. are now in the possession of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, where 'Abdul Messih held the post of Director of the Translation Bureau, and it is to be hoped that the Ministry will eventually see to its completion and publication as a monument to a faithful servant.

## A FORECAST OF ARAB UNITY

By COLONEL S. F. NEWCOMBE, D.S.O.

**I**N the autumn I was invited by General Nuri Said to visit Baghdad as a guest of the Iraq Government to learn their point of view on Arab unity. His proposals may be summarized as follows:

1. Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan to be reunited into one State.

2. The people of that State to decide its form of government, and whether they have a King or President as head, and whether it be one State or Federal.

3. An Arab League to be formed: Iraq and Syria to join at once. Other Arab States can join if and when they want to.

4. The Arab League to have a Permanent Council nominated by the Member States and presided over by one of the Rulers of the States, to be chosen by the States concerned.

5. The Arab Council to be responsible for: (a) Defence, (b) Foreign Affairs, (c) Currency, (d) Communications, (e) Customs, (f) Protection of Minority Rights.

6. Jews in Palestine to have semi-autonomy: their own rural and urban district administration, including schools, health and police, subject to general supervision by the Syrian State (under international guarantee).

7. Jerusalem to have a special commission of three theocratic religions to ensure free access and worship.

8. If required, Maronites in Lebanon to have privileged régime.

Politically, only Iraq and a greater Syria are concerned in these proposals at present. Sa'udi Arabia and Egypt are not concerned as yet but are interested in other ways.

It is too early to say how Arab unity will develop; the Arabs are only now exchanging views and formulating their plans, and some of their leaders in Syria and Palestine are not yet free to speak, and it is rather difficult for the people to express their views in open discussion, especially in war-time. But the outlook of the Greater Syria and Iraq is, on the whole, one of progress, education and development by their own people. Like that of Atatürk, it would develop their country on modern lines with no religious interference. There are varying shades of opinion, but the principal leaders are Nuri Said in Iraq and Shukri Koweitli in Syria.

Nuri Said has co-operated with us since 1917. He helped with his moderation at the Palestine Conference in 1939. In August, 1940, just after the fall of France, he proposed semi-officially the entrance of Iraq into the war on the British side. If the Palestine question were settled by Great Britain on the lines of the White Paper, he offered two Iraqi divisions to serve under General Wavell. He also proposed to establish an Iraqi Legation in America. His speech of December 15, 1940, which indicates the above, proves that Nuri Said supported us at our worst time

and resigned from Rashid Ali's Cabinet. That speech of his is not sufficiently known. It was published in Iraq but not in this country.

Shukri Koweitli is not known in England. He is a strong, clear-minded, clear-headed character, who knows what he wants. He was voted for by 118 out of 120 delegates in Damascus, and is the only leader to count. He is a friend of Ibn Sa'ud and a devout Moslem. He said his policy was the same as in 1915, when, as a member of the Arab Nationalist Committee, he asked Emir Feisal to invite the Emir of Mecca to negotiate direct with Great Britain on "a policy of Arab freedom supported by British co-operation." That policy he still follows. Arabs, he said, need British co-operation; since 1915, and especially since Lord Curzon turned Emir Feisal over to Clemenceau in 1919, Syria has had to face many difficulties; in 1941 the former policy was again renewed.

Syria has been occupied with revolution for twenty years and has made little progress compared to Iraq and Transjordan; Shukri Koweitli hopes to ensure to all Syrians equal civic rights and that general progress which has been needed for a long time; and he hopes that all Arabs without exception should collaborate cordially so as to come to an agreement on a Federal, Confederal or other basis. He realizes the need of safeguarding communications by Great Britain for general international welfare, and that Arabs should co-operate with Great Britain.

The general principles of the Palestine White Paper are accepted by him and by Arabs generally, but it is for Palestine Arabs to put forward suggestions.

Bishara Khouri, President of Lebanon, spoke moderately and sensibly. A Maronite lawyer, about sixty-five years of age, courteous, cultured, of simple appearance, he intends to co-operate closely with Syria and abolish needless inter-state obstacles, and had therefore elected a leading Moslem, Riad Selh, a practical man, as Prime Minister. A large section of Maronites fear Arab unity, fearing that Moslems will never treat them as equals. This section would prefer a small Lebanon, in which Christians would have an 80 per cent. majority. But Moslem leaders in Syria welcome the greater Lebanon, because Moslems and Christians will be in equal numbers, which will remove the fear of Christian *v.* Moslem and diminish the religious question in politics. The Syrians and Lebanese are determined to have independence. Their main complaint was that the French held *les intérêts communs*, customs, control of the frontiers, public security, administration of Bedouin; that they keep harbour dues, etc., from which they pay their own French officials, and that, in the name of public security, these *officiers des services* interfere in everything. They had to have two Budgets with divided financial control, which they do not consider is independence.\*

In each of these countries naturally there are different views. Kurds in Iraq may prefer semi-autonomy, Assyrians require to be settled somewhere in safety, Druses and Ismailia in Syria may not agree with Damascus, but on the whole all require a greater Syria joined to Iraq politically as broadly outlined by Nuri Said. Whilst it is left to the people to decide on a King or President, I believe some Moslem leaders

\* Many of these difficulties have now been removed.

prefer the latter in order to avoid personal or family difficulties and also to reduce religious controversy; Syria and Iraq have Shia, Sunni, Druse and Ismailia Moslems, many Christian sects and Jews; and, like Atatürk, their leaders want no religious interference with State affairs. That, however, is for them to decide. On the whole, they look to develop their countries with Western ideas of progress and education. They have vast room for expansion. Iraq now has some  $3\frac{1}{2}$  millions where there is said to have been 25 millions before the Mongol invasion.

In Palestine and Transjordan, Arabs are believed to be much in favour of the principle of Arab unity, but the Palestine leaders are at present somewhat inarticulate. The Palestine White Paper of 1939 is accepted by practically all Arab leaders and a far greater number of Jews than is supposed are ready to come to terms on that basis.

We are bound broadly on the Maugham Commission's report—*i.e.*, White Paper 5,974.

In Iraq and Greater Syria, Nuri Said's proposals are accepted almost unanimously.

As regards British interests, all Arab leaders I have seen recognize (1) that communication from Gibraltar to the Indian Ocean must be secure for British and even world commerce, (2) that they themselves require protection from outside aggression.

The Committee of Imperial Defence can best state our needs for security and can ask Arab States to co-operate by informing us of their local anxieties and contributions for defence. This principle underlies the present treaties with Egypt and Iraq, and it is assumed that Great Britain would be acting on behalf of the U.S.A., Russia and France, or other Powers.

Sa'udi Arabia is separated from Iraq and Syria by 500 miles of desert, which is as bad as 2,000 miles of sea; Mecca and Medina are the main cities and no big schemes of development exist, except oil and gold-mining.\* Her people are all Moslems and not divided by various religions, and there are no Christian or Jewish citizens. Sa'udi Arabia does not affect our communications, and it is scarcely threatened from outside.

Ibn Sa'ud has great influence, partly due to his extraordinary personality and sense, and partly because he controls the holy places. He wants no European advisers. His political outlook and interests are very different from those of Syria and Iraq, and so are our interests with him. They are mainly concerned with the Islamic world.

Egypt, too, has little political interest to-day in political unity of Iraq and Syria, but the meetings held by Nahas Pasha of Arab leaders should lead to much closer co-operation in economics, research for agriculture and health, and in education and literature, as well as in political and military support.

Roughly, then, Greater Syria and Iraq want to become one political unit, as in Nuri's scheme. What form that unity takes is for them to say, not for us.

Sa'udi Arabia, the Yemen and Egypt wish to remain separate political

\* This paper was given before the Americans had announced their projected oil pipe-line.

units as at present, but all are more ready than before to support each other politically and to co-operate economically.

For ourselves, our main concern is security of communications and oil for strategic reasons. We assume that the Great Powers, including France, agree to a general policy, and that their individual interests are safeguarded and in many cases their co-operation is required. Our security of communications from Gibraltar to the Indian Ocean will require certain treaties and key points. It may be possible by treaties to get close co-operation of defence without overstepping the sovereignty of these States. As Jaafar Pasha often said: "Remove your troops from Baghdad and Iraq, but don't go too far. We know that Turkey or Iran could defeat us in a day without your support."

It is accepted there will be Regional Control of Areas. We will require a Minister of State in Cairo with a staff who are known by the people and therefore have their confidence, even more important than knowing Arabs and Arabic.

The fewer administrators we have and those only the best, and the more that local talent is encouraged, the better: not for the short run but for the long run.

Middle East countries would all be dealt with by the Ministry of State, Cairo, and one Department in London, instead of three as at present (Foreign Office, Colonial Office and India Office). If we have one Minister dealing with all Middle East questions it will help the various States to co-operate and may later lead to their joining a future Commonwealth of independent States, united by interest of security and economics. We shall not dominate, but, as President Dodge of the Beirut American College said, Arabs will not take advice of permanent European officials, but the best influence is through such means as the British Council and the best education.

The Middle East Supply Centre, a joint Anglo-American concern, must continue for some time its present work to regulate shipping and supplies. It has the advantage of taking the widest view of economics and is not enclosed by frontiers. The Middle East Supply Centre meeting on May 8, 1943, laid down their function to plan maintenance on a war-time basis of essential food supplies, public services and facilities, mobilize economic resources of the Middle East to the best mutual advantage, and to relate all these factors to the production programmes of Great Britain and the U.S.A. and to the state of world communication. These functions can apply after the war as well as now. (1) They reduced monthly imports from 150,000 to 50,000 tons by increasing food production of the countries themselves; (2) they conserved resources by restricting consumption and preventing waste, yet ensured essential needs at fair prices; (3) they prohibited needless imports and controlled commodities in short supply; (4) they made goods locally for the armed forces.

The U.K.C.C. work with the Middle East Supply Centre in allotting shipping and the storage and distribution of pooled commodities, and

(a) Assist Government by importing bulk supplies for civil needs. The U.K.C.C. is the sole importer of cereals, rice, sugar, etc., oil, hides and fertilizers.

(b) Assist industry by importing raw materials.

(c) Place orders in Palestine for boots, tents and whatever can be made there.

(d) Allocate shipping space for essential exports from the U.K. and U.S.A.

(e) Sponsor local resources, such as production of sulphuric and other acids and of superphosphate fertilizers.

(f) Help importers *re* payment for imports from the United Kingdom by guarantees against transfer risks, deviation of voyages.

(g) Provide storage for stocks for 100,000 tons.

The Middle East Supply Centre co-ordinated control of locusts in five or more States; standardized medical drugs and appliances enabling medical resources to be pooled by all Middle East States; extended the growing of seed potatoes, as they had already done in Malta and Palestine, to other Middle East countries; sent the early growing of wheat of Palestine to be sown in Iraq and Iran. Three irrigation schemes have been started in Iran, another prepared for the Euphrates, and a tunnel in the Litani River made by the South African Army brings water to 7,000 acres. The Middle East Supply Centre has proved its use in war and can be invaluable to economic co-operation in peace.

A statistical conference was arranged for regular exchange of statistical data prepared on one system between Middle East countries, each having a representative on a permanent standing committee with interchange of agricultural research and data over a wide area. Programmes for education and agricultural research are being drawn up; cultivators are put into touch with research and hire tractors from a special tractor board. Like the Crown Agents, the Middle East Supply Centre can not only purchase the right goods but also get the advice of the best experts for big engineering or industrial projects.

To indicate the money available in the Near East, Palestine has £30 million instead of the pre-war £6 million in circulation, and £41 million instead of £8 million pre-war in bank deposits. Iraq has some £40 million instead of £6 million currency.

Gold in terms of pre-war purchasing power: United Kingdom 12s. 6d., Egypt 8s., Palestine 6s. 8d., Iran 4s., Iraq 3s. 6d., Syria and Lebanon 3s.

1935-37.		Percentage.		Percentage.	
		Total Exports.	within Region.	Total Imports.	within Region.
Egypt	... ..	107·0	2·0	102·0	2·0
Palestine	... ..	13·6	11·0	48·0	15·0
Syria and Lebanon		40·0	47·0	24·4	12·0
Iraq	... ..	12·0	18·0	23·5	4·0

It must be remembered that these countries are not at present complementary in economics. They can be very much more so.

There will be vast sums in banks and currency to be spent by Middle East countries; to spend it usefully will require abnormal organization.

One of the most essential needs is improvement of health. Dr. Hoff, sent out by the U.S.A. on research, asked me to visit an Iraq village to

see the people; he said 75 per cent. were diseased with malaria, dysentery, etc., and that £4,000,000 would stamp out many of these diseases. Child mortality is perhaps 60 per cent. He said we spent far too much on propaganda and too little on helping the people. Dr. Clelland, of the American University, Cairo, reported in 1937 much the same of Egypt, and said that, owing to bilharzia and other diseases, the physical strength of Saidis is half what it was thirty years ago. The Middle East Supply Centre, with America's Rockefeller Institute and existing institutions, can help in this health problem. The money is there and the problem is a serious one. Medical research could be centralized at Beirut, whereas research on agriculture for all the Middle East area might be increased in Cairo.

Transport has hitherto been organized for each small country separately, but Iraq and Syria now want to plan as one and to build a railway from Baghdad to Homs, developing the land west of Palmyra and helping the Jezira; this would be far cheaper and more economical than the Haifa to Baghdad line.

The Turkish railway to Diarbekr may be continued to Mosul, and if so the existing line, Mosul to Tel Kotchek, will be redundant. Many roads have been improved by the British troops and the broad-gauge line has been taken from Haifa to Tripoli; but improved transport is needed from Damascus to Haifa, through difficult country. Incidentally, the road, Cairo-Akaba-Jof-Koweit, has proved quite easy for motor-cars, running in Ibn Sa'ud's area some 100 miles south of the pipe line.

Motor lorries and cars for disposal may be bought by the Iraq Government after the war, and they hope to co-operate with Syria in a monopolized and controlled motor traffic to and from Baghdad. Also it is proposed to take the railway from Basra to Fao, which will become the deep-sea harbour.

Irrigation and electric power, too, must be considered as a whole. It is said that Iraq could increase her population from  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to 25 million, and Syria from 4 to 8 million or more by irrigation. The population of Egypt, on the other hand, is about 17 million, and, as Dr. Clelland shows, it is too large for the cultivated area even after Lake Tana has been dammed.

The petty hindrances to trade and travel, both pre-war and to-day, are ludicrous. Egypt hinders the export of eggs to Palestine until the price of wheat is lowered, refuses to buy Jaffa oranges because a few oranges are grown in Egypt. Customs and barriers exist needlessly. Nothing annoyed me more than to pay nearly £1 to enter Damascus from Iraq as an entrance fee.

The Egyptian Government report (May, 1942) 1,500 square miles of surface iron ore, 200 million tons of best quality accessible; the Assuan dam will provide the required power.

Oil in Sa'udi Arabia is held by American interests and is said to be enormous in quantity—much more than in Iraq or Iran; this may be optimistic, but large quantities are already proved.

There is vast scope for useful work and development post-war in the Middle East area, and for improving standards, and the Middle East

Supply Centre has proved the value of economic co-operation many times.

The United Nations—not Great Britain alone—will have to give the final decisions, though ours is the greatest responsibility and we have the most direct interest . We should continue, therefore, the existing Middle East Supply Centre for economics, and also the British Council's cultural and educational work, co-operate with Nuri and Shukri Koweitli at a Round Table for safety of communications, and give all Arab countries complete independence internally.



# INDIA'S NORTH-EAST FRONTIER

By SIR ROBERT REID, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 17, 1944, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing the lecturer, said that as Governor of Assam and later as Acting Governor of Bengal his knowledge of the North-East Frontier districts and the peoples living in them was comprehensive and exact. He congratulated the Society on having Sir Robert as a lecturer on a little-known part.

UNTIL the time when the North-East Frontier became a major theatre of operations and the land front between us and the Japanese enemy, it was looked on, I think it is fair to say, as a frontier which could safely be disregarded from the strategic point of view. Physically there were no natural routes by which an enemy could enter, no well-beaten tracks such, for instance, as the road from Kabul to Peshawar or the road from Kandahar to Quetta, or even the road from Lhasa over the Jalap La into Sikkim. The North-East Frontier displayed only a few insignificant, seldom-used routes which ran across a frontier the main features of which were high mountains, almost impenetrable forest, and numerous unbridged rivers fed by a rainfall as high as any in the world. Nor was there anywhere much to go to, so to speak, on the other side. On the north you had Bhutan and Tibet, the former completely undeveloped and the latter a country of small products and a trifling export trade. Nor did either offer any threat to our safety. To the east you had Burma, up to 1937 part of the Indian Empire and always part of the British Empire and therefore no danger militarily. Beyond Bhutan, Tibet and Burma there was China, which, though Chinese penetration in the direction of Rima was once the cause of considerable misgiving, was never really a serious threat.

There was therefore no threat of aggression from outside, and there was no commercial interchange with our neighbours. This corner of the Empire was, in fact, a sort of geographical *cul de sac*. The outlets, such as they were, are soon enumerated. In the direction of Balipara Frontier Tract there were two routes to the north, regularly used it is true, but only on a very small scale and only for a few months in each year, fit only for foot passengers or at best pack transport, very mountainous, very difficult, and passing at the Assam end through deplorably unhealthy country. Farther east there was the valley of the Brahmaputra or Dihang, which makes its great southward bend through the Himalayas some miles above the point where it enters the Assam valley. But there was no trade route in the full sense of the term. There was nothing much to come down it from Tibet, the road was bad, the tribes lying athwart it levied blackmail on travellers, and such products of Assam as went to Tibet could be exported by easier and better routes.

Next to the east is the Rima road. That also is a regularly used trade

route into Tibet, but it can be used only for an insignificant amount of traffic, and the road itself is in many parts dangerous and in none fit for anything but pack or human transport. There are no supplies or labour to be got on the way, and even our Political Officers, whose expeditions are on a very modest scale, can only maintain themselves by laying out dumps of supplies weeks beforehand. Beyond Rima lies Batang and the great west to east road to China. But there is many a deep valley and many a precipitous pass to be traversed before you reach it. The Rima road has often attracted travellers in the past. Krick and Boury, the French missionaries, travelled by it in 1854, Needham in 1885, Williamson in 1908, Dundas in 1912, Godfrey of recent years more than once. Bailey came down it from Batang in 1911, Kingdon Ward of the British Museum Expedition in 1933-34, Ronald Kaulbach in 1937. Williamson, in an almost lyrical account written of his journey there, talked of opening it out as a great trade route to China, even visualizing the conveyance by rail to that country of the products of the Assam tea gardens, but he was curiously oblivious of the immense physical obstacles which lay along the route.

Next is the Chaukan Pass, which is a pass and that is about all—no inhabitants, no supplies, no road, frightful weather conditions, and a heavy rainfall at most times of the year, as the Burma refugees who had the temerity to take that route in 1942 found out.

Then there is the Hukawng valley route to Burma, again in the pre-war period a route and that is about all. In the early days, however, the way into Northern Burma by this route was often probed. Needham travelled twice in that direction; on one occasion, in 1892, joining hands with a Burma column at Mainkhwon, a name well known fifty years later to many weary and hungry refugees. It was also along this line that a railway survey was made in 1920 and 1921. It is very sparsely populated, very unhealthy, very mountainous and very wet; and supplies are scarce or, more often, unobtainable. The refugees from Burma who traversed this route in the rains of 1942 suffered the severest hardships—heavy and continuous rain which turned the track into a quagmire wherein the weakly ones were often drowned, no supplies, unbridged and unfordable rivers.

South again we have the Manipur Road, not a thoroughfare to Burma though it runs in that direction, but the only route for wheeled traffic to Imphal, the capital of Manipur State. It was completed as a metalled road only in 1910. Beyond the capital it degenerated, first, into a fair-weather earth road, and then to a 6-foot bridle-path, fit for pack transport only, until it reached the Burma frontier at Tammu. That used to be a favourite route, when Burma was still a part of India, for Viceroys and Commanders-in-Chief to traverse in the good old days when such a leisurely progress was possible. They would go by road to Tammu and then embark on a river steamer on the Chindwin for Rangoon and so home by sea to Calcutta.

South again there were land and river routes to Aijal, headquarters of the Lushai Hills district and to Lungleh, subdivisional headquarters of the same district, but they were not thoroughfares. Through roads into

Southern Burma eastwards from Lungleh were vigorously discussed and strongly advocated by soldier and civilian in 1889 or thereabouts, when we were engaged in hostilities in conjunction with Burma against the Lushais, but dropped when those hostilities came to an end with the Chin-Lushai expedition of 1889-90, the last big undertaking in that country. There was never any public demand for a trade route between India and Burma in this direction. For one thing, all routes on both sides of the boundary, land or water, run north and south, following the formation of the country, while the sea route from Calcutta to Rangoon was neither difficult nor long. South again the last possible route was that which has been developed during the present war to supply our troops fighting on the Arakan front, that from Chittagong towards Akyab. It was traversed by the armies both of the Moguls and the Burmese in the early days, but never opened out as a trade route, presumably, again, because the sea route was so much easier and cheaper.

The internal communications of the Province of Assam have conformed to the shape of nature just in the same way as have those on her external boundaries. In the early days the sole convenient means of travel was by water, and as late as 1905 we find in the *Assam Gazetteer* the statement, "The principal arteries of trade are the rivers." Water transport has remained a very important and convenient means of carrying goods and travellers, and the waterways of Assam have a very efficient river steamer service which affords communication all the way from Calcutta up to Sadiya in the north-east corner of Assam. A substantial number of steamers and flats had been carried off for use in other theatres of war before Japan came in, but the system has rendered magnificent service, under most efficient local management, in transporting munitions and supplies to forward bases in Assam, in bringing down sick and wounded, besides all its normal functions as a distributor of tea and other produce.

It is only since 1891, when the Assam-Bengal Railway (now a part of the newly named Bengal and Assam Railway) began to be led into Assam, that the water transport system was supplemented by rail communications, and it is only since 1903 that the portion known as the "Hill Section"—on which, incidentally, lies Dimapur, the railhead for the Manipur Road—has been completed. The system is narrow-gauge and single line, so that its carrying capacity is severely limited, and the strain to which it is now being subjected by military traffic must be tremendous. On the north bank of the Brahmaputra, where it runs right athwart the whole watershed and close to the hills, it is peculiarly vulnerable to flood damage. Immense difficulty was experienced on this account in 1942, supplemented by the malign activities of Congress saboteurs. On the other bank the railway is able to follow the lines laid out by nature.

A reasonable system of roads is of even later growth. In fact, it is only since about 1933 that it has been possible to say that the road system of Assam has become at all adequate for peace-time requirements. That year saw the completion of a very substantial portion of the great projects which were framed for financing out of the Road Fund, including an

immense amount of important bridging. Unfortunately, the project for the most important bridge of all, that over the Brahmaputra at Gauhati, which it was intended should be a combined road and rail bridge, had failed to reach its final stages, though it was very near it, when war broke out. This means that that serious break in communications between Bengal and Assam, a wide unbridged river lying athwart a main transport route, still remains, and up to the time I left Assam there was on it only one small ferry capable of taking railway wagons, for which, if it had been sunk, there was no substitute in the whole of India. Perhaps things have been changed since.

That was the road position in the plains—a system good enough for peace-time purposes, but quite inadequate to carry fast and heavy military traffic. In the hills, excepting the Manipur Road which ran through one section of the hills, the only roads were 6-foot bridle-paths, a network of which were maintained by Government in all hill districts. Again all that was needed, of course, for peace-time requirements but useless for the vehicular traffic of an army. Aerodromes there were none.

Such was the transport situation when Japan came into the war in 1941, and as things developed in those disastrous days it was a situation which had to be met with desperate urgency. The first road that was tackled was the Manipur Road. In December, 1941, the Civil Government of Assam were asked if they could turn their Public Works Department engineers on to drive it through to Tammu on the Burma frontier. It was a stupendous task to attempt to drive a road through with half the working season gone, but the Assam engineers threw themselves into it and made good progress until the military engineers took it over. By May, 1942, the road was through, just in time to allow the retreating Burma Army to pass down it. Not only was it through to Tammu, but the work of widening the original road throughout was also undertaken, so that now it carries four lines of fast and heavy traffic. The successful accomplishment of this work is largely due to the ungrudging and efficient service rendered by the great Tea Industry in providing the labour force.

Not only did the Burma Army pass down this road, but also the bulk of the Indian refugees from Burma, a continuous stream of whom had been moving along this route since February. And all the time in the opposite direction was a steady flow of men, vehicles and munitions of war on their way up to reinforce the defence of the Burma front against the invading Japanese. How far it has got since I am of course unable to say, but one can safely guess that the work is going steadily forward well into Burma.

As regards other routes to the east, we know that a second land route into Burma has been opened and taken a long way into Burma by way of the Hukawng valley. The newspaper accounts show that this work has been carried on through the year, regardless of the immense physical and climatic obstacles, and at great speed. It would have been impossible to carry it on through the rainy season, which is a very long one, if the engineers had had to rely on normal methods of road-making and it had been necessary to house, feed and attend to the welfare of thousands of

coolies from all over India. Success, I imagine, was only rendered possible by the use of the same sort of modern mechanical appliances for road-making as enabled the Americans to construct the Alaska Highway, and of every modern device for the welfare of the men working on it. That, under such circumstances, General Stilwell should now be able to state that the road they have constructed is an all-weather road is a triumph of modern engineering skill.

To the south, I understand a motor road has been opened from the plains at Dwarbund to Aijal, replacing the old bridle-path which was a seven-stage march previously. That also no doubt has been carried farther beyond Aijal towards the Chin Hills. I would hazard a guess, too, that the river route from the plains to Sairang, dangerous in the rains and slow and tedious in the dry season as it was, has been improved as well as the 11-mile cart-road up from Sairang to Aijal. It is easy also to conjecture that communications have been vastly improved all along the southern half of the Assam-Burma frontier between Demagiri and Lungleh and eastwards, possibly along the very lines General Tregear contemplated when he was campaigning there in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Lastly, according to a statement which was recently published in *The Times*, a road was pushed forward in the winter of 1942 80 miles from railhead at Chittagong to Tumbru at the head of the Naf River. Tumbru is about 20 miles north of Maungdaw, our present front line. The correspondent assumes the road has now reached Maungdaw. There is a road (pre-war) from Maungdaw to Buthidaung.

As for aerodromes, they have been constructed here, there and everywhere with amazing rapidity. Work on the first of them was started in the spring of 1941, and I should doubt if the work has ever ceased.

How, if at all, the railway system has been improved—a more difficult problem, I imagine, than the improvement of roads—I am unable to say. Yet the inadequate railway system, forming one vast bottleneck right from the broad gauge at Parbatipur to railhead, must be a constant anxiety to our supply services.

I have purposely dwelt somewhat largely on the communications on this frontier because they really are the key to everything. This, in fact, was recognized early in March, 1942, well before Assam became a base for forward military operations, but when the stream of Indian refugees from Burma was beginning to flow and the Burma Army had commenced its northward retreat. The late Viceroy then commissioned Major-General Wood with the widest possible powers to deal with all matters of communications, no matter whose authority—civil, military, railway or any other—he impinged upon, in order to cope with the numerous problems which were arising daily, practically all of which came back in the end to the one word transport, whether that word meant, roads, railways, buses, wagons or anything else. It was excess of zeal, perhaps, on the part of someone at G.H.Q. who was anxious to solve the transport problem that resulted in a wagon-load of camels being sent up to Dimapur, no country in the world except perhaps the Pripet Marshes being less adapted for such animals.

As to the country generally, the main feature of the whole north-eastern "fringe" is the tangled mass of great mountains, running up to 8,000 or 12,000 feet above sea-level. These are nearly all heavily wooded, as our troops operating on the Burma front well know. The rainfall is very heavy throughout. In the distant parts, of course, there are no records, but in Assam generally a fall of 100 inches in the year is a commonplace, and it is certainly no less in the wilder regions. It starts earlier, too, as you get farther north and east. Up the Noa Dihing River, for instance, you get heavy falls of rain as early as February and the monsoon period is one of heavy and prolonged rain. Malaria is rife in these hills, and the submontane belt lying between Assam and Burma contains some of the most heavily malaria-infected areas in the world. Insect pests abound, and in an excessively damp climate like that bites develop into persistent sores, reducing efficiency and vitality to a serious degree. One particularly noxious insect is the *dim dam*, which is quite noiseless in its approach and leaves a bite the results of which make some people positively ill. Even the local natives suffer from them very seriously.

The dense, damp jungle which is characteristic of this country, depressing enough to have to live in at any time, has a further depressing effect in that as often as not it means that the enemy is never seen, a fact which inevitably is a serious danger to morale, specially among troops to whom the jungle is strange and possibly rather alarming even without an enemy. With all this heavy rainfall, paradoxically enough water is often a great difficulty, especially when great numbers have to be catered for. And what there is is often unsuitable for human consumption.

That, of course, is the worst side of it. In the fine, dry weather of winter and in peace conditions there is no more attractive country to travel in and no more attractive people to travel among.

This brings me to the inhabitants, and I will try and give you a short description of the highly diversified tribes who inhabit the North-East Frontier. I will take them from west by north round to the south, and will show you some slides illustrating the various types that one encounters.

Beginning with Balipara Frontier Tract, here we have a narrow strip of administered country and behind it an immense hinterland running right up to the borders of Tibet. As you get farther north Tibetan influence naturally increases, and the villages to the north all have their affinities in that direction. Away to the north-west lies Tawang, on one of the regular, if not very important, routes to the north. Between Assam and Tawang is a 12,000-foot pass, the Sela, only crossable after April when the snows have melted.

The principal tribes in this direction are Dufflas, Akas and Miris, all very primitive peoples, who respond hardly at all to the influences of civilization. The Political Officer, a police officer of the Assam Cadre, spends the bulk of his time touring in the wild mountainous country settling disputes, generally by persuasion, sometimes by force, among the tribes.

Historically there is little to relate about our dealings with this group of hill tribes. There were some raids on British territory in the nine-

teenth century, but the only reminder now that the peace to our borders here was ever threatened lies in the annual payments of "posa" or subsidy to certain persons or tribes which we still make in fulfilment of ancient treaties.

Farther to the east and on the left bank of the Subansiri we come to Sadiya Frontier Tract, inhabited in the west by the Abors and Miris, in the east by the Mishmis, Khamtis and Singhphos. The hinterland of this area runs up to the borders of Tibet, entailing again contact, direct or indirect, with China. On the eastern edge of the tract, in Mishmi country, is the road to Rima, the trade route to Tibet which I mentioned earlier on.

The Mishmis are a shy, inoffensive and rather suspicious people, very dirty, preferring to live in their hamlets on the high hills and not fond of coming down to the plains. The Khamtis are of the same stock as the Thais of Thailand or Siam, and they and the Singhphos are small communities which have given no trouble.

Though the Abors have very definite tribal divisions among themselves, they enjoy the great advantage of a single language. They are short and sturdy with broad Mongolian features. They have no written language and have been little touched by civilization. Unlike other hill tribes, they have given us in the past little trouble by way of raiding the plains, mainly for geographical reasons, and on our side it is only since 1911, when the murder of Mr. Williamson, the Political Officer, and Dr. Gregorson, a tea-estate doctor, led to the Abor Expedition of 1912, that we have penetrated the Abor country to any considerable extent. There has been no trouble since. In the present war they have expressed and felt great loyalty to the British, and in 1942 they furnished a Labour Corps of 2,000 men who did excellent work in carrying supplies for and rescuing the Indian refugees on their way out of Burma. One was awarded the George Medal.

Next, and now tending southwards, we come to Tirap Frontier Tract, inhabited mainly by Nagas of rather a degraded, backward type, known as the Rangpangs. This area was cut out of Sadiya Frontier Tract and set up as a separate district in 1942. It was through this tract that those refugees from Burma who took the Hukawng valley route passed on the last stages of their journey.

And then we come to the abode proper of those picturesque people the Nagas, the Naga Hills District, an area of some 4,000 square miles with a great belt of unadministered Naga country lying between it and the Patkoi Range, the natural boundary between Assam and Burma. The term "Naga" as a general name for the tribe is inaccurate, if convenient. They themselves do not use it, nor have they any common language, but each tribe, be it Angami, Lhota, Ao, Chang and a dozen others too numerous to mention, has its own peculiar tongue.

The Nagas are frank and independent by nature, of a cheerful and hospitable disposition, and the men who work there become devotedly attached to them.

Historically, our early relations with the Nagas were unfriendly. We went into the country first as a measure of protection for our own people

in the plains, beyond which in the early days our writ did not run, for the transborder Nagas were constantly raiding the plains and carrying off heads. And, once the process of penetrating the country on these lines had begun, it had to go on. Starting in 1832 with the protection of the peoples of the plains, we went on inevitably to protecting the peoples of the hills, who had made submission to us and had thereby transferred the responsibility of defence from their own shoulders to those of Government. It was in 1878 that Kohima, a name well known now to the British Army in Eastern India, became the headquarters of the district.

The Nagas have shown themselves thoroughly loyal in the war. At the very start they offered themselves for service in Labour Corps, and though it was not then found possible to utilize them, hostilities with Japan brought the war to the Naga doorstep, especially that of the Angamis who live on either side of the Manipur Road, and they furnished thousands of young men for road or transport work.

Next we come to Manipur State, a small native State under its own ruler, the Maharaja. Manipur covers an area of about 8,000 square miles and has a population of rather over half a million. It consists of a small central plain inhabited by the Manipuris proper and a great circle of hills inhabited by hill people—Nagas, Kukis and the like. Three-fifths of the population are concentrated in the small central plain.

The Manipuris are orthodox Hindus, and no killing of cattle, for instance, is allowed in the Manipur plain. Perhaps it would be safer to say "was," for the war may have changed even that. They are not very advanced, educationally or politically, except for some members of the ruling family. The inhabitants of the hills are on much the same level as the more remote Naga clans.


Our relations with Manipur have, with one exception, been traditionally friendly, and in the past we interfered little with their doings. The exception was in 1891, when the Chief Commissioner of Assam and four other officers were murdered. That disturbance was very quickly suppressed, but it led to a very definite change in the character of our relations with the State. Though annexation, which was strongly advocated by the local officers, was not agreed to by the British Government, the new ruler, a small boy of six, was chosen from another and obscure branch of the house and a *sanad* in stringent terms was drawn, and control has remained pretty close ever since.

Then, running down to the southern tip of Assam are the Lushai Hills, with the Chin Hills district of Burma on their eastern border. As with the Nagas, our first contacts with the Lushais were of an unfriendly nature, because the Lushai of a hundred years ago had, like all hillmen, an inveterate habit of raiding the people of the plains. The British India districts of Cachar, Sylhet, Tippera and Chittagong were the subject of his attentions and consequently there were numerous punitive expeditions between 1850 and 1890. The last one to be undertaken on a large scale was the Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889-90, in which some 6,000 troops and police were engaged. The Lushai country was taken directly under our administration in 1890 and, except for certain disturbances in the early days, profound peace has reigned there ever since until





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the present war. The war with Japan has come close to them, and it has had, and will have, great effects both for good and evil. It has tested their loyalty, and their loyalty has stood the test just as firmly as in 1914-18 and in much more difficult circumstances. Lushias have freely joined the Assam Regiment, the Indian Hospital Corps, the Assam Rifles and, in the largest numbers, a local service Labour Corps, while Lushai girls, trained in the excellent mission hospitals, have done nobly in the nursing service.

That really covers the frontier areas, but I think I might just mention some of the tribes, similar to the frontier tribes in that they are non-Indian and backward, whose habitat is within Assam itself, in the Mikir Hills, the Garo Hills and the British portion of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, constituting roughly the central hill mass which separates the two valleys of which Assam in the main consists.

The Khasis are as a rule short and sturdy in appearance, with Mongolian features and fair complexions. The women generally are of better physique than the men, a fact, no doubt, not unconnected with the matriarchal system which prevails among the Khasis. It is this system, too, and the freedom it grants to the women which is the reason for such a high level of education among Khasi women. The percentage of literacy among Khasi women, 79 per mille, is the highest in the province, and it was a Khasi who was chosen as the first, and so far only, woman member of the Assam Cabinet. The Khasis show great extremes of development, ranging from highly educated persons who can hold their own anywhere to peasantry in the outlying villages whose condition is little removed from savagery.

The Garos are a backward, slow-witted lot, plain in appearance, not very attractive personalities. Though the American Baptists have worked hard among them for many years the response they have obtained has not been very great.

The Mikirs are an inoffensive, backward community. They have few villages worthy of the name; they are constantly changing the village site, and most of their villages even now are known by the name of the head man, a sure sign of a primitive stage of civilization.

The future of these tribes is very much bound up with the future of the North-East Frontier both in its political and its military aspects. In that part of his report which deals with this area, Professor Coupland has linked these two aspects closely together, repeating in fact what the Government of Assam said to the Simon Commission in 1928, during the discussions which preceded the Constitution Act of 1935. They recommended that the Backward Tracts should be excluded from the Province of Assam and be administered by the Governor, as Agent for the Governor-General, and at the cost of the Central revenues, on the ground that the Naga Hills, Lushai Hills, and the Sadiya and Balipara Frontier Tracts were frontier districts and had been occupied to protect India as well as the Province of Assam from invasion and attack. And they went on to point out that, though for the moment the North-East Frontier might not be a serious menace to the peace of the rest of India, the time (to use their own words) "might soon come when that frontier would become

no less, if not more, important for the defence of India than the North-West Frontier."

The Constitution Act of 1935 did "exclude" these tracts in a sense, but only from the full privileges of representative government. There are two factors now which make the situation totally different from the one which was pictured in 1928 or even in 1935. One is that the political advance for India which we have now to contemplate will differ tremendously in degree, possibly in kind as well, from any measure of political change that has yet been invented for India, entailing, among other things, far less protection or—even more probably—the abolition of protection, for the classes that need protection. The other factor is the proved military importance from the defence point of view of the North-East Frontier. These two grounds alone would appear to point overwhelmingly in favour of some such arrangement as is outlined briefly in Part III. of Professor Coupland's report—*i.e.*, a civil administrative unit comprising the hill areas along the north and east frontiers of Assam and taking in as well the similar areas in Burma itself. In any case, there rests on us a serious responsibility for the future welfare of a set of very loyal, primitive peoples, who are habituated to look to us for protection and who will get it from no other source. They are not Indian in any sense of the word, neither in origin, nor in language, nor in appearance, nor in habits, nor in outlook; and it is only by historical accident that they have been tacked on to an Indian Province. Personally, I have no doubt whatever that to allow them in any way to be involved in Indian politics, and with no safeguards such as now exist, would spell disaster for them. All they need—and they are entitled to it—is time, a period in which to develop, but the danger is that, if the present opportunity to give them that chance is let slip, it will never recur.

# SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA: SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

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Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 22, 1944, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

FOR the purposes of this talk the designation South-Eastern Asia is to be understood as comprising the following five territories: Burma, Malaya, Siam, French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. The Philippine Islands are sometimes spoken of as coming within this same area, but I do not propose to say anything about them to-day—partly because I am in no way familiar with them, and partly because neither historically nor geographically can they be regarded as linking up very intimately with any of the countries which I have just mentioned.

My object is to give you a brief description of the territories in question, to indicate their significance both for the continent of Asia and for the world at large, and to pose some of the problems which will face the United Nations when the time has come for effecting the post-war settlement which will follow upon the expulsion of the Japanese from the regions which they have so treacherously occupied or overrun in the Far East. I shall not, however, attempt the invidious and ambitious task of suggesting how those problems will most suitably be met, for to do so would be tantamount to rushing in foolishly where even angels, at the present early juncture, might fear to tread.

Before proceeding with my remarks, I would remind you of the distressing fact that every one of the five countries named above is at this moment occupied or controlled by the Japanese.

The area of Burma is just over 260,000 square miles, which means that that country is approximately of the same size as France and England combined. Of this total figure Burma proper accounts for over 150,000 square miles, and what are known as the "Excluded Areas"—*i.e.*, the Shan States, the Karenni States, and the Chin and Kachin Hill Tracts—for over 100,000. The population of Burma in the larger sense of the word was in 1941 estimated at just under seventeen millions, of whom from eleven to twelve millions were Burmese-speaking. The principal town and the seat of government is Rangoon, with a population of half a million inhabitants; it is a seaport situated in the south, as you all know, and is a very cosmopolitan city. More specifically Burmese is Mandalay, in Upper Burma, which used to be the capital of the former kings. Burma, of course, now forms a part of the British Empire, Lower Burma having passed into our possession as the result of annexations in 1825 and 1852, whilst the upper portion of the country was occupied by us in the

last decade but one of the nineteenth century, after a military campaign which led to the deposition and subsequent exile, in 1885, of King Thibaw, the last of the Burmese monarchs. Burma is principally an agricultural country, though it also possesses considerable mineral wealth; there are, for example, oil and silver, lead and zinc; there is tungsten and a certain amount of tin in the south, whilst the ruby mines in the north are well known. But the chief product of the country is rice, of which Burma exports more than any other Asiatic country; it is also the world's chief producer of teak. In recent years a beginning has been made with the application to Burma of a democratic system of government; there is now (or, rather, there was before the coming of the Japanese) a Legislature consisting of two chambers and resting upon a basis of popular suffrage, and there is a Cabinet of Ministers over which a Prime Minister presides. The Governor of Burma, however, has extensive overriding powers, of which he is entitled to make use in case of necessity. Moreover, certain reserved departments of the administration (such as those of defence and foreign affairs) are under the sole direction and control of the Governor, who also is alone responsible for relations with what are called the "excluded areas," consisting in large part of the Shan States. These latter are each of them placed under rulers, generally hereditary, who control the internal administration of their States by virtue of their "Sanads," or appointment orders. It is the Governor, as the King's representative, who deals with these rulers, and not the Government of Burma.

Malaya, yet another part of the British Empire, consists of a territory much smaller than Burma, its total area being just under 51,000 square miles and its population amounting to about five and a half millions. From the administrative point of view it is divided into three parts: The Straits Settlements, consisting of Singapore, Penang and Malacca, which together form a Crown Colony with a Governor at the head of it; the Federated Malay States, consisting of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, with a federal capital at Kuala Lumpur; and the Unfederated Malay States, which consist of Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu. The suzerainty over the four last named among the Unfederated States was transferred by Siam to Britain under the terms of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. The Colony of the Straits Settlements represents about one-thirtieth of the total area of Malaya—namely, less than 1,500 square miles—but its population (approximately a million and a half) is equivalent to about one-quarter of that of the entire region. The area and population of the Federated Malay States are rather more than those of the Unfederated States, the inhabitants numbering just over two millions in the case of the former and just under two millions in the case of the latter. The largest town of Malaya is Singapore, with a population of close upon 800,000. Malaya has attained an importance out of all proportion to its size and to the number of its inhabitants by reason of the fact that it produces a very large share of the world's total consumption of tin and rubber. Unlike Burma, Malaya has not yet witnessed any serious attempt at the introduction of a system of autonomous government along democratic lines. The colonial methods of administra-

tion are still in full force in the Straits Settlements, the Governor of which holds in addition the office of High Commissioner for the Malay States. The latter rank as protected territories and are under the rule of their own native Princes, whose powers, however, have been curtailed and made subject to control through the agreements into which they have entered with His Britannic Majesty. A factor which is bound to make difficult the application of any form of self-government to Malaya is to be found in the diversity of its population, the intensive development of the mining and other industries, among other things, having led to a great influx into that area of Chinese and Indian workers and traders, with the result that, if Malaya be regarded as a whole, the Malays themselves have come to be in a minority, forming less than 45 per cent. of the total figure. In the Straits Settlements the Chinese are in an absolute majority. Attached to the Straits Settlements as dependencies are the Cocos or Keeling Islands and the Island of Labuan, off Borneo. British North Borneo and Sarawak (situated in North-West Borneo) are British protected States, the former being administered by the British North Borneo Company and the latter by a Rajah, who is an Englishman and a descendant of Sir Charles Brooke. Brunei, under a native Sultan and likewise situated in North-West Borneo, is also a State under British protection.

Siam, with an area of about 200,000 square miles, is rather smaller than Burma (including the Excluded Areas), and has a population of something like fifteen million souls. (Here I may say parenthetically that the above figures do not take into account territory amounting to about 25,000 square miles and including some hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, mostly situated in Cambodia, which the Vichy Government was compelled, in 1941, to yield up to Siam under pressure, disguised in the form of mediation, from Japan.) Siam differs from all the other territories of South-Eastern Asia in that it is still, and always has been, an independent country. It is, in fact, one of the few indigenous sovereign States surviving upon the Asiatic continent. Siam is, like Burma, mainly an agricultural country, rice being its staple product and its principal article of export; a certain amount of rubber is also grown in the south, whilst teak is extracted from the forests in the north. Of late years a flourishing tin-mining industry (financed chiefly by British and Australian capital) has come into being in the southern provinces, and Siam now furnishes an appreciable quantity of the world's total production of tin. The only large city is Bangkok, the capital, with a population of nearly one million. Until quite recently the form of government in Siam was that of an absolute monarchy, but, as the result of a *coup d'état* staged on June 24, 1932, the system of absolute rule was suppressed, the King was forced to promulgate a Constitution and an administration was inaugurated on modern democratic lines, with a single-chamber Legislature, one-half of whose members were elected by popular vote, and with a Cabinet of Ministers. Latterly, although the Government remains a constitutional one in name and in theory, effective power has passed into the hands of the military faction under the leadership of Field-Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram, who has been Prime Minister since the end of the year 1938. As everyone knows, the Government of Luang Pibul



Songgram threw in its lot with Japan after her invasion of Malaya and her attack upon Pearl Harbour.

French Indo-China has an area of some 286,000 square miles and is thus larger than either Burma or Siam, whilst its population of close upon twenty-four millions is half as large again as that of either of those two countries. It is divided for administrative purposes into the following five divisions: Cochin China, Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia and the Lao Province. Cochin China, where the French established themselves about the middle of the nineteenth century, resembles the Straits Settlements in being a colonial territory; it is under a Governor and, as a French colony, it returns an elected Deputy to the Legislature in Paris. Annam is a Protectorate with a titular Emperor, who has his Court at Hué with a French *Résident-Supérieur* at his side to guide and control him. Tonkin (which, historically speaking, is a dependency of the Empire of Annam) constitutes yet another Protectorate with a *Résident-Supérieur* at Hanoi. Cambodia is likewise a Protectorate, with a King ruling nominally at Pnompenh, where there is a third *Résident-Supérieur*. The Lao Province (known to the French as "Le Laos") is situated on the upper reaches of the Mekong River and forms a protected area under the jurisdiction of an *Administrateur*, who resides at Vientiane. The former indigenous rulers of the State of Vientiane have been deposed, but there is still a princeling (or "King" as he is even designated) who is the titular ruler over the adjacent State of Luang Prabang, which forms part of the Lao Province and is in consequence under the control of the *Administrateur* at Vientiane. At the head of the entire region of French Indo-China stands a French Governor-General, whose seat of administration is at Hanoi, though he spends a portion of every year at Saigon, the capital of Cochin China. Little or no real authority remains vested to-day in either the Emperor of Annam or the King of Cambodia, to say nothing of the so-called King of Luang Prabang; it is the French who are everywhere in effective control of the administration, and they have so far not attempted to endow the native population with autonomous institutions on anything like the same scale as has been done by ourselves in Burma. The main articles of export from French Indo-China are rice and coal, the chief exporting area for rice being Cochin China; there are valuable coal mines in Tonkin and a certain amount of rubber is also grown. Attached to French Indo-China is the adjacent small territory of Kwang Chau Wan, on the coast of China, which has been leased by the Chinese Government to France since 1898.

The Netherlands East Indies constitute a vast island empire whose natural resources make of it one of the most productive areas in the whole world. The immense size of this archipelago may be gathered from the fact that, if a map of the Dutch East Indies be superimposed upon a map of Europe drawn to the same scale, it will be found to extend across the entire width of that continent with a very considerable amount to spare. The thousands of islands composing the archipelago vary in size from tiny atolls to such huge masses of land as Sumatra, Celebes, Borneo (the greater part of which is Dutch) and New Guinea (about half of which belongs to Holland). The total area of the Netherlands East

Indies amounts to no less than 735,000 square miles, the population now being approximately seventy millions. Of this population about two-thirds—*i.e.*, more than forty millions—are to be found upon the Island of Java alone, which is, however, by no means the largest, though it is the richest, of the islands composing the region. The area of Java is something like 50,000 square miles, which is no more than approximately one-fourteenth of that of the whole archipelago, but its teeming population makes of it one of the most densely inhabited tracts upon the face of the globe; both as regards its size and the number of its inhabitants it approximates, in fact, very closely to England. Dutch rule over the Netherlands East Indies had its beginnings about three hundred years ago. The seat of government is at Batavia, in West Java, and the Queen of Holland is represented by a Governor-General, who is at the head of the central administration of the whole archipelago. Under him (here again I am speaking of the situation as it was before the Japanese occupation) there are eight Governors, under whose jurisdiction are placed the eight provinces (five of them in Java) into which Netherlands India has lately been divided. Most of Java and rather less than half of the territories outside it are directly administered by the Dutch, but there are still a large number of native States (some of them very small) under indigenous rulers, four of them being situated in Java and the rest elsewhere. Whilst none of these native rulers enjoy much more than the semblance of power to-day, the Dutch have, nevertheless, made real progress with the task of leading the people along the road to self-government, the steps taken to that end, though less far-reaching than what has been accomplished by the British in Burma, being greatly in excess of anything of the kind that has been done by the French in Indo-China. Not only have various elected regional and municipal councils been set up in Java, with the prospect of an extension of this system to other islands, but a legislative body for all of the Netherlands East Indies, in the shape of the "Volksraad" or People's Council, has been in existence since the year 1918. As at present constituted, this body exercises legislative powers with respect to the internal affairs of the archipelago and the majority of its members are elected, the remainder being nominated by the Governor-General. One-half of the members of the Volksraad—that is to say, thirty of them—must consist of Indonesians, by which term is meant natives of the country; the other half is made up by twenty-five Dutchmen, by four Chinese and by one Arab. The powers of the Volksraad are, however, limited drastically—in theory, at any rate—by the overriding-authority of the Governor-General, which is even greater than that exercisable by the Governor of Burma. I may remark here that the Netherlands East Indies no longer constitute for official purposes a colony. In accordance with Article I. of the Dutch Constitution, as amended in 1922, they now form, together with Surinam and Curaçoa in the Western Hemisphere, an integral part of the "Rijk" or Realm of the Netherlands. Since the recent occupation of the archipelago by Japan the above conception has been further developed in various pronouncements made by Her Majesty the Queen of Holland, in one of which she promised that a conference should be called immediately after

the expulsion of the Japanese for the purpose of arranging for the constitutional relations of the component parts of the realm in the future. In a later pronouncement Her Majesty foreshadowed collaboration between the different portions of the realm on a basis of full independence, without racial discrimination, as regards the internal affairs of each of them. With respect to foreign trade and commerce, it is to be observed that the Dutch East Indies form essentially an exporting area. Together with Malaya, they supply the world with most of its tin and rubber; rich oil fields exist in Borneo and Sumatra; Java furnishes practically the whole of the world's supply of quinine, whilst the exports from the archipelago also include tea, coffee, sugar, pepper, tobacco and a variety of other commodities too numerous to mention.

South-Eastern Asia is sometimes called Further India and sometimes it is referred to as Indo-China. As the latter designation indicates, it is situated geographically between two great spheres of civilization and culture—the Indian and the Chinese. With which of these two spheres does it more particularly link up? Should we stress more especially the Indian or the Chinese aspect of its connections and affiliations? I have told you a little about the physical and natural features of the countries in question, as well as about the political conditions obtaining in them at the time when they were overrun by Japan. But the information thus supplied will not help us to answer the question which I have just put. In order to find an answer it will be necessary to enquire into their historical background and into the characteristics of the peoples which inhabit them.

Let us first get an idea of the peoples by which South-Eastern Asia is inhabited.

The Burmese are said to share certain linguistic characteristics with the Thibetans and, like the Thibetans, they are of Mongoloid stock. For all practical purposes, however, they speak a distinctive language of their own and, unlike the people of Thibet, they profess the Buddhist religion in its southern and purer form, such as we still find practised in Ceylon. The southern form of Buddhism is known as the "Hinayana" or "Lesser Vehicle," to distinguish it from the northern form, known as the "Mahayana" or "Greater Vehicle," which is a later and, as some would say, a debased variation of Buddhism as originally practised and which is followed to-day in China, in Thibet and in Japan. The Siamese belong to a special group of peoples known as the Thai group, to which belong also the Shans (to whom I have already referred) and the Laos, who inhabit the Lao Province of French Indo-China. (There are some Shan States, by the way, situated close to the frontier of Burma but within the confines of the Republic of China, whilst the inhabitants of Northern and North-Eastern Siam are called Laos equally with the people of the same name in the Lao Province.) All of these peoples—Siamese, Shans and Laos—together with a few others, who are numerically too inconsiderable to require special mention, all of these peoples come of one common Thai stock and employ different forms of what must have been originally one and the same tongue. Their original home was in South-West China, whence they were gradually driven southwards to

their present-day habitats by the Chinese. But they are not Chinese themselves, although, like them, they speak a monosyllabic language and in doing so make use of a system of tones for the purpose of differentiating, when necessary, one syllable from another. Like the Burmese, the various peoples of Thai stock profess the southern form of the Buddhist faith. In Cambodia we find yet another people, of a different race from the Thais or the Annamites and speaking a separate language of their own; the Cambodians are said to be related to the Peguans, or Mons, of Lower Burma and, like them, to be of what is called Mon-Khmer stock. In their case also the national religion is Buddhism in its southern form. Since Buddhism itself derives from India, it follows that all of the peoples which I have just mentioned have acquired their religion from that part of Asia. More than that, it is also from India that their culture, their style of architecture and other art forms, and much of their literature are derived, for the greater part, even at the present day. Their old system of common law likewise came from India, whilst the various scripts which they employ for writing their respective languages, though differing from one another in many ways, all of them betray a common Indian origin. In other words, Burmese, Shans, Laos and Cambodians are in the last resort orientated towards India from both the religious and the cultural points of view. The indigenous inhabitants of Malaya belong to a race the members of which are also to be met with in adjacent portions of the Dutch East Indies and they are akin to the Javanese and Sundanese, who make up the great majority of the population of Java. The Islamic faith is professed both by the Malays and by the greater portion of the inhabitants of the Netherlands East Indies, but it is to be noted that these peoples were not converted to Mohammedanism until about the fifteenth century of the Christian era; prior to that time they professed either Buddhism or Brahmanism and the culture and art of the Javanese, to this very day, reveal their pre-Islamic origin by being predominantly Indian in spirit and in form. On the Island of Bali, indeed, the Hindu forms of worship still prevail, Islam never having been able to gain a footing in that region. It is not until we come to the Annamites (who compose the population of Cochin China as well as of Annam) and to their near kinsmen the Tonkinese that we find among the inhabitants of South-Eastern Asia a people which is affiliated to China rather than to India. The religion, art and culture of the Annamites and Tonkinese are unmistakably of Chinese origin and can only be the result of long centuries of association with China.

All this brings us to a consideration of the historical background of the various peoples which we are discussing.

In the early centuries of the Christian era and for some hundreds of years afterwards there was a constant flow of visitors from the eastern shores of India to the countries of South-Eastern Asia. These visitors were probably most of them traders, though some of them must have been religious missionaries, and they must have come from India in very considerable numbers, for they were able to found States, and even mighty Empires, all over the region in question. Some of these emigrants were Buddhists, others among them practised the Brahmin reli-

gion, and their traces are to be met with in Burma, in Siam, in the Lao country, in Cambodia, in Malaya, in Sumatra, Borneo and Java and even in Annam, where the once powerful Empire of the Chams (now vanished except for the architectural remains which it has left behind) was founded by emigrants from India. The ruins of many of the noble temples erected by, or under the auspices of, these Indian visitors have survived up to the present time; among them are the splendid monuments of Angkor, in Cambodia, and the famous temples at Brambanan and the shrine of Borobudur, in Java. And, as I have already indicated, the influence of these Indian traders and missionaries—or colonizers, if it is preferred to call them by that name—is still to be discerned in the art, the culture and the literature of the Burmese, of the Siamese, Shans and Laos, of the Cambodians, of the Balinese and, to a lesser but unmistakable degree, of the Javanese right up to the present moment.

Chinese influences, on the other hand, are not nearly so discernible except in the case of the Annamites and Tonkinese. There have, of course, been contacts between China and the countries of South-Eastern Asia from very early times, and up to the end the Chinese Emperors did not cease to advance a claim to be the suzerain lords over all the territories which we are considering—as, indeed, over the rest of Asia as it was known to them. But, save for Annam and Tonkin, which used long centuries ago to be incorporated in the Chinese Empire, this claim was seldom or never vindicated by the employment of force; for most of the time it continued to be something very vague and intangible, though the Kings of Burma (and even the Kings of Siam in former days) went so far as to recognize it in theory and to send symbolic tribute periodically to the Chinese Imperial Court. But apart from Annam and Tonkin—which, I may say, had already become effectively independent of China many hundreds of years before the French appeared on the scene—it cannot be said that the South-Eastern Asiatic countries ever formed part of the dominions of the Chinese Empire in any real sense of the word. There has, however, been a very considerable immigration of Chinese into Siam and Malaya in recent years, so much so in the case of Siam that there is scarcely a Siamese family to-day which has not a certain amount of Chinese blood flowing in its veins. But, in spite of this fact, the religious and cultural traditions of the Siamese people remain predominantly Indian in their ultimate character and show little trace of Chinese infiltration. With respect to the Malays, the fact that they are Moslems is sufficient to have kept them from coming under Chinese influence.

From what I have said above it will be clear, I think, that, if the term Indo-China is to be applied to South-Eastern Asia at all, it is upon the first and not upon the second element of that compound that the stress should be laid. In fact, if we leave Annam, Tonkin and Cochin China out of the picture, we shall be better justified in applying the designation Further India to the part of the world about which I am talking to you. Some Indian enthusiasts even appear to be acquiring the habit of referring to it as Greater India, but there is this much to be said against the use of any such term: intimate contacts between South-Eastern Asia and

India itself ceased long ago, and the records of them, apart from architectural remains and scattered statues and stone inscriptions, are very sparse. The whole subject of the early relations of India with South-Eastern Asia is thus very obscure—so obscure that it is impossible to compile anything like an exact history of them. The visitors from India who founded all those States of which I have spoken can never have formed the majority of the populations by which they were inhabited; they must have functioned either as a ruling caste or as missionaries and instructors who sought to bring the native inhabitants up to something approaching their own cultural level. And in course of time they and their descendants must have gradually become merged in the indigenous populations among which they were living. In any case, each of the early States in question is shown by its architectural and sculptural remains to have developed along its own lines and to have displayed the results eventually of what can only have been a happy combination between Indian influences and the native genius of the region. Thus, whilst they all of them exhibit in their manifestations as known to us a common Indian inspiration and origin, they are distinguished from one another, nevertheless, in those manifestations by marked local differences. It is an astonishing fact that to-day all conscious memory of their former Indian conquerors or instructors seems to have been erased from the minds of the various peoples of South-Eastern Asia, and a similar forgetfulness prevails in India, too, where (except for a very few chance stone inscriptions) this vast and century-long process of colonization appears to have left no record behind it at all. Existing contacts, such as are revealed by the presence to-day in South-Eastern Asia, and in Burma and Malaya especially, of Indian traders and workers, are of quite recent date and are in no way to be considered in connection with the historic past.

I have endeavoured to give you some idea of the various countries comprising South-Eastern Asia by telling you what are their chief natural resources, by describing to you very briefly their populations and the system by which those populations were governed before their recent overwhelming by the Japanese, and by touching upon their religious and cultural associations. I will now indicate in a few words their significance and their importance from both a continental and a world point of view.

From the continental standpoint their importance is chiefly military and economic. As events have only just demonstrated so tragically, Siam and, behind her, French Indo-China form one of the main avenues along which an enemy attack can be launched against Malaya and Burma. It was in Indo-China that the Japanese completed their preliminary preparations for their invasion of the two last-named territories and it was through Siam that the main attack was actually delivered. Burma in its turn lies on the eastern flank of India, and Calcutta is only a few hours distant by air from Rangoon. Inasmuch as Singapore, situated in Malaya, forms a vital link in the chain of connections between Britain and Australia, the military significance of South-Eastern Asia for the British Empire is obvious and transcends considerations which are ex-

clusively Asiatic and continental. China, too, is affected vitally by the circumstance that the frontiers of French Indo-China in the north are co-terminous with her own; it was, in fact, alleged reasons of security with respect to their campaign against the Chinese which first served the Japanese with a pretext for their penetration into Tonkin.

From the economic point of view the significance of the countries of South-Eastern Asia in the continental sense, as distinguished from the interests of the world at large, is to be found in the circumstance that three of them—namely, Burma, Siam and French Indo-China (I mention them in order of importance)—constitute the granaries of much of the southern portion of the Asiatic continent, since they produce large exportable surpluses of rice, which is the staple article of diet of so many tropical peoples. In normal times India derives considerable supplies of rice from Burma, and the cessation of such supplies owing to the Japanese occupation of the latter territory contributed to no small extent to the recent famine in Bengal. Malaya obtains normally a very large proportion of the rice which she consumes from Siam, which country also exports in the ordinary way great quantities of the same commodity to Hong Kong and Southern China, whilst the Dutch East Indies likewise rely upon considerable importations of rice from one or other of the producing areas which I have named. Inasmuch as all three of those areas are now under Japanese domination, the effects of the consequent dislocation of the trade in rice must be disastrous, both upon the countries which have been used to consume it and upon those in which it is grown.

From the larger global point of view South-Eastern Asia is, economically speaking, of the first importance by reason of the fact that the greater portion of the world's supplies of tin and rubber are obtained from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, which latter region likewise produces virtually the world's total supply of quinine. I say nothing of the other valuable agricultural exports of Netherlands India or of its abundant resources in petroleum. Siam, too, as I have already said, furnishes a by no means negligible part of the world's requirements in the matter of tin. It is for no other reason than the occupation by Japan of the territories of South-Eastern Asia that we ourselves are suffering from such a shortage to-day of the three commodities—rubber, tin and quinine—to which I have just made particular allusion, a shortage which is being brought home to each of us by the prevailing scarcity of all goods made of rubber (motor-car tyres, for example), by the difficulty of procuring metal containers for the thousand and one little objects which we used to purchase in receptacles fabricated with the help of tin, and by the impossibility of getting our chemist to supply us with quinine or even with medicines of which that drug forms an ingredient. These commonplace facts of everyday experience at the present moment will serve to show how great is the economic significance of South-Eastern Asia for the rest of the world, a significance which is far more than commensurate with its total area or with the magnitude of its populations, vast though these may be, and which has not been very generally realized by ordinary people hitherto.

I will devote the last portion of my remarks to an enumeration of

some of the problems which will have to be faced by the United Nations in South-Eastern Asia after the expulsion of the Japanese. That expulsion, final and complete, is, of course, the immediate and all-absorbing problem which confronts us at the present moment. But, assuming that in the fulness of time the Japanese have at last been driven out of the south-eastern corner of Asia, as they assuredly will be, the United Nations will then be called upon to solve a number of questions which will, I think, arise principally under the following heads: Political and administrative; economic; general security; and the maintenance of peace and good neighbourly relations as between the various countries concerned. As I told you at the outset of my lecture, I shall content myself with stating these problems and shall not attempt the invidious task of suggesting solutions for them.

About the problems of a political and administrative nature I have little to say. I imagine that they will not be the least difficult to solve, involving as they do the implementing of the policy, which appears to have been accepted in principle by world opinion and by the Governments of the United Nations themselves, of leading along the path to self-government what, for lack of a better term, I will call the various "colonial peoples" at as rapid a pace as may be in conformity with their ability to exercise it. It may, I think, be taken for granted that, after the close of the war in the Far East, Britain will continue to discharge her beneficent rôle of tutelage to that end in Malaya, and also in Burma, and that the Dutch will similarly return to Netherlands India for the purpose of carrying out those promises which I have already quoted as having been made by Her Majesty the Queen of Holland. Of French Indo-China it is too early as yet to speak.

The economic problems should be less difficult of solution than the political ones, though the process of resolving them may take some time. Burma, Siam and French Indo-China, being essentially agricultural countries with an exportable surplus of foodstuffs, will not suffer from lack of the actual means of subsistence, but, if the prosperity of their respective peoples is to be re-established, it will be essential to secure for those three countries once again, and as quickly as possible, free access to the normal markets for their rice in India, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, Hong Kong and China. Those areas in their turn will be in urgent need of the supplies of rice despatched to them in normal times from Rangoon, Bangkok and Saigon, whilst one and all of the countries which we are discussing will require no less urgently supplies of those manufactured articles (some of them virtual necessities of life) which, not being themselves industrialized to any appreciable extent, they are obliged to import from abroad and of which they are now being deprived owing to the war. Textiles, in especial, come under this heading. For the purpose both of exporting foodstuffs and of importing manufactured goods, the greatest difficulty after the conclusion of hostilities will not improbably be encountered in the matter of shipping, the general post-war demands upon which are bound to be enormous. At present the only country to which the South-Eastern Asiatic territories can look for the provision of manufactured articles in any quantity is Japan,



which latter, however, is sending them practically nothing, partly because her industries are now being directed almost exclusively into war channels and partly because her available shipping is (happily for ourselves) in process of being sensibly diminished through destruction at the hands of the Navies and Air Forces of the United Nations. Meanwhile, the shortage of manufactured goods in the countries occupied or controlled by Japan must be very acute indeed. Yet another economic problem which will call for solution is that of finding the mechanical equipment which will be needed for restoring the export trade of South-Eastern Asia in such commodities as tin, rubber, oil, tea, coffee, sugar, quinine, etc. In this respect much will depend on what the Japanese may have already destroyed, or may proceed to destroy as the hour of their expulsion draws nigh. If, as is not improbable, they viciously and wantonly make havoc of all they can before retiring or surrendering, then very great replacements will be necessary in the shape of equipment for mines and oil wells and of the requisite mills and factories in connection with the various agricultural plantations. There will be such a huge world-wide demand for machinery of all kinds after the war has ceased that there cannot fail to be long delay in satisfying the needs of South-Eastern Asia unless some degree of priority is assured to her by the manufacturing countries most capable of ministering to her requirements. Such a concession would seem justifiable and expedient in view of the fact that after the war there will be an insistent and universal demand for the resumption of supplies of rubber, tin and quinine from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, irrespective of the consideration that the post-war rehabilitation of those two areas will hang almost entirely upon the restoration of their external trade.

The problem of ensuring general security and protection against the danger of a fresh war of aggression in the Pacific zone, including South-Eastern Asia, is a question which is engaging attention already in certain quarters. It is universally realized that there is little use in planning for a better future anywhere in the world unless there is going to be some provision against such a thing as a recurrence of the two disastrous conflicts of the past thirty years. By most people it is hoped that the United Nations, after emerging triumphantly from the present struggle with the Axis Powers and Japan, will succeed in setting up some form of world organization which will be able to keep the peace between all of the various national groups comprising the human family and to repress, and punish if necessary, all attempts at aggression on the part of any one of them. In order to make assurance doubly sure, the suggestion has also been put forward that the countries composing the British Empire should at the same time institute regional defence schemes of their own, one of which would be applicable to the South-West Pacific. The active participation of India, in association with Great Britain, in any such scheme as this has recently been advocated by Mr. K. M. Pannikar in an interesting book entitled *The Future of South-East Asia*,\* and the same question has also been discussed recently, although from a somewhat different angle, by Sir George Schuster. One thing appears certain:

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even when the countries of South-Eastern Asia have attained to a full and complete measure of autonomy, they will none of them be capable of standing upon their own feet from the military point of view. If they are to be free from the threat of subjugation or control by some country stronger than themselves, it will be necessary for them to rely upon some form of concerted organization, either world-wide or regional, to which they will themselves belong or under the protecting shadow of which they will abide, for the preservation of their individual national rights and independence.

Finally, there is the problem of maintaining peace, order and friendly relations as between the countries comprised within the limits of South-Eastern Asia. The need for devising some means to that end will become increasingly apparent as the territories in question approach more nearly to the goal of self-government on their own account. Disputes among them upon one issue or another are only too likely—are, indeed, bound—to arise and some provision for their settlement will be desirable, once the control of the present tutelary Powers has been relaxed, if the risk is to be avoided of these States becoming one day the Balkans of the continent of Asia. Here at least I will venture upon a suggestion. It is that the solution of the problem which I am now anticipating will perhaps be found in some such body as that Regional Council, to be formed by the nations concerned under the ægis of a larger world organization, the creation of which Lord Hailey has recently envisaged as an instrument for helping to maintain general security in the Pacific zone. It may be that one of the most useful functions of such a body, if it is called into being, would be to act as the arbitrator in disputes between such countries, including those of South-Eastern Asia, as would come within the scope of its jurisdiction.

Sir HERBERT PHILLIPS said they had listened to a very erudite account of the various countries comprising that large area of South-East Asia. The only slight claim he might have to know anything about the subject was perhaps the fact that during his long stay of forty-two years in China in the Consular Service he had the pleasure, when he was Inspector-General of Consulates in the Far East, to visit French Indo-China, where he met the French authorities and saw something of their administration; and also saw to a certain extent the life of the big Chinese community there. It showed him how difficult it was for the French to administer that particular country, and on the whole he went back with the feeling that they were doing pretty well.

He also visited the north of Indo-China, and drew attention to the great work the French had done in constructing the Yun-nan Railway from Hanoi to Yun-nan-fu. When peace came in that part of the world he strongly recommended his hearers to try to make that trip. It provided some of the most marvellous scenery to be found anywhere.

He congratulated the lecturer most heartily on his most interesting and, he felt, very learned talk. Speaking in an extempore manner, he (Sir Herbert) did not feel competent to deal in any special way with the

political problems raised by the lecturer, because he felt they all agreed with the recommendations Sir Josiah had made.

When Mr. EDWARD JACOMB had seconded the vote of thanks, Sir ROBERT CLIVE said he desired to ask Sir Josiah Crosby a question about Siam, where Sir Josiah had spent many years. After the revolution and when the present régime came into force, the Japanese unquestionably made a great drive to make the Siamese more friendly to themselves. He would like to know whether, when Mr. Matsuoka forced the Vichy Government to hand back to Siam a portion of Indo-China, the Siamese were in any way grateful to the Japanese for that; whether their feelings towards Japan were any more friendly now than they were before; and whether they had a more friendly feeling towards the Japanese as an Asiatic race than they had towards the British or the French, who had been their close neighbours during the greater part of the last century. He would like also to know whether Mr. Matsuoka's co-prosperity movement with South-East Asia had had any effect upon the Siamese; whether they looked upon it as a reasonable suggestion or merely as Japanese propaganda?

Sir JOSIAH CROSBY replied that the boundary dispute between Siam and Indo-China arose originally out of the circumstance that since 1893 there had been an irredentist feeling among the Siamese against the French for the manner in which they had made various demands during the course of forty or fifty years and forced the Siamese Government to yield up portions of territory to French Indo-China. In 1893 the British and the French very nearly came to war on that issue. After the collapse of France in 1940 the irredentism flamed up and the Siamese said, "This is a good time to get our own back," and proceeded to make certain demands which the Vichy Government refused to entertain. Irregular hostilities broke out between Siam and Indo-China. All that afforded Japan its opportunity to intervene and assert her authority, on the ground that she was charged with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and order in South-East Asia. So the Japanese Government, with Mr. Matsuoka, literally insisted on mediating in this dispute, and made an award which gave to Siam a great deal more than Vichy wished to give up and at the same time a great deal less than Siam wished to obtain. The result was that no one was satisfied except the Japanese, who found a means of asserting their claim to domination. The Siamese were dissatisfied, especially the military. The Prime Minister himself, Sir Josiah knew, was intensely dissatisfied, hoping to have got a great deal more.

As regards the feeling of the Siamese for the Japanese, he did not think it was particularly friendly. It never had been in the past. In the old days it was one of indifference. As the Japanese grew stronger, indifference became mixed with a great fear. The Siamese never found any real affinity between themselves and the Japanese. He thought if the Siamese could have chosen, and felt sure they would be safe and not be punished, they would rather have seen the old balance of power maintained. Or if one Power had to predominate, he thought they would have preferred us to the Japanese, on the ground that they knew us better and respected us more.

As for the Japanese idea of a co-prosperity sphere, the Siamese looked upon it as propaganda.

Sir JOHN T. PRATT said that one point which interested him very much was the lecturer's description of how, from the point of view of culture, literature and language, the affiliations of these countries were mostly with India. He had always been led to believe that at any rate politically they looked towards China. These things had not been studied as they ought to have been in this country. All these countries—Burma, Siam, and the States comprised in Indo-China before it was taken by the French—were tributary to China; and that tributary relationship, he had always felt, was more real than the lecturer was inclined to think. He said that China never used force against those countries. That was perfectly true, because China had another way of doing those things and getting those countries within her political orbit, but they certainly were within that orbit.

He was in North China in 1908 and saw the last tributary mission from Nepal arrive in Peking. The Nepalese were no mean fighters, and we have no more gallant allies than they in the present war, yet for more than a hundred years they had sent tributary missions to Peking. He was in Tien-tsin when the Nepalese representatives went there. The head of the mission explained how the Emperor had very graciously given them permission to go down to Tien-tsin, and they greatly appreciated the courtesy shown to them. The Chinese spent large sums of money in entertaining this mission and receiving them with great honour and impressing them with a sense of China's greatness. There was something very real in that tributary relationship between those States and China. It contributed to the security of the Chinese frontiers, and in return China protected the States within her political orbit. She did not use force against them, at any rate in the old days, but she always reacted very strongly if there was any threat to them. Thus, in 1791, when the Nepalese invaded Tibet, China sent armies down which defeated the Nepalese. The tributary States dropped off one by one in the course of the nineteenth century. During that century China fell into decay, and was struggling with the difficulties caused by the impact of the West. The great question was whether China's entry into the peace settlement after the war would result in the re-establishment of that tributary relationship.

Mr. A. H. BYRT said India obtained her cultural ascendancy in South-East Asia in olden times in the same way as England came to have a great empire—namely, by virtue of her geographical position and sea communications. In ancient days—perhaps 10,000 years and more ago—India was the radial cultural centre of the most fruitful and prosperous regions of the eastern hemisphere. Her cultural empire extended not only over South-East Asia and westward as far as North Africa and Europe, but along the isles which embroider the Southern Pacific and into America. In course of time, natural and political conditions changed. The once prosperous regions became desert lands. India's predominance faded out. Yet the lecturer, having pointed out how India flourished in those former times, agreed that she must in the future have in certain ways a new great position in the South-East Asia region.

Mr. K. M. Pannikar, in his recent book on that subject, showed that India must be the main base of supply for men and *materiel* for any great system of regional defence that was established in South-East Asia. He made another point which it was difficult to gainsay: that if India was to make her maximum contribution in that respect she must be an India in free co-operation with Great Britain. India was not at the present time free in the sense he indicated, though in putting up the largest volunteer army that the world has ever seen she was showing a great deal of free choice. As circumstances and conditions developed she would need considerable further constitutional evolution if she was to throw her full weight into international affairs.

India was not only of importance in South-East Asia. She occupied a position of immense strategic significance in the whole Indian Ocean area. At the moment there was concern about the decision of America to establish a vast store of oil in Sa'udi Arabia, the coasts of which lay within that region. If that step were taken, measures to protect the oil would almost automatically have to follow. It would then be difficult to deny a claim by Russia to have a warm-water outlet in the Persian Gulf and arrangements to protect it. All such changes must have an important bearing upon British dispositions and upon our relations with India in connection with them.

The co-operation of India in international activities in her neighbourhood would inevitably be affected by the colour problem. This to India was a very live question in South and East Africa. In South Africa it had for many years been acute, and the Union Government and white population constantly worsened the situation by their policy and actions rather than helped to solve it. The matter had now reached a stage when it was disturbing the loyalty of steadily widening sections of people in India and constituted a very serious danger to the prospects of Indian co-operation with the rest of the British Commonwealth.

The CHAIRMAN said we must not think of any rehabilitation or reconstruction or policy of any kind in the Far East unless we were sure that any policy there was of security was based on command of the sea. He wished to thank Sir Josiah Crosby. The audience had been most delightfully entertained and charmingly instructed.


## “ QANATS ”

By COLONEL E. NOEL, C.I.E.

**P**ERSIA depends on *qanats* for the greater proportion of its irrigation water. - At a rough estimate there must be 100,000 miles of *qanats* in Persia with an aggregate discharge of 20,000 *cusecs*; twenty million men-days of labour are expended annually on the maintenance of existing *qanats* and the construction of new ones.

The system of making *qanats* has not changed in several thousands of years and modern engineering science has not contributed towards any improvement in the methods of construction. As far as is known, no study of the *qanat* system in Persia has ever been made, or if made the results are not available. In view of the importance of *qanats* in Persia's economy, the desirability of examining the system and the possibility of improvement are indicated. This article records the result of enquiries which the author has made, with suggestions as to the possibilities of improving indigenous methods.

The system of obtaining water by *qanat* (in some places known as *kahrezes*) can best be diagrammatically explained.



The line AB shows the natural surface of the land and CD the level of the subsoil water. EFG shows the *qanat* or tunnel (4 ft. 2 inches high and 28 inches wide).  $W_1, W_2, W_3$  are wells, 30 inches diameter and 20 to 150 yards apart, which are required firstly for removing the spoil when (a) the *qanat* is being constructed and (b) periodic cleaning is being effected, and secondly for ventilation. They are made up to E, the beginning of the *haranj*.

The following is a vocabulary of some of the common terms used in *qanat* construction :

$W_1$ . *Madar chah* (mother well).

FG. The section of *qanat* in water-bearing strata is known as *ab deh* (water-giving).

EF. The work in the dry strata is called *khushki-kar* (dry work).

El. When the bed of the *qanat* comes within  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  metres from the natural surface the tunnel ceases and gives way to an open channel known as *haranj* until it starts to command the land.

*Pushteh*. Section of a *qanat* between two wells.

*Moghani*. *Qanat* builders.

*Qanats* in Persia vary in length from a few yards to 40 miles or more. Near Birjand there is a *qanat* with its *madar chah* over 900 feet deep. The discharge may run up to 5 *cusecs*, but the average is about  $1\frac{1}{2}$ .

It is obvious that the maximum discharge depends to a great extent on the slope. The standard dimensions of a *qanat* are 2 feet 6 inches wide and 4 feet 2 inches high, giving a cross-section of 10 square feet. In the case of lined *qanat* using the Persian form of lining, which will be described later, the cross-section is reduced to 8 square feet. *Moghanis* consider that normally these dimensions cannot be increased, as there would be danger of the sides falling in.

In the case of an unlined *qanat* flowing three-fourths full at a slope of 1 in 2,500 the discharge will be 6 *cusecs*. Increase the slope to 1 in 1,000 and the discharge will rise to 10 *cusecs*. With lined *qanat* these discharges would be about 25 per cent. less.

In the spring discharges go up sometimes very considerably, and this can only be explained by assuming that the water in the *qanat* near the *madar chah* is under a head. Some *moghanis* have stated that the water does rise in the upper wells—above the level of the top of the *qanat*.

The above facts illustrate the importance of suitable siting of the *qanat*, which will be facilitated by accurate surveying and levelling and a quick method of ascertaining the depth of the subsoil water. These points will be referred to in more detail.

The method of constructing a *qanat* is as follows:

Two of the most important conditions are that there should exist a water-bearing stratum not too deep down and that the slope of the natural surface should be such that the *qanat* can come to the surface reasonably quickly. These conditions are generally found in proximity to hills. The majority of *qanats* are therefore sited with their mother-well at the foot of the mountain ranges, and the mouth of the tunnel commands the plains, which in Persia are found lying between ranges of hills. The depth of the mother-well of a typical Persian *qanat* may be put at 250 feet and the length 10,000 yards. Such a *qanat* might give a discharge of 2 *cusecs*, and cost before the war T.25,000. The prospecting *qanat* builder puts down some trial wells (*gumana*) to ascertain where the water-bearing strata lie and take levels to the land to be irrigated to ascertain the point F—i.e., where the *qanat* leaves the water-bearing strata (*ab deh*). The slope given to *qanat* bed is about 1 in 1,500.

It is in connection with these *gumanahs* that modern engineering science can make its first contribution.

The *moghanis* have no reliable method for ascertaining whether the water in the *gumana* is temporary *ab-i-araq-i-zamin* or permanent *ab-i-kehri*. If it is temporary, then the unfortunate owner of the *qanat* will in a short space of time experience the drying up of the *qanat* and the loss of his capital. It is suggested that by installing a pump and keeping it working continuously, so that the depression head with a given discharge could be observed, a good indication would be obtained of the character of the subsoil water.

Levels are taken by suspending a spirit-level between two pieces of cord each about 10 yards long. The *moghanis* are illiterate persons and

tally up the differences in levels by a piece of string and a pin. As they may have to take 1,000 readings, it is obvious that there is much opportunity for mistakes. Such mistakes frequently occur and result in great loss. Some careful *moghani*s start construction at F and work backward to E, using the water as a natural leveller (*taraz*). Such an expedient involves a slow rate of construction and capital lying idle. Here there is another opening for improvement—namely, the use of trained levellers using proper instruments and levelling staffs. Having decided on the point F, the *moghani*s start work on the wells from E to F. The spacing depends on the depth. Below 15 feet a spacing of 25 yards is common practice. For greater depth the spacing increases, but never goes above 150 metres. A factor in the siting of wells is that of ventilation. Some soils, it is said, give off a vapour “ dam ” which militates against ventilation. Work is started on as many wells as possible in the portion from E to F (*khushkikar*). Each gang consists of one or two men on the windlass and two men working below in the tunnel. Of the two below ground, one excavates and the other carries the spoil to the well and attaches it to the rope from the windlass. The load lifted in the *charm-i-gao* weighs about 60 lbs. With a well 240 feet deep the two men on the *charkh* must bring up a load of spoil once in six minutes.

By substituting a donkey with a direct pull instead of wooden windlass, the time taken to lift will be only one minute. The author actually tried this method of lifting the spoil at Kerman, and the local *moghani*s admitted its advantage.

Another advantage of wire rope would be the saving in weight. With hemp rope in very deep wells the spoil has to be raised in two stages. The second windlass is ensconced in a niche halfway down the well. As a wire rope of high-quality steel is one-third the weight of a hemp rope with the same breaking weight, there will therefore be no necessity for a double stage. The saving in weight also means less labour in lifting.

The rate of progress depends, of course, on the nature of the soil and the depth, but the following typical figures may be quoted for average soils :

Depth. (Feet.)	Men Employed.	Progress in 8 Hours. (Feet.)	Pre-war Cost per Cubic Yard. (Labour at Rls. 3 a Day; Moghani at Rls. 5.)
30	3	12	4¾d. per cubic yard.
60	4	12	5d. do.
120	4	6	12d. do.
240	4	4	18d. do.

The above rates are low, and only experience can show if any mechanical means can be profitably employed. One improvement that suggests itself is the use of boring machinery for rapidly sinking shafts of about 4 inches diameter in connection with the preliminary survey, ventilation, checking position of wells in the *ab deh* relative to the *qanat*. (These points will be discussed in more detail.)

If soil is encountered which requires a lining, *kavulls* (elliptical rings of burnt brick) are used. The method will be subsequently described.



Having completed the dry section EF, the more difficult work in the water-bearing strata has to be undertaken. The difficulty is that the tunnel enters into water-bearing strata some time (it may be 100 feet) below the subsoil water-level. This raises the problem of de-watering the wells, which is overcome by digging the tunnel upwards from the tunnel to meet the tunnel from the ground-level at the point where work has to be abandoned owing to water. It is by no means easy to ensure that the two wells coincide. Here there is considerable scope for the application of engineering devices. Two possible solutions suggest themselves. Firstly, boring of well from the top into the tunnel, using the type of rotary borer employed in prospecting for oil. Secondly, de-watering the well by means of a vertical spindle pump. Another difficulty which arises is in regard to ventilation. This will be described separately under the paragraph devoted to that subject.

Obviously the method of boring would help in solving the ventilation problem.

Under the Persian system drainage from the water-bearing strata proceeds through the already constructed *qanat* in the *khushkikar*, and this naturally makes progress slow. By the use of electrically operated pumps, which would of course have to be placed near the bottom of the well, it might be possible to work simultaneously on several faces, and the progress would be correspondingly expedited. This necessitates a power unit and would probably not be justified unless used in connection with a compressor.

#### COMPRESSORS AND OTHER APPLIANCES SUCH AS DREDGE PUMPS AND HYDRAULIC MONITORS

With a compressor, pneumatic picks and other tools could be usefully employed, but the economy of the method could only be tested by actual practice. In Persia a *moghani* cannot deal with more than 4 cubic yards of excavation in the most favourable circumstances. It is stated that in Russia a Stakhanovist can hew 150 cubic yards of coal in an 8-hour shift. On this basis it would seem as if excavation can be economically dealt with by mechanical means. There is, of course, the problem of getting rid of the spoil. A method which suggests itself is the use of the type of pump which is specially designed to deal with mixtures of sand, gravel, clay and water. Such pumps are used for dredging and for obtaining supplies of sand and gravel from river bottoms or other places under water. Similar pumps are also used for carrying concrete mixture when the proportion of water need not be more than 10 per cent.

It is stated that pumps of this nature can remove sand, gravel and clay at a cost of 1d. per cubic yard. The water in the *qanat* would be sufficient for this duty. For example, with one-fourth of a *cusec*, and assuming that the water is 50 per cent. of the mixture, the amount of spoil that could be removed per hour would be 33 cubic yards, equivalent to 90 ft. of *qanat*.

An alternative to excavation with a pneumatic pick would be the method known in mining as hydraulicizing, whereby a jet of water under high pressure is thrown against a bank of earth or gravel, thereby under-

mining the material which is carried by the water to the pump. It is stated that with a flow of 4 *cusecs*, 320 cubic yards of material can be removed in 24 hours by a 2-inch nozzle hydraulic monitor weighing 120 lbs. and costing £28. The cost is put at about 1½d. a cubic yard. The aggregate cost of dealing with a cubic yard of material thus amounts to 2½d., which is much less than the cost by hand labour, which, as already shown, varies from 4¾d. to 18d. per cubic yard; 320 cubic yards of excavation is equivalent to 864 rft. of tunnel. As 10,000 feet of work in the *ab deh* might be taken as typical, the work on this section, the most important part of the *qanat*, would be completed in a fortnight. There would also be a considerable economy in the construction of the walls, as they could be spaced at greater intervals. This would necessitate artificial ventilation, which would, however, be comparatively simple when operated from the power unit required for the dredge pump and hydraulic monitor. If the work in the *ab deh* was tackled first, the same method of excavation would be possible in the *khushkikar*, as the water from the *ab deh* could be used for the hydraulic monitor and the dredge pump.

The question of water supply should not be difficult, as the 4 *cusecs* required for the hydraulic monitor would be used repeatedly, and the water from the dredge pump could be returned to the *qanat* if necessary.

Apart from the economy in the cost of excavation there is the important advantage of celerity. By Persian methods it takes three years to construct a *qanat*, during which time a lot of the capital is lying idle. By mechanization and good organization the period could be reduced to months instead of years.

With a power unit, electric light for the men working in the *qanat* would be possible, and this would considerably facilitate the work.

#### DISCHARGE OF WATER FROM A “QANAT”

The more water is pumped from a well, the more the level of the water drops. This drop is known as the depression head. The higher the depression head, the greater the velocity of the water entering the well. If this velocity reaches a certain limit it carries with it sand, and the well is said to “blow.” Under average conditions in Northern India the depression head should not exceed 5 feet. The well will then give 15 gallons per hour per square foot of surface in the bottom of the well. In Persia the *qanat* is carried down into the water-bearing strata as rapidly as possible. To hasten this the slope of the *qanat* on entering the *ab deh* is made flatter—i.e., say 1 in 3,000 instead of 1 in 1,500. There are cases where the *qanat* goes 100 feet down into the water-bearing strata. It might be expected that under such conditions blowing would take place. However, the opinion is that if it does, it is not serious. That it does occur would seem to be proved by the fact that some *qanats* require much more cleaning than others.\* At a group of *qanats* about 25 miles southwest from Teheran the silt and sand that has to be removed every year forms a deposit about 1 foot deep. In other *qanats* which tap water-

\* The case of a *qanat* of the village of Israrabad in the Bulook of Farumad and Ferozabad can be quoted. It is said that the *qanat* has not required cleaning for centuries.

bearing strata with less fine sand the cleaning of the *qanats* is an easier proposition. Whether it would pay to keep the depression head low so that blowing did not take place would depend on the circumstances; in any case, preliminary investigation is necessary to ascertain what proportion of silt a *qanat* carries when the discharge increases after heavy rains.

The *moghanis* maintain that the deposit in the bed of the *qanat* comes from the sides. If this was so, the cross-section of a *qanat* would rapidly expand when the annual deposit represented 20 per cent. of the *qanat's* capacity. Cases of increasing cross-section are not very common.

It is believed that a good deal of the silt is deposited in winter, when cold air entering the *qanat* forms icicles on the *qanat* sides. When these icicles melt they bring down the sides of the *qanats*. For this reason it is recommended that four in every five wells should be closed at the top. The unconvincing explanation given for keeping one well in five open is that the steam from the water must have a way of escape.

If the Indian figure of 15 gallons per square foot per hour, with a 5-foot depression head, could be reached, a very short length of *qanat* in the *ab deh* would be necessary to give all the water which the *qanat* could discharge. There are many places in Persia where the length of the *qanat* in the *ab deh* is 20,000 feet. In such *qanats* the regeneration figure cannot reach one-third of a gallon per square foot per hour. A good deal of investigation could profitably be made on this point. Another fact worth mentioning is that when a *qanat* first flows, the water table is apt to drop and it is necessary to prolong the *qanat* to keep up the discharge. It would be interesting to know if an equilibrium is reached and, if so, in what period of time.

Another reason for a diminishing discharge is the deposit of calcium carbonate from the water. This closes the pores through which water infiltrates into the *qanat*, and in certain circumstances may progressively reduce the cross-section of the tunnel to almost nothing.

#### POSSIBILITY OF USING A WATER DIVINER

In the majority of cases a water table can be found, but near mountains the underground water is apt to be canalized—in other words, it forms underground rivers which flow into lakes, *i.e.* strata which are water-bearing. When the mother-well taps such strata, a water diviner would not appear to be much use. On the other hand, a water diviner might be of value in hilly country where there were definite underground rivers. Recently the son of a well-known resident of Teheran who possessed the gift of water divining located a source of underground water near one of his father's *qanats* which had run almost dry because a new *qanat* had recently been made at a lower level. The *moghanis* were loud in their declamations against the folly of wasting money by sinking a well in the place the water diviner selected, but they changed their tune when at 33 metres an underground spring flooded the well.

#### LINING

The method of lining, using elliptical rings of burnt brick, is efficient and economical. It is difficult to see how it can be improved upon. It

meant, before the war, that a water conduit equivalent to a pipe of 2 feet 4 inches diameter could be excavated at a cost of  $\frac{1}{6}$ d. a running foot and lined for 6d. per running foot, and, moreover, one which if properly constructed would last a century. The method might with advantage be used in other countries.

The dimensions of the *ḳavull* are: long diameter (outside) 43 inches, short diameter 23 inches (outside), thickness  $1\frac{5}{8}$  inches, breadth 6 inches. The weight is between 52 and 56 lbs. The question of weight is important, as in the confined space of a *qanat* the *moghani* cannot handle a heavy article. The *ḳavulls* are burnt at site. The price before the war was 70 to 100 tomans—i.e., about  $1\frac{1}{2}$ d. each. To-day's price is T.1,000 a hundred. Of every 1,000 *ḳavulls* burnt, 800 come out sound, 100 are broken and 100 cracked. The 200 cracked and broken are used as packing between the *ḳavulls* and the sides of the *qanat*. When the soil is very friable (*shoorat*), weeds and leaves are stuffed in to prevent cavities forming. When the vegetation so placed rots, the surface of the natural soil has become consolidated. Great care is required in placing the *ḳavulls* so that they stand exactly vertical in both planes. A man with two assistants can place up to 30 *ḳavulls* in a day, but it is a wise economy to ensure good work by adopting a much slower speed. If well made and properly laid, *ḳavulls* will last a century. The secret of making *ḳavulls* is to see that the earth used is of the right sort, the correct temperature is used in the kiln, and the clay is properly puddled. This last direction is perhaps the most important. There is a temptation to economize on the *ḳavulls*, but this is a false economy which should be avoided. For example, the labour employed on making 100 *ḳavulls* can be put at four men-days, but if this is doubled so that extra puddling can be done the money is well spent. To the clay used for moulding 1,000 *ḳavulls* there should be added 360 kilos. of broken straw and 150 kilos. of horse dung. If the *ḳavulls* are fully burnt a certain number become crooked, and to avoid this loss the full temperature is not given.


#### VENTILATION

It is said that a lamp goes out before a man suffocates. The lamp used is an open flame from castor oil. Kerosene is considered unsatisfactory. It is obvious that if ventilation could be assured the wells could be placed at greater intervals. Ventilation is arranged for by the use of pipes of about 5 inches diameter with a bell-shaped horn at one end. In deep wells a rope made of sheets knotted together is lowered and shaken. Vinegar is also sprinkled at the spot where ventilation is bad. It is said that ventilation in the water-bearing section is easier to arrange than in the dry, and the spacing between the wells is therefore generally higher in the *ab deh*. In deep wells which have not reached the tunnel, ventilation is arranged for by sinking another well a few yards away to a depth of about 10 feet. The bottom of the well is connected to the main well by an adit. From the bottom of this small well a pipe of tinsplate of 5 inches diameter is carried to the bottom of the main well.

It might be possible to improve ventilation by the following means:

1. The use of pneumatic tools.
2. Employing a fan worked by hand in connection with flexible piping.
3. Drilling holes as already proposed.

When at Kerman the author made successful experiments of ventilating by using a hand forge with some flexible piping. The local *moghani*s were favourably impressed.



"MOGHANIS"

The life of the *moghani* is a hard one. When the *qanat* penetrates far into the *ab deh*, water trickles on him from the ceiling of the tunnel, and if this happens in winter he wears a sheepskin coat with the fleece inside and the leather anointed with an oil to make it more waterproof. Many a *moghani* is killed by the collapse of the roof, by suffocation and by falling stones. When investigating a *qanat* at Kerman I had to descend a well 300 feet deep, and when suspended in the mouth of the well preparatory to being lowered down, a prayer was said over me, accompanied by the remark that many a living body had been lowered

down a *qanat* to be hauled up as a corpse. My hat was taken from me and on my head was placed a felt cap, with the comment that it might do something to break the blow caused by the impact of a stone loosed by the swaying of the ropes to fall 300 feet.

I remember on another occasion, when crawling along a *qanat*, arriving at a point where the water reached the roof. The *moghani* told me to duck my head under water and take 15 paces forward, when I could again raise my head to find air.

Snakes are sometimes found in the water, but generally near the *haranj*. They are not poisonous.

Another danger is when a *qanat* becomes blocked by falling earth, which forms a dam and heads up the water so that the *qanat* above the dam is filled to the top. The *moghani* has to break down the dam and, if he is not sufficiently adroit, the dam is carried away and he is drowned before the water drops. The murderer (*khooni*) is a common name for *qanats*.

Before the war the *moghani* was paid Rls. 5 a day ( $9\frac{1}{4}$ d.), and he was assisted by three labourers at Rls. 3 ( $5\frac{1}{2}$ d.).

The occupation of *moghani* is a hereditary one, handed down through centuries. Round Yezd, Kerman and Kashan it is calculated that one-seventh of the able-bodied men spend their lives in *qanats*. They speak a dialect of their own.

#### LAWS IN CONNECTION WITH “ QANATS ”

It is forbidden to construct a new *qanat* within a certain distance of an existing one; this varies from 250 to 500 metres, and is generally determined by arbitrators. It is also forbidden to construct a *qanat* at a lower level than an existing one, but if this is essential the distance to be maintained between new and old *qanat* may be correspondingly increased. Recently a law has been passed in the *majlis* whereby Government can call on owners to put their *qanats* in order, and if they refuse to do so, the Government can get the work done itself and recover the cost from the owner by instalments.

There is also a law of compulsory acquisition so that the constructor of a new *qanat* can acquire a strip of land 12 metres wide in which to build his *qanat*.

#### ECONOMIES OF “ QANATS ”

The cost of a *qanat* can vary between wide limits. The following figures for a pre-war *qanat* per *cusec* year may be cited :

Capital cost ... ..	T.10,000	£790
Recurring cost :		
Interest at 6 per cent. ... ..	T.600	£47
Cleaning and maintenance ... ..	T.120	£9
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	T.720	£56

This is a cheap rate for water. In India the average gross revenue for a *cusec* year of canal water is double this figure.

Enquiries regarding the annual rent of water disclose interesting facts. The cost of water depends very much on the cost of producing it. For example, at Kashan, where *qanats* are expensive, a *cusec* year can be rented for T.7,000 (£550), whereas in the Shahriar district near Teheran, where *qanats* can be made cheaply, the cost per *cusec* year is T.1,000 (£79). It may be asked how the Kashan farmer can afford to pay seven times more for his water than the farmer of Shahriar when both grow the same crops. The answer is that the Kashan cultivator is forced to farm far more intensively.

The *qanat* would seem to be a very profitable form of investment, bearing interest which may run up to 100 per cent., and which on the average may be put at 25 per cent.

A great economic advantage of the *qanat* is that it produces water in small and therefore manageable quantities, which do not need the costly administrative machinery of a canal, nor the expense of the canal distribution scheme.

It is generally considered in Persia that the owner of the water should receive one-fifth of the crop. As owner of the land he gets another one-fifth. As the value of land depends on water, it may be said that the constructors of a *qanat* generally enjoy 40 per cent. of the produce of the crop. One *cusec* will irrigate 150 acres in a year, and the gross value of the harvest at pre-war prices should be T.9,000 (£700); 40 per cent. of this figure is £280, from which must be deducted £10 for annual repairs, leaving £270, which represents 34 per cent. return on capital.

#### SUMMARY

From the above description of *qanats* it may be gathered that there is room in Persia for an organization which will undertake construction of new *qanats*, the repair of existing ones, and bring into commission *qanats* which have deteriorated or dried up. Incidentally, such an organization will collect and sift information regarding *qanats* and try out improved methods of repair and maintenance. The benefit to Persia's economy will be :

1. The cheapening of *qanat* construction.
2. Expedition of the work with the saving of interest charges and the securing of earlier returns.
3. Siting of well and selection of water-bearing strata in which the water is of a permanent nature.
4. Ensuring the quality of the *kavulls* and their correct laying.
5. Use of new devices for ventilation, lighting, excavating and extracting spoil.
6. Laying out *qanats* to reduce silting.

In view of the profitable field that *qanats* offer for investment, it would seem that the above object can best be achieved through the floating of a public company, to which the Persian Government might well make a grant, so that the necessary collection of information and research work could be carried out.

Note from Brig.-General Sir PERCY SYKES, K.C.I.E. :

I have read this valuable article of Colonel Noel, and am reminded of a visit that I paid to a landowner not far from Kerman. Approaching one of his four villages, he lamented that its *qanat* had been spoiled by the chief *Mujtahid*, or Doctor of Sacred Law, who had dug a deeper *qanat* alongside. My host had previously discussed the marriage of his eldest son, and I had advised him strongly against intermarrying into any of the local landowners' families, who were all closely related. Suddenly I said: “Marry your son to the *Mujtahid's* daughter and arrange for her dowry to be the new *qanat*.” My friend slapped his thigh and said: “Sahib, I will certainly arrange this.” When I returned to Kerman some years later I found that my friend's daughter-in-law had presented him with four strapping grandsons.

### SOME FURTHER TERMS COMMONLY USED

*Cusec* is an abbreviation for cubic feet of water per second.

*Taraz*. Levelling.

*Sang chin*. Stone lining of a *qanat*.

*Kavull*. Oval rings of burnt bricks used for lining *qanats*.

*Shurat* or *rikhwai*. The name for soil requiring a lining—soil that will not stand by itself. *Shurat* is of two kinds—namely, *masteh*, sand, and *roost*, clay. The former is more difficult to deal with.

*Harim* or *gil andaz*. Width of 12 metres reserved for the line of the *qanat* wells.

*Kureh*. Tunnel.

*Baghal bur*. A diversion made to avoid rock or bad soil.

*Mileh* or *chah*. The vertical shafts or wells.

*Daweel*. Well started upwards from the tunnel.

*Pishkar*. The upper end of the tunnel.

*Mazhar*. Mouth of the *qanat*.

*Hafr kardan*. To dig a *qanat*.

*Keleelai bandi*. Protection to mouth of wells like a chimney-pot.

*Pasgod*. Bed of *qanat* not level.

*Gharq ab*. Ingress of water in quantities sufficient to interfere with work.

*Sar su*. Top of the water-bearing strata.

*Zir su*. Bottom of the water-bearing strata.

*Asman nigah*. “Looking to the sky”; said of a *qanat* whose water supply depends on rain.

*Bahar ab*, *ab-i-araq-i-zamin*. Subsoil water of a temporary nature.

*Kahri*. Depending on a deep water-bearing stratum and not therefore much affected by rain.

*Roost-i-zard*. Stiff clay.

*Roost-i-safid*. Clay with veins of lime.

*Lat rubi*. Removal of silt.

*Tanqihai*. Cleaning of a *qanat*.

*Jush*. Conglomerate, or any ground which has become cemented by the deposition of chalk from water.



*Charḳh.* Wooden windlass for raising the spoil.

*Charm-i-gao.* Hide of a cow used as a container for the spoil. They do not last more than a couple of months. They should be kept in lime water for twenty-four hours on the weekly holiday (Friday).

*Sang-i-ab.* A measure of water about half a *cusec*. Persians can generally say how much wheat can be sown and irrigated by one *sang*. Round Teheran 10 *ḳharvars* (3,000 kilos) is the general figure. As the seed rate is high—*i.e.*, 125 lbs. per acre—the duty of a *cusec* is about 100 acres. This is low. In Northern India the duty is about 130 acres. The above *sang*, which is also known as *sang-i-tehran*, must be distinguished from the *sang-i-asiab* (the water required to run a mill). This may be put at about 10 *cusecs*, but depends of course on the fall.

## TIBETAN BOOKS FOR ENGLISH STUDENTS

Note on Sir Basil Gould and Mr. H. E. Richardson's series of three books on Tibetan *Words, Sentences and Syllables* for English students of the colloquial of Central Tibet. Oxford University Press. 1943.

THIS series of Tibetan manuals, especially the *Sentences*, which are well chosen and in daily use, form a welcome addition to previous publications. They are described in detail critically and, it is to be hoped, helpfully below.

1. The *Tibetan Word Book*, 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ " by 7", with an informative introduction by Sir Aurel Stein, of famous memory, is a large volume of xvi pages of introduction and 447 of text. The *Tibetan Sentences* and *Tibetan Syllables* are slighter books, 7" by 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ ", of 137 and 120 pages of matter, printed at Gangtok, Sikkim. The text of the first—*Tibetan Word Book*—has been reproduced by photozincography at Calcutta by the Survey of India from Kazi Dorji Tsering's Tibetan handwriting.

2. As the General Preface informs us, some 2,000 syllables occur in Tibetan alphabetical order in the *Word Book*, and the words including them are explained by explaining the meaning of each component syllable. In *Tibetan Syllables* the same 2,000 syllables are re-arranged "according to their phonetic values in English alphabetical order." For cross-reference, in each book every syllable is given a serial number. Only the *Word Book* contains the words compounded out of the key-syllables, plus other syllables, etc.

3. In *Tibetan Sentences*, some 800 syllables are used, and the same series of key numbers is under-printed. This book is the easiest to tackle and is most practical, as it gives only (a) Tibetan sentences in script, (b) a very simple phonetic romanization, and (c) the English translation. These sentences, all useful, range up to twelve or thirteen syllables in length. They consist of brief orders, question and answer, simple statement.

4. This series of three books is to be continued with further books on the *Alphabet, Verbs* and *Grammar Notes* (for use with Sir C. Bell's Grammar), also Gramophone Records, covering matter in the three books now noted on. The completed series will thus constitute a highly systematized and valuable, but to the student rather formidable, apparatus for learning the modern vernacular. And at once the doubt arises whether it will not be far more useful to the teacher than to the beginner, for whom it is intended, but who will still be unlikely, though provided with so much, to progress far in safety without a Tibetan-speaking teacher. But the authors' object, as the Preface to the *Tibetan Word Book* states, is "to help ordinary people to learn to speak Tibetan as it is spoken to-day in Lhasa." They also point out the various difficulties that Tibetan presents to the beginner, unfamiliar with that type of language, and especially those difficulties rising out of its extremely complicated

system of spelling, which often at first, to others than phoneticians or philologists, appears to bear only remote relationship to the actual sound value. The literary language of Tibet, that remarkable creation of Tibetan translators, working together with Indian pundits, versed in Buddhistic Sanscrit, into which new language the immense Mahazana canonical literature of India was translated, has never been a language of everyday life, though it has profoundly influenced the written Tibetan ever since, apart from providing a mine for quotation in common speech.

5. Tibetan is by no means alone in that the spoken language has developed on natural lines, while the religious and literary languages respectively have tended to remain static, or have developed much more slowly than speech. Its alphabet was adapted from the North-West Indian Gupta script and, in the main, its orthography was fixed in or soon after the seventh century A.D. The modern pronunciation of the central province, in which Lhasa is situated (pronounced Ü and spelt *dbus*), is shown to differ greatly from that of the seventh century, not only by the old orthography, still in use, but also by comparison with the more archaic vernacular of the extreme west and elsewhere remote from the centre. For instance, the *Bos Grunniens*, still spelt *gyag*, and probably once so pronounced, is now *ya'*; but it is still *yak*, with the k sharply sounded in the west; king, spelt *rgyal-po*, now pronounced *gye-po*, is still *gyal-po* in the west. The word for Tibetan, *P'ö-pa*, spelt *Bod-pa*, is still *Bot-pa* or *Bhot-pa* towards North India. The names *Bhotis* and *Bhutan* may be instanced in support.

6. So much for preliminaries. The reviewer's own opinion is that it is psychologically a mistake to over-emphasize the difficulty to the beginner of his new language; also that it is as a rule advisable to vary one's methods for different pupils, according to their individual ability, language experience and the purpose for which they are taking up Tibetan. Also he considers the best course is to study both the spoken and literary languages under a Tibetan teacher together, as he was able to do himself. That is, if he wishes to gain any real hold on this language.

In the early stages he found Jäschke's Grammar, Henderson's Manual, Bell's Grammar of the central colloquial, and the Darjeeling primers for Tibetan schools all useful and complementary, also a phrase book for Tibetans wishing to speak a little English and Hindi. And by far the best for the Tibetan colloquial of the Chinese borderland is the masterly little *Essai de Grammaire Thibétaine pour le langage parlé, par A. Desgodins* (Hongkong, 1899), of only 92 pages, and tried out on pupils destined for East Tibet. It is a model of lucid exposition and of conciseness.

8. Of the books under review, it must be reiterated that with all their excellent points, their novel method, their abundant material, and their careful compilation by the two authors, both well versed in the language and aided by several Tibetan experts, named in the General Preface to the *Word Book* (pp. xii-xiii), they are likely to prove less useful to the novice student than to the European teacher of Tibetan, to whom they will be an undoubted boon. This may be a matter of opinion, but, rich

in material and valuable as the whole series when completed will be, smaller books like Desgodins, Jäschke, and Bell seem more suitable for the tyro, who later, perhaps, may with advantage turn to Sir Basil Gould and H. E. Richardson.

9. While the approach to the language obviously should be different from that to Indo-European languages, as the authors rightly insist in the Preface, and by the method of building up from mono-syllables, here happily adopted, there is still something to be said for following to some extent indigenous methods—as the authors admit—but modified and supplemented by a modern and accepted phonetic system of transliteration and the representation of the important tones. Chinese presents many of the same difficulties, and in it the new Roman script (*Gwoyeu Romatzyh*) has already proved its usefulness for western learners. That same Roman script has also been applied to Tibetan in a Chinese edition of the sixth Dalai Lama's Love Songs, with Chinese and English translations and Tibetan text (*Academia Sinica*, A.5, Peiping, 1930). In the teaching of Tibetan's sister language Burmese, tones, etc., have long received attention, and stories in it were recorded in the International Phonetic Script and a H.M.V. gramophone record by L. Armstrong and Pe Maung Tin in 1925 in London.

10. In these three works now under review the tones are left over to the promised gramophone records and the teacher. Tones are unfortunately not indicated in the body of these three books, though their importance, together with that of a correct pronunciation "in stress and cadence," is noted on page xi of the General Preface. If the promised records are on the lines of, say, the Linguaphone Course, which has proved invaluable to many students of Chinese, they will be most welcome, but an adequate close phonetic transcription will also be an essential. We are told that "phonetic renderings and letter-by-letter transcription" will be dealt with at length in the still to come book on the alphabet.

11. The sign ' (e.g., k̄) on 7 letters here "indicates that those letters are sounded more heavily than the same letters without the '. But final k̄ is often almost or entirely silent" (p. xvi). This wording will hardly satisfy the modern phonetician or be sufficiently lucid for the beginner; though those conversant with the language know just what is meant: k̄ of course is the simple g, without a prefixed or superscribed letter, and k is the Tibetan k, while the final k̄ mentioned is the epiglottal stop—an abrupt cutting off of the breath after the vowel, either with or without a slight sound of the final g or k.

12. These books have the great merit of the Tibetan being reproduced photo-mechanically by the Survey of India, Calcutta, and so are an exact replica of Kazi Dorji Tsering's clear uncial handwriting. The first editions of Jäschke's Grammar, also of his Dictionary, were lithographed from Tibetan handwriting at Kyelang in 1865, and had the same decided superiority over type. It may be of interest that Jäschke's stones were twenty-five years ago again put into commission by the reviewer for two small Tibetan grammars and other primers, composed by his teacher and friend, J. Gergan, for use in a newly founded Tibetan-Urdu school at Kyelang. He may then be permitted to congratulate the authors on

obtaining superior reproduction of Tibetan uncial handwriting by a modern process. The examples of cursive handwriting promised will be welcome to supplement the full but old examples in Csoma de Körös' Grammar (Calcutta, 1834). In the cursive script a brief history of the Dogra-Ladakhi Wars' was lithographed some twenty-five years ago in Leh; few Tibetans write letters, etc., in any other script, so its importance is not open to question, and of the script, too, there are several varieties given in Csoma.

13. A few notes only on miscellaneous points. It is questionable whether the authors are well advised in inventing new modifications of accepted transliterations—especially as regards the six Sonants—or new phonetic renderings. And certainly this should only be ventured upon with a full knowledge of what has recently been done in kindred languages on the basis of modern phonetics. A simple version of the International Phonetic Script has tended to become accepted. But the *Gwoyeu Romatzyh* is equally suitable, though not many English beginners in Tibetan in India may as yet be familiar with it. The *Gwoyeu Romatzyh* is also eminently suitable to Burmese on account of its representation of the tones, an important matter inadequately treated here, though not neglected by the Tibetan grammarians, by Amundsen (*Primer of Standard Tibetan*, Darjeeling, 1903), Bell, A. H. Francke (p. 110, *Addenda to Jäschke's Grammar*, Berlin, 1929), and others. Dr. Sten Konow's résumé on tones in pages 24-25, Vol. III., Part I., *Linguistic Survey of India*, merits close attention.

14. The notes on the Alphabet seem less lucid than the equally non-technical description by Desgodins of the sound values of the letters.

Following Bell, the authors rightly stress the importance of a knowledge of the Honorific language.

It is stated in the *Word Book*, pages xii-xiii, that Mr. G. Tharchin "is the editor and producer of the only Tibetan newspaper." But what of the *La-dwags-kyi-Ag-bār*, that was in existence in Western Tibet forty years ago, and to which the reviewer subscribed in the 1930's? And not a little other work in modern Tibetan has been published since last war in Kyelang and Leh. But everyone interested will agree with the authors' desire that Tibetans should write "books which any Tibetan of average education can understand." And we do not forget that in addition to modern works and translations, many made by missionaries, notably Moravians, there are some old works that any literate Tibetan of to-day can read with ease and enjoyment, such as *Milaraspa*, tenth and eleventh century, and the *Love Songs* of the sixth Dalai Lama.

15. At most these three books will give the European in the *Sentence Book* a stock of some 800 useful and up-to-date short sentences, and the material to form others in the *Syllable* and *Word* books. But sound as a basis for conversation, restricted to short sentences of six words or so, these books of 735 pages will not enable anyone to thread sentences together in narrative or to compose a simple letter. And in a method of acquiring a spoken language, and that is what these books are limited to, connected speech in a simple form should be introduced at an early stage. In the Tibeto-Burman languages especially, word-stress undergoes

certain modifications. This stress being here practically a matter of tone, in fact, tones may "change considerably in connected speech."

16. It would be premature to set down in detail personal doubts as to the correct representation in these books of phonetic values, for the first essential is a close scientific phonetic study of Tibetan, as was done for Burmese by Armstrong and Pe Maung Tin. As to Tibetan phonetics, the best modern attempt to treat the matter scientifically is that mentioned above of Mr. Yu Dawchyan and Dr. Jaw Yuanren in 1930 at Peiping (*Academia Sinica*, A.5, pp. 26-29), which is brief but important. However, in each of these two phonetic studies only one speaker was used, and that is not enough. In both the phonetic script-record is, perhaps, too detailed for a student without a teacher, and in beginners' manuals some simplified variety based on the international phonetic script, and always denoting the toneme, would be preferable.

17. While we would disapprove of a Basic Tibetan of 800 sentences and 2,000 syllables, we welcome these books in that they follow a word-count system in which the most useful syllables, words and sentences have been carefully selected and, in the case of the latter, graduated. Honorific language has also been adequately treated. The general format, the Indian paper used, the printing, done at Calcutta and Gangtok, and even the dust covers of Bhutanese paper are excellent.

H. LEE SHUTTLEWORTH.

## REVIEWS

**The Future of India.** Part III of the Report on the Constitutional Problem in India submitted to the Warden and Fellows of Nuffield College, Oxford. By R. Coupland, C.I.E., M.A., Hon. D.Litt. (Durham), Fellow of All Souls and Nuffield College, Beit Professor of Colonial History in the University of Oxford.  $8\frac{1}{2} \times 5\frac{1}{2}$ ". Pp. 207. 6 Maps. Oxford University Press. Price 6s. 6d.

Professor Coupland has now completed under the auspices of Nuffield College his study of the constitutional problem in India by the issue of Part III, *The Future of India*. In this well-written book the author first restates briefly the dominant factors of the Indian constitutional problem and the main course of Indian politics from 1833-1942 as set forth in Parts I and II of his study, and then explores some of the ways in which these factors might be dealt with in arriving at a constitutional settlement.

In a clear-cut analysis of the present situation Professor Coupland shows that what is called The Deadlock is not a simple case of nationalism in revolt against British rule, but is a conflict of Hindu versus Moslem and of the Minorities generally against the claim of the Congress Party that it represents India and should therefore rule India in place of the British. The present state of affairs is therefore really an admission by Indians that at the moment British leadership is irreplaceable. The conflict has been accentuated by the fact that when Congress Party Governments were in power in some of the Provinces they admitted no representatives of Minorities to the Ministries unless they first joined the Congress Party, and this the Moslems held to be a case of broken pledges. This has increased the bitterness between Moslems and Hindus, of which latter the Congress Party is mainly composed. The Congress Ministries also alienated many Indians by acting, not in accordance with the desires of the electors, but on the orders of the Congress Party's Working Committee, the members of which did not belong to the Legislatures.

The Provinces of India are reviewed from the point of view of autonomy, the legislatures, safeguards for minorities and the executive. The various Provincial Areas are considered to be more or less in accord with the natural divisions of race and language. But as they vary so much in their quality, characteristics and state of development, their constitutions should not be of one pattern, but should be developed locally and gradually, provided they do not interfere with the Central Government Settlement. In the chapter on Legislatures various methods of representation are mentioned which might possibly ease communal tension, but are not fully examined, as present conditions of separate electorates hold the field, and could not be upset for many a year. But provided a basic Hindu-Moslem settlement were brought about, a better method of representation might be obtainable.

The chapter on Safeguards discusses the general political and cultural rights of Minorities and gives various examples from other nations as to how they are respected. The point is stressed that safeguards can only be guaranteed, and alterations without the consent of Minorities avoided, if action is taken in accordance with the law and that is dependent upon universal respect for law. Unfortunately this respect has diminished lately.

The considerations regarding the Executive are very thought-provoking. Professor Coupland points out the necessity for making Provincial Govern-

ments more stable than they are at present. A possible solution appears to be a Coalition Government based on the example of the Swiss Constitution, which unites peacefully French, Germans and Italians and the one-time warring religions of Protestant and Catholic. The interesting point is that the people elect the Legislature, and the Legislature elects the Executive or Federal Council, and that neither the Executive nor the Legislature can get rid of the other for four years, which is the period between elections. The Executive is freed from the day-to-day control of the Legislature, and as its members are representative of the various Cantons (which in Indian Provinces would be the Divisions) and not of parties, the needs of Switzerland as a whole are considered. The result is that members tend to become less and less party politicians and more and more professional administrators, with great advantage to the country. While not wholly applicable to India, especially as regards the judiciary, the example of Switzerland is a promising one to follow.

There is an able chapter on the prospects of Partition. Consequent upon the way the Congress Party between 1937 and 1939 destroyed or threatened all the assumptions by which previously they had obtained Moslem acquiescence in their campaign, the Moslems within the last few years have become increasingly united in demanding Partition, as they do not wish to be subjected to Majority rule (*i.e.*, Hindu rule) at the Central Government. Their proposal is that there should be separate Moslem and Hindu Provinces and no Central Government of India. Though nothing definite has been issued, it is understood that the Moslem League contemplates in British India two Moslem States, in which Moslems would be in a majority—Pakistan and North-East India. Pakistan would consist of the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan. Assam and the greater part of Bengal would form North-East India. These two areas are mainly agricultural. Compared with the rest of India they are much less furnished with industrial installations and less endowed with the mineral resources on which modern industry so largely depends. Their population is approximately one-third of India's whole population. Political possibilities of trouble are that in Pakistan the Sikhs, who at one time ruled the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, would feel towards Moslem rule what the Moslems feel towards Hindu rule, while in North-East India its capital, Calcutta, would be a Hindu Majority city containing most of the industries and capital of the State. Past and present history show also that these two Moslem States are on the lines of invasion of India. Provincial Budgets of the past show that though Pakistan so far has paid its way on purely provincial matters, if the Central Government expenditure on defence measures and strategical railways (now run at a loss) within its area had to be borne by Pakistan, that State would be involved in a heavy loss. Bengal and Assam recently have not met their own expenditure, so North-East India starts definitely with an adverse balance, which will be increased by the defence measures necessitated against the Japanese. Awkward problems are: Who will decide on defence policy in the absence of a Central Government, and on the share between the Provinces of defence expenditure for the whole of India? In return for their share will the Hindu areas demand a larger quota of personnel in the defence services, and will they take their tour of service on the frontiers? Will the Kingdom of Nepal continue to supply Gurkha recruits in accordance with the treaties and arrangements made with the British Government? What will happen to the Gurkha colonies in India? As for some time India's naval and air strength will be inadequate for her responsibilities, will Britain supply the deficiencies in the meantime, and what arrangements will India make for paying for them? These problems are not considered, but would certainly have to be met.



Summing up, therefore, the two Moslem States cannot be self-supporting, and in the absence of a Central Government India cannot be really united. Though at present political ambitions of Moslems and Hindus would ride roughshod over all material conditions, it may be that the Moslems, like the Arabs, may say, "What does it matter how poor and weak our homelands are if only we are masters in them?" But the deserts of Arabia are not as attractive as the riches of India, and both Hindus and Moslems ignore the lesson of history, that hardy united races ready to fight will sooner or later attack peace-loving wealthy nations unprepared to defend themselves.

In Chapter IX Professor Coupland discusses the unity of India and points out that though many Indians consider it inconceivable that after a long period of peaceful progress India should relapse into the blood and barbarism of a half-forgotten past, the spectacle of Europe offers little hope to a divided India except a repetition of the same sombre story. Moreover, the idea of Partition is really nationalism based on religion, and this is reactionary when it is remembered that the Caliphate or head of the Moslem world has been abolished. The "Balkanization" of India (*i.e.*, splitting it up into several independent "national homes") would gravely impair its strength and wealth, and their States would never rank with the great powers of the world. Professor Coupland's last argument in defence of India's unity is somewhat difficult to follow. He states that the primary cause of discontent and unrest amongst the Indian intelligentsia is due to the sense of humiliation and resentment at being subject to alien rule, and that Indians must be given the opportunity through freedom to redeem their past. If India could recover the position she once held in the world and could become again a great Asiatic power, then a United States of India might reasonably expect to take rank in years to come among the great political units of the world. But this ignores the fact that the Mauryan, Afghan and Moghul Empires of India did not include all of present India and were empires of invaders to the previous inhabitants, and as the source of recruitment dried up they in turn faded away in disruption.

Now that the British have declared their readiness to hand over a United India to a Government acceptable to all, no such Government has as yet appeared. There thus appears to be no common political interest, and we must search for some other common interest that will unite India. Common economic interests appear to be the solution, for with enough food, money and employment to enable the people to live fairly comfortably and healthily, there would be a common interest in maintaining a decent standard of life.

Professor Coupland then examines various proposals that have been made to group Provinces in larger regional units, on the basic principle that the primary sanction of all political organization must be its economic validity, and that Constitution-makers must think first in terms of Indian economics. Clearly India needs a scientific long-term plan for the proper use, conservation and development of her natural resources for her general, social and economic wealth. Such a plan can only be executed by an authority and organization of more than provincial scope. That this can be done is proved by the example of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the U.S.A., which co-ordinates the activities of parts of seven States, and has turned a backward primitive area, smitten with hookworm and vitamin deficiency diseases, into a thriving area. Professor Coupland then examines a suggestion of a Mr. Yeatts that the natural divisions of India should be based on river basins, for rivers provide a common interest for agricultural, hydro-electric, industrial and transport purposes. Based on this he divides India into four areas, the Indus, the Ganges, the Delta (*i.e.*, the Brahmaputra and the mouths of the Ganges) and the Deccan. This scheme he considers deserves consideration on its economic merits alone,

but also that it has the advantage of a Regional Division on economic principles confirming the political demarcation of the Moslem homelands. But this division places most of the mineral resources of India in the Hindu areas, and past history shows that modern wealth is mainly dependent upon mineral resources. Apart from the financial reasons already given, the Moslem areas would appear to be comparatively handicapped for the worse. If one is therefore to combine mineral resources and river power, the Ganges and Delta areas, whose two main rivers join several hundreds of miles from the sea, would appear to be better combined in one area, and the attempt might be made there to unite Hindu and Moslem in common economic interests.

Professor Coupland then analyses how India, including the Indian States, might possibly be united. He shows that the Moslem claim that the Moslem States should be independent even as regards defence, external affairs, customs, etc., simply means the disruption of India, and that there must be an inter-regional centre or agency centre which might be called the Council of India. This body would elect the Prime Minister and his colleagues for executive work, and would conform generally to the Swiss form of government. The Indian States, it is suggested, should join in the common economic interests of the region, as Bikanir has with the Punjab. Otherwise they would probably be part of an Indian States Dominion, or retain their present status of principalities under British suzerainty, as they would never acquiesce in an all-India system of government which overrode their rights and put them at the mercy of the Congress Party and its "High Command." At the same time it would be necessary for them to evolve gradually constitutional government on democratic lines.

A difficulty of the centre of a United India as envisaged by Professor Coupland is that he proposes a weak centre which would make it hard to ensure co-ordinated effort in the event of a region refusing to co-operate.

A further difficulty is his proposal that the number of representatives from each region should be the same, and that these representatives would come to the centre, not on an all-India footing, but solely as the agents of their regions with mandates of their governments and legislatures. We would thus have the two Moslem States with approximately one-third of the population of India having the same value at the centre as the rest of India, and as they are to be agents of their regions there seems little chance of real unity.

Professor Coupland then discusses the British obligations in India. These he holds to be as under: First, to give such assistance as India may require for defence against external attack, for the war has proved that her security is a strategic necessity for the peace of the world. Secondly, that the safeguards of the treaties with the Indian States would be replaced by the guarantees of the Constitution. Thirdly, the safeguards for minorities. The solution proposed is that we must rely on the sanctity of a Constitution framed by agreement, and that being so there is no necessity for the British Government retaining a particular responsibility for minorities. Fourthly, the rights of British personnel in the Defence Services and the Secretary of State Services. Though their services might be dispensed with, their pension rights would have to be secured. Fifthly, that India's Rupee Debt must be honoured, while the Sterling Debt has been liquidated owing to Britain's large war expenditure in India. Sixthly, the British resident community. These claimed to be a minority to be safeguarded, but have been informed that they must expect to be treated as traders from abroad are treated in any civilized State.

The question of India remaining in the British Commonwealth is considered. It is shown that though Sir Stafford Cripps stated that India would be free to remain within or leave the British Commonwealth, the events of the

past few years prove that for the security of the peace and economic development of the world India would have to form part of a general agreement of the United Nations as a whole, and that in view of her long connection with Britain this can best be done as a member of the British Commonwealth.

Professor Coupland sums up that India's future is now a matter for Indian statesmen to decide, and the choice lies between the possibilities of a United India taking an honoured place in the society of nations, or of an India of Independent States with conflicting interests providing the potential breeding-ground of another world war, and that the future is more dependent upon economic matters by which men live than on political matters.

The book is well written and thought-provoking, and it is hoped that it may help towards brightening India's future. But the object lesson of the present famine and outbreak of disease in some of the Provinces in India, which are not touched upon in the book, shows what dire effects can result from the lack of unity between the Provinces and their disregard of the Central Government lead to improve matters, and one cannot but help thinking that a weak centre will not help to unite India, and that with no centre the result may well be as in Europe now.

H. E. AP R. P.

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**Allenby in Egypt.** Being Volume II of *Allenby: A Study in Greatness*.  
By Field-Marshal Viscount Wavell of Cyrenaica and Winchester, G.C.B.,  
C.M.G., M.C., Viceroy of India. 10s. 6d.

This, the second volume of Lord Wavell's study of Allenby, derives a special interest from the circumstances in which it came to be compiled and written. Both author and subject are Field-M Marshals; and just as the first volume on Allenby as General was completed and published when the author himself was undertaking the command of a campaign based on Egypt, so the materials for Allenby in Egypt were collected and marshalled during that command, and the present volume appears at the moment when Lord Wavell, like Lord Allenby, had been transferred from the successful command of armies to the administration of a great country disturbed and impatient for the promised advance to autonomy. Nor is this the only parallel which will occur to the student of British administration in the Near and Middle East. During the very years when Allenby and the Foreign Office were grappling with His Majesty's Government's responsibilities in Egypt, Sir Percy Cox and the Colonial Office, at first under the virile guidance of Mr. Winston Churchill, were seeking the solution of a similar problem, that of securing the external defence and internal stability of Iraq while advancing the constitutional monarchy of King Feisal to complete independence. Journey's end has been the same in Iraq and Egypt, complete independence coupled with a Treaty of Alliance securing the special interests of both parties in their mutual relations; but the journey to this end in Egypt was less direct and very much longer than that taken in Iraq. It may be of interest to return to this comparison later.

A character sketch of "Allenby the Man" is repeated from the Prologue to Vol. I. It is a picture which justifies the claim in the sub-titles, "A Study in Greatness"; and the biographer does well to state the claim, for Allenby himself never stooped to answer his critics. "He never troubled to explain his successes or to justify any action he had taken; he bore no grudge against his critics or detractors; he left behind no account of his life and no material to compile one; he had, in truth, a certain impatience with those who recalled past events, saying that it was only the future that mattered." Those who knew

Allenby best will agree that Lord Wavell's summary is accurate and just, though a hint of partiality is betrayed in the attempt to palliate his faults of temper by the excuse that "however violently his anger might rage, he never cherished a grudge or bore any ill-will." Merit for so much forbearance could have been more justly claimed on behalf of the bitten subordinate!

The outstanding event in Allenby's pro-consulate was the Declaration of February 25, 1922, by which the Protectorate was abolished and Egypt declared an independent Sovereign State, leaving for subsequent negotiation "the reserved subjects." These subjects were the security of British imperial communications, the defence of Egypt, the protection of foreign communities, and the Sudan; and over them Great Britain retained liberty of action until such time as an amicable arrangement could be reached. It is by this act of policy that the success or failure of Allenby's mission must be judged. He was primarily responsible for advocating this "unilateral solution" of the deadlock which had resulted from the Protectorate; and it was his courage and firmness which carried it through against a weight of opposition and misrepresentation. Not the least entertaining chapter in the book records the inner story of this clash between the Field-Marshal and the "elder statesmen." The logic of facts prevailed over the considerations of diplomacy; and Allenby "got his way and cared not what was said of him." In form the Declaration was published by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, and in the words of Mr. Harold Nicolson, "by this decisive gesture Curzon arrested the process of liquefaction which threatened to dissolve the remaining vestiges of our position in Egypt."

Lord Wavell asks if there can now be any doubt that Allenby's solution was the right one. "The only alternative amounted to virtual annexation and military rule, which, quite apart from questions of morality and justice, was unthinkable in view of the temper of the British nation at the time and the inconstancy of their rulers. How long would British opinion have tolerated military rule in Egypt, and how long would the Government have supported their representative in such rule?"

Indeed, much more might be said in defence of the termination of the Protectorate. Its imposition, except as a temporary war measure, was contrary to the policy of Cromer and Kitchener, and to many pledges and promises. No British Government could have been so cynical as to confirm a permanent Protectorate over Egypt in disregard of our emphatic and repeated declaration that our occupation of the country was temporary and informal.

It may be difficult now, in the light of the happy relations established with a free and independent Egypt, to appreciate the resentment felt against Allenby for his courageous solution of the deadlock. The truth is that Egypt was still the land of paradox in Milner's phrase. Allenby's bitterest critics were those who swore by the great days of Cromer; yet the basic principles of the Cromer régime were that it was not a Protectorate and could not be permanent; and Cromer's parting instructions to his successor were to give the Egyptians a greater share in government. Another favourite theme of the same critics was that the real *fellahin*, if their voice could be heard, preferred British rule to that of their own leaders; yet all the evidence conclusively proved that these misguided peasants preferred indifferent government by their own compatriots to the efficient and honest administration of an alien power. The imperialist of those days was blind to this outrageous paradox! Allenby's clear judgment was not affected by traditional sentiment but by evidence of facts, and he took account not of what the Egyptians ought to desire, but of what they were determined to have. The opposition in the Cabinet to Allenby's solution of the deadlock was not directed to the termination of the Protectorate in principle. They accepted this as inevitable. What they objected to was the undiplomatic

character of a procedure by which all bargaining points were jettisoned at the outset. Once the grant of complete independence had been conceded, how could Great Britain secure the safeguards required for the reserved subjects? The jam having been enjoyed, how was the powder to be administered?

It cannot be said that the Cabinet's objections were ill-founded. In fact, it took fifteen years of bitter controversy, marred by agitation, disorder and bloodshed, to reach the final settlement of the reserved subjects in a Treaty of Alliance. In Iraq, where the converse policy was adopted and the mandate was not formally revoked until the safeguards had been secured by agreement, deadlock was avoided and the advance to complete independence and a treaty was made more rapidly and by logical and progressive steps.

How, then, was it that Allenby was able to justify his solution to the Cabinet, and that Lord Wavell has succeeded in stating a convincing argument that Allenby was right? The answer is that the circumstances were too strong for logic; things had gone too far for bargaining. As the author says, it was not Allenby who sold the pass; the pass had been already sold. Our system of administration under the Protectorate, as under the Cromer régime, had been worked through the Egyptian Ministers. When they refused to play, the game was up. The cry of self-determination abroad and the birth of a genuine spirit of nationality at home made it impossible to find ministers who would accept office under the conditions of the Protectorate. The machinery for negotiation did not exist. Allenby's unilateral solution, although it gave away the bargaining points, at least made bargaining possible. There was an Egyptian Government to bargain with. Ministers could now be found to accept office. Martial law, which had been in force for eight years, was abolished. A Constitution could be framed. Generous compensation was conceded to British and foreign officials of the old régime. The Declaration of 1922 had made these things possible.

In the following year the foundations of modern Egypt's political life were laid. Lord Wavell is entitled to claim that "Allenby played a great part in shaping and securing those foundations; and subsequent events have shown that the foundations were, on the whole, well, truly, and wisely laid—given the material and labour available."

The chapter covering the year 1923 is rightly entitled "A Year of Progress." The murder campaign against Englishmen, for which Allenby was unjustly blamed, appeared to have been stopped by the arrest and conviction of the murder gang. Martial law had been abolished. The Constitution had become law, and the compensation of British officials was satisfactorily settled—so satisfactorily, indeed, that many of them were able to draw their compensation while they retained their office with its emoluments for many years! Allenby went home for a well-earned rest. But there were two ominous clouds on the horizon. Agitation over the Sudan had been renewed; and on the abolition of martial law Zaghlul returned from exile in September. The clouds gathered in January, 1924, when the Zaghlulists won an overwhelming victory in the elections to the first Egyptian Parliament and Zaghlul became Prime Minister. After an abortive visit to London, in which his preposterous proposals were rejected by Ramsay MacDonald and the first Labour Government, he lost grip of the agitation which he himself had fostered, and the storm burst on November 19, when Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General of the Sudan, was murdered in Cairo.

Allenby acted with courage and decision. He saw the importance of fixing responsibility on Zaghlul before the latter had an opportunity to resign office. Parliament was due to meet at 5 p.m. on November 22, and without waiting for Foreign Office approval Allenby, escorted by a regiment of Lancers, de-

livered to Zaghlul in person an ultimatum backed by the threat of force. The terms were drastic and in some respects ill-advised, but those who were on the spot and knew the Egyptians were almost unanimous in upholding him. The Egyptians themselves understood the strong hand and expected no less.

These events cast a gloom over the last months of Allenby's term of office. They led to the immediate fall of Zaghlul and to the indefinite postponement of any agreement on the reserved subjects; and Allenby himself had determined to resign, although, for reasons of public policy, he agreed to stay on into the year 1925.

It would be an utter mistake to conclude from this that Allenby's administration ended in failure, still more that his policy was responsible for the tragedy of Sir Lee Stack's murder. It would be about as reasonable as to say that the Emancipationists were the cause of Abraham Lincoln's death! It may be true that this particular tragedy would have been avoided if, instead of the Declaration of Independence, the Protectorate had been maintained by stern and forceful repression. But Allenby saw, as we all see now, that such a policy would have led nowhere, and he had the courage to face the risks inherent in the only other alternative. Grievous as the cost proved of entrusting the Egyptians with the responsibility of self-government, Allenby's long view has proved to be the right one.

The Epilogue gives a brief account of Allenby's ten years of retirement. It is a pleasant picture of "port after stormie seas"; of useful but unobtrusive public work, and of his own enjoyment in the things he had always loved—birds and travel and fishing. A quotation from a letter gives a piquant example of how the introspective T. E. Lawrence could misjudge a man of different mould: "Poor Allenby! It is sad to see a big man in retirement and not knowing what to do." Lawrence was the citizen of another world; Allenby was a great Englishman.

N. G. D.

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**Generals and Geographers: the Twilight of Geopolitics.** By Hans W. Weigert. Pp. 259. Oxford University Press (New York). \$3.00.

"Geopolitics" is not recognized by the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*. The word itself, and the ideology for which it stands, were in fact made in Germany. Dr. Weigert has rendered a service in unmasking this pseudo-science, this dream of power-politics and strategic geography, which might be described as begotten by *Weltanschauung* out of *Lebensraum*. The author goes about his work, however, in a tedious and long-winded manner, and it takes him 259 pages to say what is very ably condensed into less than 250 words on the outer cover.

The philosophical speculations of Ratzel, List, Grimm and Spengler led Karl Haushofer (a retired Major-General of the last war, who in 1920 became a professor at Munich University) to evolve a theory of global political strategy according to which the great land masses of Eastern Europe and Asia were bound in the long run to dominate the maritime powers forming their outer fringe. Haushofer may in part have founded his theory on the geographical conception enunciated by Sir Halford Mackinder of a great Eurasian "heartland." This doctrine naturally pointed to the necessity for Germany, after her defeat in the last war, to ally herself with Russia and China, thus forming a solid transcontinental block of land powers which, linked by a close network of airways, would be able by the use of interior lines to triumph over the sea powers dispersed round their periphery. This doctrine, in fact, found many adherents among the leaders of German military thought, but it was negated by Hitler's blind hatred of Soviet Russia and also by Japan's aggression against China, which Haushofer vainly endeavoured to avert. Fortunately for the United Nations, Hitler finally tore up Haushofer's teaching by attacking Russia in June, 1941—not 1942, as stated in this edition.

J. H. M.C.

**Judæa Lives Again.** By Norman Bentwich. Pp. 189. Gollancz. 8s. 6d.

This book gives in brief and readable form an account of the part played by the Jews in Palestine from the middle of the nineteenth century up to the present day. The bulk of it is naturally devoted to the years following the Balfour Declaration. Professor Bentwich is an ardent Zionist, but he tempers his enthusiasm with some criticism of Zionist methods, and with a measure of sympathy for the Arab point of view. Few writers on Palestine have a better knowledge of the facts. He was acquainted with the country before the first World War, entered it as an officer in Allenby's army, and served there for many years as Attorney-General. Since his retirement from official service he has held the Chair of International Relations at the Hebrew University. Anything, therefore, that he writes on Palestine is worthy of serious study.

The story Professor Bentwich tells is a notable record of achievement. In twenty-five years the Jews have proved to be among the most successful pioneers in history. Travellers to Palestine before the last war have recorded the poverty of the country. The few early settlements at Rishon, Petah-Tikvah and Ness Ziona were oases in an impoverished land. Since 1920 the number of settlements has increased to 250, in which 150,000 Jews (more than a quarter of the total Jewish population in Palestine) have their homes, though not all of them are engaged in agriculture. In Northern Galilee, across the Plain of Esdraelon, along the maritime plain from Haifa almost to Gaza, even on the Judæan hills, prosperous farms are thriving where there were formerly marsh or sand-dunes or rocky untilled slopes. Every form of agriculture and animal husbandry thrives. "By experimenting with the breeds of cattle and by measures against cattle disease, the milk yield of a cow was increased ten times. By similar means the laying capacity of the hen was trebled. By irrigation, fields which had yielded one poor crop of grain were made to render six crops of forage or three vegetable crops. . . . The export of oranges rose from 1 million cases in 1919 to 15 million cases in 1939." (Incidentally, though Professor Bentwich does not mention it, half these cases came from Arab groves.)

In all this the "Youth Aliyah" has had its share. Aliyah means both "immigration" and "spiritual ascent," and is peculiarly well adapted to the movement which began in 1934 as a means of escape from German tyranny. It has not only saved thousands of children who might otherwise have perished, but has settled them in Palestine under conditions that have made them both healthy and happy.

In industry too great progress has been made. The hydro-electric works at the junction of the Jordan and the Yarmuk, initiated by that notable figure Pinhas Rutenberg; the potash works on the Dead Sea; the cement factories; and the more recent development of small factories, turning out cloth, footwear, even arms and ammunition for the British forces—all testify to the zeal and ability displayed by the Jewish immigrant.

Above all, there has come to pass the "Hebrew Renaissance." The revival of Hebrew as a modern tongue, thanks in large measure, as Professor Bentwich reminds us, to two men, the gentle unassuming Ginzberg, better known as "Ahad-Haam" ("one of the people"), and the burning enthusiast Ben Yehuda, is among the most remarkable achievements of the present century. Through its adoption, not without a struggle in the early days, as the medium of instruction in the Jewish schools, Hebrew has become the common language of all Jews in Palestine, no matter what tongue they or their parents spoke previously. "The crown of the Hebrew renaissance is the Hebrew University," opened by Lord Balfour in 1925 and now containing all the faculties of a European university. The site on which it stands is an inspiration to those who teach and study there. On one side it looks down on the City of Jerusalem; on the other, across the Judæan desert to the Jordan Valley, the Dead Sea, and the Hills of Moab beyond. In the arts, too, there has been a national revival. The poetry of Bialik, the architecture of Mendelssohn, the drama of the *Habima*, the music of the symphony orchestra—each illustrates in its own way a development in Jewish life that Zionism has created, and that appeals to Gentile hardly less than to Jew.

Professor Bentwich is not always so accurate as such a keen observer should be. For instance, he gives the population of the Negeb as 4,000, whereas it is certainly far higher, probably between 60,000 and 70,000. From the context his figure cannot

be a misprint, and it reads almost like a case of special pleading for Jewish settlement in that area. Again, he refers to Transjordan in preference to the simpler and officially accepted Transjordan. When he says that, "apart from the extreme nationalists, the Arabs generally recognize the right of the Jews to settle on the land," he makes an assertion which no Arab and indeed few others acquainted with Palestine would uphold. And is he not guilty of a *suppressio veri* when, in referring to the murder of Arlosoroff, he omits to state that the assassin, though never caught, was undoubtedly a Jew?

The book is enlivened by those humorous touches and play upon words which have graced the author's earlier works: "The law of the National Home was a mosaic, and not Mosaic"; "the Jews charged the administration with sins of omission and Commissions"; the outcome of the Department of Development was "rather the development of a department."

In his penultimate chapter Professor Bentwich deals with the Arab-Jewish problem. But, in spite of his sympathetic treatment of this difficult question, his proposals, under the heading "The Healing of the Schism," do not lead us very far. They are too nebulous and too detached from present-day facts to be of much value. He not only brushes aside the White Paper, omitting to mention that it is now regarded by Arabs, however mistakenly, as binding as the Balfour Declaration is by Jews; but he fails to recognize the recently granted independence of Syria and the Lebanon, and the semi-autonomy of Transjordan. Nor does he refer to the movement for Arab unity. On the contrary, he proposes some form of international supervision of "the Mandated territories of the Middle East" by the United Nations. In place of a British mandate for Palestine he envisages an international mandate for Greater Syria; and claiming that Palestine can readily accommodate another million Jews, he would plant that number there "within a few years of the peace." It is difficult to imagine that after the war the United Nations would impose another mandate upon Syria and the Lebanon whose independence has now been guaranteed by the Fighting French with the support of Great Britain. The Jewish problem must be solved, and Great Britain must certainly help to solve it. But how long would "the peace" remain unbroken in the Middle East if another million Jews were to be settled in Palestine within a few years of its coming? Professor Bentwich evidently has his doubts. "If the exodus and the homecoming could be accomplished in peace and with the assent of the United Nations, that would be a desirable solution. But if it could not be accomplished with that assent, then the Jewish people must take counsel of their faith."

The omission of a map and an index might well be rectified in a future edition.

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**Desert Journey.** By George Rodgers. Pp. 151. 44 photographs. Cresset Press.

15s.

This book has a striking photograph of one of the Transjordan Arab Legion on its dustcover and the forty photographs, taken by the author, are excellent.

It tells the story of his journey across Africa from Freetown to Kufra, where he arrived only a few hours after the Free French occupation of the oasis, and of his work in the campaigns in the Middle East. The style is pleasing and the matter exciting. It is wartime journalism and is worth having, or at least reading, for that reason. It dispels at once the idea (if anyone holds it) that modern war correspondents live an unromantic life, calling daily at the Public Relations Office for such scraps as may be vouchsafed to them. From Kufra with hardly a pause, Rodgers went over ground never before traversed by a car to Abecher and caught up with a column bound for Eritrea. Massawa he entered before the Army, and he gives some vivid descriptions of action during the later part of the campaign. He visits Transjordan, and leaves it with the following reflection, which should be quoted in full: "I went back to Jerusalem and from there to Cairo, having formed a great liking for the little Emir, the Father of all the Arabs, and found myself hoping that he achieves his ambition of a Pan-Arab Empire. . . . He would be a better neighbour to India than the late Shah, Riza Khan Pahlevi, had been and a bloc of Arab States, each under its native ruler, stretching from Dacca to Suez, policed by a joint United



Nations force, might not be a bad idea at all. At least it would ensure our communications with the Far East through the Mediterranean and would silence for ever the peevish little war cries that emanate from Rome." On p. 97 he describes "the fierce Jebel Druze tribesmen," supported by tanks, doing a wide skirting movement on the flank of our advance into Syria and capturing places from us.

When Mr. Rodgers takes photographs he is successful; when he describes his own adventures he holds one's attention; when he outlines his difficulties during his desert travels and in the cities, where he is endeavouring to obtain passes or permission quickly, he has the reader's sympathy, which he readily arouses; but when he steps into politics like this, the reader's hair quite stands on end with apprehension.

And then one reflects. After all he is (it is obvious from his book) a quick-witted journalist, unprejudiced and receptive. How did it come that journalists in the Middle East, who were officially attached to the Forces, could come and go without acquiring some better education on Middle Eastern affairs than this?

Mr. Rodgers visited Teheran and is fortunate in being the first photographer to photograph the meeting of the British and Russian Armies in Persia. He goes to India to see the North-West Frontier, and returns from there to be in "Benghazi for Christmas," which is the title of his last chapter. He describes without venom the difficulties he sometimes met when he was trying to get in a hurry to some place where he wanted to go (there is an example on p. 89), and one wonders whether there is not still an undeserved dislike of war correspondents in some quarters, for the author arouses one's warm sympathy in his quest and in his adventures in search of news. As a sample of the wartime photographer-journalist's life in the Middle East, this book is excellent.

**Jordan's Tunis Diary.** By Philip Jordan. Pp. 256. London: Collins. 1943. 10s. 6d.

Mr. Philip Jordan was one of two British journalists chosen to represent the British Press in covering the Tunisian campaign: his paper is the *News Chronicle*.

As a writer Mr. Jordan exhibits all the facility of style which may be expected from one whose profession it is. He is at his best in his description of the actual fighting, and he portrays the scenery with deft touches. But when he writes on the broader aspects of the military problems, both strategical and tactical, and on political matters, he becomes at once precious and somewhat pompous: and these have the lion's share of his *Diary*. His bland assumption that he always knew just what was the right way to deal with the various complicated military and political questions which faced the Allied commanders in all directions in North Africa is apt to provoke impatience with him. Some of his strictures were merited, some of his suggestions constructive and helpful; his manner of making them is not always felicitous.

Mr. Jordan admits in his Foreword that he has retained some hastily formed judgments with which he does not now entirely agree; and he will be glad to have this, even if it is his only, defence hereafter.

Nevertheless, this is a vivid and truthful account of a campaign which resulted in the first major Allied victory on land—a campaign, so far as Tunisia was concerned, pregnant with the possibility of disaster, militarily because of the inexperience and insufficiency and initial lack of cohesion of the troops, and politically because of the hazards inherent in dealing with French affairs. The absence of a map detracts from the merits of this personal narrative, written by one well qualified to do so.

A. M. W.

**Persia in the Early Days of the Pahlavi Régime.** By D. Bourke-Borrowes.

The manuscript of this unpublished book has been presented to the library by the author. It sets out in detail the events which led up to the establishment on the throne of Riza Shah Pahlavi and deals in an interesting manner with various important points—the Kurdish risings, Perso-Russian Trade disputes and, above all, with the good work done by Dr. Millspaugh of the U.S.A., who, in the five years'

tenure of his post as Administrator-General, changed a large deficit in the budget to a larger surplus. Refusing to have his powers reduced, Dr. Millspaugh retired, and the Persian Government proceeded to engage a German Financial Adviser with a German staff.

There is much valuable material in the work, and had it been published in 1929 or 1930 it would have made an important addition to our information regarding the period it deals with. The Society is fortunate to have the MSS. in its library for the use of any enquirers.

P. M. SYKES.

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**Return to Happiness.** By Jonas Lied. Pp. xi + 217. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 6". Macmillan. 18s.

Jonas Lied is a Norwegian from the Romsdal, famous in Viking days. He would, I am convinced, have been a wholly admirable Viking himself, but the course of events cast him for another part, that of developing commercial relations with Siberia through the Kara Sea, first under the auspices of Mr. Derry, of Derry and Toms, who wished to obtain Siberian furs by the sea route, subsequently in collaboration with Fridtjof Nansen and Russian interests. He followed in the wake of that pious navigator Captain Joseph Wiggins, who, in the latter part of the last century, before the days of wireless and aviation, explored the estuaries of the Siberian rivers.

His has been an adventurous life, bringing him into contact not only with commercial circles in Britain, France, Germany and Russia, as well as America and Japan, but also with political personalities in those countries. The main scene of his activities has been Siberia, his experiences in Krasnoyarsk, where he was Norwegian Consul, and elsewhere providing a striking picture of life there in the days of the Imperial régime, in war-time and in the years when the First Socialist State was emerging out of chaos. His book has appeared at the right moment, for the broad-minded, impartial manner in which he writes will be found most attractive by all who are prepared to look dispassionately upon the circumstances attending the birth of the Bolshevik Colossus whose doctrines we once found so unpalatable, whose signature of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk aroused the intense ire of Russia's former allies, and whose missionary proclivities, which found their expression in the now defunct Third International, provoked such enmity in the capitals of Europe.

A complication which adds interest to Mr. Lied's narrative is that, to assist him in his operations, he adopted Russian nationality on the eve of the Revolution. Indeed, the Emperor conferred upon him the dignity of a "hereditary, honorary citizen of Russia." Later on, when the Imperial family was confined at Tobolsk, he planned a secret expedition to effect their rescue. Subsequently, when Admiral Koltchak, as "Supreme Ruler," led the "White" movement at Omsk, he visited him to discuss the organization of an expedition for supplying the goods of which Siberia stood in need. The possibility of carrying out this scheme faded away when, in the summer of 1919, it became evident that Great Britain was no longer prepared to support intervention in any shape in Russia.

Armed with a Soviet passport, supplied to him by Litvinov at Copenhagen, Lied in 1920 made his way to Moscow to discuss the possibility of business dealings with the Soviet Government. He then had to deal not only with the unpleasant Zinoviev (Appelbaum), but with the outstanding figures of the Moscow of those days. The story of his dealings with George Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, whose efforts to reach understanding with Britain were so ill-received, with Krassin, first Bolshevik representative in London, and others, is well worthy of attention. Among them was that incredible mixture of asceticism in private life, of immense kindness in personal relations

and of pitiless ferocity when the sanctity of "Party" principles was involved, that was Felix Edmundovitch Dzerjinsky, head of the O.G.P.U. (Secret Police).

At the time of Lenin's "New Economic Policy" he was once more on business in Russia. Again, in 1931, he returned as representative of the Aluminium Company to reach agreement with the Concessions Committee. The attention of which he was the object on the part of the O.G.P.U. on this occasion was the cause of his reverting to Norwegian nationality, and it would seem probable that his days in Russia are at an end.

*Return to Happiness* is well written and in a fluent entertaining style, with a marked sense of humour. Soukumski's illustrations are excellent. The book is one which, I am confident, will be found of real value by all who are interested in the beginnings of Soviet Russia.

R. M. HODGSON.

**Jenghiz Khan.** By Squadron-Leader C. C. Walker. 10" x 6½". Pp. 216. 7 Maps. Published by Luzac, London. 1940. 17s. 6d.

This remarkable work on Jenghiz Khan by the late Squadron-Leader C. C. Walker first appeared as a series of articles contributed to the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* during the years 1932 and 1933, and it was not until six years later that, revised and rewritten and with excellent maps, it was published in the present book form and so became available to the larger public. Walker, in his preface, says that his chief aim has been to clarify one of the great periods in history. This he has done from the military angle with such ability that it is a pity his authorities for the first part of the book, on Jenghiz Khan's rise to power and his wars with the Kin and Tangut, were so inadequate. But it is only recently that some of the best sources for that period of the conqueror's career have been translated from Chinese into German and French, while many still remain in the original. Consequently, chapters 1, 2 and the first part of 7 are not up to the standard of the rest. However, those dealing with the conquest of the Khwarazmian Empire, particularly 4 and 6 and the appendices, are of great value.

Unhindered by the training that so often inhibits the professional scholar from drawing any but conservative conclusions, Walker boldly sets forth his own solutions of the many problems that arise in connection with the military activities of the Mongols.

Describing the geographical and psychological factors which must have influenced both Jenghiz Khan and his Moslem opponent, he stresses the geographical disadvantages besetting the Khwarazmian Shah in the defence of his dominions, and does much to clear him of the oft-repeated charges of cowardice and indecision. In the same chapter he provides a new and most convincing explanation for Jenghiz Khan's original plan of campaign and ultimate operations in the conquest of Transoxiana. Again, in chapter 6 he offers a completely fresh conception of the engagement fought by Jalal ad-Din and the conqueror on the River Indus. Contrary to the accepted accounts of this battle, he contends that, owing to the tremendous strain imposed on the Mongols by their non-stop pursuit of Jalal ad-Din through the mountains of Afghanistan, they must have begun the action with an inferiority in numbers.

Perhaps the most radical part of Walker's book is Appendix I, where the chronology of events is treated in detail. Faced, as he frequently is, with conflicting information concerning the month when certain happenings took place, he invariably follows that date which is most reasonable when checked against the climatic conditions of the region involved.

In conclusion, one can safely say that to the student of military history, even if unfamiliar with the achievements of the Mongols, the career of Jenghiz Khan cannot fail to be of the greatest interest. Not only has the author successfully described the most outstanding example in military annals of the triumph of mobility over so-called impregnability, but he has given us the first full-length portrait in English of Jenghiz Khan the soldier.

H. DESMOND MARTIN.

**Tibetan Sentences.** By Sir Basil Gould and H. E. Richardson.

"Can you review *Tibetan Sentences* from the point of view of an officer sent to Gyantse and having to learn enough Tibetan to make himself understood, not as a language specialist?"

This admirably practical book (with its companion volumes) will do much to smooth the path of the beginner, and the reviewers would have given a great deal to have had them at their disposal when they set forth to learn Tibetan. The sentences are of exactly the kind that one has to use and the Tibetan printing is beautifully clear and easy to follow. The authors most wisely advise the learner to have the sentences read over to him by as many different people as possible. This point is very important in a language like Tibetan, with its difficult sounds, which will be much used with illiterate people, to whom a precisely correct pronunciation of a word is essential if they are to understand it, especially when uttered by one who is clearly a foreigner. For this reason, too, it is greatly to be hoped that the authors will be able to carry out their proposal to make gramophone records. Such records can be of immense help in attaining the correct pronunciation of difficult and unfamiliar sounds without estranging teacher and pupil by deadly repetition; and should be invaluable in learning the curious Tibetan system of spelling out words "ka kiku ki" and so on, and in mastering the lilting tones of the voice, so necessary if one is to be readily understood.

The book is professedly for the beginner and a phonetic rendering is, it is true, a very useful short cut to picking up a little of a language like Tibetan without the considerable labour involved in learning the Tibetan script, but there is some danger of its leading to incorrect pronunciation; and its position in this book, just below the Tibetan script, tends to draw the eye away from the Tibetan characters. Might it not be better to place the English translation between the Tibetan script and the phonetic rendering? The phonetic rendering would still be equally available to those who had not the time to master the Tibetan characters and would not hinder those who were trying to follow the Tibetan script. This is, however, rather a personal preference than a criticism.

The authors have earned the very real thanks of all newcomers to Tibet for these aids to learning the Tibetan language, of which a knowledge is so essential, not only for the official work of an officer, but to enable him to peer below the surface of an old civilization of absorbing interest and very different from the materialistic haste which has engulfed so much of the modern world.

N. AND G. D. B.

**India Today and Tomorrow.** By Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency. Signpost Booklet. Price 6d.

This excellent review of the Indian situation of the present day and the immediate future shows how rapid has been, considering the complexity of the problem, the progress of constitutional change since the pronouncement of 1917. The reasons why the proposals of the Cripps Mission were rejected by the Indian politicians are set out. Although, as Sir Geoffrey states, this non-acceptance was common to all the Parties, it was probably the rejection by the Working Committee of the Congress Party that led the other leaders also to register disagreement. They could not afford to accept when the Congress Party had refused the proffered terms. The public disappointment at this non-acceptance was, as Sir Geoffrey states, intense at the time, and is now even more widespread. As the author indicates, the intransigence both of the Congress Party and of the Moslem League is largely based on the personal position and prejudices of Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah. Herein appears one ray of hope. Another lies in the fact pointed out by the author that the feature of hyperbole, as a form of haggling, pervades Indian political utterances as it does other phases of Indian life. If Sir Geoffrey may be optimistic in arguing that the comparative success of some of the Provincial Governments may mean a similar degree of success in a Central Government, he is justified in claiming that the differences have been narrowed down to disagreement between Indians themselves. The problem of the Indian Princes is admitted to be especially difficult. Sir Geoffrey, than whom no one is better qualified to judge of the valuable and genuinely Indian tradition of the

States, plainly indicates his hope that, even at some sacrifice of their present position, they will associate themselves with the Provinces.

As it may be hoped that the pamphlet will be widely distributed and reprinted, two small suggestions for future editions may be made. To write the word *Mahasabha* as *Mahasahba* involves a mispronunciation as well as a misspelling. "Righteous Indignation" seems a curious translation for "Satyagraha." "Grasping of Truth" or "Truth Tenacity" gives a more literal meaning.

P. R. CADELL.

**The Burmese Scene.** By Maurice Collis. 7" x 5". Pp. 60. John Crowther. 5s.

Into this little brochure of less than 15,000 words Mr. Collis has packed a description of the Burmese landscape, a sketch of Burmese history from A.D. 850 (including a glance at the Buddhist creed as practised in Burma), some reflections on the Japanese invasion and the shortcomings of British policy, and some counsel to the Burmese on post-war policy. It is all very well done within the narrow limits set, even if the magic spell which Burma lays on the devotee of the picturesque has led to a certain idealization of some of the physical and cultural features of the land and its people.

There is a tailpiece by another hand, entitled "Wingate—Clive of Burma," which has little relation to *The Burmese Scene*, and by its far-fetched analogy does no service to a most distinguished soldier.

F. L.

**Government by Assassination.** By Hugh Byas. George Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

Going originally on an assignment of two years, Hugh Byas' life in Japan covered a period of twenty-three. In the ordinary course of his duty he was in continuous contact with Japanese Government departments, and came to know most of the men who, as Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Ministers of War and the Navy, directed the destinies of the country. He liked the country and the life, and lived agreeably with his neighbours, feeling, as he closes his book, that not all of the people are like those of whom he has written and that it "depicts only the scum on the surface of the stream." Yet the tragedy is that it is this "scum" which has increasingly dominated Japan's domestic and foreign affairs, brutally murdering or driving into obscurity those who stood in its way, and plunging the country first into undeclared war in China and then into the struggle now beginning to assume such a grim aspect for Japan.

Japan's invasion of Manchuria began in September, 1931, just a little over ten years before her attack on Pearl Harbour. Byas commences his story with the series of assassinations which occurred during the following spring, and which culminated in the murder of Premier Inukai in a joint military, naval and civilian plot on May 15, 1932. He outlines the history of Japan's patriotic societies, which "are an integral element of Japanese political life and are accepted as such by the Government, the politicians and the public," and tells, in a way which holds the attention of his readers, yet without undue sensationalism, the story of the growth of this and later plots, and of the trials which followed them, the course of which reads more like fantastic fiction than a record of twentieth-century history. He seeks to discover the real causes of the dissatisfaction felt by the fighting services with the existing state of affairs, a dissatisfaction shared by the more conservative elements in a nation which was less than a century away from feudalism.

Byas brought a scholarly mind to the task of "seeking for concrete programmes and statements of principle in plain language," made by the patriots who had undertaken the self-imposed task of seeing "that weak-kneed statesmen do not deviate from the path of glory," but he confesses, as will every Westerner who really knows his Japan, that he found himself in a collection of strange shibboleths such as he had never before encountered, adding "the patriots deal only in untranslatable platitudes—ideas which the Japanese consider profound and which have a lofty sound, when written in Japanese, dissolve into froth when they are translated into the language of 'the analytical West.'"

Byas has a singular aptitude for expressing striking facts in a succinct manner. One might quote numerous examples, but one or two must suffice:

"Japan is the only nation which in this century combines modern military and industrial power with religious and political ideas inherited from the primitive ages of mankind."

"There was a moral infection somewhere in Japanese ideas about their country."

"In Japan, loyalty has been morbidly exalted until it excuses any cruelty, any crime."

"The soldiers dominated public policy, and to all questions they brought minds steeped in a terrifying blend of Prussian and Japanese false philosophies."

His book is, in spite of his own sense of failure in this respect, a vivid and arresting analysis of the psychological storms which have swept over Japan during the last decade.

Among the major causes of Japan's entry into the war Byas considers that three stand out:

1. The delusion of a unique state with a special mission.
2. The constitutional vice which allows the fighting services to control the Government.
3. The possession of jumping-off places for aggression and of the heaviest and best-organized armaments in Asia.

He devotes his final section to questions dealing with the post-war period, but says they were written with some misgiving, as "the field is one in which I do not see my way clearly or very far ahead." To anyone with more than a superficial knowledge of Japan this caution will commend itself, but these closing chapters are well worth careful study. He says, "We want the Japanese people to recognize the war for what it is—a bloody and useless sacrifice to false gods," but the note on which he closes is struck in the following words:

"We are laying the foundations of a new order which we conceive to be suited to the modern world in which we live. The riches of the earth will be freely and fairly open to all nations, and the primitive or backward or simply weak peoples will have the protection of an authority representing civilized humanity instead of being left to the chance that may give them a mild or harsh taskmaster.

"If we consider fifty years of modern Japan and not the gangster decade alone, we are entitled to believe that Japan has qualities that will again fit it to be a member of this new order. Japan is now possessed by the evil genius that it loves, but there is another Japan and it has a contribution to make to the world."

**Survey of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1941.** By K. D. D. Henderson.

**Kassala at War.** By B. Kennedy-Cooke.

Two pamphlets issued by the Sudan Government, 1943.

*Kassala at War*, written by its Governor, describes the war and its effect on Kassala Province from the outbreak of hostilities with Italy until the end of January, 1941. It is a most heartening story, especially in these days of criticism of our colonial policy and methods. A handful of Sudanese troops and police, confronting ten and twenty times their own numbers, held the frontier during those critical early days after the collapse of France. Backed by the whole-hearted support of the population, they had the initiative from the start, so that the enemy ventured forth to seize only Kassala and Gedaref before he lapsed into a timorous defensive, harried by Sudanese ground patrols and the R.A.F. In that year of fifth columnists, the Italians found in the Sudan no fifth column to assist them, indeed they complained bitterly of the impossibility of finding agents anywhere. The calmness and loyalty of both tribesmen and townsfolk were remarkable. This pamphlet tells how intensive cultivation of vital foodstuff was carried out under the very noses of the enemy; how information was collected and the patriots in Abyssinia contacted and supplied with arms, how locally recruited Sudanese forces were raised and trained and the part they

played in the ultimate attack. Meanwhile across the frontier the vastly more numerous Italian forces had missed their chance; without reliable agents, and confused by deliberately indiscreet talk which was passed back to them (for instance, the arrival of the 5th Indian Division as that of five Indian divisions) they dug in deeper at Kassala, waited awhile and then withdrew back across the frontier. The arrival of the 5th and later of the 4th Indian Divisions made possible the advance which ended at Amba Alagi. It tells of work done by District Commissioners, facing a multitude of new and varied problems, of how the administration in all its branches was carried on under the stress of war, and ends with a tribute to the work of the Sudanese Chiefs and Town Councillors "to whom in the past fourteen years the leadership and government of the people have been more and more entrusted. . . . Their conduct is the perfect justification of the policy of local government."

*The Survey of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, by a member of the Sudan Political Service, explains how from the chaos of the Mahdi, which reduced a population of eight millions to less than three, a country has been built up "where the bulk of the population is to-day happier, better off and better cared for than at any time in its history. It would be difficult to find in the world better satisfied men than, for example, the average cattle-owning Arab on the west bank of the Nile." This work deals mainly with the Moslem North and at length with the work done in giving the country as a whole a sound and progressive system of education, and to the vocal minority opportunities of employment, responsibility and advancement. It explains how the Gezira Cotton Scheme has made it possible to finance this recent development of the population "which forty years ago was as primitive a community as could be found in Africa." After describing the development of the technical and other professional services, it deals at some length with the recent policy of administrative devolution which has been so triumphantly justified under the stress of war.

The Northern Sudan is culturally part of the Islamic world and to-day pupils from the Hejaz, the Aden Protectorate and British Somaliland are being educated at Gordon College and Bukhet al Rhoda. With the spread of education, the consciousness of the ties linking the Sudan with other countries of the Middle East will become stronger and interest in those countries more widespread.

Through it pass the pilgrims from French Equatorial Africa, Nigeria and the West, many of whom linger for years in the Gezira, sometimes settling there for life. Here is the meeting-place of Arab and African cultures, of Islam with the paganism of the South.

An authoritative account of the steps being taken to meet the problems inherent in its development must be of interest to many members of this Journal.

P. W. T.

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#### ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR THE NORTHERN SUDAN: A BROADCAST

FROM quite early days the Government of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan adopted a very liberal policy in all that concerned public health, education, land use, land ownership and so forth; in constitutional matters it has proceeded more slowly. Various local authorities were established some twenty years ago, and there has been a steady move to promote young Sudanese to posts formerly held by British or other non-Sudanese nationals. The law creating an Advisory Council marks a new stage. It is the subject of a talk broadcast from Khartoum by the Civil Secretary, Sir Douglas Newbold.

The law has been much canvassed by progressive members of the local community, and Government has been happily inspired to take the people into its confidence before the Council meets. The broadcast combines a statement of Government's position with a sympathetic review of some of the criticisms it has evoked. With perhaps one exception—a complaint that the purview of the Council has not been extended to the Southern Sudan—the criticisms are not unreasonable or discouraging; they are quite the reverse. Some critics have urged that the Council, having no legislative powers, will sink into a mere talking shop; Sir Douglas replies

very truly that the constructive work of most governments originates in proposals put forward by boards and committees which are purely advisory. Others, who point to the restrictive appearance of the regulations with which the new body has been hedged about, are reassured that the Governor-General has promised to consider amendments if experience proves that the rules hamper free debate. Others fear that the Council will be filled with unprogressive Yes-men because at least half its members will be appointed from members of the Province Councils.

Thanks to the war, what Sir Douglas calls "the distinctive individuality and entity of the Sudan and its importance in the Middle East" have been emphasized. The Sudan Government and the Sudan Defence Force have acquired an enviable reputation in Africa and overseas. The country is ready to go forward. Both the criticisms we have quoted and the admirable spirit in which they have been handled are good auguries for the future.

J. W. CROWFOOT.

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## OBITUARY

### MAJOR-GENERAL O. C. WINGATE, D.S.O. AND 2 BARS

FOR a General of young middle age to be commemorated in St. Margaret's, Westminster, is no small honour, and to that honour has been added a memorial service in the Great Synagogue. These two commemorations speak of the great esteem in which General Wingate was held, both for his official work as a soldier and of his width of sympathy with Zionists and other sides of Jewry. So much has been written about him that it is not possible here to give more than two short notices from friends, although in a later number there will be yet another memorial of his work in Burma. At the same time it is not in England or Palestine that Wingate's greatest work was done, but in the Ethiopian campaign, where his genius was given full rein. Any history of the war in Abyssinia must be dominated by Wingate and his Gideon force; it is there that he has become a legend, and there that his name will be sung and his heroic deeds narrated round the camp-fires for many years, perhaps for generations to come. It falls to the lot of few to be so sung and so remembered. "A sword of rare metal was forged out of a handful of Englishmen and a few hundred Africans." "The same fervour that made him goad men to almost superhuman effort insisted later that their courage be recognized."\* What better epitaph could any soldier want? Haile Selassie I, King of Kings of Ethiopia, Conquering Lion of Judah, sits on his throne, but if it had not been for Wingate's genius the campaign might have gone otherwise. It left a great work accomplished and a lasting memorial.

### A ZIONIST APPRECIATION

Orde Wingate came to Palestine in 1936. The Arab disturbances were increasing in intensity and claiming a steady toll of killed and wounded—Jews, Britons and Arabs. The Arab bands in the hills were being strengthened by leaders, recruits and equipment from outside. Acts of sabotage were frequent and the oil pipe-line from Iraq to Haifa was repeatedly cut and fired. The British military authorities in Palestine disposed of a considerable force, some 20,000 men, but Wingate was quick to see that regular methods of campaigning were not suitable to deal with the elusive marauding bands. After studying the country and its people, he decided that the best way to defeat the

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\* *Guerrilla War in Abyssinia*, by W. E. D. Allen. Penguin edition, p. 93.



bands was to use the men of the Jewish agricultural settlements—men who knew the hills, were hardened by an open-air life and could rapidly be trained in guerrilla tactics. He was given authority to proceed with his plan and built up the Special Night Squads composed of young, virile, rural Jews with an admixture of British soldiers.

Wingate's plan succeeded. The quick-striking squads carried the fight into the enemy's territory; they operated mainly by night, and by forced marches, by skilful ambush and surprise attacks they broke the grip which the Arab gangs had fastened on large areas of the countryside.

In the organization and training of the Night Squads, as in fighting, Wingate showed the qualities of leadership which were to be acclaimed in his later exploits in Abyssinia and Burma. He called forth from those who fought under him devotion and love, and courage and self-sacrifice in the face of danger. And because his men knew that he, as they, fought not for the sake of the fight but for the peace that was to follow, nothing was too difficult or too dangerous.

During his stay in Palestine, Wingate learnt to know and to appreciate the Palestinian Jew, his devotion to the soil and to the ideal of national regeneration which inspired that devotion. He became deeply interested in the Zionist Movement; he met its leaders and kept in touch with them and their problems after he had left Palestine.

After the outbreak of war he dreamed of leading a Jewish fighting force, and the Palestine Jewish units in Italy, North Africa and at home longed to be led by the man who understood them so well.

A blend of qualities brought Wingate to Zionism and to a realization of the rôle which Palestine can play in meeting the needs of the Jewish people—a passionate love for justice, and a hatred of everything unfair, an eagerness to right the wrong and to champion the weak. And his understanding and sympathy were quickened by the Puritan tradition of his family and by his deep knowledge of the Bible. Coupled with his idealism was a keen sense of realism. He saw in the return of the Jews to Palestine and in the continued and unhampered development of the Jewish National Home the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Bible and the solution of the two-thousand-year-old Jewish problem; further, a great contribution to the revival of the Arab Middle East, the building of a bridge between the East and West, and therefore an undertaking of moral and practical value, the success of which was in the best interest of Britain and the Empire.

In the course of the few, all too few, years during which Orde Wingate was connected with Palestine and the Zionist Movement, he won the warm affection of the many Jews who had the good fortune to meet him, the admiration and homage of larger circles who had heard of his exploits and of his sympathies, and a lasting place in Jewish history.

J. LINTON.

#### FROM A BROTHER-OFFICER

This can be no more than a brief tribute from a friend and brother-officer who was privileged to know the late Major-General Wingate during the early years of his career, before even his pre-war successes in Palestine had brought him into the public eye. I first met Wingate in 1926 when we were both studying Oriental languages at the School of Oriental Studies in London. Even then, when he was only twenty-three, one could not fail to recognize in Wingate a most unusual character. He was a curious mixture of the scholar and man of action, the philosopher and soldier. Yet first and foremost he was undoubtedly a man of action and, above all, a realist. He had a streak of that

rather intriguing eccentricity so often associated with genius. One immediately became aware of a keen intelligence, combined with great powers of concentration, which enabled him quickly to master the intricacies of Arabic grammar. He has always seemed to me a brilliant example of the truth of Emerson's observation that concentration is the secret of success. He loved a serious argument or discussion, but his remarks were invariably tinged with a strong undercurrent of humour. He was very widely read and had thought deeply, so that he could talk well on a great variety of subjects. These qualities made him a stimulating and delightful companion.

I have a vivid recollection of the last occasion I saw Wingate, shortly after his return from the Sudan, when he was quartered in a particularly dreary camp on Salisbury Plain. As he paced up and down the large deserted ante-room of a gunner mess, discoursing earnestly on various topics of mutual interest, his restless energy gave one a strong impression of a caged lion, and one instinctively felt that it would not be long before he managed to break out somewhere, somehow. It is interesting to recall that on this occasion we discussed at some length the exploits of Lawrence of Arabia, a subject obviously near to Wingate's heart. It was not long before he commenced, in Palestine, to emulate the feats of Lawrence, which he has long since surpassed. I remember, at our last meeting, I showed Wingate a memorandum I had written on a Service matter. After reading it, without a word he wrote at the foot of the paper a verse from the Bible which admirably summed up the whole question. When he expressed a definite opinion on any subject, Wingate did so with such confidence that one felt convinced he had reached his conclusion only after the most serious consideration. One had the feeling that here was an absolutely genuine man, whose principles were based firmly on his own carefully thought-out convictions, which he would stick to, like his friends, through thick and thin.

Wingate was one of those men, rare in any walk of life, but particularly in Government service, who possessed both the courage to express unorthodox opinions and also the infinitely more valuable gift of being able to persuade others to accept his views. Such a man is a priceless asset to the nation at the present time. One would have liked to see him enter the political field later on, though it is doubtful whether that would have appealed to him.

The sudden disappearance of this brave and gallant figure from the scene of human affairs at the present juncture is a real tragedy, and constitutes a heavy blow not only to the fortunes of this country and of all the United Nations, but ultimately to the cause of Peace, Justice and Freedom throughout the world.

H. M. BURTON.

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W. H. LEE-WARNER, O.B.E.

With the death of William Hamilton Lee-Warner, which took place suddenly from heart failure on September 7, 1943, at Bungay, Suffolk, has passed a figure well-known in Malaya and indeed throughout the Far East. The third son of an eminent Indian administrator, Sir William Lee-Warner, G.C.S.I., the call of the East dominated his life. Like most of his family he was educated at Rugby, where he was a Scholar, and also became a distinguished fives and rackets player. From there he went up to Oxford with a scholarship at University College. During these years he laid the foundations of a wide knowledge and passionate love of the classics which lasted throughout his life.

In 1903 he entered the Malayan Civil Service, and during the next twenty-five years a varied and colourful career took him to the Netherlands East Indies, Borneo, China, French Indo-China, Siam and Arabia. From 1910 to 1913 he was British Resi-

dent at Brunei, with an interval of eight months' service in the Colonial Office in London. The first two years of the first World War found him as Private Secretary and A.D.C. to the Governor of the Straits Settlements and also Secretary to the High Commissioner for the Malay States, Sir Arthur Young. Both these appointments carried no small responsibilities and he filled them with distinction. In 1916 he was seconded to the Foreign Office and did valuable work in Java, Sumatra and China; but this did not satisfy him, and in 1917 he obtained permission to come home and enlist in the Army. He joined the East Surrey Regiment as a private and soon he was given a commission; but his hopes were disappointed, for his medical category prevented his being sent to the front. Once more, however, the Foreign Office found use for his services. He was sent on a secret mission to the Hadramaut and Southern Arabia, for which his cordial relations with the influential Arab community in Singapore had specially qualified him. The mission, designed to foster Arab co-operation against the Turks, was highly successful, but the hardships of it told further on his constitution.

In 1919 he returned once more to the Malaya, and was detailed for duty in connexion with Food Control in Penang and Singapore as Official Member of the Rice Rationing and Distribution Boards. The complexity of this task in an Oriental country where rice is the staple diet and is practically all imported can be gauged by recent events in India. Once again his duty was discharged with credit. Later, he was Director of the Political Intelligence Bureau, and also served for a time in the Colonial Secretariat, where at the request of the Governor, Sir Hugh Clifford, he prepared an exhaustive scheme for the self-feeding of Malaya in war-time, which earned him official thanks and the O.B.E.

But ill-health due to tropical diseases was telling its tale and in 1929 it compelled him to retire, before he had attained the high position in the Colonial Service for which his abilities had marked him out. He settled, with his charming wife, for a time in Northumberland and later at Bungay, on the borders of Norfolk, the traditional home of his family. She died with tragic suddenness on the day they moved into their new home.

During the present war, bravely fighting recurring illness which frustrated his desire to return to the East, he served in turn in the Foreign Office, the Admiralty and the Ministry of Food until a few weeks before his death.

Besides being intellectually brilliant, he was a fine shot, fisherman, tennis player and golfer; but the keystones of his life were his generosity and his genius for friendship. Not only did no one ever ask him in vain for help, his keenest pleasure was to find lame dogs whom he could help over stiles. A great number of protégés will keep his name in loving memory, as well as a host of friends of many ranks and races. The following extract from an obituary notice in the Rugby School magazine aptly describes his many-sided and lovable personality. "It is difficult to sum up his characteristics—they were such a blend of the serious and the gay. He was hail-fellow-well-met with everyone, from My Lord Bishop to the ploughboy; and even the austerity of his London club failed to stop his determined approach to every new face. It was a matter almost of embarrassment, how he would leave one and rush across the road and start an hilarious conversation with some chance passer-by whom he had never seen before, and the roars of laughter which followed him. He was a great talker, the words rushing out in a flood which he could not restrain. He read much, and especially about Arabia, Central Asia, and the Far East. And it was in these subjects that his closest friendships were made. And what a friendship it was! Absolutely loyal, staunch and unforgetting. He was always in touch with such friends, whether they were at the back of beyond or home on leave, and wanting to learn the latest in politics or happenings from the expert. His own knowledge of such things was great and his judgment shrewd."

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The Council also deeply deplore the death of Major F. F. Rynd and of other members either in action or from causes due to the war.



# Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society

VOL. XXXI JULY—OCT., 1944 PARTS III. & IV.

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## NOTICE TO MEMBERS

IN the year which ended in December, 1943, the *expenses* of the Society were £120 more than the revenue.

In the year which ended in December, 1944, the *income* of the Society was £113 *greater* than the expenses.

The REASON was that we received £129 from the Inland Revenue as the result of members having signed covenants to pay their nominal subscriptions for seven years. This increase in revenue has cost members NOTHING.

So far we have received just over 200 covenants out of a membership of over 1,500—that is, *under 15 per cent*.

The expenses of the Society are bound to increase after the war: the Journal will again be published four times a year, lectures will increase in number and the dinner club will be revived. More important still, our staff MUST be adequately remunerated.

This can ONLY be done if we increase our membership *and* if more members will sign covenants. REMEMBER that this does NOT cost you anything but it DOES help the Society's funds.

The Council again appeal for your help in the matter.

## DEED OF COVENANT

I .....

of .....

hereby covenant with the ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY that for a period of seven years from the date hereof or during my lifetime whichever period shall be the shorter I will pay annually to the said Society such a sum as will after the deduction of Income Tax leave in the hands of the said Society *a net sum of one pound* such sum to be paid from my general fund of taxed income so that I shall receive no personal or private benefit in either of the said periods from the said sum or any part thereof.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this

..... day of ..... 19.....

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said .....

In the presence of .....

Address of Witness to your signature .....

.....

Occupation of Witness .....

## NOTICES

MEMBERS are asked to send their changes of address and of rank to the office.

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Contributors only are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

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## NOMINATION FORM.

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.....  
.....  
*(Name, with Rank, Appointment or Occupation and Address)*

*being desirous of becoming a Member of the ROYAL CENTRAL  
ASIAN SOCIETY, we recommend <sup>him</sup><sub>her</sub> for membership.*

*Proposed* .....

*Seconded* .....

*His  
Her* connection with Asia is :

# ISLAM IN INDIA

By SIR FIROZKHAN NOON, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

Anniversary lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on July 12, 1944, the Rt. Hon. Lord Hailey, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., President, in the Chair.

In opening the meeting the President, Lord HAILEY, welcomed the speaker as an old friend and a man of many interests. He was, perhaps, first and foremost, a representative of that class of landowners which was the backbone of the Punjab. But he had also qualified as a barrister; he had spent many years in the Legislature of his Province; he had been a Minister, a member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General, and High Commissioner for India; he was now a delegate from India to our War Cabinet.

As for the subject on which he was to speak, Lord Hailey said that we, as a people, were perhaps inclined to show far less interest than we should in the great religions which counted so much in the lives of other peoples. But even if we were incurious regarding the position of Islam as a doctrine and a religious philosophy, we could not afford to overlook its significance in other respects—a religion of great international importance, exercising a vital influence over the lives of innumerable people, and with the power of evoking an unusual measure of solidarity among them. Above all, we could not afford to neglect the force which Islam occupied to-day in India, and one of the factors which accounted for the fact that the country is divided into two political camps, separated by a gulf which, if it cannot be bridged over, must have a decisive effect on the whole future of India. It was the existence of this problem in particular which would give special importance to what Sir Firoz Khan would have to say to-day.

SIR FIROZKHAN NOON : I was most grateful to you, Sir, for having referred in such complimentary terms to myself. You call me your friend, which I feel a great honour. I know that you are in a greater position to me than that of a friend. In the East we give the first place to God, the second to the Prophet, the third to our parents, and then the fourth place goes to the teacher, and I claim you as my administrative teacher because I started my political career first under you. I do not know of any administrator in India who can outshine you so far as the successful administration in India is concerned. I have learned such a lot from you that I really cannot tell you how grateful I am.

I remember the very first year I got into office as Minister, Lord Hailey came down to my district. There he was, walking up and down the verandah on his long legs and thinking hard over many things. He very kindly called me up and said to me, "I made only one mistake in my life." "What was that?" I asked. He replied : "In an administrative matter I had much advice given to me. My own judgment wanted to take me another way, but I took the advice of somebody else. I made a mistake and I have never forgiven myself."

Every day I learned something from him. Therefore I am most grateful to him, and the high administrative positions I have held have been due to the training I received from him in the Punjab.

**M**Y subject is such a wide one that I find it difficult to realize which aspect of the connection of Islam with India is likely to appeal to you most. But I think I might give you a bird's-eye view of the religion of Islam in India and how it spread.

As you all know, the Prophet Mohammed died in the year 632 A.D.



Within eighty years of that date—*i.e.*, in 712 A.D.—Sind was conquered by the Mohammedan Bin Qasim, and ever since Islam has been in India.

The next big step in the Islamic connection with India comes in the time of Mahmud of Ghazni. He invaded India at about the same time as William the Conqueror invaded England, and after many invasions Mahmud, King of Ghazni, annexed the Punjab to his kingdom in the year 1020 A.D. Since then Islam has had a permanent footing in India, the whole of which came under Moslem rule in the time of Akbar the Great, who ruled in India from 1542 to nearly 1605. That was the high-water mark of Islamic political power in India, when for once the whole of India was under the Mogul Emperor at Delhi. It is often said that Islam has been spread by the sword and by force. That is an absolutely untrue charge, because the Koran itself says, "There shall be no compulsion in religions." Therefore it is almost impossible to visualize anybody, in Islam who has any faith in his religion doing a thing which is against the tenets of the Koran itself.

In India there is no doubt, as in many other countries, the religion of the ruling power naturally appeals to everybody, if for nothing else at least for the worldly goods that the man who changes his religion can acquire. In the time of the Sikhs in the Punjab we know that many Moslems and Hindus became Sikhs, as now many have become Christians. There are many people who may have accepted the Christian religion because they felt that they would ingratiate themselves with the higher officials who were Christians. During the time of the Moslem Emperors in India there may have been similar people who may have changed their religion for that purpose. But I feel that the majority of people in India changed their religion through two methods. Firstly, because of the simplicity of the religion and its principles; and, secondly, because of some of the Sufi saints of North-West India, who through many years had a wonderful influence on the majority of the people in those parts. My own ancestors are supposed to have been Rajputs, and out of poverty and hunger they migrated from Jetalsar State into Northern India. When crossing the River Sutlej at Pakpattan they accepted Islam at the hands of a very famous Sufi saint, who is now buried there. The vast majority of the Moslems in India are the original inhabitants of India converted to Islam, and the Sufi saints who did the largest amount of proselytization were the following: first, the one who is buried at Taunsa in the Punjab; another is buried in Lahore; the third is buried in Sirhind; the fourth in Ajmere; and the fifth is buried in Pakpattan. These five are responsible for large conversions through their piety and exemplary conduct.

Secondly, I should like to refer for just a few minutes to the simplicity of the religion itself. First of all, it is such a great pity that the Christian writers of the West have during the last several centuries built up an anti-Islamic literature in order to create hatred in the minds of the Europeans against the Islamic people to a great extent based on religion. Unfortunately, nowadays people in the West are so busy with their own affairs that they have no time to read for themselves, barring a few.

The Koran says, "O Mahmud, you are a man like other men, except

this, that I have selected you to be my messenger." There is the simplicity of the religion, that even the Prophet himself cannot be placed above the other human beings except in this one respect.

Secondly, the Koran says, "Oh Mahommed you have brought no new religion to the world. You are only a confirmer of the truth brought before you by Abraham, Moses and Christ."

I remember when I was a young boy my tutor was a clergyman. There was a large quantity of books in the loft of his stable, and I was rummaging among them one day when I picked out a book written by an English bishop in Asia Minor in the time of King Edward II. to the bishop in London. In one of these letters he had said that in this country, Asia Minor, a great heresy is arising called Mohammedanism. He could only use the word heresy because he found so much similarity in the two religions. According to us there is absolutely no difference between the religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. They are the same religion, from the same source, and, as a Moslem, I have to believe in Moses and Christ just as much as in Mohammed. According to us, Islam is the latest edition of the one religion. When a man accepts Islam, supposing he is a Hindu and he becomes a Mussulman, the formula he has to recite is: "I believe in Abraham, Moses, Christ, Mohammed, and in all the Prophets." It is thus alone that he becomes a Mussulman.

Therefore for me, as a Mussulman, Christ is as much respected as a prophet as Mohammed is. We do not believe in the sonship of Christ; that is against the Islamic religion; but the Koran mentions the immaculate birth of Christ. We believe that Christ had immaculate birth, but still we, like the Unitarians in Christianity, do not call him the son of God. It is such a pity that there should have been this great antagonism between the Islamic and Christian religions when essentially there is no difference between the two at all; they are the same religion. But still you find Christians fighting Christians, and therefore when Christians fight Moslems one must not be surprised.

The Islamic religion has very simple principles, which have appealed particularly to the people in the East. First of all, property is divided equally. The daughter gets half the share of the son. The shares of all the children were laid down in the Koran thirteen hundred years ago. Every heir has a share in the property of the deceased person, and no person could deprive another of the share to which he was entitled. It is not possible for a husband or father who is dying to give away his property to any other except his direct descendants.

The democracy of Islam is well known. I just quote you one example, that in the time of Omar the Caliph, when he was lecturing in the Mosque, he was wearing two sheets. A young boy said: "I have one sheet. Why do you have two?" The Caliph had to explain that the second sheet belonged to his brother, who had lent it to him because he had fever.

In India we have no paid priests at all. Every village has its priest, but he is more or less selected on account of his character and learning by the village headman. Therefore we have no clerical class like the one you have here.

Islam in India, as well as in Africa, has spread, unlike Christianity, not through the support and backing of missionary societies. If the Islamic religion had as much political power and money behind it as Christianity has had in Africa and in India, I should think that probably the Hindu-Moslem question in India would have been settled by now.

I should like to take you to the next stage of Islam—that is, after the impact with Great Britain. The Queen took over the administration of India in 1858. For nearly a hundred years before that date—that is, nearly from the middle of the eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth—there was not a single year when there was not some kind of war in the Punjab, either an invasion from abroad or an internal war between one king and another. There was no peace at all, and therefore the British and their great armies came in as a great relief to the people of North-West India. Irrespective of any religious feeling, even the Moslems—whose king was ruling nominally in Delhi, but actually the Sikhs were ruling—were out to welcome anybody who showed them some prospect of peace and order in India.

But when the British took over administration from the Moslems in Delhi it may be that they feared the Moslems, and therefore they favoured the weaker party according to their view, the Hindus, and pushed them forward in administrative posts; the Moslems were foolish enough to be sulky and stood off and did not benefit by the new education, which they felt was not as good as their own. But, so long as the political power rested in the hand of an outsider, he went on holding the balance, and sometimes pitching his weight in aid of one party or the other.

But when the new democratic forms of government came into existence in India from 1920 onwards, the old policy of the British authorities in India standing by themselves as neutrals between the Hindus and the Moslems was no longer advisable, because when you introduce a form of government where everything is decided by votes you have to decide what is the right thing, and if you know your mind many people will be willing to help, otherwise there comes a time when you find nobody to support you.

But the policy of the British Government (knowing that gradually they were going to hand over the administration of India to Indians) has been in the past to stand absolutely aloof from the internal quarrels of the two great communities. This I feel on the whole has been a wise policy to follow, although it may have created occasions for annoyance for those who thought that they should have had the support of the British and did not get it. But, on the whole, the right policy for the British to follow was to stand alone and not meddle with internal differences between the various communities.

Now we have reached a stage where somebody has to do something if there is to be peace and contentment in India. His Majesty the King has more Moslem subjects under his flag than he has Christians, and ninety-two million of these Moslems live in India. It is a very powerful community, whose interests and welfare cannot be ignored, and the time

has arrived when H.M. Government will have to decide whether they can any longer follow this policy of saying to the Hindu that you cannot have a united India because the Moslems do not agree, and turning round to the Moslems and saying, "You cannot have your Pakistan because it breaks up the unity of India and the Hindus do not like it." If that attitude continues for long I fear that through sheer disappointment both parties might get into a condition of mind which may unite them against Great Britain in an unpleasant manner, which I, as a man who is very keen on the development of India into a full dominion within the British Commonwealth of Nations as an equal and free partner, would deprecate very much.

I feel that every effort ought to be made to solve the Indian political problem, which is really the Moslem problem in India, at the earliest possible moment if an opportunity is not to be lost of keeping India as a friendly and contented and a grateful partner inside the British Commonwealth.

I know that there is no political power in the whole world which is interested more in Islam, or in whom Islam is more interested, than Great Britain. We fully realize what all the Moslem countries owe to Great Britain in her world policy for being their friend, particularly with regard to the action of Great Britain in preserving their freedom against aggression from certain quarters.

Iraq got her freedom and her present existence under England; similarly Egypt. I am convinced that there is a great future before Islam as well as Great Britain on a basis of understanding and friendship. Europe, and particularly England, has got to forget the past, the past of the wars between the Crusaders and the Saracens and the Inquisition. They are past history. Modern educated men must realize for themselves that it is in the interest of both that we should look to the future and not be against each other because of what has happened in the past.

A great deal of good can be done by understanding, and I for one feel no difference at all between Christianity and Islam. Wherever I go in England I walk into a church as if it were my own mosque, and there has never been anything said at any service which has been against my conscience or my religion. I hope that one day the people of Great Britain will also begin to see Islam in the light in which it ought to be seen and in the light of the Koran, because once that real understanding comes about between the two peoples, the whole of the Islamic world and Great Britain, I am confident that there is a great political future before us, and this will be such a great power that every political power in the world will have to consider seriously before they interfere within these territories.

The combination of all these Moslem countries on the side of England is all the more necessary from many political points of view in the years to come, because I know that the Soviet Union peoples have changed their Constitution in such a way as to enable their States to have foreign representatives, and they have also changed their national anthem. It may be that they are hoping that one day all these Moslem countries bordering on Russia may become States inside the Soviet Union. I hope that in view of the growing understanding between Russia and ourselves, where

our relations are very cordial now, these things will not arise in the near future.

I shall not fully repeat here to-day what I have said in many other places since my arrival here on April 10, that behind the Pakistan demand is the united voice of Moslem India. But one thing is certain—namely, that it is in the interests of Moslems the world over to stand by Great Britain, and it is equally in the interests of Great Britain to see that a great block of ninety-two millions of Moslems in India are not submerged in a great flood of Hindu fanaticism and intolerance.

General Sir JOHN SHEA: If I had not heard what Lord Hailey said in his opening remarks I possibly would have used the same expression as he did, by referring to Sir Firozkhan Noon as my old friend. It has been a very great happiness to know this very young man—not only him but his family—for many years.

It was indeed a great pleasure to me to hear him give his views on Islam and India. In the Indian cavalry regiment to which I belonged for twenty-one years the rank and file and the Indian officers were composed entirely of Mohammedans. So during that time I had every opportunity of appreciating not only their profound loyalty to their officers, which was in accordance with the teaching of their religion, but also we none of us could have failed to be deeply impressed by the way in which they observed their religion and what their religion meant to them. I owe to these men with whom I served the twenty-one happiest years of my life.

If it is not indiscreet, I would like to ask the lecturer what he thinks of Mr. Gandhi's offer of Pakistan to Mr. Jinnah.

Sir FIROZKHAN NOON: This correspondence which you have seen in the papers is an old one, but come to light now. The Moslems are bound to reject it, for it was never meant to be accepted—judging from the draft published here. But you will have realized that Mr. Gandhi in that letter suggested that we might ask the districts where the Moslems are in a majority to decide by plebiscite whether they want Pakistan or not in each Province. Obviously there is this catch, that in parts of the Punjab the Moslems, the Hindus and Sikhs are more or less 33 per cent. each. So really both sides are manœuvring for power and position and trying to see how they can get the better of the other two, which shows that there is really no genuine feeling for a compromise and understanding.

When that feeling has grown I am sure they will find a formula, but at the moment each leader is probably thinking of the position of his party and hoping that some compromise will be arrived at.

General H. L. HAUGHTON: Sir Firozkhan Noon has given us very distinctly and clearly an idea of the point of view of Islam in India. But during the last few years it has been my business to travel about in the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province from village to village, meeting people of all strata of society.

One complaint was that the Mohammedan point of view was very little heard. Their complaint was that when anyone visited India, whether it was a Member of Parliament or a journalist or author writing a book, or whoever else it might be, from the moment they landed they

received nothing but the purely Congress point of view. So to-day we have been very fortunate in getting the Mohammedan point of view from one so well qualified to speak. But I would like to ask whether that point has occurred to the lecturer, and whether anything has been done by the Mohammedans themselves to bring to the public, not only in this country but in America and elsewhere, the very sober Mohammedan point of view which has been put before us today?

One other small point. The lecturer referred to the Mohammedan law of inheritance. The division of property amongst all the children does lead to tremendous fragmentation of land amongst the sons of a family, so that in time fields get divided up into tiny little pocket-handkerchiefs of land, which is obviously very detrimental to agriculture. In view of the importance of agriculture for India in the future, perhaps Sir Firozkhan Noon would tell us how this fragmentation of land can be dealt with under the Mohammedan law.

SIR FIROZKHAN NOON: With regard to the first point, there is not much that the Mussulmans can do in persuading people who go from outside India to write about India. Naturally they are not interested in the internal squabbles and they are more interested in the majority community. Some try to write up the majority cause out of spite for England and her rivalry. Others probably do it in order to be able to sell their books. Others will do it from the democratic point of view, that here is the Hindu majority and they must have their will in the country. We are not the only ones to blame them for looking after the interests of the majority. I am afraid many people care very little about the minority problem, so little that they are always running after Gandhi and his party and trying to make peace with him, and yet they never have courage to turn round and say to the Moslem party, "We will try and make peace with you." They will run after Gandhi and his party because they are the majority.

Secondly, it is true that according to Islam the property is divided, and if I were a second son I would much rather have the Islamic law than the English law, where all the property is often left to the eldest son and everybody else is left in the street. Of course, it is open to everybody to go and buy land from other shareholders. Everyone likes to have a bit of his own property in the world. Girls and women have also a share in it, and they begin to take a live interest in the problems of the community, the State and the administration.

But fragmentation has gone on and does go on. The Punjab Government has done a lot. You have to choose between the two systems—either of giving landed property only to the firstborn or dividing it up among all the children. I would much rather adopt the latter course, because then you do not get a large propertyless class of people who are more or less irresponsible citizens.

MR. LEE SHUTTLEWORTH: There are only two small questions I should like to put to the lecturer. The smallest is that the Qadiyanis have organized in Africa. Can he enlighten me on that?

He pointed out, secondly, the importance of the Sufi saints and their influence in helping to convert Hindus. That might be greatly ampli-

fied. Of course, as we who have been in India know, Hindus and Moslems equally respect both Yogis and Pirs. A great deal might be said about that, but I think that is where the two religions can easily meet—in mysticism.

Sir FIROZKHAN NOON: It is quite true that the Qadiyanis have some representatives in parts of Africa, but they are a very small community. Their headquarters are in the Punjab. I do not know whether the actual number of people who believe in the Qadiyani movement is 50,000 or 100,000.

The second point: with that I have no difference of opinion.

There was another way of proselytization. A Sikh friend of mine once told me that in the Ludhiana district some pious Moslem in Delhi used to send down agents to tempt people with money to become Moslems.

One day his emissary went out into the fields. A man said, "Yes, but let me bring my relations." He collected fifteen or twenty people. Then the emissary gave him 50 rupees per head. He said, "No; the last man who made us Moslems gave us 80 rupees each!" I should like to know if Christian missionaries have followed similar methods of increasing their flock!

Mr. PHILLIPS PRICE: Adverting to the question asked by General Haughton, might I ask about the agricultural position in India. Is it not a fact that there will be a danger of recurrent famines all over India if the agricultural production is not raised and the standard of agriculture generally? Is it not necessary then somehow to introduce mechanical cultivation in India, as was the case in Russia? Is not the problem rather similar in India to that in Russia before the Revolution—namely, the mechanization of agriculture and the raising of the standard of agriculture? Is it possible to do this with the land system as it exists in India to-day?

Sir FIROZKHAN NOON: I think there is a great deal of force in what you have said, that there is room for mechanization in India, but on a co-operative basis. All these small farmers in a village might form a co-operative society and buy the machinery in that way. But for that a great deal of initiative from the Government is needed, and I hope that that matter will receive attention. But machine ploughing will not increase the production per acre. For that purpose natural and artificial manures are necessary, and growing of proper crops.

But the two most important things necessary to India now are, firstly, that as nearly 90 per cent. of the people depend on agriculture, we have got to raise the number of factory workers up to 30 or 40 million in order to bring about a right balance between industry and agriculture, so that the great industrial centres may absorb and buy up the agricultural produce.

Secondly, we have to adopt a policy of stabilization of agricultural prices. I think the world has come to realize that this *laissez faire* policy in agriculture and industry is a great mistake.

In India the difference in the price of cotton in the same year may be as much as 40 per cent. While there is so much fluctuation in the price

of cotton there will be fluctuation in the price of the articles produced. Therefore, industry cannot be stable and there will be cycles of prosperity and depression. If the U.S.A. have stabilized their price of cotton at 18 cents per lb. for many years, I do not see why we could not do it, and we have done it in this war in India. We have fixed the price of wheat in the Punjab. If we standardize the prices of agricultural products, that will bring prosperity to the farmer.

Standardization of prices and increasing the purchasing power of the consumer in the East are not only essential from the point of view of the prosperity of India, but also from the point of view of the prosperity of this country, which depends on the export of consumer goods.

Colonel NEWCOMBE: Is there any fundamental difference between Islam and Unitarianism? If not, is it not rather a simple way of explaining the difference between Islam and Christianity to ordinary people of the West?

Sir FIROZKHAN NOON: I am grateful to you for the suggestion, because Islam teaches Unitarianism. Unitarians believe in one God and not in the sonship of Christ, and that is exactly the faith of Islam. Sir Michael O'Dwyer once told me that when he was Governor of Lahore there was a riot. He sent an officer down to find out the cause. The cause was that the Moslems had beaten up the Hindus because some Hindu lecturer had abused Mary, the mother of Christ. Therefore it was their duty to go and fight them. That shows how much Moslems revere Christ, Mary and Moses.

A MEMBER: The second speaker referred to the backwardness of the Mohammedans in India, and you suggested that this was possibly due to the natural tendency of visitors to follow the more vocal side. I am not at all certain that this backwardness is not rather an inherent vice in Mohammedans, because the same thing occurs in Palestine.

Sir FIROZKHAN NOON: It is true that the Moslems, because of lack of education and funds, do not present their case to the world as much as they should do, but that is a thing which cannot be remedied from outside. When you are poor and ignorant these two things are great sins, and I do not know how we can help in that matter.

Mr. LEE SHUTTLEWORTH: There is one suggestion I should like to make as regards fragmentation. I think Hindu law is as responsible for fragmentation of holdings as Islamic law.

Sir FIROZKHAN NOON: I agree, except that under Moslem law women do inherit and under Hindu law it is only the males who inherit landed property. The joint Hindu family system is unfortunately disappearing.

The PRESIDENT: You will, I am sure, allow me to thank Sir Firozkhan Noon on your behalf. His lecture was exceedingly interesting and exceedingly illuminating.



## THE INDIAN ARMY THEN—NOW— AND THEN?

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR DASHWOOD STRETTELL, K.C.I.E., C.B., late Director of Demobilization and Reconstruction, G.H.Q., India, gave an informal talk to the Society on April 12. He explained that, beyond known facts, the contents of his talk were only his own experience and had no official approval or otherwise. He briefly described the organization of the Indian Army pre-war, and gave a rough sketch of its expansion and the inherent difficulties, partly due to lack of direction from home and partly to the old-fashioned ideas in India regarding what are so wrongly called the martial classes. The recruitment from the South has been enormous and was greatly retarded by lack of instructors who knew the language.

General Strettell gave his views on reconstruction and resettlement, some of which looked like being accepted. He suggested that, among other things, there were openings for an Indian Corps of Commissionaires, employment of ex-soldiers in the Police, employment of Indian Army medical personnel in the Provincial Health Corps, and as male nurses in what must inevitably be a largely extended Civil Hospital Service. He described the scheme put forward for the utilization of the Military Reconstruction Fund in improving knowledge of better farming, both of stock and crop, by demonstration plots and by classes of instruction, though his personal opinion was that, with the short time available, the natural conservatism of farmers might not justify the expenditure. He emphasized that this scheme could *not* be looked on as a Resettlement scheme *financed by Government*, as the Fund was derived from half an increase in deferred pay allotted to the soldier, and was therefore the money of the soldiers as a whole and no longer belonged to Government.

He strongly deprecated the non-existence of a living wage in India. Governments, both Central and Provincial, paid their lower grade employees salaries on which it was impossible to live, and as long as this was the case corruption and bribery were encouraged.

As regards the future army of India, his own opinion was that as soon as hostilities in any area permitted, we should form an "Interim Army," with its main object the "Defence of the Frontiers," which should require to be *in situ* during the period of demobilization so as to prevent the disasters which occurred during demobilization after the last war.

His own strong opinion was that in organizing this interim army we should bear in mind the necessity for spreading the recruitment over all India and, with our knowledge of Indian political ideas, we should attempt to organize this army so that it might easily be transposed into the post-war Regular Army. It would be better to hand over an army so constituted, which might possibly require very slight alteration, than to leave things in the melting-pot until the new Constitution came into force. He emphasized that these were only his own personal views.

He has since written to us to say that, in error, he omitted to mention the remarkable Women's Corps which was first raised in 1942, just two years ago. The necessity which caused it to be raised was primarily a shortage of clerks. There were many previously who thought there was little likelihood of any success attending the raising of this corps. Sir Dashwood was responsible for its organization in its early days and was glad to say it now numbered some thousands, of which nearly one thousand were Indian ladies; some two hundred second and third grade staff officers had been replaced by women. This corps, called "The Women's Auxiliary Corps (India)," was based on the organization of the A.T.S., and carries out *identically* the same duties. The officers hold the King's commission, and Europeans, Anglo-Indians and Indians were all welcome and on exactly the same footing. Service was confined to India.

# SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC

By EDWARD JACOMB

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, May 10, 1944, in the rooms of the Royal Society, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

**S**HAKESPEARE in the Prologue to *Henry V.* asks:

“Can this cockpit hold  
The vasty fields of France?”

I feel much inclined to ask a similar question in endeavouring to compress the vast expanse of the South-West Pacific into a forty-minutes discourse. What is the South-West Pacific? No doubt you have a map of the Pacific more or less in your minds. Imagine the Equator, which runs north of Papua, New Guinea. The distance along the Equator from one side of the Pacific to the other is 10,000 miles. If we take the 140th meridian of longitude, which is a little more than halfway across the Pacific, as our eastern limit, we shall find between it, the Equator on the north and  $22\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  latitude south, the area of the South-West Pacific in which practically all the islands are to be found.

I do not propose to talk about Australia or New Zealand, although Australia fringes and New Zealand is not far outside that area. Inside it are a number of what are called groups—*i.e.*, aggregations of islands—some coming under one Power, some under another. England has an interest in a number of these groups, which it controls either directly, as Fiji, or through the Western Pacific High Commission. Australia controls Papua, the Territory (formerly German), and two small islands, Norfolk and Lord Howe; New Zealand, Samoa, the Cook Islands, and the Kermadec Group. France has New Caledonia, the Wallis Group, the Marquesas, Tahiti, and the Taumotus. The United States hold Eastern Samoa, while the New Hebrides are an Anglo-French Condominium.

The south-eastern part of the Pacific is practically all blank water. There are only a few groups and islands in it—Easter Island and the Juan Fernandez Group (Chile), and the Galapagos (Ecuador). The only group of islands which, strictly speaking, belong to the South-West Pacific and overflow north of the Equator are the Hawaiian Group (U.S.A.), which is part of Polynesia.

First, I will make a few general remarks about the geographical character of the area. We have a number of island groups separated by stretches of water. Distances are very great, many hundreds of miles separating the groups. That fact alone creates considerable difficulties, both from the trading and the administrative points of view. Another great difficulty is the paucity of harbours. In the New Hebrides there are only two or three fairly good ones; in Tonga two; in Western Samoa

not one. There may be some eight or ten harbours worth the name in all, and they are important both from the strategic and from the trading points of view. To anyone who has been around these islands, as I have, in small ships to collect a few bags of copra or cases of oranges or bananas, it is heartbreaking, if the tide does not chance to be quite high enough or the sea not quite smooth enough, to have to pass on and leave these products to spoil on the shore.

The climate, of course, is tropical, but is tempered by the trade wind. During the winter—June to September—the trade wind blows from the south-east, and quite cool nights are experienced. In the South-West Pacific there are two main geological structures. One is the coral atoll, built by the coral animal and which only exceeds high water by about 10 feet—chiefly seen in the Gilbert Islands, the only part of Micronesia to come within our area, and in the Taumotus; and the other the volcanic formations of Papua, the Solomons, New Hebrides, Fiji, Samoa, Marquesas, Tahiti, etc., which may contain minerals—*e.g.*, the gold of Fiji and Papua and the nickel of New Caledonia—and coral as well. The climate is, generally speaking, not unpleasant, but at times life is made burdensome by flies and mosquitoes and other insects such as ants.

There are few large animals in the area. In New Guinea there are crocodiles, elsewhere only pigs and small native rats. Birds are few in number—mostly pigeons and wild duck. Dogs, cats and fowls have been imported by Europeans. In New Guinea there are, I believe, snakes also.

All tropical plants thrive luxuriantly—bananas, lemons, oranges, coconuts, yams, coffee, cotton and so forth. European imported vegetables do less well on account of parasites. The soil is very fertile. Mr. Lloyd George, when he went to the West Indies, was very much struck with the fertility there—the West Indies are somewhat like the Pacific—and is reported to have said of Jamaica that “if you plant a stick it comes up an umbrella.” It would not quite do that in the Pacific, but very nearly.

Fish are very plentiful, and sharks abound. The main trouble about food is that there are no cooks.

The foregoing rather disjointed remarks will give you a rough idea of what the islands are like. They were discovered only fairly recently. It is but 450 years since Columbus discovered America. Balboa discovered the Pacific in 1513, and a few years later, in 1519, Magellan the straits which bear his name. At that time the impulse towards discovery and voyages to distant parts was motivated by two considerations: one, to find a path to the fabled riches of India, not going east but west; the other, the universal belief that on account of the large mass of land existing above the Equator there must be a large continent in the southern hemisphere to balance it, otherwise the earth would topple over. After Mendaña had discovered the Solomons in 1568, de Quiros, in 1606, thought he had actually found this supposed southern continent when he arrived at the island of Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides. But Santo is only an island, some 60 miles by 40. He did not sail round it. Incidentally, he says that he discovered pottery there, but it is much more probable that he brought it with him or made it himself *in situ*.

Then there was a considerable interval. Cook (1769-1778) discovered

and charted a great deal of the Pacific, so it is fair to say that until the last 150 years nobody really knew much about the different groups. A certain number of accounts of visits to different islands exist and have been published, and the general impression I got when I read them was that the islands were at the time full to overflowing with a native population. There is no question of statistics here, only of impressions, and the impressions must be treated with reserve. A ship coming to a strange island would naturally attract all the natives in the vicinity to the beach, and an exaggerated idea of the total population might easily have been formed. Occasionally, however, we get a little bit of concrete evidence to reinforce our impressions. There is that, for instance, of the American Herman Melville, who in 1842 ran away from his ship and was a prisoner for four months of a native tribe in a valley of Nukuhiva in the Marquesas. He estimated the population in that particular valley at 2,000, and adds there were a number of other valleys, all at enmity one with another. The French, who annexed the Marquesas in the same year, estimated the total population then at 20,000.

We get another angle on the population problem when we consider the question of cannibalism. One of the causes of cannibalism is the overcrowding of islands. There are, of course, other reasons. You kill your enemy and eat him because, perhaps, you despise him, or want to acquire some of his good qualities, his courage or his cunning. But cannibalism is one of the signs of a superabundant population. It still exists in the New Hebrides, the Solomons and New Guinea. In pidgin English, the *lingua franca* of the South-West Pacific—in Melanesia, at all events—man is referred to from the cannibalistic point of view as "long fellow pig," which suggests what he tastes like. This is not uncomplimentary, for sucking-pig at all events is extremely good. Some old natives have admitted shyly to me that they may have once had a mouthful, but they qualified this quasi-admission by saying that it was only a very little one, and, anyhow, that white man tastes rather too salt for their liking.

I think it may be stated as a fact, then, that when the first white men reached the Pacific they found the islands fully inhabited everywhere they went.

There are three native races in the South-West Pacific—Melanesians, Micronesians and Polynesians. We have little to do with the Micronesians, who are only represented in this area by the Gilbert Islanders. The Melanesians are in Papua, New Guinea, the Solomons, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides and Fiji. The Polynesians are in the remaining groups I have mentioned, and also, of course, in New Zealand as the Maoris. The Polynesians and Micronesians have smooth hair and light skins; the Melanesians curly hair and much darker skin. They are not really black, but a very dark brown—not the shiny skin of the American negro, matt.

I have little time to go into the question of the origin of these three races. That subject has been dealt with by various authors, notably by the late Dr. Codrington of the Melanesian Mission in *Melanesia and the Melanesians* and *Melanesian Languages*. His theory is that they came

originally from India, possibly from the Punjab, and that there were two streams of emigration, one down the east coast of Africa and the other across Malaya to the Pacific. He adduces certain words such as "tas" (salt-water) and "mate" (dead), which are found both in Madagascar and in Melanesia, combined in both localities in the place-name "Tasmate," always situate on the lee side of an island. This is a suggestive observation.

I want now to say a few words about the characteristics of the natives, or Kanakas. Parenthetically I may remark that it is sometimes convenient to refer to the three races as Kanakas. The term was first popularized by the French, but nowadays it has degenerated rather into a term of abuse. In fact, the word "kanaka" is simply the Hawaiian for "man." In disposition they are cheerful and honest—two very good qualities. I have often left Vila, the capital of the New Hebrides, for weeks on end, my house remaining wide open, and have come back to find nothing missing. There are certain things Kanakas regard as common property—food, for instance. Food is so plentiful that it is not worth stealing, and the taking of it is not regarded as theft. It is rare indeed to find anything else stolen. They are also hard-working. Many might deny this, but the truth is that in their natural village life they work very hard for certain periods of the year—when gardens have to be made and planted and canoes built. Between whiles they rest and amuse themselves. The European has little use for such spasmodic work. What he wants is steady labour over several years on plantations or as domestic servants.

With regard to languages, again owing to shortness of time I can say but little. In many of the groups—e.g., Fiji, Samoa, Tonga—there is but one language in each group. In the New Hebrides, on the other hand, we are supposed to have some sixty different languages, including dialects. This makes intercourse between native and European very difficult. To get over this the Melanesian Mission used to teach all its scholars *Mota*, the language of a small island in the Banks Group, while the Papuan Administration uses another native language, *Motu*, for the same purpose. A more generally used *lingua franca* is pidgin English, which, though quaint, is eminently practical. Anyone can learn enough of it to get on with within a few weeks. The main principle underlying it is to make the fullest possible use of every word. Take the word "calico," for example. All tissues or cloths are "calico." By indicating the thing to which it belongs or is attached one can describe a large number of different objects. Thus, "calico belong ship" is a sail; "calico belong table," a tablecloth; "calico belong bed," a sheet; and "calico belong nose belong me," a handkerchief. Dr. Lambert, in his important book on the Pacific, *A Doctor in Paradise*, gives a chapter on pidgin English, while there is a good example of a story told in it in Jack London's *Cruise of the Snark*.

The Kanaka never invented the art of writing, but he learned to read the stars and to navigate by them. Of art he has little to show apart from decorated clubs, spears, arrows and mats. As to architectural monuments, such simply do not exist, but on Easter Island (outside our area) there are the famous statues (fully described by the Routledge expedition), while on

Tongatabu there is one of the most extraordinary archways known—the Ha'amoga trilithon. This consists of three massive blocks of coral limestone, the two uprights weighing 25 and 37 tons respectively, while the lintel weighs  $6\frac{1}{4}$  tons. There is a second somewhat smaller trilithon on the island of Tafahi, also in the Tongan Group. Melville describes a number of royal tombs on Nukuhiva in the Marquesas built of great blocks of coral limestone, and there are similar royal tombs (*langis*) on Tongatabu. It seems certain that all these, like the Pyramids, were placed in position by human hands without machinery.

As to their religion, until the missionaries came along it was pure animism, and to a great extent it is so still to-day. They believe in spirits, mostly maleficent. When we die our spirits survive at least for a time and become like goblins, playing tricks to do harm. Thus their lives are subject to an overriding fear of the evil influences of a spirit world which must at all costs be conciliated.

Of cookery they know little. Roasting or baking is performed by means of hot stones buried in the ground alongside food wrapped in banana leaves. The drink of the Pacific is *kava*, which is a root. In the old days it was prepared by children, who chewed it and then mixed it with water in a bowl. Now it is prepared mechanically. It tastes rather like soapy water. Too much of it induces unconsciousness, but it has no exhilarating effect.

So far as physical appearance is concerned, Kanakas are of a somewhat stocky physique. The Queen of Tonga is an exception, being 6 feet 4 inches in height. One of my friends, a rather embittered old man, on reading some book describing the beauties of Polynesian girls sitting under palm trees, said: "Why, they are not even ugly!" Mariner, who stayed in Tonga for six years, describes their games, which are mostly concerned with hunting. The power of the chiefs in Polynesia is very great. When the Queen of Tonga opens her Parliament her subjects sit down, because the head of the subject must be below the head of his queen.

Now some words about the white man in the Pacific. The first comers were the explorers, who did little. They did, however, do one thing—they brought disease with them. Indeed, every type of white man who has come to the islands has also brought disease. After the explorers came the sandalwooders (there was sandalwood on Aneityum and Malekula in the New Hebrides) and the "blackbirders," who kidnapped natives. Both brought disease. The missionaries, too, brought disease. This is rather a delicate subject. I am in favour of missionaries because I have always regarded them—I am speaking of the New Hebrides—as a buffer between the unscrupulous white man and the native. But there is no doubt about it that alongside the good they have done they have also done much harm. Enthusiasm is not enough; it must be accompanied by knowledge. Many of the early missionaries were quite uncultured people, and in particular they had no knowledge of medicine. Charitable persons at home used to send them clothes for the natives. You know how shocked some people can be at the thought of poor savages without clothes. It was bad enough to clothe them, but when the clothing is

second-hand and dirty, and when they are not taught that wet clothing should be removed and not allowed to dry on one, trouble is bound to follow.

Dr. Lambert, in his book which I have already quoted, says that the importation of disease has been the chief evil done by the white man to the native and the main cause of the fall in population. I do not entirely agree with that. In the New Hebrides, at all events, there is another potent cause of evil—the indentured labour system. That system recruits the young men and women for three years' service on plantations. There they are unable to produce children, and if they are kept there, as I have seen happen, particularly on French plantations, for perhaps twenty years, from whence is the new generation coming?

Dr. Lambert regards the indentured labour system as a civilizing system, and refers particularly to Papua, where I can well believe that that may be the case. The Australians do at least try to have proper labour inspection; whereas in the New Hebrides labour inspection—at any rate, on French plantations—simply does not exist.

Suva, in Fiji, is the administrative centre of the Pacific for English-controlled groups, Nouméa in New Caledonia for the French. In Fiji a good deal has been done in the construction of roads and the building of hospitals and schools, and a considerable amount of medical work is carried out. But in other groups (apart from Papua), like the New Hebrides, Solomons, and even Samoa and the Cook Islands, very little has been done at all. There are few evidences of roads, drainage, water, lighting or any of the ordinary services which here we all take for granted. And that in spite of an excessive number of officials. In Samoa, for example, out of a total white population of 412 there were, in 1939, just before the war, no less than 63 officials. I asked what they all did, and the answer I got was: "Draw up one another's pay sheets."

The New Hebrides is a very curious place. It is an Anglo-French Condominium (since 1906), and there the usual number of officials you would expect to find is not merely doubled, but sometimes trebled. For instance, there are two Resident Commissioners, two Assistant Commissioners, two Chiefs of Police, three Judges, and so on. But this multiplication of officials does not give the people who inhabit the group the things they are entitled to expect; indeed, they are in many respects worse off than their brethren in neighbouring groups.

But of all sins of commission and omission committed by island administrations, the one I find hardest to forgive is their almost universal lack of interest in all things medical. When I came home on my second furlough, two or three weeks after my arrival in London I received a letter from Vila telling me about a case of leprosy. Leprosy is one of the diseases of the South-West Pacific. In Fiji they have a leper colony (at Mokogai), but there is nothing of the kind in the New Hebrides. A leper was sent to Vila from an island named Tanna by the resident medical missionary there. He was sent to the British Resident Commissioner, who promptly sent him to the Presbyterian hospital. The doctor in charge of the hospital refused to receive him, and he was passed backwards and forwards between the two till someone remarked that I was



away and my house empty and he had better go there. He did, and for some weeks made himself quite at home in my kitchen, using, naturally enough, anything there that he needed. Again, when I was in Tonga in 1939, the Chief Medical Officer there told me that he had written dozens of letters to the Premier's Office during the preceding six months on medical matters, but had never received a single reply.

This lack of interest is further illustrated by the absurdly small numbers of Government Medical Officers employed outside Papua and Fiji. In the New Hebrides there are two, one British and one French, in Tonga two, in the Cook Islands two, in Samoa two or three, in the Solomons one—for 100,000 natives. And yet, as I have indicated, the medical problems are of outstanding difficulty and importance. There are all sorts of dreadful diseases rife among the population. Hookworm disease, for instance, is prevalent. The hookworm is a parasite which lives in the human intestine, where it is said to consume one drop of blood per day. This has been known for years, but the Administrations were not interested, and as a result the population has been dying off like flies, for the parasite makes the patient so anæmic that he cannot stand up to any fresh infection he may encounter.

For the sake of completeness I will just mention the traders and planters—there are not so very many of them. The traders have little stores where they sell tinned meat and clothes to natives, who would be much better off without them. The planters drain the villages of their most likely young men and maidens and so contribute to the fall in population. Then there are also a few Government officials who, on retiring, settle in groups like Fiji, where one gets some of the amenities of civilization combined with cheap living and a good climate.

To return to medical matters. In addition to hookworm, there is malaria, dengue, blackwater fever, filaria (which leads to elephantiasis), leprosy, yaws and tuberculosis. The handful of Government Medical Officers, even with the addition of an even smaller number of medical missionaries, have been far too few to cope with all these. Happily, something was done in regard to hookworm by the Rockefeller Foundation, which has put in twenty years' work in the Pacific, first tackling Queensland, then Papua, and then other parts of the South-West Pacific. Two things are needed to combat hookworm disease—a proper system of sanitation (otherwise there would be reinfection) and a drug to expel the worm. At first oil of chenopodium was used, but it proved very inefficacious. At last, however, Dr. Hall, another American, suggested carbon tetrachloride, and this proved to be a specific. Dr. Lambert and his assistants treated thousands of patients at a time, and for the time at least went far towards stamping out the disease.

Another thing the Americans did was to give a grant of £10,000 for a medical school in Suva, and that is one of the most encouraging things I have come across in recent years. They get hold of the more intelligent boys in the various groups, send them to New Zealand or Australia to learn English (so that they may be able to read medical text-books), and then give them a four or five years' course in medicine and surgery. This wonderful school turns out first-class surgeons and physicians, their

raw material being lads whose grandfathers (if not their fathers) were cannibals. The school was started in a very humble and primitive way by Dr. Cornish, the then Chief Medical Officer of Fiji, in the eighties of last century, but it was not until the Americans came forward with this splendid gift, on condition that the different groups also agreed to pay their proportion of the charges, that the thing really got going. I record thankfully that New Zealand is one of the supporters. The only two non-participators are Papua and the New Hebrides. I cannot explain the abstention of Papua. Dr. Lambert in his book dismisses the matter by saying simply, "Australia will not play ball." But the reason why the New Hebrides will not collaborate is the fear of the French half of the Condominium that any New Hebrideans sent might fall too much under British influence. I told this to a Frenchman whose mother was English and who was bilingual. He refused to believe me. However, the next day there chanced to arrive in Suva a Messageries boat with the French Resident Commissioner for the New Hebrides on board, and I suggested he should go off and ask him the question direct. He did, and received the same reply that I had already given him.

A few words now about population. I have already explained that the original population became greatly diminished owing to imported disease, the indentured labour system and various other causes. I cannot give figures of the population at the time of the first explorers, but I can quote some more recent ones which show that the population went on declining until the Americans intervened, sent Dr. Lambert to the Pacific and put the Suva school on its feet. In those parts of the South-West Pacific where the Suva school native medical practitioners are now working, the decline has not merely been arrested but the population is beginning to increase once more; in those parts still without native medical practitioners, particularly the French Groups, the decline continues unchecked.

When I went out to the New Hebrides in 1906 we estimated the population at 65,000; to-day it is about 35,000. In 1842 the French themselves estimated the population of the Marquesas at 20,000; to-day there are less than 3,000. Captain Cook estimated the population of Tahiti at 240,000; to-day it is under 5,000. Whatever the population of the Taumotus was in the past, to-day it is under 4,000. On the other hand, the population of Tonga has increased from 29,000 in 1932 to over 33,000; that of Samoa from 33,000 in 1921 to 55,000; that of the Cook Islands from 10,000 in 1931 to 13,000. The population of Fiji in 1881 was 114,000; by 1921 it had sunk to 84,000; to-day it is over 97,000. In all, under the British flag there are (exclusive of Papua, the Territory, and the New Hebrides) some 222,000 Kanakas, under the tricolor only 22,000. As a result of the disappearance of native population in the French groups, the French have imported Annamites and Indo-Chinese to provide labour on their plantations, thus creating a problem similar to the one we created in Fiji when we allowed Indian indentured labour.

These figures will, I hope, not merely adorn my tale, but point a moral. My own view is that the French have been a failure in the Pacific, and that one thing at least should be done at the end of this war and that is

to abolish the New Hebrides Condominium. It has never worked and it never will work—meanwhile the natives are dying out.

As to the future, there are plenty of problems—old ones still completely unsolved and at least two new ones. There is likely to be a further spread of disease. With ships passing increasingly to certain of these islands still immune from malaria-infested lands, malaria, which hitherto has not extended east of the New Hebrides, may be expected to reach Polynesia. A second problem—or an old one on a larger scale—will be that of the half-caste, or, as he is euphemistically labelled in Fiji and Samoa, “the local born.” The next twenty or thirty years will be very important for the future of the Kanakas. They are a very attractive race and merit sympathy, for, after all, they are the original and natural owners of the soil. They did not ask us to go there. Moreover, the islands have a distinct value. They produce certain commodities which can be produced there in perfection, notably copra. If you look at a map of the world you will see that there is relatively little land in the tropics and near sea-level, the two conditions indispensable to the coconut tree. So if the natives die out our supply of copra will be sadly diminished, for you cannot work plantations in the South Seas with white labour.

I thank you very much for the patience with which you have listened to me. I hope I have given you some idea of that part of the globe where I have spent a number of happy years and where, when this war is ended, I hope to spend the rest of my life.

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In reply to a question, the lecturer gave the following figures for the Fijian population of Fiji :

1881	...	...	...	...	114,748
1891	...	...	...	...	105,800
1901	...	...	...	...	94,397
1911	...	...	...	...	87,096
1921	...	...	...	...	84,475
1936	...	...	...	...	97,651

In Fiji in 1881 there were 588 Indians, in 1936 there were 85,002, or only 12,000 less than the number of Fijians in the same year.

In reply to another question, he said that there could quite easily be hill stations in the Pacific as in India, but with the very heavy rains most of the soil was washed down to lower levels, so that there could be little high ground cultivation. One could live quite well in the higher altitudes and come down to the lower ground to work as soon as roads have been made to unite the two.

# TRANSJORDAN : PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

By B. TOUKAN

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on April 19, 1944, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., in the Chair.

In introducing the lecturer the CHAIRMAN said Mr. Toukan was a Transjordanian by birth, had worked under Colonel Peake Pasha, and latterly with H.R.H. the Emir Abdullah himself. He was shortly returning to Transjordan.

**T**RANSJORDAN, though small in area and population, is very rich in history and enjoys an extremely important geographical situation. It is impossible to confine its full story, with the possibilities of the future, within the space of a short lecture. However, my theme in this talk is to outline, briefly, the main landmarks of the country's history and to point out the significance of certain events that have left a deep impression on the general trend of the development of the Near East. Actually this lecture should not be considered more than an *hors d'œuvre* to a further study and a deeper research. This might mean, however, that I am fulfilling the function of a travel agency, thus inducing you to go over to Transjordan for a short or long visit. I think even if I could do this now I would achieve a great success, especially as there is no other Transjordanian in this country who might compete with me. I have been struck by the fact that all the British who have been to Transjordan have a definite liking and affection for the country. What is there in Transjordan that leaves such an impression on its visitors? I hope that this lecture will supply the answer.

With the arrival of His Royal Highness Emir Abdullah bin Hussein in Amman on March 2, 1921, shortly after King Feisal's kingdom in Syria had come to an end, Transjordan, in its present political status, came into existence. The country in situation is similar to an island in a sea of important Arab countries—Syria from the north, Iraq and Wadi Sarhan of Nejd from the east, Saudi Arabia (*i.e.*, Nejd and Hijaz) from the south, and Palestine from the west. It borders on Egyptian territory at the Red Sea port of Aqaba.

Transjordan, with the exception of the eastern section, has roughly the shape of a triangle, in which a large portion of the central area is a plateau, sloping down eastward to the depression of Wadi Sarhan and Azraq and rising up westward from the Shera, Balqa and Ajloun mountains, which slope down into the Jordan valley.

Eastern Transjordan, called sometimes the "corridor"—and I call it the "peaceful corridor"—has roughly a rectangular shape and is attached to the upper part of the eastern side of the triangle.

The area of Transjordan is about 90,000 sq. kms.; inhabited by nearly 350,000 people, of whom the great majority are Arabs, and the rest are minorities representing Circasians, Shishans, Turcomans and Persian

Bahais, who are all Transjordanians either by birth or naturalization. A good section of the population are Beduins, nomadic or semi-nomadic. The nomads are gradually becoming semi-nomadic, owing to the prevention of raids, the Beduin sport and hobby, and the encouragement and help they receive from His Highness's Government to cultivate the land and raise cattle.

Owing to its unique geographical position, Transjordan is rich in history and has been directly or indirectly affected by the history and destinies of the surrounding countries. Its early inhabitants were of Semitic stock, who were described as giants or "Amalekites," as referred to in the Bible and old Arab narrations. Of them were the Horrites (the mountain-dwellers), living on Mount Seir or the Shera mountains of to-day, the Emims in Kerak, the Zamzummins in Amman, and the Hogarites in Gilead (roughly modern Ajloun District). Besides a crude kind of agriculture which these people carried on, they utilized their situation and undertook the carrying trade between different surrounding countries. The Bible makes mention of these caravans in more than one place. Joseph, the son of Jacob, was sold to a caravan party transporting goods to Egypt. It is correct to assume, then, that these caravan parties helped in the diffusion of the civilizations of the various countries they visited.

These caravan routes, in addition, helped the Children of Israel during their march from Egypt to Palestine under the leadership of the Prophet Moses. Having crossed the frontiers of Transjordan, they made a halt in the neighbourhood of Mount Harun (Hor of the Bible), near Petra, where Aaron, Moses' brother, passed away and was buried. His tomb is marked now by a sacred shrine, built during the rule of the Mameluke King Al-Nasir in 1330. From there the Israelites marched northward, following roughly the route of the modern railway line on the fringe of the desert, then turned west, breaking their way through until they reached the approaches of the Jordan. But before crossing it, Moses yielded up his soul, ". . . but no man knoweth of his sepulchre unto this day." It is related that before his death Moses ascended Mount Nebo, corrupted now into Naba, just west of Madaba, from which he saw Palestine for the first and last time.

The passage of the Israelite Tribes through Transjordan was followed by a period of turmoil and troubles. Besides the internal disturbances and disputes amongst the already established kingdoms of Gilead, Ammon, Amorite, Moab and Edom, the country was overrun by the Assyrians as early as 846 B.C. and was the prey sought by the Beduins emerging from the south. Shortly after, the country had to undergo the sufferings brought about as a result of the imperial ambitions of both the Chaldean Kings and the Egyptian Pharaohs. After 540 B.C., Transjordan fell under new masters, the Persians, who were the heirs of the kingdom of Chaldea, and about two hundred years later became part of Alexander the Great's empire.

In the course of these events and upheavals the ancient kingdoms of Transjordan either completely or partly vanished, and new people made their appearance in the south, where they established a kingdom that en-

riched the country's history and significance in the world of civilization. These people were Arabs known as the Nabateans. They migrated northward from Central Arabia and superseded the Edomites in their area, which controlled all trade routes from east to west and from south to north. Consequently this favourable situation engendered in them a capacity for commerce and carrying trade. As a result they became so prosperous that there were no slaves or poor among them. Eventually, every one of them had to take a share in carrying out public services such as policing, cleaning the streets and other similar duties. Hence their society was free from social classes, nor had they any family distinctions. All were equal and extremely democratic. Even their kings, as the contemporary historians related, had to submit a periodical report of their activities and public expenditure. Such a picture may remind one of the Utopias of the philosophers; but Transjordan in the past had in reality such a Utopia and should ever be proud to be a cradle of ideal democracy.

This energetic and illustrious race managed to survive throughout the evils of the wars and disorders which broke out during the Greek and Roman periods until A.D. 106, when their ascendancy was broken up and smashed shortsightedly by the Emperor Trajan. It is not improbable that the Bidul Beduins who now live primitively in the upper caves of Petra are remnants of the old Nabateans, though the proofs and evidence are still lacking.

The Nabateans left a number of monuments, particularly in the south of Transjordan and north of Hijaz, the most important of which is Petra, the "Red Rose City of the Desert," which as it stands reflects the marvellous achievement of nature and man. Its solitude in a barren area, the different colouring of its sandy rocks, its single and narrow approach through a deep cleft called Al-Siq Pass, its numerous temples and tombs, its theatre, thoroughfares and houses cut into living rock—all these ascribe to Petra characteristics that are not found anywhere else in this universe.

The entrance to Petra called Al-Siq lies between high cliffs and is 6,000 feet long. In some parts the road is 20 feet wide; in others the rock almost touches overhead. Along one side is a channel cut in the rock, which originally carried water to the inhabitants from the springs at Wadi Musa.

The passage suddenly ends with a tomb, which was cut in the rock with amazing beauty and perfect proportions of sculpture. It is wrongly called by the natives Khaznat Faroun, or the Treasury of Pharaoh. The rock face in which it is carved is sheltered from winds and rain. A little farther on there is the theatre cut out of living rock.

Soon the hills fall back on either side and leave an open space about a mile long and three-quarters of a mile wide. Here, on the slopes, was the actual city, its temples, palaces, baths and private houses, with a fine paved street following the line of the stream, and bridges across at intervals.

High up in the mountains to the west is the great building of Al-Deir, or the Convent. The monuments show that it was a Roman temple.

Petra had been unknown to the outside world until it was visited by

the Swiss traveller John Lewis Burchardt in 1812. After him, few explorers attempted to visit it; not until after the last World War was it actually accessible to every interested person.

Transjordan was also profoundly influenced by Greek civilization. The Greeks were not absorbed in conquests and domination so much as in colonization. In North Transjordan they founded a number of cities, the most important of which was Gerasa (modern Jerash), in which the language, culture, religion and administration were predominantly Hellenistic.

It is suggested that the name "Gerasa" was Semitic in origin and probably came from the Nabateans. Most likely the town was founded by the Seleucid King Antiochus IV., who gave it his name and came to be known as Antioch instead of the old name, which was revived by the Moslem Arabs and corrupted afterwards into Jerash.

It enjoyed more prerogatives than any other Greek town in the country and a good part of its Greek community survived throughout the ages. In the reign of Omer Bin Al-Khattab, the second Khalif, it was decreed that they should be treated with toleration and kept unmolested.

At the beginning of the first century before Christ Gerasa fell into Jewish hands, then dominated by the Romans. A Nabatean community, probably traders or trade agents, was living there. Hence, though its monuments are essentially Greek, they bear Jewish, Roman and Nabatean influences as well.

The town was surrounded by a wall, having a regular thickness of 3 metres, a height varying with terrain and a length of about 3,456 metres. As a result of recent excavations a great number of its monuments are now above ground—namely, temples, cathedrals, thoroughfares, plazas, public baths and fountains, amphitheatres, paved streets with colonnades on both sides, and so on.

Transjordan was also influenced by the Romans, who succeeded the Greeks there. The whole country, including the Nabatean kingdom after it had been subdued, was united into one province and was called first the Province of Arabia, then "Palæstina Salutaris." During this period towns and villages sprang up, chiefly in the north, embellished with theatres, aqueducts, temples and colonnades. To serve their military, administrative and commercial purposes, the Romans built a network of roads in the country, the most important of which were three. First, the road that connected Bostris (Busra Eski Sham) with the Red Sea; the second was that which connected Bostris with Tiberias, passing through the most northerly part of Transjordan; and, lastly, that which connected Philadelphia (*i.e.*, Amman) with Jerusalem. I mention this fact for the simple reason that the modern network of roads in the country follows for the most part the lines of the Roman roads.

The Romans, in addition, constructed a series of fortresses and posts for the most part along the line dividing the desert from the agricultural area. Of these, the ruins of which still exist, were Qasr Burqa', Al-Azraq, Qastal, Zizia, Umm Rasas, Khan Al-Zebib, Da'ajaniya and Odroh.

Under the Romans Christianity found its way into Transjordan and by the seventh century it had been established in the country, not only

amongst the settled section of the inhabitants, but even amongst a number of Beduin tribes, the most important of which were the Ghassanites, who distinguished themselves as orderly and efficient people. They established a civilized and powerful kingdom extending north as far as Damascus, under Roman protection. A number of buildings, whose ruins are still existing at Zerqa, Mushatta, Hammam Al-Sarkh, Al-Muwaqqar, Al-Jerba and Ma'an, are attributed to them. Their power came to an end with the Moslem invasion and they were assimilated by their Moslem kinsmen. A considerable number of Christian families in Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine are believed to be descended from the old Ghassanites.

In addition to those Arabs who made their home in Transjordan, the country was visited by commercial caravans from Hijaz. The Quraish tribe of the Prophet Muhammed made regular mercantile expeditions to Transjordan, Syria and Palestine. The Prophet himself had led, more than once, commercial caravans to the north as far as Syria via Transjordan before he was commanded to undertake the great task of preaching Islam. Hence, Transjordan's importance economically and strategically had been known to the Prophet and his supporters long before they carried out their programme of founding an Arab Moslem State. No wonder then if the Prophet himself, first, and then his successors, the Khalifs, utilized the country to the utmost in realizing their ultimate aim and policy. As a matter of fact, Transjordan was the field of two great battles which took place between the Moslem Arabs and the Romans, and which decided the destiny of the surrounding countries, mainly Palestine and Syria. I allude here to the battle of Muta, which was the first big clash between the upholders of the new faith and the Romans, near Kerak in 629. The beautiful shrine of Al-Mazar, built by one of the Ayyubid kings in the thirteenth century and recently repaired, marks the tombs of the three big commanders of the Moslem army who fell on the battlefield—namely, Zeid Bin Haritha, Ja'afar Al-Tayyar, the Prophet's first cousin, and Abdullah Bin Ruwaha. The second big battle was that of the Yarmuk River, in which the Moslem army under the skilful leadership of Khalid Bin Al-Walid gained an overwhelming victory, and which opened wide the way to the occupation of Syria and Palestine.

Under Moslem rule the country enjoyed a happy and restful life. It was an attraction to the Umayyad Khalifs of Damascus, who made it their holiday resort and in which they held their sports. For this purpose magnificent buildings were erected, like Qasr Al-Kharranah, Qasr Al-'Amra, Qasr Hammam Al-Sarkh, Qasr Tuba and Qasr Bayer—all of these in the eastern part of the country. But the most interesting building of that period was Qasr Al-Mushatta, just east of Amman. Unfortunately, most of its frescoes were removed to the Berlin Museum in 1905.

During the chaotic era of the Crusades, Transjordan witnessed the misfortunes of fighting and violence. Strategically it was of vital importance to each of the two belligerent parties. In other words, its occupation by the Crusaders would have actually meant the severance of the main line of communication between the four Moslem strongholds—namely, Hijaz, Egypt, Syria and Iraq; while if it continued in Moslem possession, the



Latin kingdom of Jerusalem would have been subjected to the constant threat of attack and destruction. Hence the Crusaders hastened at the first opportunity to establish strongholds in it, particularly in the southern district. The castle of Montreal in Shobek, which is still standing, was built in 1115, while an important outpost was founded at Wadi Musa (Le Val de Moïse) and was connected with Shobek by a fairly good road. Nearly at the same time Aqaba was seized and a castle was constructed on the island of Graye in the Gulf of Aqaba, which is called locally Jeziret Far'un—*i.e.*, the island of Pharaoh. Forts were also built at Tafleh, Ma'an and Wu'aira in the Shera mountains. To administer this line of fortifications the Crusaders established the principality of "Oultr Jourdain," extending from Wadi Zerqa in the north to Aqaba in the south. Soon after, the castle of Kerak, which became the most important and powerful Latin stronghold in Southern Transjordan, was built, and deservedly was given the name of "La Pierre de Desert." To challenge the Latins' supremacy in Southern Transjordan and ultimately to deprive them of their kingdom in Palestine, the most heroic and distinguished figures of all Moslem rulers of the period, Saladin, fortified Northern Transjordan. His most important piece of work there was the famous Rabadh Castle, controlling the Jordan Valley and guarding the Sultan's line of communication with Syria. By 1187 he was well prepared to strike at the Crusaders at Hittin and to deprive them of almost all their possessions in the Near East.

Saladin's successors followed his example in paying special attention to Transjordan, and strengthening their hold of it. At the beginning of the thirteenth century forts were built at Salt and Azraq, together with a number of posts along the pilgrimage route to guard the caravans going to Hijaz.

Transjordan seemed to have suffered very severely during the period of turmoil that followed the downfall of the Ayyubids. It became one of the victims of the Mongol outrages and a battlefield during the long and constant struggle among the rival Mameluke Sultans and claimants of Egypt. With the arrival of the Turks into the Near East at the beginning of the sixteenth century the country became part of the Ottoman Empire, and seemed to have redeemed its special importance as a pilgrim route. The maintenance of order and security in the country was the main task of the new overlords.

Before the Turkish régime the pilgrim route followed for the most part the old Roman road, which by this time had fallen into disrepair. During the reign of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent a new road was built, almost along the fringe dividing the desert from the cultivated lands. Up till now the road is called Tareeq Al-Bint—*i.e.*, the Maiden's Road—because it is believed that the Sultan's daughter was the first to suggest it and to travel on it. To guard this road the same Sultan erected a fort at Ma'an, where his name is still inscribed on its eastern gate. Shortly afterwards, posts at Qatrani, Hasa and Anaisa were set up; all of them later became stations for the Hijaz railway.

The internal history of Transjordan during the Turkish régime up to the beginning of the nineteenth century consists mainly of intertribal feuds

and family disputes. In addition, the country was involved in the continuous rivalry and fighting of the feudal lords of Palestine and Syria. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Transjordan was invaded by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt, whose rule was very much resented and even resisted by uprising and revolts. The chaos which followed this attempt forced the Turks to establish a well-organized administration in this country. This serious step facilitated, later on, the realization of the great scheme of connecting Syria and ultimately Turkey with Hijaz by a railway line. In 1907 the construction of the line was completed, running through Transjordan from north to south. Though the original plan included a branch line connecting Ma'an with Aqaba, yet this has only been realized during this war—partly by rail between Ma'an and Naqb and by a road between Naqb and Aqaba. Aqaba has also been connected by a road with the main road built lately between Egypt and Palestine across Sinai Desert.

During the great Arab revolt in the last Great War, Transjordan assumed a prime importance in the military operations against the Turkish army. With bases established there, it was possible to blow up the Turkish line of communications with the Hijaz and to carry out an attack on the Turkish left in Palestine. Therefore, with the combined operations of both the Arab army under Feisal assisted by Lawrence and the British forces under Allenby, Transjordan was freed from the Turks and the advance was carried out easily without a stop until the Turkish frontiers.

The country, after its occupation by the Allied Forces of the Arabs and the British, formed part of the Occupied Enemy Territory (East), and was administered by the Arab Government set up in Damascus. It ceased to be an Occupied Enemy Territory when the San Remo Conference entrusted the Mandate over it to the British Government in 1920.

In August, 1920, the High Commissioner for Palestine, then Sir Herbert Samuel, arrived in Al-Salt and declared to a gathering of notables that the British Government favoured the establishment of local self-government in the country assisted by British advisers. Accordingly a number of such governments were set up, each acting almost independently. The experiment, however, was a complete failure; it only threw the country into unceasing chaos until the arrival of H.R.H. Amir Abdullah in Amman on March 2, 1921.

H.R.H. Amir Abdullah, the second son of H.M. the late King Hussein, has distinguished himself as one of the most prominent political figures of the Arab world. He was scarcely thirty years old when he entered the Ottoman Parliament. As an ardent believer in the Arab cause and an enthusiastic Arab nationalist, proud of his descent and eager to free his country from foreign rule, he played an active part in the early secret national movements and societies. This, besides other qualities, caused his father to entrust him with more exacting duties than either his elder brother Ali or the younger Feisal. As time went on the Ottoman authorities grew worried and suspicious of his activities, and tried hard to deflect him with offers, first of a seat in the Cabinet, then of the post of Governor-General of Yemen. But Abdullah refused them both, with one

aim in mind—the independence of the Arab countries, even if this would entail a trial of strength with the Turks. This he had in mind when almost everybody was in a state of despair, because any revolt or uprising then would have been doomed to failure. Abdullah, foresightedly, saw that both British and Arab interests coincided, and that any Arab national move would be encouraged and even materially helped to success. So as early as February, 1914, acting most probably on his own initiative, he had a meeting with Kitchener, then British Agent in Egypt, and several sittings with Sir Ronald Storrs, then Oriental Secretary at the British Agency, in which he disclosed to them both Arab hopes and aspirations, and asked for British help should the Arabs draw arms in the face of the Turks. Though the reply he received at the time was rather discouraging, yet the incident, in essence, had sown the seeds of Anglo-Arab co-operation. That came about later, when Turkey entered the war against the Allies. In fact, we do H.R.H. Amir Abdullah no more than justice if we credit him with laying the foundation stone of Anglo-Arab relations which resulted in the Arab revolt in June, 1916.

During the revolt, Amir Abdullah took an active part in the fighting against the Turks. He was commander of the Arab force that attacked Taif, whose garrison, after a brief but well-planned siege, surrendered unconditionally, with the Governor-General of the Hijaz, Ghalib Pasha, among the prisoners. Besides other successful operations he undertook in the north of Hijaz, he was entrusted with the post of Foreign Minister to his father.

In November, 1920, Amir Abdullah unexpectedly appeared in Ma'an at the head of tribesmen, and was credited with the intention of raising a large force to invade Syria and avenge his brother's expulsion from Damascus. Mr. Churchill, who was then in Cairo dealing with the Arab question as Secretary of State for the Colonies, invited Amir Abdullah to confer with him in Jerusalem. After a series of conversations, a provisional agreement was agreed upon. It provided that Great Britain should use her good offices with France to secure the restoration of an Arab administration in Syria, with the Amir Abdullah at its head, and that in the meanwhile he should assume the rule of Transjordan under the general direction of the High Commissioner for Palestine as representing the Mandatory Power, with the pledge to pave the way for a reconciliation with the French. The arrangement was for six months, during which the Amir was to receive financial assistance from the British Government to enable him to raise a force for the preservation of order in Transjordan and to check any movement of hostility on the part of the discontented population against the French in Syria, with the object of facilitating the realization of the project of uniting the two countries.

Immediately after this agreement had been concluded a system of central administration was set up, with a police force, named the "Arab Legion," which has since gained a reputation for valour, efficiency and discipline. In September, 1922, a memorandum was received from His Majesty's Government declaring the exclusion of Transjordan from the article of the Mandate relative to the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

With the exception of a few minor local uprisings and disturbances in its early years, Transjordan, ever since its creation, has led an amazing peaceful existence. The development of the country in every sphere has been striking and worthy of appreciation. On February 20, 1928, the relations between His Majesty's Government and His Royal Highness's Government were defined by an agreement based on a declaration issued as early as April 25, 1923, by the High Commissioner, which also recognized the existence of an independent Government in Transjordan under the rule of the Amir Abdullah, provided that such Government should be constitutional.

An organic law was accordingly enacted and general elections for the Legislative Council were soon held. On April 2, 1929, the Council held its first meeting to ratify the agreement, which was amended in 1939, empowering the Transjordan Government to establish consular offices in the neighbouring Arab countries. As far as I know, three consulates have already been opened at Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus.

During this war Transjordan, under the leadership and guidance of His Royal Highness Amir Abdullah, not only rallied to the Allied cause, but has played an active part in the military operations in the Near East. Besides serving as a base from which operational movements were directed against Rashid Ali's *coup d'état* in Iraq and the Vichy Government in Syria, the Arab Legion, under the command of its brilliant Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Glubb, participated with distinction in both operations. This is in addition, I believe, to other activities that the future will reveal. On top of that, Transjordan is noted, as it has been throughout the periods of its history, as one of the most important main road junctions of the Middle East. The Haifa-Baghdad overland road runs through its northern district, connected at Mafraq with the main road running through the heart of Syria as far north as the Turkish borders, and with the main road leading south to Amman and then west to Jerusalem and other parts of Palestine. As I have mentioned before, Amman is connected with Ma'an in the south by a railway line which runs southward to Naqb, whence a road recently built leads to Aqaba, which has assumed special vital importance during this war. The Port is also connected with the main road between Egypt and Palestine. In addition to these main roads there is a good network of tracks which debouch like arteries to all directions. In short, Transjordan has been and will remain a vital strategical base and junction in the Near East, connecting south with north and west with east. The Iraq petroleum pipeline, starting in Kirkuk and terminating at Haifa, passes through Transjordan, and any proposed similar line from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean must go through it.

So much for the story of Transjordan in the past and in the present. What of the future?

We have seen that Transjordan enjoys a position which has affected the destinies of the surrounding countries, especially Syria and Palestine, with which geographically, socially and culturally it is most closely connected. As a matter of fact, it was a part of what used to be known as Greater Syria, and which may become so once again. When this comes

about as an essential step towards the realization of the bigger scheme of Arab unity, Transjordan will no doubt play the part that its situation and history dictate. H.R.H. the Amir and its people, though concentrating most sincerely on its development in every sphere of life, making the utmost use of honest British co-operation, have shown on more than one occasion their deep desire for the reunion of Greater Syria. Besides that, Transjordan as a link between the most important Arab countries is destined to play an active rôle in the Arab unity, whatever its nature or kind may be.

But Transjordan hopes and aspirations are not confined to this. Its people believe that they have arrived at a stage of development to allow the replacement of the Mandate with a treaty with Great Britain similar to that of Iraq or Egypt. Such a belief has sunk so deep in the heart of every Transjordanian that its realization would be considered as a reward to a country that has shown an aptitude for development and sound politics. The Amir himself was the first to lay the foundation stone of Anglo-Arab co-operation, and the country has proved that such co-operation is fertile and productive. I am of the opinion that the time is ripe now to put this co-operation on a different foundation as a token of gratitude and as a reward for good conduct and honest dealings.

Transjordan, which was in the past the cradle of great, illustrious races like the Nabateans and the Ghassanites, and which is now and for ever one of the main centres of Arab ideals, is building itself up on the foundations of its glorious past and admirable inheritance under the wise guidance of its brilliant and benevolent ruler, Amir Abdullah.

Mr. HYAMSON: My acquaintance with Transjordan is very small, merely that of an occasional visit. Therefore I am not in any position to criticize or supplement the very interesting and informing address for which we are so indebted to Mr. Toukan.

What struck me, when I used to be in that country, was, first, that it is a very attractive land, and, secondly, that it was to a very large extent empty. The population is estimated at three to four hundred thousand. The extent of the country is large, but I realize that the extent does not mean much because I believe less than a twelfth of it is inhabitable. So that, when one considers the size of Transjordan for practical purposes, it is very much less than the figures of its extent as suggested by the map. The country, as I say, certainly on some of the occasions when I was there, was very attractive; but what one may deduce from that attraction is not altogether what one would expect. Because although the country is so attractive, especially in the late winter and the early spring, the water—on which the possibility of existence in that part of the world is almost entirely dependent—is not as plentiful as it should be.

Passing from that, I was specially interested in the last remarks of Mr. Toukan, relating to the political possibility of the future. Of course, I agree with him that the only hope for the future is a hope that is based upon the past. After all, no one who does not know the past is competent to legislate for the future. It is my opinion that no person should be permitted to practise politics unless he has passed an examination in

history! Transjordan in the past was always politically a part of a greater whole. It was a part of the Ottoman Empire for many centuries. Before that it was a part of the larger Byzantine Empire, and before that of the Roman Empire. Even in biblical times it never stood alone. Just as in the past for two thousand and more years it was impossible for it to live by itself politically, I believe very strongly that in the future it will be unable to live politically or perhaps even economically by itself. That applies also to the neighbouring countries.

That leads, of course, towards the scheme, or the proposals or suggestions, that some sort of union or federation should be formed between all those neighbouring lands. I foresee that if such a union or federation is brought into being, it will not only react upon the future of Transjordan but also prove to be to the future benefit of other neighbouring lands and incidentally may relieve the tension in some of them. I remember when I was once in Transjordan I had a seat in a car from Amman to Suweileh, a Circassian village on the road to Palestine. In the car was an Arab boy, who spoke English perfectly. We got into conversation. He explained that he was at St. George's School in Jerusalem, but was on holiday at the moment. Recently there had been a little excitement, a rebellion, and he pointed out to me the battlefield. Then he added casually that he had taken part in that battle. He had spent his holidays fighting on one side or the other, and at the end of the war he went back to school in Jerusalem.

The CHAIRMAN: One of the most interesting things about being Chairman of this Society is to notice the effect either the Society itself or the room has on our members and their visitors. Because it invariably happens that when I get up after a lecture here and call on somebody in the audience to speak, he just gets up and says, "I don't know why on earth I have been called on." Then he proceeds to say something which is really worth hearing. Thank you, Mr. Hyamson.

Major NORTHFIELD: First I would like to thank my brilliant friend, Mr. Toukan, with whom I worked for many years in Transjordan, for his most interesting discourse.

He said he welcomed visitors to Transjordan. Those of us who have been there can testify that he always gave us a warm welcome there. I know of no visitor or official who has not left Transjordan feeling very grateful for many kindly actions and words from a very happy people.

With regard to the almost final remark of Mr. Toukan relating to co-operation, I think many of us could learn many lessons from the co-operation which we have sensed and known in that country, and I hope Transjordan will reap the reward it is hoping for.

Colonel NEWCOMBE: It is well to be reminded of the part that Transjordan has played in the past, which one is rather apt to forget. An Arab unity of Transjordan with a Greater Syria will, I hope, come shortly, but it will require all the constructive energy and co-operation that Arab leaders can give to it, and it is for them to think out and plan their own future.

The American pipeline, too, will affect the problem. If or when it is made, it has either to go to Haifa or right south along the Red Sea up to

Port Said or Alexandria. If it is to go to Haifa, it would be through Transjordan, and that will affect very considerably the future of that country.

The CHAIRMAN: At the beginning of his lecture, Mr. Toukan remarked that it was his hope that we would have our interest in that quite remarkable stretch of land, Transjordan, increased by what he said. Speaking for myself, I have the greatest desire to re-visit that country, which fascinated me very much the only time I saw it. I am certain that you would wish me on behalf of our Society, while we thank the lecturer for what he has told us and the way in which he has put all he had to say, to pay through him a most respectful tribute to that great ruler, who has kept a peaceful oasis so wisely and well ruled in the middle of so many troubled lands. We wish him the greatest success, and may his dreams come true in the future.

## MODERN PALESTINE

By HUMPHREY BOWMAN, C.M.G., C.B.E.

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on April 26, 1944, Lieut.-General Sir Robert Haining, K.C.B., in the Chair.

AS a temporary Civil Servant employed in the Foreign Office, I am precluded from taking part in political discussions. When I mentioned this to a friend with reference to the talk I am to give to-day, he said, "But Palestine without politics is like *Hamlet* without the Prince of Denmark." If that is so, I must crave your indulgence to watch some of the lesser-known scenes of the play with me this afternoon, and do the best you can to enjoy them in spite of the absence of the principal player.

So much has been written and spoken in recent years of the political difficulties of Palestine, and of the complex problems that have faced successive British Governments in trying to find a solution satisfactory to all parties, that it is almost a relief to turn to certain other aspects of the country—geographical, historical, economic and social. These aspects, which are indeed worthy of study by such a Society as ours, are apt to be submerged and forgotten in the controversies that occupy the time of those who are engaged only on the political issues. It is with these more general and non-controversial aspects that I propose to deal to-day.

Palestine, which derives its name from the ancient Philistina, is a small country of about the size of Wales or Belgium. You can travel by car from Dan to Beersheba comfortably in a day, and from Jaffa to the Jordan in a few hours. Its geographical features are doubtless well known to you. A brief outline of the main features may nevertheless be helpful. The country is bisected from north to south by a line of hills, which are in fact a continuation of the Lebanon range, and which run from Mount Jarmak (nearly 4,000 feet above the sea) in the north till they merge into the foothills that lead to the Plain of Beersheba. Nazareth, Jerusalem and Hebron are all on the summits of this range, which at Jerusalem reaches 2,500 feet above the sea, and at Hebron over 3,000 feet. Nablus, the ancient Shechem, nestles in the valley between Mounts Ebal and Gerizim, and is the home of the few remaining members of the Samaritan sect. The range is broken south of Nazareth by the Plain of Esdraclon, the scene of battles from the time of Ahab to that of Allenby, who took his title from Megiddo, now only an archæological site on the western edge of the plain.

To the west of this long spine lies the rich maritime plain, now mainly cultivated by a series of Jewish settlements. To the east is the Great Rift, through which runs the River Jordan, merging into the Sea of Tiberias on the north and flowing ultimately into the Dead Sea. From Lake Huleh southwards the rift is below sea-level—from 680 feet at the Lake of Tiberias to nearly 1,300 feet at the Dead Sea. The Dead Sea, 48 miles long and 10 miles across at its greatest breadth, is almost identical in its



dimensions with the Lake of Geneva;  $6\frac{1}{2}$  million tons of water fall into it daily, and as a result of the intense evaporation the water is impregnated with mineral substances, including 7 per cent. of common salt. The water destroys nearly all organic life, and both the Sea itself and the coastline surrounding it are indeed "dead." No water flows out of it, and though the Great Rift extends far to the southward, and may in ages past have maintained a river-bed, it is now nothing but a dry and rocky valley.

The southern part of Palestine, known as the Negeb, is desert, inhabited only by Bedouin Arabs, who get a bare subsistence from the scanty rainfall, moving with their black tents of camel-hair, their flocks and herds, from pasture to pasture, as did their forefathers in the days of Abraham.

Palestine has thus four main and distinct physical features, with a climate differing in each, and in each a consequent effect on the characteristics of the inhabitants. There is no rainfall except in the winter; the maximum is about equal to that of London. On the hills the climate is cold in winter, with occasional snow; not unduly hot in summer. The plains have a somewhat lower rainfall, and are warmer in winter; but the summer heat is tempered by the westerly breezes from the Mediterranean. The Great Rift, on the other hand, is sub-tropical, with little or no cold in winter and intense heat in the summer months; while in the Negeb there is barely sufficient rainfall to support life on a large scale, and the area is inhabited only by wandering Bedouin, whose numbers probably do not exceed 60,000.

The population of Palestine, now about one million and a half, is roughly two-thirds Arab and one-third Jew. The Jewish population has increased, mainly of course through immigration, from about 10 per cent. in 1920 to above 30 per cent. at the present day. The Jewish population comes mostly from Central and Eastern European countries—Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Russia. Whatever language they spoke before coming to Palestine, they all learn Hebrew after arrival, and their common tongue and common faith and ideals bind them in the land of their fathers into a united race. The Arab inhabitants, on the other hand, are mainly descended from the original people of the country—Canaanites, Jebusites, Philistines and other tribes of which the Old Testament speaks. The Arab conquest in the seventh century introduced some Arab blood and served to Islamize the majority, but many of the people retained their Christianity. A number of villages are wholly Christian, and there are many Christians—mostly Greek Orthodox—living in Jerusalem, Nazareth and Bethlehem. But whether Moslem or Christian, they all speak Arabic, and all call themselves Arabs.

Thus Palestine is the land of the three faiths—Islam, Judaism and Christianity. Representatives of all three are to be found in Jerusalem, and especially at Eastertide, when the Christians celebrate Easter, Moslems the Feast of Nebi Musa (the Prophet Moses), and Jews their Passover. On Easter Eve the Church of the Holy Sepulchre is the scene of the Holy Fire, when the huge congregation work themselves into a frenzy of excitement and religious enthusiasm, reaching its zenith as the flame,

mysteriously ignited from the Tomb, is passed on tapers from hand to hand, and the church is filled with a seething mass of pilgrims holding on high their lighted tapers, shouting, gesticulating and embracing. Simultaneously Moslems from Hebron and Nablus throng to the Dome of the Rock, one of the holiest sites of Islam, and proceed thence, carrying banners, dancing, shouting, merry-making, to the traditional tomb of Moses in the desert, there to keep the feast of Nebi Musa. At the same time Jerusalem is filled with Jews who have come to keep the Passover with their families and to observe the ritual as laid down in the Book of Exodus. Small wonder that Eastertide in Jerusalem has always been regarded—even in Turkish days—as a time of trouble between the religious factions, and, since the British occupation, has been a period of special anxiety for the authorities.

But it is Christmastide that appeals to the devout Christian in Palestine even more than Easter. Then the crowd of worshippers flock to the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem—the fine basilica built by Constantine in the fourth century and the oldest Christian church still in use. The long nave is divided by four rows of marble pillars, taken from the local quarry, and supporting the roof, which was repaired with English lead sent for the purpose in 1482 by our King Edward IV. At the east end is the grotto wherein our Lord was born, and it is in that confined and narrow space, the roof of rock so low that the visitor cannot stand upright, that pilgrims of all nations come on Christmas Eve in groups of twos and threes to worship at the site of our Lord's birthplace. Though Protestants, alone almost of all Christian sects, have no legal status in the church, the Orthodox Patriarch has since 1918 allowed the British community to hold their carol service on Christmas Eve in the courtyard just outside, and himself gives the blessing on its conclusion within the adjoining chapel.

With this brief sketch of the country as a background let us take a look at modern Palestine and see how the country has progressed during the twenty-five years of the British occupation. So much stress is laid on the political situation and the tragic happenings that have occurred in Palestine, that it is sometimes forgotten how much has been done in recent years to develop the country on modern lines. The Mandatory Government has been blamed and criticized often enough for the troubles, but it has received scant praise for what has been accomplished in spite of the troubles.

First, a tribute is due to Jewish enterprise. Across the Plain of Esdraelon, on the shores of Tiberias, and along the maritime plain are groups of Jewish settlements, most of them of modern growth, where the colonists have converted what was often a marshy and malarious swamp into a prosperous and smiling countryside. As you look down from the heights of Nazareth you see below you a chequer board of cultivation, where wheat, barley, maize and other crops grow in profusion; forest-trees cover the once-bare hillsides and well-laid-out villages of red-tiled houses are to be seen at intervals from the Mediterranean to the Jordan Valley. All along the coast from Haifa to Gaza, and from Acre to Haifa, are other settlements, where orange groves and vineyards are cultivated

as well as cereals. Cattle and other livestock are bred and tended; poultry farms abound; bee-keeping and the silkworm industry thrive. The Jewish immigrant has proved himself a capable and industrious farmer. In agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry and poultry-keeping, it is doubtful whether anywhere in the world more has been produced in a shorter time than by the Jews in Palestine.

In industry too Jewish progress has been remarkable. The hydroelectric works on the upper Jordan, founded by the Jewish engineer Pinhas Rutenberg, provide power and light to the whole of Palestine outside the Jerusalem area, which generates its own supply. The potash works on the Dead Sea also owe their origin largely to Jewish enterprise, and are already supplying a considerable amount of the world's potash. Cement, bricks and building materials are furnished by Jewish firms, while during the present war, when imports have been severely restricted, a number of smaller industries have sprung up and prospered.

Nor have the Jews forgotten the importance of scientific research, culture and the arts. The Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, overlooking Jerusalem, with faculties of arts and sciences and a magnificent library; the agricultural research station at Rehevoth; the schools ranging from kindergarten to secondary, agricultural and technical; the *Habima* theatrical company producing original plays and also Hebrew translations of Shakespeare and Bernard Shaw; the classical concerts performed by first-class artists; the exhibitions of painting and sculpture—all testify to the passionate desire of this talented people to create a culture of their own based on Hebrew ideals and expressed in Hebrew thought and through the Hebrew language. The revival of Hebrew and all that it implies is the first plank of the Zionist platform. That policy has unquestionably succeeded in every branch of Jewish life. When we consider that thirty years ago modern Hebrew hardly existed, and that only among a handful of Jews, we must admit that this alone constitutes a considerable achievement.

And what of the Arab population, who form approximately two-thirds of the whole? There is, of course, an easy contrast to draw between the Jew and the Arab. While the Jew represents the new world, the Arab represents the old. The Jew, after hundreds of years of life in the ghetto, where, if not actually persecuted, he was segregated and deprived of the ordinary citizen's privileges, now finds himself for the first time free and independent in the Promised Land. Small wonder that he shows burning enthusiasm to produce, to create, to make all things new.

The Arab, on the other hand, is not by nature progressive. Nor till recently has he had much opportunity of progress. For 400 years the dead hand of the old Turkish régime had lain on Palestine as on the rest of the Sultan's Empire. Little or nothing was done by their Turkish rulers for the Arab provinces. They were allowed to stagnate. But the Arabs have a history of culture of which they are justly proud. In the Middle Ages they were the pioneers in mathematics, in astronomy and in medicine; their literature and their architecture alike betoken a lofty sense of the beautiful and æsthetic. The Arab of to-day, freed from misgovernment and spurred by modern facilities of travel and intercourse

with the Western world, longs—no less than the Jew—to use his opportunity. But he has not the advantage of Jewish wealth, and has perforce to rely more upon Government help and advice. He is a quick and ready learner, and in horticulture at least he has shown himself the equal of the Jew. The Arab orange groves near Ramle are among the best in Palestine. As the owner shows you with pride over his grove he will touch and feel the fruit before cutting you the perfect specimen—large and golden and juicy. The orange industry is indeed the main export of the country; in the year before the war the number of cases shipped (nearly all to Great Britain) was over 15 million, of which about half came from Arab groves and half from Jewish. The grapes of Hebron and the olives and figs of Samaria are as good as any in the world; while on the bare hillsides, as on the richer plains, the Arab farmer works tirelessly to produce his crop of wheat or barley, maize or sesame.

Many Arab villages are built on or near the summit of the hills, doubtless originally for defence purposes. The houses are of stone and usually have the domed or vaulted roof, a characteristic feature to be found in the mosques—pre-eminently in the Dome of the Rock. The Arab is a master-craftsman in masonry, and the local type of architecture so admirably fitting to the hill country has been brilliantly adapted by Mr. Austen Harrison, now engaged in the reconstruction of Malta, in his designs for the High Commissioner's residence and the Rockefeller Museum in Jerusalem.

Much of the credit for the development of Palestine is due to the Government. In spite of the troublous years between 1920, when Sir Herbert (now Viscount) Samuel was appointed as the first High Commissioner, and the outbreak of war in 1939, a great deal was achieved by him and his successors, Lord Plumer, Sir John Chancellor, Sir Arthur Wauchope and Sir Harold MacMichael. Excellent roads traverse the country from north to south and east to west; country tracks have been improved, and there are few—perhaps by now scarcely any—villages that cannot be reached by car. The railway system is well administered; and the recent extension from Haifa to Tripoli connects Palestine directly with Europe, as it has long been connected with Egypt. The port of Haifa, opened in 1933, where the 600-mile pipeline from Kirkuk terminates, is the most modern harbour on the Eastern Mediterranean. The telegraph and telephone service is well organized and efficient; the posts regular and rapid. The Palestine Broadcasting Service, operating from Jerusalem, gives a trilingual daily programme in Arabic, Hebrew and English, which is appreciated not only by listeners in the towns, but by the inhabitants of all important villages, where receiving sets with loud-speakers are installed by Government.

The health of the country too has greatly improved. The Department of Health maintains Government hospitals in all the principal towns, and assists municipal and some of the missionary hospitals. It has also opened a number of Baby Welfare Centres, which have done much to preserve infant life and assist motherhood. Malaria and other endemic diseases have greatly decreased; eye disease, especially trachoma—that curse of the Middle East—has diminished. In combating disease, Govern-

ment has been greatly helped by private enterprise. The St. John Ophthalmic Hospital in Jerusalem, maintained by the Order of St. John, is doing magnificent work in treatment of the eye and in training doctors and nurses in ophthalmology. There are excellent Jewish hospitals in Jerusalem and elsewhere, while the French, Germans and Italians all maintain hospitals, or did before the war, of a high standard. Hospitals have also been established by British missionary bodies; those at Tiberias, of the Scottish Missionary Society, and at Hebron, under the Jerusalem and the East Mission, have both acquired a well-deserved fame.

The advent of modern ideas was not without its humorous side. When the first motor buses were started in Jerusalem instructions were issued to forbid smoking and spitting, and were duly written up in Arabic and Hebrew. But, under official order, an English version was also required. The first attempt read, "NO SMOK NO SPIT." A helpful passenger pointed out to the conductor that a final "E" was missing, and next day the notice read, "NO SMOKE NO SPITE." And when authority ordained the erection of a finger-post on the road leading to the Roman ruins at Jerash, tourists were puzzled to find themselves directed in large letters "TO THE INIQUITIES."

In education, more perhaps than in any field, the Government has helped Palestine to progress. While from the first the Jews were given a large measure of autonomy, Arab education was taken over as a heritage from the Turks. The Jews had substantial funds from abroad, and their budget provided, or attempted to provide, schooling for every Jewish child. An illiterate Jew is almost unknown anywhere, and Palestine is no exception to the rule. From the kindergarten and elementary school, to be found in every Jewish settlement, to the fine University overlooking Jerusalem, the Jews developed an educational system of which they may well be proud.

But the Arabs, unlike the Jews, had no funds from outside Palestine. There was, moreover, the tradition of Turkish rule that it was the function of Government to administer education. Though the Turks had done little enough for Palestine or for other parts of their Arab empire, it was clearly the duty of the Palestine Government to make good the lack. So while we gave a substantial grant to the Jewish schools, our budget was mainly devoted to improving the Arab system. Funds were never sufficient to supply all the needs, but we were able to enlarge and develop the existing schools and to open many new ones. Training colleges, urban and rural, for men and women teachers were opened; town schools were increased and modernized. But it was in the rural districts of Arab Palestine that the most striking development took place. All villages over a certain size were invited to co-operate with the Government in opening a school. The building was on a model plan and the cost shared between the village and the Government. The village also provided an agricultural plot, on which vegetables and fruit trees were grown; and poultry, rabbits, bees and silkworms were reared. The teachers, appointed and paid by the Government, soon became the most influential men of the village community. Trained in agriculture as well as in methods of teaching, they were responsible not only for their school but also for

various branches of village welfare. A cleaning campaign was set on foot; rubbish was cleared; pools were drained or oiled; manure removed to the fields. Thus flies and mosquitoes diminished; eye disease and malaria decreased. A small travelling cinema showed films of the dangers caused by the fly, the mosquito, the locust and other pests; of modern methods of cultivation, irrigation, drainage, road-making and forestry. Travelling libraries were sent from village to village in boxes on donkey-back or by car; the wireless sets provided by Government provided a daily programme of news and talks.

The Department of Education was greatly helped in its projects of rural welfare by the close co-operation of the sister Departments of Health and Agriculture. The Health Department examined the physique and especially the eyes of all schoolchildren. If a clinic was available, those suffering from eye disease or other ailments were treated daily by the nurse; if not, simple but effective treatment was administered by the teacher. In this way the health of the children improved in a marked manner. Sir John Strathearn, for many years the eminent Warden of the St. John Ophthalmic Hospital in Jerusalem, once told me that in a cursory walk through an Arab village he could tell, from the state of the children's eyes, whether or not a Government school had been opened there.

By the institution of games, physical training, and scouting, the physique of the children has steadily improved. All these activities in Government schools are in the hands of Arabs, trained in British methods and guided under British advice. A young Palestinian, who received his training in Scotland, is now in charge of the physical culture of all boys in Palestine Government schools.

A tribute too must be paid to the excellent work being done by the Mission Schools, British and American, among which may be mentioned the Bishop Gobat, St. George's, and the Jerusalem Girls' College.

Enough has perhaps been said to provide a general picture of Palestine to-day. But I cannot close this brief description without a word on another aspect. Palestine is a land filled with memories of the deepest significance to mankind. Though the authenticity of some traditional sites may be questioned, the veneration of centuries has given them a sanctity which is proof against scepticism. At the inner shrine of the Dome of the Rock you are enshrouded in the dim mists of a past that goes back to the earliest stages of human belief. Here sacrifices were offered to some unknown god centuries before Ornan the Jebusite sold it to David as the site of Solomon's Temple. Here the Jews worshipped until its final destruction by Titus. Here the Moslems founded their Holy Sanctuary. Christendom, too, can claim a share in its sanctity. Here Christ walked and preached. And here, in the twelfth century, the Crusaders converted the Dome into a Christian church and made the octagonal shrine a model for their own Temple Church in London.

Pass outside, and at the Western Wall you stand and commiserate with the ancient race that laments each Sabbath at the only stones that remain of Solomon's Temple. Walk up the stone-stepped street, and in a few minutes you are within the centre of Christendom, the church that

covers Calvary and the Holy Sepulchre. Here, on Good Friday or Easter Day, you form one of the countless pilgrims from every Christian country that have worshipped there since the fourth century or before. But all these shrines are man-made, and have the faults as well as the virtues of humanity. The natural landmarks and homely scenes are even more impressive. The hills and valleys—the Mount of Olives, the Hill of Temptation, Mount Tabor, the Sea of Galilee, the River Jordan, the Garden of Gethsemane: these have their memories even for the least inspired. And in the meadows below Bethlehem the shepherds tend their flocks; by Tiberias lakeside the fishermen cast their nets for a draught; on the rocky uplands the sower scatters his seed on good ground and on bad. The eternal beauty of the country, varying in aspect and colour as the year turns from winter to spring, and from spring to summer, is a never-ending source of delight and inspiration. Surely to live and work in Palestine is an experience unsurpassed; to lend, however humbly, a hand in its revival a unique privilege. Even the most sceptical can hardly remain unmoved by his surroundings. To him who has faith to believe they bring help and encouragement to press forward, however steep the path, to the achievement of peace and prosperity in the Holy Land.

# IRAN'S FUTURE: SOME LESSONS FROM THE PAST

By A. H. HAMZAVI

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on May 17, 1944, Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,—During the past year Iran has occupied a leading position in the proceedings of the Royal Central Asian and kindred Iran Societies. In September, 1943, Miss Lambton lectured brilliantly on Persia's policy. She included the reign of Shah Riza Pahlavi, who introduced westernization and built the great Trans-Iranian railway.

Later in the same month Dr. Shadman, Assistant Iranian Delegate to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., lectured on the period from 1798 to 1815—the year of the Battle of Waterloo—in a remarkable manner.

Finally, another of our members, Major Burton, dealt authoritatively with the Kurdish question. As we all know, Kurdistan falls under Iran, Russia, Turkey and Iraq.

This afternoon I have much pleasure in introducing Mr. A. H. Hamzavi, the distinguished Press Attaché of the Embassy, whose lecture on "Iran's Future: Some Lessons from the Past" will, I am convinced, crown the admirable lectures we have recently enjoyed on Persia.

SINCE the end of 1941, Iran's internal and foreign affairs have been crowded with political events of international importance. During the nineteenth century the social and administrative structure of Iran functioned by virtue of a conglomeration of autocracy, semi-feudalism and rule of the clergy, exasperated by recurrent outside influences. After a period of constitutional and democratic government, which began with the Mashrooteh of 1906, Iran's administrative machinery for the last twenty years revolved on authoritative, centralized and fervently nationalistic lines, unfettered by foreign entanglements.

Those familiar with the situation in Iran after the First World War, who have witnessed the prodigious achievements of the past twenty years, will readily and impartially agree that, in spite of some undeniable shortcomings, Iran was turned from a feudalistic country into an orderly and well-conducted state with international prestige. (1) The disarming of turbulent tribes and the establishment of law and order all over the country. (2) The curtailment of the mischievous influence of the clergy. (3) The emancipation of women. (4) The strengthening of Iranian nationhood and the revival of self-respect. (5) The vast development of general education. (6) The construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway and thousands of miles of serviceable roads. (7) The reorganization of the national exchequer and the regular collection of taxes are a few of the notable administrative and social changes brought about during this period.

In the last days of August, 1941, however, consequent to the linking-up of Anglo-Soviet armed forces on Iranian territory, this phase was abruptly interrupted.

It soon became evident that the two decades we have covered were not



long enough to allow for the consolidation of a foundation to withstand sudden disruptions from outside. Hence the last quarter of 1941 found Iranians totally unprepared.

In the first months after the sudden change of the last quarter of 1941, superficial signs were interpreted by certain observers as proofs that Iranian resilience and genius were irrecoverably spent.

It would be futile to blink at the critical trend of thought and apathetic mood of some section of Iranians following the entry of Anglo-Soviet troops into Iran. But all the apparent signs of feebleness did not mean that Iran as a living organism had atrophied. The indiscriminate emotional outbursts of a minor section of the people have never been deep-rooted. Like a burnt-out volcano, now and then it erupts, throwing some lava about and causing certain temporary damage. It is unfortunate that these shallow tokens should have lent colour to unjust interpretations by some observers concerning the true situation in Iran. Let it be recorded that amidst the turbid external influences and the maelstrom of clashing ideologies and interests inside Iran, the greatest proof of national unity and political foresight was manifested by the majority of the people, the deputies in Majlis, and by that venerable statesman and leader, the late Mohammed Ali Foroughi. Undoubtedly he saved Iran from procrastination and indecision in a perilous time and in one of the most difficult hours of her political destiny. It was Foroughi's sagacity, backed and blessed by the young, virile resolve of His Majesty Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, which aligned Iran and the future of her people with that of the Allies and their exalted aims. The alignment of Iran with Great Britain and the Soviet Union must surely be recorded as fine a piece of political prescience as has ever existed in Iran's foreign policy throughout the ages.

On January 29, 1942, the Majlis approved, by a majority of 80 votes in favour as against 8 dissentients, the Treaty of Alliance between Iran, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, the Treaty being based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Thus, Iran, who had observed strict neutrality since the outbreak of war, became in its third year a fully fledged ally of the Democracies. Since then Iran's value to the furtherance of the Allied cause has included:

(1) The use of the 808-mile Trans-Iranian Railway connecting the Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea, built by the Iranian Government during the years 1928-38 at a cost of about 40 million pounds from Iran's national exchequer. (2) The network of thousands of miles of serviceable chausee roads and highways, which have so effectively and expeditiously linked up the vital sinews of the great Anglo-American war supplies with the Soviet battlefronts. (3) The inexhaustible source of millions of tons of essential oil and fuel for the war needs of Allied armed forces east of Gibraltar, and for nearly all the Middle and Near East, and even as far as China. And, finally, there was the fact that in Iran was a friendly and hospitable people and Government who, at the risk of dislocating and endangering the internal requirements of the country, placed the entire transport system, posts, telegraphs, telephones, various factories, warehouses, ports, food and currency at the disposal of the Allied Powers.

The Allies, recognizing the valuable services rendered by Iran to the

common cause, gave it special and appropriate prominence in the declarations of the Tehran Conference. The fact was implicit before, but it was gratifying to the people of Iran that it should be openly and decisively affirmed by the three great Allied leaders. There is no doubt that the momentous declaration on Iran, endorsed so cogently at the Tehran Conference, dissipates the legacy of any past misunderstandings and prejudices that may still have lurked in the minds of some Iranians as to the real motives of the Allied Powers in respect of Iran.

#### PRESENT-DAY IRAN

To-day Iran is suffering from the general difficulties created by the exigencies of war. Cost of living has risen incredibly in the last two years. For some time past it has oscillated dangerously between an increase of 700 and 1,000 per cent. as compared with that of 1938. This has made Iran one of the most expensive places to live in, since 1942.

A country which for years has depended to a considerable extent on foreign imports in respect of essential industrial materials, Iran has naturally been hard hit by the limitations imposed on imports.

These restrictions, privations and difficulties have naturally created many hardships and upset the daily routine of life. But they are borne with traditional tolerance by the masses, who realize only too well that the Allied Powers have, in the circumstances, done and are doing a good deal to assist the Iranian Government in improving the situation.

The main problem facing the Iranian Government is the provision of food, the stabilization of prices and the establishment of national economy on a sound basis. Owing to the stupendous local expenditure of the Allied armed forces, the increase in prices has been accompanied by an increase of money in circulation. With restricted shipping space, the Allied Powers have been unable to set off this difficulty by imports into the country, though the import of a certain amount of gold from Great Britain and the U.S.A. has contributed to an extent in warding off the dangers of inflation. Since the beginning of 1942 a spiral of prices chasing wages and *vice-versa* has brought Iran to the verge of inflation. The circulation of paper money has increased approximately sevenfold and the potential purchasing power of the people has multiplied accordingly, but owing to scarcity of goods, prices have rocketed sky high.

The Iranian Government and Majlis, attaching the utmost importance to the question of food and cost of living, have spared no effort in meeting the situation. The indefatigable efforts of American advisers employed by the Government have done much to ameliorate the financial, economic, food, transport and other tangled problems of Iranian administration. The Iranian Government are endeavouring to create, slowly but surely, that confidence and constancy which is so essential in establishing a healthy national economy.

Within forty years the people of Iran have fought and gained their most precious possession, the Constitution or Mashrooteh of 1906. They have witnessed the intrusion of foreign Powers in the country, the use of their neutral territory by armed forces of all sides in the First World

War, the regeneration of a spirit of patriotic fervour and progress, and finally the tragic breakdown of the centralized administrative machinery of the State, and later their alignment on the side of the Allies. The ground is now strewn with the wreckage of the last twenty years in general and with that of the last two years in particular.

As an aftermath of the shock sustained, Iran is to-day in the process of recovering from a number of maladies, some psychological, some organic, some external and some internal. But the underlying causes go well back in years, and the question is whether a problem of contemporary history—and a problem singularly vexed—can be diagnosed within a short time of its emergence and solved in the heat and dust which surround it. And how far must we go back if we want to get at the truth? Perforce, this must be a brief interim report. It is, however, diaphanous as daylight that the great neighbouring nations of Iran must inevitably influence her political outlook and social structure. But it is also clear that whilst Iran in the past has been handicapped by outside interference, yet the country's future destiny and prosperity remain in the hands of her own people—in the hands of her rulers, her leaders and her young generation. In whatever sinister guise outside influence may have appeared to Iranians in the past, it must not under any circumstances distort their vision as to the essential fact that they and they alone are the arbiters of their destiny.

It is sometimes argued that recent years have served as a period of transition, when the various potential forces of the country were being tested in order to produce a working combination which could gradually collect all the loose threads and knit together the social and economic machinery of the country. We have suffered in the past from roseate-dawnists who have considered all the anachronisms of the last 150 years of Iranian administration as transition periods. For this reason it would be well to emphasize as a first principle of Iran's foreign policy the establishment of a permanent and mutual friendship and harmony with Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Similarly, the first principle of her internal policy should be the discarding of antiquated notions and the solving of the country's problems with up-to-date ideas and means, whilst maintaining national traditions. Iran's leaders must surely strive to keep abreast of the times and, in a constantly changing world, to anticipate national interests in a progressive manner.

#### IRAN'S FUTURE

The history of Iran has a sequence and continuity extending from remote antiquity to the present day. Few other countries have been so rigorously dependent on their surroundings and natural circumstances as Iran. Living along the territories of the earliest civilizations of mankind—*i.e.*, Sumer, Elam and Chaldea—Iran's natural conditions have formed the basic national characteristics which have stood the test of time for about 2,500 years. This was in the face of invasions, wars, religious and social upheavals, not to mention the political designs of the Great Powers in the East during the last 150 years. Despite all, Iran has maintained

her independence and individuality as sturdily as any nation in the world. This is surely the greatest heritage of the Iranian people. It is this continuity, which links generations and centuries, that constitutes the irreplaceable and proud possession of Iranians.

Iran has been in the past, as to-day, the link between East and West. In the days of the Chaldeans, Phœnicians and Lydians, Iran's geographic situation formed the crossroads between three fertile plateaux: (1) in the north-west the fertile regions of Asia Minor and Caucasia; (2) in the west the regions of the Tigris and Euphrates; (3) in the south-east the vast plains of Punjab. To-day the 628,000 square miles of table-land, with almost every kind of climatic condition and terrain, lying between the warm waters of the Indian Ocean in the south, the Caspian Sea in the north, between the Tigris in the west and India in the east, forms the stepping-stone between East and West.

In the past Iran's political destiny has been notably affected by her geographical situation. This is no less true to-day.

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Iran's relations with the Great Powers have constituted a vital factor in the establishment of her security, social development, education and the mental outlook of her people toward foreign nations. Whom geography has brought together not even history can part, is a true saying which applies to Iran's future relations with Great Britain and the Soviet Union in its fullest significance.

The essential interests of Iran *vis-à-vis* Great Britain and the Soviet Union are complementary and not necessarily antagonistic. This is true conversely of the interests of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. *vis-à-vis* Iran.

The question of Irano-Soviet relations is beyond the scope of this address. Of Anglo-Iranian relations, it can be said with satisfaction that it has withstood the test of time and some adverse circumstances during the last 150 years. It is the geography of Iran which has made Anglo-Iranian relations of the utmost importance to both countries. Some Iranians like to conjecture that this akinness of interests has been created or prompted by political machinations or financial considerations on the part of the British. On the other hand, some British like to suspect Iranian friendship of opportunist hesitation or playing them against another Great Power. In my opinion, both are denying the hard facts and lessons of geography as well as history.

In the past there have certainly been conflicting interests between Iran and Great Britain; there have been unhappy memories and mistakes on both sides. It is gratifying to observe that the inadvisability of the wretched Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, and of the Anglo-Persian Pact of 1919—which never saw the light of day—has been recognized all round. Despite setbacks, despite all the contradictory charges levelled against both sides, it cannot be denied that failures in Anglo-Iranian relations are far outweighed by their triumphs.

The future will undoubtedly bring its own complicated problems, but the primary object of Anglo-Iranian relations should be the uprooting of prejudice and the consolidating of the understanding of the bonds that inexorably bind the two countries together. This can and must be done by direct methods, by magnanimity of purpose, and a regular interchange

of cultural and social relations between the two countries. Anglo-Iranian friendship is not a thing that comes of itself in the order of nature; it must be worked for and not taken for granted.

Iran's future must inevitably be placed first and foremost on the national and historic interests and purposes of the country and her people, and not on some sentimental prejudice or abstract theory. The people of Iran recognize that their true interests lie in the ever-strengthening of the bonds of friendship and collaboration with Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. They must strive to accept all the responsibilities attached to this amity and to explore all its implications and possibilities.

The lessons of history for Iran are clear and precise. While she has played her important part in Middle and Near Eastern politics, yet her vital interests for the last two centuries have been comprised primarily of her relations with Great Britain and Russia. The conduct of these two powerful nations towards Iran and Iran's relations towards them have formulated the major part of her foreign policy, which in turn directly and decisively affected her national welfare and development.

Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America made the following declaration at the Tehran Conference: that "The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R. and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

"The three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them for the world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.

"The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran."

This declaration is the corner stone of Iran's present alignment and collaboration with the Allies. This is the common denominator on which the true and irrevocable future sentiments of Iranians towards the Allies are based. This is the foundation upon which rests a deepening of a sense of solidarity towards Great Britain. More than any other consideration, the heartfelt desire of every Iranian is to safeguard the complete sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of his country and to run Iran's affairs without foreign intervention.

The Tehran Declaration has forged a new link between the people of Iran and the British, Russian and American peoples. The foundation of Iran's future collaboration and amity with the Allies has been laid; the superstructure must now be built steadily, surely and patiently.

The passage of time since the events of August, 1941, has not diminished the force of the lesson learned in the First World War.

Iranians are born and bred individualists, but as a nation they are

fully united. The younger generation, which is steadily coming to the forefront of the social and administrative life of the country, has instilled virile notions and introduced forceful ways of life. The old passion for metaphysical speculation is gradually giving way to modern conceptions and a progressive sense of realism. This is the paramount impulse of to-day, forming a basis for the fresh thinking of to-morrow.

It would be fatal to ignore the intense national fervour and virility which has been resurrected in the younger generation of Iran, and the surging which this awakening entails. Just as for twenty-five centuries Iran has maintained her entity, just as she has weathered the ups and downs of centuries, so to-day she is tolerating with equanimity the privations and hardships she is suffering owing to the exigencies of war. Conscious of her place in the forefront of nations in the past, and proud of her notable contributions to mankind's civilization, the younger generation of Iran are to-day led by their young, inspired and sagacious Sovereign, His Majesty Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, the worthy and rightful heir of Iran's ancient throne. They are resolved to resuscitate and maintain the standards and traditions of their cultural and historic attainments.

As for to-morrow, I have no doubt that Iran has the potential ability to recover her hard-won prestige as one of the oldest civilizations of the universe. I feel confident that the friendship of her faithful Allies, and in particular that of Great Britain, will help her to regain the glorious place that is rightfully hers amongst the nations of the world.

The CHAIRMAN: We have all listened to the lecture with much appreciation, and I suggest to the lecturer that he should write a book on the subject.

The vote of thanks to Mr. Hamzavi was carried by acclamation, after which the Chairman declared the meeting closed.

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## POSTSCRIPT

BY H. D. GRAVES LAW, C.I.E.

I have been asked to add a postscript to Mr. Hamzavi's lecture, and I do so with the greatest pleasure. We have long got past the stage of wonder at Mr. Hamzavi's eloquence and command of our language. If, as he says, Iran is a bridge between the East and the West, then Mr. Hamzavi is surely one of the girders of that bridge. The guide, philosopher and friend, not only of all his fellow-countrymen in England, but of any Englishman who wants to know about Iran, Mr. Hamzavi occupies a unique position. He belongs both to us and to his own country, and none is better fitted than he to discuss the problems of Anglo-Iranian relations.

If the main theme of his lecture is the present position and the future prospects of his own country in the world after the war, his subsidiary theme was that old, old question which figures so largely in lectures and articles about Iran—the question of Anglo-Iranian relations—for the simple and solid reason

that, as Mr. Hamzavi observed, there is a close identity of interest between Great Britain and Iran, and after the war Iran will look to the friendship of her allies and (to quote Mr. Hamzavi) "to Great Britain in particular" to help her to regain her place among the nations of the world.

This is not the time nor the place to embark on an essay on Anglo-Iranian relations; but assuming that there is such a problem and that something must be done about it, Mr. Hamzavi suggests that Anglo-Iranian friendship must be *positively* worked for, and that one of the most hopeful ways of covering the ground would be the interchange of cultural relations between the two countries. Let us consider for a moment how this object can be attained in a practical and workmanlike way. Undoubtedly something has got to be *done* about it, and somebody has got to *start* doing it.

Mr. Hamzavi recommends an interchange of cultural and social relations. It is possible that nothing very much can be done in this way until after the war, but it would be an excellent thing if a cultural mission could come from Iran to this country, similar to the mission which has just visited India. We would all welcome a mission which fully represented not only the old school, but the best of the modern—modern literature, modern thought, modern politics. This is a step which must be left to the two Governments to bring about.\*

Finally, there is the extremely important question of the language. That there should be an increase of students of the Persian language in this country, and of teachers, is from every point of view an undeniable necessity. It is a thousand pities that the scheme of State scholarships for the study of Oriental languages, including Persian, was dropped after being in force for only two years. Nothing but good could come from a renewal of these scholarships, and it is to be hoped that English students who win these scholarships and who go out to Iran should be encouraged to spend some of their time on reaching that country in the houses of Iranians, where they could perfect their knowledge of the language, acquire an understanding of the thought of the people by living among them and getting to know them and their characteristics, and find out how the two peoples differ in their outlook and way of life, and where we must agree to differ instead of worrying about the differences. No individual can initiate such action. It must be begun by our Government. But it is probable that the School of Oriental Studies in London is fully alive to the necessity for much more active steps being taken in the future than have been taken in the past.

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\* NOTE.—Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes's *History of Persia* is now being translated into Persian. Volume I will shortly be published, probably in Teheran.

# TURKEY ON THE STRAIT AND NARROW PATH OF NEUTRALITY

By DEREK PATMORE

Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on June 28, 1944, the Rt. Hon. Sir Percy Loraine, Bt., P.C., G.C.M.G., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, it is my very pleasant duty to present to you to-day's lecturer, Mr. Derek Patmore, who was correspondent of the *News Chronicle* in Turkey and has during the two years or more that he has been there had magnificent opportunities for observing, noting and digesting his information on a country which is, and in my opinion always will be, one of the greatest interest to this country.

I do not wish in any way to forestall what he is going to say to you, and I will therefore call on him to address the Society.

A FAMOUS American correspondent writing about this war called one of his books *Only the Stars are Neutral*, and, indeed, events have proved that it is difficult to remain neutral in the present world-wide conflict. So far, Turkey, although an ally of Great Britain, has elected to follow the difficult path of preserving her neutrality, and I am sure that many British friends of Turkey have questioned this trend in Turkish foreign policy. They have rightly said: "Turkey is an ally. We know that she has an army of about a million men under arms. Then why didn't she enter the war?" "Why does the Turkish Government still announce that it will help the United Nations' cause with all means within Turkey's power but hesitates about declaring war on Germany?"

The answers to these questions seem to me to be in a brief survey of the history of the Turkish Republic and a study of the present-day internal situation of modern Turkey. In doing this I do not propose to attempt to unravel the veiled secrets of Anglo-Turkish diplomacy. Moreover, I do not feel that we can estimate the true position of the Turkish attitude until the details of the Adana meeting between Mr. Churchill and Ismet Ineunü and the conference at Cairo between Mr. Eden and Nouman Menemendjioglou are made public. Indeed, before such experts as are here to-day it would be presumptuous on my part. The following observations are merely my own personal impressions gathered during a two years' stay in Turkey, during which through my work I had many opportunities of meeting and discussing world affairs with Turkey's leaders.

When discussing Turkey, most people forget that modern Turkey has undergone the most violent social revolution known in this century except for that which occurred in Soviet Russia, and that this Kemalist Revolution, as it is called, only happened in 1923. And so, before examining Turkish neutrality, let us recapitulate some of the violent changes this revolution brought to what had been the disintegrating Ottoman Empire—the "sick man of Europe," as the dying empire was familiarly known to the Chancelleries of the Western Powers.

Kemal Atatürk, even before he came to power, had long pondered on



the weaknesses of the empire. He had realized that the Ottoman Sultans had never been able to assimilate the many foreign races under their rule. Witness the Balkan revolts, and the rise of the Arabs under Lawrence during the last war. A current Turkish saying is: "We had the Arabs in the last war. You can have them in this one."

Kemal Atatürk also appreciated the dangerous geographic situation of Istanbul, the empire capital, and he sensed the dangerous fanaticism of some of the old Turkish leaders. He disliked the Ottoman's dangerous love for past tradition as symbolized by the fez. He realized that the majority of the Anatolian peasants were illiterate and the urgent need for national education.

I think also, when you look back on the empire days, curiously enough the Turks suffered from a lack of national pride in being Turks. They had become so cosmopolitan that they called themselves Ottomans as against Turks, and there was a danger of losing the energy, vitality and vigour which had made the Turkish Empire originally. It is a curious thing, I think, that if you look back at the Turkish Empire, so many people accuse the Turks of being cruel and oppressive, but actually the empire suffered from too much tolerance. For instance, the Ottoman Empire could never assimilate its Greek or Armenian populations as the British Empire has made any subject in it feel British, or America has made millions of people feel Americans and not Europeans. One reason was that, even if they had efficient administration, they had no single idea that made them feel Turkish as opposed to being members of the empire.

I am just mentioning these things because they explain many of the reforms which Atatürk introduced when he came to power in 1923. You had a crumbling empire. Many people thought it was finished, and suddenly there was a kind of renaissance. A new leader appeared, and the country pulled itself together and revived. The Turkish people gathered round the new leader in Ankara and the new Turkey was born.

I think it is one of the most extraordinary things in modern history how a tradition-bound empire could suddenly turn itself inside out and survive; but in the effort it had left certain things to be done. For instance, the change-over from old Turkish script to the modern alphabet, by which the whole of the peasantry could learn to read and write, was in itself a great revolution.

The doing away with State religion was another.

The liberation of Turkish womanhood was an even more important change.

Then Ankara was made the capital, and Istanbul was left to dwindle for the time being on the Bosphorus.

Moreover, a great drive for education took place, and Atatürk himself went round the country, encouraging schools, teaching the new alphabet, and generally galvanizing a people who, though charming and loyal, are often rather lazy, into unheard-of activity.

At the same time Atatürk instituted the basis of modern Turkish policy, which in itself was a new orientation. Instead of posing as the protector of Islam, which was a great temptation, because I have heard from so many people, even in this war, people coming from India, that Atatürk's

prestige after his first success was so great that many Moslems came to him and wanted him to lead a crusade to liberate the Islamic countries; but Atatürk was wise enough to realize that Turkey could only survive if she remained a purely Turkish State, with no minorities, no Arabs, no Balkan people to revolt, and also no territorial ambitions. "Turkey for the Turks" was the cry, and I think it still is.

Unfortunately, Atatürk died before he could see the completion of his great work, and Ismet Pasha, who had been his friend and adviser and helpmate throughout the revolution, succeeded.

He too realized, and still realizes, I think, the problems that face the new Turkish Republic. When I was in Ankara he told a friend of mine, talking about a rather difficult moment when it looked as if Turkey might have to fight: "Turkey has fought too many wars in the present century. I don't want to sacrifice the youth of the nation unless I'm forced to do so for the national honour. Modern Turkey needs peace to complete the great revolution started by Kemal Atatürk."

I think this is a deeply significant statement coming from the man who is, after all, the virtual ruler of the country, and it may explain some of the reasons for Turkish hesitancy about entering the war.

Still, before dealing with the problems which have faced Ismet and his Government during the present conflict, let us turn for a moment to the internal problems of the Turkish Republic. Turkey is still an agricultural country, although many new industries have been created, such as the great steel works at Karabuk, and the developing of the railways, etc. But agriculture remains the basic industry. Although twice the size of France, Turkey has a population of only eighteen millions, and therefore there is a tendency in Government circles to wish to preserve that population.

Also by her geographical situation Turkey is poised between several great World Powers—Germany, Russia and Great Britain. Kemal had wisely and shrewdly always said the basic factor of their policy must be friendship with Great Britain. At the same time, when the war broke out the people had made this tremendous effort during the last twenty years, and although they were ready to fight for their independence I think they were a little tired by this tremendous national effort. Also I think they were shrewd enough to see that there was nothing to be gained in 1939 by throwing themselves into the conflict, because they were not ready and they saw the terrifying power of Nazi Germany.

In September, 1939, I went out to Bucharest and saw the Turkish Ambassador, who told me that at that time the situation looked extremely dangerous for Turkey because the Balkans were obviously not united.

The first big step the Turkish Government took was to send a mission to Russia, where they signed a pact of non-aggression between Russia and Turkey, by which Russia promised not to attack Turkey in any circumstances. At the same time, they sat and waited.

Then 1940 came, and the Balkans were overrun. I arrived in Istanbul at the worst time, when it looked as if the Balkans were lost. It was the beginning of 1941, when Germany was just entering Bulgaria and the German troops, after overrunning Greece, were at the Turkish frontier.

Next, more bad news followed, and it looked as if Great Britain was all alone.

I think one of the things which we must remember was that, in the darkest hours, Turkey did reaffirm her alliance with Great Britain when practically everybody else on the Continent thought Britain was finished.

I remember talking to Reget Pasha, who had been sent to London by Ismet on a military mission during the fateful summer of 1940. He told me, when he came back: "The President asked me, 'Do you think the English will win?' I replied, 'I know as a soldier they have not got anything. They have so few divisions in England, and almost no soldiers in London itself; but they will win.'" So they reaffirmed their alliance.

More evil things followed, because our own situation in the Middle East at the time was not particularly happy. Syria was controlled by Vichy, and Raschid Ali revolted in Iraq.

I think the reason why Germany did not attack Turkey at that moment was that they had decided to attack Russia, and they thought—owing to Syria and Raschid Ali—that Turkey would fall like a ripe plum into German hands without a struggle. But the Turks took no chances. They called up more reserves, and there is no denying that, if Turkey had been attacked, they would have fought.

Another leader said to me: "We would fight Germany; not because we are allies of Great Britain, but people seem to forget that Saradjoglou and the other leaders have sacrificed everything to make the Turkish Republic, and therefore we would rather die defending this republic than see it destroyed by the Germans."

Keeping their army under arms for a long time—in fact, it is still mobilized—was a tremendous expense, and a lot of Turks feel they have done enough. Turkey has no territorial ambitions. But Ismet has always said that the independence of the Balkans is a keystone of Turkish foreign policy. To-day Balkan liberation seems attained. Turkey is neutral, with a friendly Government towards Great Britain and one which seems now eager to help the Allies as much as possible and cut down supplies to Germany. But can this neutral attitude go on if Turkey wants to have a say in Balkan affairs?

The other thing is that, after four years of very costly neutrality, Turkey after the war will need credits and help to go on developing a country which is still very undeveloped, and Great Britain is the logical country to supply such credits. Therefore, if the Turkish Government wants to gain British support it must take a more active part in the conduct of the war.

I think we can see a closer coming together of the Turkish Government and the British. But the thing that has interested me about Turkey is that Turkey is a curious country, because, although it is a republic, it is virtually ruled by a small group of men, the men who made the revolution, headed by Ismet. There is Saradjoglou, Menemendjioglou and Marshal Chakmak, until recently the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army. The Turks are extremely influenced by personal contact and not so much by friendship for various countries. I mention this because it struck me very forcibly that the Turks are very proud, rather impersonal,

very good friends, but they have not got any one great love for any nation like so many other nations have in Europe. I think they have always admired Great Britain and always will. In fact, they say: "The English are the gentlemen of the West, and we are the gentlemen of the East."

But what I have noticed about Anglo-Turkish relations is the rôle Englishmen have played in Turkish affairs. If the Turks like an Englishman they will do a great deal for him, more than for his country. I mention this because we have Sir Percy Loraine here, and I think Sir Percy has done more than anybody to bring about the Anglo-Turkish friendship, because everybody I met in Turkey still talked of him with affection, and they say, of course, he was such great friends with Kemal Atatürk. The present Ambassador, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen's friendship with Premier Saradjoglou has also helped our cause.

I have noticed that these friendships, very undiplomatic as they may appear to be, have an effect, and it is a curious fact that you do not see them with the diplomatic representatives of other countries. I think that there is a curious attraction between the English and the Turks. Once they break down the barriers they do find they have much in common and friendship grows. I just mention this point because I think it is peculiar to the Turkish scene, and it explains a great deal which may be puzzling to other people. It also explains even Turkish internal affairs, because it is obvious to everyone who has been in Turkey that only a man with the tremendous physical attraction and fascination of Atatürk would have made the Turks undertake their revolution.

Even to-day Turkish politics are dominated by the personalities of their leaders. It is not like other countries where there are political groups. I have mentioned Saradjoglou, who is very typical of the new Turkey, a son of a peasant, very proud of his peasant blood, but, because he has travelled and studied in Switzerland, been to America, and represented his country at various great conferences, has a much more modern attitude than some of the older Turks. I think he is also extremely democratic by nature.

He and Ismet Ineunü want to carry the revolution to its conclusion. There is a great deal to be done still. People who come out for a short visit are rightly impressed by the modern city of Ankara. At the same time, behind all this there are thousands of peasants who still want education. There is a great deal of civil administration reform to be done.

I remember one Turk said to me: "I know you criticize us. We seem to be slow and lazy sometimes. But, after all, Great Britain has had two hundred years to build up a Civil Service and we have only had some twenty years."

Saradjoglou is an extremely interesting figure, because he shows the vitality of the new Turkey. Also he has started certain reforms which may have far-reaching effects when peace is restored. He has told me himself that he and the President realize that the present régime has to be rather dictatorial in view of the national emergency and the fact that the Turkish people are not ready for what Atatürk dreamed—a real democracy.

One of the most interesting developments is the rise of the women in Turkey. Atatürk's rule gave women their chance. One thing that impressed me most during two years in Turkey was the unusual intelligence of the Turkish women, as well as their energy, their modern outlook and much more advanced outlook than many of the men. It is interesting because many people have always looked upon Turkey as a very masculine country, in which women played no part. Actually, if you study Turkish history, women have always played a part although behind the scenes. But to-day in Ankara women are in power as well as the men. Some of the deputies are women, and you find them in all walks of life, as judges, lawyers, doctors. There is no getting away from the fact that the moderating influence of women in politics may have a very far-flung influence on the development of the country.

One of the most interesting things I find in Turkey is the fact that the youth looks towards Great Britain. They are rather bewildered by the tremendous changes that have taken place in their background, but they have a sincere desire for English culture and English books, and the British Council has had a phenomenal success in Turkey; in fact, the Director of the Council told me they cannot get enough teachers.

At the same time, I think that the violent changes which Turkey has undergone has made most Turks feel they need a breathing space. They are a little tired by this tremendous effort they have made during these last twenty or so years, and there is no getting away from it, they want peace.

But if Turkey can have peace, I think that, given a good Government, which they have at the moment, and no unforeseen political disturbances outside, Turkey is going to be a tremendous force in the Middle East, and one which we shall always look to with gratitude and affection.

But there are dangers. Ismet Pasha faces a very critical period in the post-war years, because already the country's finances are in a very bad state and there is a good deal of grumbling; but, of course, during war-time they are united round him.

So I think needs, if not sentiment, will make them always turn towards Great Britain, and I do not foresee any reasons why the Turkish Revolution, which was begun with such great élan by Atatürk, should not ultimately march to a triumphant conclusion. (Applause.)

A discussion followed, after which the CHAIRMAN said: Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like you to authorize me to thank Mr. Derek Patmore most sincerely for a very interesting lecture. It seemed to me, while I was listening to him speaking, that he had steered a most skilful and resolute course between the Scylla of sensationalism and the Charybdis of dulness. His whole address seemed to me very temperate, extremely sensible and really objective. I think, therefore, that his address will go on the records of the Society as a valuable contribution to our knowledge of contemporary Turkey.

If I might make perhaps one very minute criticism, I would myself have preferred the word "non-belligerency" to the word "neutrality" in regard to Turkey.

Neutrality is a sort of legal attitude; it is uncommon as a personal habit. You cannot get away from the legal aspects of international relations; but the legal aspects, important as they are, very rarely reflect the real feeling of people. If Turkey has remained non-belligerent, it is, I think, for State reasons, of which we can certainly attempt in our own way to appreciate the importance. But I cannot believe—and I do not think Mr. Patmore would contradict me—that the non-belligerency has anything to do with the sentiments of the Turkish people towards this country.

Now, if I may add on my own perhaps a little in amplification of what the lecturer has said.

During recent years I have had to answer frequent questions from my own friends, and I have answered them to the best of my ability, about the Turkish rôle in this war. I have found that nearly all the questions spring from an axiomatic assumption that the entry of Turkey as a belligerent into this war would necessarily have been a military advantage to the United Nations.

I am quite certain it is not axiomatic, though I admit that it is discussable. I think really that if you carefully examine the position, if you look at the map and compare the events of this war with those of the last war—and they do have a certain interrelation—I can demonstrate to you that it is not axiomatic, and give you some ideas of the geographical and strategical considerations involved.

I think you will all accept the fact that the conduct of the German war in a south-easterly direction in the 1914-18 war followed the line of the Hamburg-Baghdad railway, and documents that have since been made known make it quite evident that Germany's object, or one of her main objects, in allying herself with the former Ottoman Empire, which was symbolized, moreover, in this scheme of the German railway to Baghdad, was to establish herself as a military power at the head of the Persian Gulf and open up all the intervening regions to German commercial exploitation and probably to colonial settlement also.

Assuming that was the case, and postulating, as we certainly may, that the Ottoman Empire was intended to become a sphere of exclusive German influence, what was the width of the corridor through which Germany could march? It was from Ararat to Suez.

She failed, but her failure, as I think those of you who have some knowledge of the German character will agree, was not a reason for the Germans giving up their plan. But before 1939, if they were going to resume a plan of that sort, the corridor had shrunk from the width of Ararat to Suez to the exact width of the Anatolian Peninsula.

Why? Russia and Turkey were in very good relations. Syria was a French mandated territory. Palestine and Jordan were British mandated territories. Egypt and Iraq were allies of Britain. Therefore this width of the Anatolian Peninsula became the important thing. If you could block that, Germany's possibilities of access to the head of the Persian Gulf were out. What did German access to the head of the Persian Gulf mean? It meant an enemy base from which hostile submarines, aircraft and even maybe surface ships could prey on our communications to

India and the Far East. That is a position that no British Government that we can remember could ever tolerate.

It became therefore, from the moment that the war with Germany started in 1939, a strategical necessity that the Anatolian Peninsula should be denied to the German enemy; not only for the reason I have described but because, with the oil deposits in various places, that Anatolian Peninsula covered one alternative route to the Caucasus oilfield and all routes to all the other Middle Eastern oilfields from the place the Germans started from.

If you are faced with a strategical necessity of denying a certain area to the enemy there are two ways of doing it—one is diplomacy and the other is shell and bullet. I would like you to take note that that position has been held without the firing of one shell or bullet at the cost of H.M. Treasury.

If you complain that Turkey has not jumped into the war, just remember those considerations.

## TREBIZOND AND THE PERSIAN TRANSIT TRADE

FROM A CORRESPONDENT

FROM time immemorial Trebizond has been the terminal port of one of the main caravan routes leading from the Black Sea across high mountain ranges and bleak plateaux by way of Erzerum and Bayazit under the shadow of Mount Ararat to Tabriz in Northern Persia. Xenophon, in his retreat from Mesopotamia with his Ten Thousand, had followed this route in 402 B.C., and had pitched his camp within a few hundred yards of the spot where the modern motor road from Persia reaches the coast at Trebizond, a site which to this day is known as "Kampos." Later, Trapezus (Trebizond) flourished as the principal port of the Roman province of Pontus, and there are still visible the half-submerged breakwaters of a harbour which the Emperor Hadrian is said to have constructed in the first century A.D. But its Golden Age was during the Middle Ages from 1204 to 1461 under the rule of the Comnenii, who had fled after the capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusaders and founded the independent Empire of Trebizond. Genoese and Venetian merchants, making use of the caravan route to Persia, once more turned Trebizond into a busy emporium for the exchange of merchandise between East and West; their trade brought wealth and renown to the imperial city, which with its conquest by the Turks in 1461 soon decayed and ceased to be of importance in this trade.

By the Treaty of Adrianople of 1830 Turkey opened her Black Sea ports to the shipping of foreign nations, and it is no coincidence that in the same year the Foreign Office sent out to Trebizond from London a certain Mr. James Brant as first British Vice-Consul with the object, as Brant himself wrote, of "the making of Trebizond a depot for the Persian trade."

Mr. Brant was not the first foreign representative to establish himself in Trebizond. The French, who had always shown an interest in Turkey and the Levant, had appointed a "Commissioner" there in 1798, and by 1830 there was a Sardinian and probably one or two other Consuls in the town, which at that time had a population of about 25,000, some 17,000 of whom were Moslems, and the remainder Greeks (about 5,000, relics of imperial days), Armenians (about 2,000, who were said to have settled there after the break-up of the Armenian kingdom in the eleventh century) and a few "Franks" (*i.e.*, Europeans). The trade of the town was almost entirely in the hands of the Greeks and Armenians, but, owing to the prohibition on foreign shipping using Turkish ports, the manufacturers of newly industrialized England and those European countries which were following in her wake made little use of the short caravan route to Persia in their search for markets. Most of the trade to and from Persia went by the longer Georgian route from Redout Kale (north of



Poti) through Tiflis in the Caucasus to Tabriz, a route which was distasteful to the British Government in view of the political and commercial rivalry which then existed between England and Russia. The British Government saw in the opening of the Turkish Black Sea ports an opportunity of using the shortest route to Persia, which had the additional advantage that it ran entirely through friendly Turkish territory. Hence the despatch from London of Mr. Brant.

Brant, who, though Vice-Consul, was permitted to trade on his own account, appears to have been a man of considerable energy and enterprise, and it is no exaggeration to say that his initial efforts largely contributed to the dominating position acquired by Trebizond in the transit trade by the middle of the nineteenth century. Almost immediately after his arrival we find him writing long and frequent despatches to the Foreign Office and the Embassy at Constantinople extolling the advantages of the Trebizond route, dispelling doubts about the safety of the Trebizond anchorage, urging the necessity of concluding a commercial treaty with the Shah of Persia, and obtaining a grant of £500 to allow him to visit Tabriz and Teheran. He entered into contact with the merchants of Tabriz in an attempt to persuade them to use the Trebizond instead of the Caucasian route, and barely nine months after his arrival in Trebizond he reported to Constantinople: "I have lately received a communication from the native merchants of Tabreez expressing a great desire to open a trade with this place, and as I conceive such a disposition very worthy of encouragement it were desirable to meet their views in every possible way . . . the Persian Merchants say that they would transfer the whole trade they now carry on with Tiflis to Trebizond if they could find all the goods they require (*i.e.*, return loads for their caravans). They are so much vexed by the Russian Authorities that they are quite disgusted with the Russian trade and nothing but necessity induces them to continue it."

Persian merchants and British manufacturers alike were quick to appreciate the advantages of the Trebizond route to Northern Persia, which was nearly 200 miles shorter than the Tiflis route; this meant that pack-horses and mules with their average daily march of 15 miles could do the journey from Trebizond to Tabriz in 30 to 35 days, a saving of 10 or more days on the Caucasian route. At the same time the Russian authorities began to place difficulties in the way of transit through Georgia, so that by the end of 1832 Mr. Consul Brant was able to report to his Government that the Persian trade through Trebizond of British goods (mostly textiles from Manchester) was steadily increasing, and as proof of his contention that the town was rapidly developing in commercial importance he mentioned that the French Vice-Consulate had been raised to a Consulate, that Sweden and Denmark had opened Consulates, and that the Shah had appointed a Persian Commercial Agent, all in the year 1832. In view of this development he urged the opening of a British Consulate at Erzerum, halfway on the road to Tabriz, as "it is indispensable that there should be a Consular Establishment at Erzerum to compleat the plan of extending our commercial relations with Persia." In 1836 Brant himself was sent to Erzerum as Vice-Consul and his busi-

ness partner, a Mr. Stevens, was appointed Consul at Trebizond. In the same year a definite agreement regarding the transit trade was signed between the British Government and the Shah, to whom King William IV. sent a small personal gift of 2,000 muskets, no doubt in the expectation that they would be used to guard the security of the caravan routes.

The transit trade through Trebizond developed surprisingly quickly and almost without interruption, except for the Crimean War years, from 1830 until the middle of the 1860's. The advent of the steamship no doubt contributed to this development. The first steamship to visit Trebizond was a British one, the s.s. *Essex*, in May, 1836. Later in the same year another British steamer, the *Crescent*, began a regular service between Trebizond and Constantinople, and in the following year the Austrian Danubian Steam Navigation Company started a similar service. The *Crescent* was sold to the Austrians in 1838, after which British steamers only called at irregular intervals until in 1845 the P. & O. Company opened a direct service between Southampton and Trebizond, which was, however, discontinued in 1858 owing to the difficulty of finding return cargoes and inability to compete with the heavily subsidized French and Russian lines which had been started in 1857 and 1858 respectively.

The transit imports for Persia carried by these steamers consisted almost entirely of manufactured goods, about two-thirds of which were cotton goods from Manchester, the remainder coming from the manufacturing countries of Europe; "colonials" (sugar and tea) were also an important item—tea from India via London and sugar from England, France and Austria. Exports from Persia were invariably in much smaller volume than imports, and consisted principally of "tumbeki" (a special tobacco smoked in narghilé pipes and used mainly in Turkey), silks (for France), shawls, carpets, gall-nuts, dried fruits, wax and wool and cotton.

After the Crimean War Russia began to take an interest in reviving the transit trade through Georgia, a step which had been impracticable so long as the turbulent Caucasian tribes remained unsubdued, and from about 1858 onwards Russian competition became increasingly menacing for Trebizond, whose very life blood as commercial centre was at stake. In March, 1857, Mr. Consul Stevens reported to his Ambassador at Constantinople: "From all I learn it is evident that Russia will ere long make an effort to deprive Trebizond of its chief importance by taking from it its Transit Trade with Persia. This alone can be avoided by the Turkish Government's making at least a carriage road to Erzurum." It was known that the Russians were developing Poti as a town and port, and there were persistent rumours that a railway was to be built from Poti to Baku on the Caspian Sea with a branch line to the Persian frontier. The Russians were doing their best to capture the carrying trade of the Black Sea, and in August, 1859, the Russian Steam Navigation Company, whose ships had started to call regularly at Trebizond the previous year, issued a circular stating that it would in future forward goods for Persia via Poti at a fixed rate, which was considerably less than the fluctuating rates of Trebizond caravans. In 1862 work was begun on

the Poti-Tiflis railway, and in 1864 the Russian Government abolished the Customs tariff on transit goods.

If Turkey was to meet the challenge of a trans-Caucasian railway it was clear, as Mr. Stevens had pointed out, that a carriage road would have to be constructed at least to Erzerum. As far back as 1850 a party of Dalmatian engineers had been entrusted with the task of building such a road, and in September of that year, in the presence of Ismail Pasha, the Minister of Public Works, and all the foreign Consuls, the first stones were laid with great ceremony, but as neither survey nor estimates had been made before the work was begun it was soon found that the engineering difficulties would be so formidable and the cost so enormous that it was decided to abandon the work after little more than two miles of paving had been laid along the Boztepe ridge above the Değirmen River.

The construction of a carriage road was no easy task, for high mountain ranges rise, as it were, straight out of the sea on this part of the coast. Caravan drivers from Trebizond used three alternative routes to cross these mountains. In summer there were two tracks of approximately equal length following parallel valleys in a direct line from Trebizond to Bayburt, where they joined up. Both these tracks, which crossed the main mountain range by difficult exposed passes, one of nearly 9,000 feet and the other of over 10,000 feet, were quite impracticable in winter, when a longer but better protected route was followed, crossing the mountains by the 6,660 feet Zigana Pass and then travelling via Arđassa (the modern Torul) and Gümüşane, with its abandoned silver mines, to Bayburt, where the summer track was followed across the bleak plateau of Armenia (as it was then known) to Erzerum. Another track across the mountains ran from Sürmene on the coast some 21 miles east of Trebizond to Bayburt, following the comparatively easy and well-protected Kara Dere valley and crossing the main ridge by a sheltered 8,000 feet pass which was rarely impassable in winter. The distance by this track from Sürmene to Bayburt was 56 miles, compared with 121 miles from Trebizond to Bayburt by the winter track via Gümüşane; therefore in deciding to make a carriage road to Erzerum there was, from an engineering point of view, every advantage to be gained by selecting the Sürmene route, which had the additional advantage that the anchorage at Sürmene was infinitely better than that at Trebizond. However, no consideration was paid to this easier and shorter route owing, apparently, to an *idée fixe* that the road must start from Trebizond, so that when in 1864 it was finally decided to resume the work of the Dalmatian engineers the winter track through Gümüşane was selected for development as a carriage road.

Two years after the laying of the first rail on the new line from Poti to Tiflis a party of French engineers under a Monsieur Thuvenin, who had recently built the Syrian road from Damascus to Beirut, arrived in Trebizond and immediately set about surveying the proposed new road. The survey work appears to have been efficient and the line followed, with occasional exceptions, was well chosen, and has, in the main, been followed by the modern motor road. Instead of taking the road up the steep Boztepe hill behind Trebizond and so along the ridge followed by

the Dalmatians, the French took their road along the coast to the east of the town and then blasted a way up the left bank of the Değirmen, this new and more practical line joining the old track some 8 miles from Trebizond. Occasionally other than engineering considerations seem to have influenced the inevitably tortuous line of the road. It was, for instance, well known that Yerköprü and Hamsiköy, two villages on the northern side of the Zigana Pass, had each offered large sums to induce the engineers to divert the road through their particular village; Hamsiköy was a prosperous Greek village and was able to offer £800, double the sum offered by its poorer Turkish rival, and so the road, even to this day, still passes by Hamsiköy. But there was constant friction between the French engineers and their Turkish workmen, together with some trouble over native women which led to the murder of two of the engineers in 1867, and in the following spring the Turkish Government dismissed all the French and entrusted their work to Turkish military engineers.

The road was completed in 1872, the same year that saw the opening of the Poti-Tiflis railway. Already there had been a marked falling off in the transit trade through Trebizond, as the following figures taken from the Annual Trade Reports of Mr. Brant and his successors show :

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Transit Imports through Trebizond.</i>	<i>Transit Exports through Trebizond.</i>
1830	610 tons	Not known
1833	960 "	240 tons
1840	2,300 "	1,010 "
1850	5,170 "	1,960 "
1858	8,020 "	2,800 "
1859	7,410 "	2,850 "
1860	7,500 "	3,460 "
1866	3,100 "	2,150 "
1867	2,790 "	2,060 "
1868	3,420 "	2,630 "
1869	4,400 "	2,100 "
1870	4,050 "	3,530 "
1871	3,630 "	3,170 "
1872	3,670 "	2,750 "

It was estimated that Poti had captured more than half the Persian transit trade by 1872, though after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 it is probable that some of this trade was diverted from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf. Trebizond merchants engaged in the transit trade began to transfer their business to Poti; Germany reduced her Consulate at Trebizond to a Vice-Consulate in 1872 (and closed it four years later) and established a Consulate at Tiflis with the openly avowed aim of forestalling England and France in capturing the Persian trade, which the Germans, like everyone else, thought would now pass entirely through Russia. The British Consul regretfully reported that very few wealthy "Franks" remained in Trebizond and that the Greeks were gradually migrating to Russia.

If Trebizond was to compete successfully with Poti it was clear that determined efforts would have to be made to attract trade by abolishing the vexatious Customs and Quarantine formalities which accompanied any transit by way of Trebizond. Whereas in Russia all transit was free after 1864, in Turkey a 2 per cent. duty was levied (reduced from 6 per cent. in 1858), and it was only after repeated petitions addressed to the Porte and to the foreign Consulates by Trebizond merchants that the duty was reduced to 1 per cent. in 1869 and finally abolished four years later. Besides the duty there were other senseless formalities, in particular the double examination of all goods at both Trebizond and Erzerum, leading to delay and the breaking open of carefully packed bales. There was an attempt to remedy this in 1873, when it was decreed that only 10 per cent. of any one consignment was liable to be opened for inspection; at the same time a system of lead sealing was introduced which it was hoped would obviate the second examination at Erzerum. However, the lead seals in their turn brought fresh difficulties, as the Kurdish tribesmen who infested the caravan route discovered that they could be melted to make excellent bullets, so that by the time the caravans reached Erzerum (a ten-day journey) most of the seals had been stolen—to the confusion of the Customs officials, who usually insisted on opening all the sealless bales.

But, apart from the quarantine difficulties and Customs formalities, if Trebizond was to compete with the trans-Caucasian railway it was of paramount importance that full advantage should be taken of the new carriage road to Erzerum. There is no better illustration of the ineptitude and apathy of the Porte than the history of this road after its completion in 1872, nor is there any better illustration of the fact that in those days it was far easier to build a new road in Turkey than to repair an old one. This road passed through difficult and high mountain country exposed to winter storms and avalanches, spring floods and landslides, and unless kept under constant supervision and repair it would inevitably become impassable, yet absolutely no provision was made for any such maintenance work. In January, 1873, less than a year after its completion, the British Consul reported that the road had "fallen into such a state of repair as to be almost impassable"; in fact, no serious repair work was undertaken until 1894, by which time its condition had long made it virtually impracticable for the clumsy four-wheeled "fourgons," drawn by four horses and able to carry about one and a quarter tons, which had been imported from the Caucasus by a few optimistic traders. One enterprising merchant, a Swiss named Hochstrasser, proposed to the Turkish authorities that he be granted a twenty-five-year concession to run a wheeled transport company for the conveyance of goods between Trebizond and Erzerum; he offered to pay £2,000 a year for the concession subject to the Turkish Government keeping the road in a fit state for wheeled traffic, but this the Porte was unwilling to do, so Monsieur Hochstrasser's idea, which might have meant so much to Trebizond, was shelved and the road was allowed to fall to pieces. It was in such a chronic state that during the Turco-Russian War (1877-78) arms and munitions for the beleaguered troops in Erzerum were re-shipped from Trebizond to Sürmene and transported from there by the Kara Dere

track—a melancholy epitaph on the work of the military engineers who had laboured so hard to build the road from Trebizond to the very important military centre at Erzerum.

But as the figures already quoted show, despite a heavy decline in the middle sixties, Trebizond still continued to handle a fair volume of the transit trade, and even in 1878, when Russian forces occupied Erzerum, over 4,500 tons of transit goods were carried by the Trebizond route. The reason for the continued use of the Trebizond road, despite its disadvantages, is to be found partly in the slowness with which the conservative East changes the habits of a lifetime, in the tenacity of Trebizond merchants and pack-animal owners who feared to be put out of business, in the natural preference of Tabriz merchants for the Turkish route because it passed through Moslem territory, but above all in the difficulties which the Russian Government began to place in the way of transit through her own territory once she had succeeded in drawing the bulk of it away from Trebizond. The sudden tightening up of Russian Customs regulations was primarily designed to check contraband, but was also influenced by Russian industrialists, who wanted protection for their own manufactures. Finally, in 1883, a year after the completion of the railway extension from Tiflis to Baku and five years after the Russian acquisition of Batum (a far better port than Poti), the Russian Government decreed that for a period of five years no merchandise of any sort was to be imported through the Caucasus for Persia. This decree, with the help of which Russian manufacturers hoped to capture the Persian market, was described by the British Consul as “the luckiest event which could have happened for the future prosperity of the districts of the Vilayets of Trebizond and Erzerum.” Allah had indeed been merciful—in the shape of the Czar—at a time when the future of Trebizond looked blacker than it had ever done before.

Trade began to return to Trebizond, though it never again reached the high-water mark of 1860. From 1883 to 1906, despite the extension of the Caucasian railway to Julfa on the Persian frontier and the development of Batum as a port, the annual imports through Trebizond for Persia averaged 5,600 tons and exports from Persia for the same period averaged 1,620 tons annually. Between 1907 and the Great War there was a sharp fall in the transit figures through Trebizond, which can probably be explained by the increasingly disturbed political situation in both Turkey and Persia and the diminution of commerce in the Black Sea as a result of the three wars in which Turkey was engaged between 1911 and 1913. During the Great War both Trebizond and Erzerum were occupied by the Russians and the transit trade came to a standstill, but as it had done after the Crimean and the Turco-Russian Wars so after the Great War it quickly returned to Trebizond. Between 1921 and 1927 over 4,000 tons of European goods were imported each year into Persia through Trebizond—a remarkable achievement, as Turkey was going through an internal political upheaval during these years (in the course of which all the Greeks and Armenians left Trebizond), though it must also be remembered that the situation in revolutionary Russia and rebellious Caucasia made the Georgian route virtually impossible.

History is always inclined to repeat itself, and the post-Great War struggle between Turkey and Russia for the transit trade to northern Persia bears many parallels with their struggle after the Crimean War. After both wars Turkey held a predominant position in the trade; after both wars we find Russia successfully diverting a large part of it—after the Crimean War by offering improved transport and Customs facilities, after the Great War by the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Persia in 1927 expressly designed to foster the transit trade through Russia except in those goods in which she herself was interested as producer; after both wars we find the Turkish Government finally awakening to the loss of her transit trade and tardily deciding on measures to stop the rot; in both periods the action decided on is the same—the construction of a carriage road, though this time the carriages are driven by the internal combustion engine.

Beyond this point the parallel does not hold good. The construction of the new road, which was begun in 1931, has been pushed forward with a vigour which may be regarded as symbolic of the new Turkey that emerged under Kemal Atatürk; and the Transit Yolu, as this road which stretches to the Persian frontier is called, with its easy gradients, its wide turns and macadam surface, compares favourably with other mountain roads in Europe. Profiting by the lessons learnt from the history of the earlier road, adequate provision has been made to keep it in perfect repair, so that every twelve miles or so there have been constructed neat little "maintenance huts" as permanent quarters for a body of workmen whose job it is to keep their stretch of road in good condition and to clear with the least possible delay the inevitable landslides and snowdrifts of spring and winter. Nowadays, owing to the efficiency and almost super-human endurance of these men, the road between Trebizond and Erzerum is rarely closed for more than a few hours even after the worst winter storms. However, it has not yet been possible to provide the means of keeping the road open during winter on the high-exposed plateau between Erzerum and the frontier, so that from mid-December until the end of April the transit traffic comes to a standstill except for occasional consignments which may be sent on from Erzerum by sleigh or pack-horse. In order to protect peasants and other travellers who may be caught by the sudden winter blizzards that sometimes rage for days on end, refuge shelters, where a bell is kept tolling during storms to guide travellers through the blinding snow, have been built on the seven main passes across the mountains. The highest of these passes are the Tahir (9,020 feet), the Kop (7,960 feet), and the Zigana (6,665 feet). At one notorious danger point on the northern face of the Zigana Mountain a shed has been built to carry avalanches across the road to crash harmlessly down the mountain-side—an idea which had first been suggested to the Porte in 1884 by a German engineer named Klause, who had also suggested the establishment of maintenance gangs and the planting of trees on the bare mountains in order to prevent landslides.

There is no record of when the first motor-car travelled over this ancient caravan route. Just before the first Great War the French Société des Entreprises was entrusted by the Porte with the task of making the road

fit for motor traffic, and the Russians, who occupied the whole road during 1916 and 1917, completed this work, so that it is probably correct to say that the first car to cross the Zigana Pass did so in 1917. The road quickly fell into disrepair after the withdrawal of the Russian Army, but there was a certain amount of motor traffic along it throughout the 1920's. The opening of the modern Transit Yolu may be said to date from June, 1937, when the State Transit Company was inaugurated by the Turkish Government to carry passengers and freight from Trebizond to the Persian frontier. There is irony in the fact that most of the steam rollers which were used to construct this motor-way had been left behind by the Russians in 1917.

The 4-ton Chevrolet and Dodge lorries which now cover the 548 miles between Trebizond and Tabriz in three days have ousted the camel, who took a minimum of thirty days to do the same journey, and the twenty-nine hans or caravanserais which each marked the end of one day's stage on the winter track now mostly lie in ruins. The last camel to be seen in Trebizond was during the winter of 1936. Contrary to popular belief, the camel's life on the caravan route to Tabriz was comparatively short. Until the completion of the "chaussée" in 1872 both the winter and summer tracks were considered too rough for them, so that horses, mules and donkeys were used to carry merchandise. Camels were first introduced during the Turco-Russian War owing to the shortage of other pack animals, which had all been requisitioned by the military authorities, and after the war they continued to be used owing to a shortage of horses and mules, which had been killed during the fighting or died through lack of fodder, so that by 1884 there were said to be over 5,000 camels engaged in the transit traffic as against 400 horses and mules.

But though the camel has disappeared, life along the road to Persia has changed little in the last hundred years. Strings of pack-horses and asses, with bright blue beads round their necks to ward off the "nazar" or evil eye, are still used in large numbers on this road, which in spring and autumn is alive with flocks of sheep and goats going or returning from their summer grazing grounds in the mountains. The creaking of the solid-wheeled ox carts is the same as it always was, and on the high treeless plateau beyond Bayburt "tezzek" (dried cattle dung) is still the only fuel used during the long bitter winter. The squat, flat-roofed peasant huts of mud have not been affected by modern developments in architectural design. In the fields by the roadside it is still the women, with their faces all shrouded from the gaze of man, who do most of the hard manual work. The old peasant squatting over his little glass of tea in the roadside café will, if he asks the time of day, expect to be told how many hours it is before sunset, for he does not understand the intricacies of the twenty-four-hour day, which he contemptuously refers to as time "a la franga." And although the volume of the Persian trade through Trebizond has declined much since the palmy days of the nineteenth century, its nature has remained much as it was then. Imports from the West have continued to consist almost entirely of manufactured goods, among which textiles predominate, though England has gradually lost her lion's share in this trade, and of tea and sugar; exports from Persia are the same



as they were throughout the nineteenth century—*tumbeki* and carpets, wool and cotton, gum and dried fruits.

With the German attack on Russia in June, 1941, and the subsequent Anglo-Russian occupation of Persia, the transit trade through both the Caucasus and Trebizond came to an abrupt standstill, to the discomfort of the Germans, who had been using both these routes to elude the British blockade and in particular to get much-needed Persian cotton safely to Germany. Inevitably one looks ahead to the day when these two routes will again be open to normal trade, and asks oneself whether Trebizond will be able to compete successfully with the Russian route and whether the expectations of those who hoped to make the Transit Yolu a great artery of trade between East and West will be realized.

Though the Trebizond route is shorter in distance, goods sent from Batum to Tabriz by rail take very little longer than the three or four days required by lorries from Trebizond. Therefore, regarding the element of time as more or less the same and assuming that other factors remain equal, the choice of route will largely depend on relative freight costs. Since 1927 it has been cheaper to send goods through Russia, but if elsewhere Road has been able to compete successfully with Rail there does not appear to be any reason why it should not do so in this case. The formation of a well-organized transport company (the State Transit Company has only succeeded in attracting passenger traffic) to replace the present system of unorganized private owner-drivers who have monopolized the trade; the adoption of a fixed competitive freight tariff; proper advertisement of the advantages of the route in those countries interested in the Persian trade; the abolition of all vexatious Customs formalities and the appointment at Trebizond and Gürcübulak on the Persian frontier of first-class Customs officials, whose aim should be to expedite the transit of merchandise with the least possible delay—all these are measures which might be adopted by the Turkish Government to the advantage of Trebizond, though until a proper harbour is built and until the means have been found of keeping open in winter the road between Erzerum and the frontier the Russian route will probably continue to be more attractive to the regular trader, providing that Russian shipping and Customs formalities do not cause unnecessary delay.

Since the beginning of the century there have been repeated rumours that a railway was to be constructed from Trebizond to the Persian frontier, and many false hopes have been raised. It has been frequently reported in semi-official publications that before the first Great War Trebizond handled annually between 60,000 and 40,000 tons of Persian transit goods, and it is believed by some that a railroad would once again attract this volume of trade through Trebizond. In actual fact, reliable statistics show that even during its most prosperous year, before Russian competition became serious and before the opening of the Suez Canal, the total volume of transit trade through Trebizond never exceeded 11,000 tons annually; it is hard to see that this figure will ever be reached again in view of the attractions of the Batum route, the fairly recent development of the Khanekin-Baghdad-Beirut route, and the improvement during the present war of communications between the Persian Gulf and the Cas-

pian Sea. Such being the case, from an economic point of view there can be no justification for the enormous expense that would be involved in building a railway from Trebizond to the frontier, especially as plans are almost completed for linking the Black Sea port of Samsun by rail with the Persian frontier. This line, which will pass through Van and Mush before joining the existing Samsun-Sivas line at Malatya, may prove a powerful factor in attracting transit trade from Bulgarian and Roumanian ports to Turkey, though it will be at the expense of Trebizond and its ancient caravan route.

### FIGURES SHOWING ANNUAL PERSIAN TRANSIT IMPORTS AND EXPORTS THROUGH TREBIZOND.

The following figures have been taken from the Trade Reports submitted to the Foreign Office each year by H.M. Consul at Trebizond. In the absence of official statistics, which did not become available until 1909, they cannot be regarded as entirely accurate, though there is no doubt that no more accurate figures than these are in existence.

The Consular Reports from 1830 until 1882 give only the number of packages involved; I have therefore converted these to tons at the equivalent of 1 package =  $1\frac{3}{4}$  cwt. for the period 1830-81. In 1882, as a result of the introduction of camels as the principal pack animal, packages were increased in weight, and I have converted at 2 cwt. for this year. From 1883 weights as well as the number of packages are given in the Trade Reports.

For the period 1920-41 statistics have been obtained from semi-official sources.

Year.	<i>Transit Imports for Persia.</i>		<i>Transit Exports from Persia.</i>	
	<i>Packages.</i>	<i>Weight : Tons.</i>	<i>Packages.</i>	<i>Weight : Tons.</i>
1830	7,000	612	No figures available.	
1831	4,730	417 <sup>1</sup>	No figures available.	
1832	9,189	804	No figures available.	
1833	10,946	958	2,785	244
1834	11,659	1,020	4,927	431
1835	19,327	1,691	No figures available.	
1836	27,039	2,366	19,793	1,732
1837	20,661	1,808	16,804	1,470
1838	28,146	2,463	17,429	1,525
1839	20,931	1,831	8,750	765
1840	26,334	2,304	11,561	1,011
1841	29,802	2,607	18,102	1,584
1842	32,248	2,822	13,618	1,192
1843	34,690	3,035	15,879	1,389
1844	36,945	3,232	18,529	1,621
1845	42,724	3,738	19,756	1,729
1846	44,377	3,882	12,660	1,108
1847	43,134	3,774 <sup>2</sup>	14,015	1,226
1848	53,368	4,670	7,258	635
1849	54,659	4,782	21,878	1,919
1850	59,129	5,173	22,396	1,959
1851	59,003	5,163	14,756	1,292
1852	49,911	4,367	17,116	1,497
1853	39,705	3,474	24,846	2,174
1854 <sup>3</sup>	43,716	3,825	12,070	1,056

Year.	<i>Transit Imports for Persia.</i>		<i>Transit Exports from Persia.</i>	
	<i>Packages.</i>	<i>Weight : Tons.</i>	<i>Packages.</i>	<i>Weight : Tons.</i>
1855 <sup>a</sup>	No figures available.		No figures available.	
1856	53,890	4,715	26,984	2,361
1857	No figures available.		No figures available.	
1858	91,708	8,024	31,982	2,798
1859	84,654	7,407	32,431	2,838
1860	85,731	7,501	39,532	3,459
1861-65	No figures available.		No figures available.	
1866	35,430	3,100	24,571	2,150
1867	31,888	2,790	23,544	2,060
1868	39,118	3,423	30,104	2,634
1869	50,241	4,396	24,030	2,103
1870	46,300	4,051	40,311	3,527
1871	41,452	3,627	33,945	3,170
1872	41,900	3,666	31,423	2,750
1873	43,897	3,841	24,000	2,100
1874	53,955	4,721	23,983	2,098
1875	51,314	4,490	24,556	2,148
1876	47,938	4,195	21,348	1,868
1877 <sup>d</sup>	33,120	2,898	24,345	2,130
1878 <sup>d</sup>	35,370	3,095	16,581	1,451
1879	42,887	3,753	14,646	1,282
1880	44,552	3,898	13,169	1,152
1881	32,774	2,868	16,233	1,420
1882 <sup>e</sup>	37,663	3,766	18,244	1,824
1883	45,514	4,656	22,396	2,411
1884	63,083	6,520	22,822	2,433
1885	—	6,617	—	1,710
1886	—	7,550	—	1,868
1887	—	5,468	—	1,901
1888	—	5,306	—	1,983
1889	—	5,838	—	2,259
1890	—	7,368	—	2,805
1891	—	6,330	—	2,650
1892	—	5,622	—	1,516 <sup>d</sup>
1893	—	5,213	—	763 <sup>d</sup>
1894	—	5,180	—	693
1895	—	6,105	—	682
1896	—	5,478	—	720
1897	—	5,231	—	738
1898	—	5,280	—	1,250
1899	—	5,143	—	1,538
1900	—	4,496	—	1,775
1901	—	5,598	—	1,905
1902	33,790	4,848	—	2,330
1903	34,706	4,919	—	1,287
1904	28,351	4,514	—	750
1905	—	5,635	—	874
1906	43,414	5,644	—	2,106 <sup>f</sup>
1907	26,629	3,288	—	1,087
1908	—	1,045	—	107
1909 <sup>g</sup>	—	987	—	39
1910 <sup>g</sup>	19,640	2,700	No figures available.	
1911 <sup>g</sup>	22,632	3,112	No figures available.	
1912 <sup>g</sup>	15,158	2,084	No figures available.	
1913-19	No figures available.		No figures available.	
1920	—	525	—	350
1921	—	4,050	—	520
1922	—	4,060	—	1,700

Year.	<i>Transit Imports for Persia.</i>		<i>Transit Exports from Persia.</i>	
	<i>Packages.</i>	<i>Weight : Tons.</i>	<i>Packages.</i>	<i>Weight : Tons.</i>
1923	—	4,340	—	1,920
1924	—	4,400	—	2,050
1925	—	5,600	—	2,060
1926	—	4,100	—	670
1927	—	4,380	—	530
1928 <sup>10</sup>	—	1,650	—	490
1929	—	1,580	—	430
1930	—	1,240	—	210
1931	—	880	—	170
1932	—	830	—	150
1933	—	700	—	900
1934	—	410	—	10
1935	—	620	—	160
1936	—	291	—	179
1937	—	399	—	198
1938	—	1,287	—	351
1939	—	Not obtainable.	—	Not obtainable.
1940	—	Not obtainable.	—	680
1941	—	Not obtainable.	—	966
1942 <sup>11</sup>	—	Nil.	—	Nil.

<sup>1</sup> Decline due to cholera and plague in Persia.

<sup>2</sup> English cotton only. Complete figures not available.

<sup>3</sup> Crimean War.

<sup>4</sup> Turco-Russian War.

<sup>5</sup> Weight of packages increased from  $1\frac{3}{4}$  to 2 cwt.

<sup>6</sup> Heavy decline in "Tümbeki" as result of establishment of Tobacco Monopoly in Turkey.

<sup>7</sup> Increase in carpets and raisins.

<sup>8</sup> Official figures commence.

<sup>9</sup> Number of packages only available. I have converted these to tons at the equivalent of 1 package— $2\frac{3}{4}$  cwt., which was the average weight of a package from 1902.

<sup>10</sup> Decline result of Russo-Persian Transit Agreement of October, 1927.

<sup>11</sup> German attack on Russia in June, 1941, and Anglo-Russian occupation of Persia in August, 1941, brings transit trade to a standstill.

# MODERN COMMUNICATIONS IN IRAQ

By G. N. LOGGIN, C.M.G.

Notes of an informal lecture given by Mr. G. N. Loggin, C.M.G., on July 5, 1944, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

**T**HE area of Iraq is 116,000 square miles, and, according to the latest official figures, the population is just over  $3\frac{1}{2}$  millions. Whether the estimate of population is or is not correct it is difficult to say.

The route mileage of the Iraq State railways is about 930 miles, but this does not include certain extensions and inter-connections made by the British Army since the war began. Some of these will undoubtedly remain, and the question as to which Government will finally bear the cost is, and will remain, a very thorny question. Of the 930 miles some 325 miles is of standard gauge, whilst the remainder is of metre gauge. The standard gauge section is that between Baghdad and Tel Kotchek on the Syrian frontier, and since July, 1940, there has been direct rail communication between Baghdad and Haidar Pasha on the Bosphorus. Once the war is over and the European lines are restored, the traveller to Baghdad will be able to entrain in his wagon-lit at Boulogne knowing that he will have to make only one change during his week's journey. It is curious to reflect on the history of the Baghdad Railway as sponsored by the Germans and even more curious to observe that British engineers have so largely completed what was a German project, and that because it was a British interest to do so. It may also be thought by some that the continued German interest in this railway actually went some way to the miscarriage of their plans when during the rebellion of 1941 the Germans alienated the sympathies of many lukewarm supporters of Raschid Ali by their attitude about this very railway. Part of the price demanded of the Iraqis for the benefit of German assistance was, it will be remembered, that this line of railway should be handed over, together with adjoining lands on either side. From many Iraqis one has gathered that this seemingly premature pronouncement of intention by the Germans created consternation amongst the landed interests. If the British were bad, it was said, these people seem much worse.

The metre-gauge section of the railway—or the most of it—is in two parts, the Basrah-Baghdad section running west of the Tigris and between it and the Euphrates, and the Baghdad-Kirkuk section to the east of the Tigris. The only present rail connection between these two sections is by means of a wagon ferry just north of the city of Baghdad. This ferry has done duty for many years, but is expensive to operate and is always attended with risk. Not only so, but, owing to the fact that it cannot be operated at all when the Tigris is in high flood, traffic is liable to serious delay, sometimes there being several hundred wagons waiting to cross. For these reasons the building of a railway bridge in substitution for the

ferry is regarded as the very first major work to be undertaken by the railways after the war. Plans for this bridge, which was designed to carry road as well as railway traffic, were completed in 1939, but the war having broken out, no contract could be placed.

Turning to road communications, the most important contribution in modern times is undoubtedly the Baghdad-Haifa road built at the expense of the British Government, but eventually to be handed over to Iraq which will thenceforward be responsible for its maintenance. It is not yet clear whether, so far as ordinary passenger traffic is concerned, this new route will or will not cut out the east to west route at present traversed by the Nairn Transport. The section of road Baghdad to Rutbah is of course common to both, but from Rutbah the Nairn Transport and other big transport agencies make for Damascus, whereas the new road makes for Mafrak, where it connects with the Palestine road system. There is not only the point that much of this traffic is routed to Syria or the Lebanon rather than to Palestine, but that the very long chassis of the Nairn buses could not possibly be operated on the ordinary Palestine roads. But the new road will undoubtedly open great possibilities for ordinary motor transport, as the car and lorry owner will be able to travel to the Mediterranean without risk and at great speed. It will therefore become a question of transport economics whether it will be preferable to continue the operation of specially designed vehicles such as the Nairn over the desert route to Damascus—which route no longer has any terrors for them—or whether these specially designed vehicles will give place to transport of conventional design. In Iraq itself there are very few good roads and very many bad ones. In Northern Iraq it is comparatively easy to construct good roads, as stone is abundant and as there is no serious and recurrent flood damage except in the immediate neighbourhood of the Greater and Lesser Zaabs. It is true that much of this country is hilly, but it is not difficult to find good routes. Many Iraqis will urge that Kurdistan has had more than its fair share of road expenditure, but that is not the case. The truth of the matter is that whilst for a given sum a permanent and satisfactory result can be secured in the north, the setting up of a good road system in the deltas of the Tigris and Euphrates can never be secured without very great expenditure, far greater than any yet envisaged. In these southern areas there is little if any stone and the whole countryside is overlaid with silt—quite magnificent for the farmer but a terrible problem for the roadmaker. Shaped and graded, a really good and fast road can be made in a spell of dry weather, but in the rains, or due to river flooding, this silt will turn into liquid mud. All are agreed that a solution is to be found in keeping the surface of such roads above the saturation level. Having done this and having formed a good crust on the top, it is said a good road will result. But the trouble is to determine what is the saturation level, and this leads to endless argument as between the road and the irrigation authorities. Indeed, until far more comprehensive measures than any yet undertaken have been applied for the control of the floods on the Tigris and Euphrates, the betterment of communications in these very rich riverain areas raises almost insuperable difficulties. During this war a great many road im-

provements have been undertaken by the British Army and at the expense of the British Government. Bulldozers and scrapers such as we now see so plentifully illustrated in our war reports were used in large numbers, and many new minds were brought to bear on the surfacing problem. But how much permanent benefit will remain has yet to be seen. An outstanding event in recent years was the completion in 1940 of two fine bridges over the Tigris in Baghdad itself, taking the place of the two floating bridges which had done service ever since the last war.

The next type of communication is, I suppose, river transport. Prior to the war this had very much diminished, but with the coming of the British Army and the need to open new transport routes there has been a great revival. Steamers which had been lying in the Shatt al Arab for many years, scarcely if ever used, made their appearance in Baghdad, and on one occasion an ex-Chinese river gunboat flying the white ensign was proudly moored just off our Custom House. The British Army did a lot of work themselves or through the agency of Iraq Government departments to improve navigation conditions on the Tigris. The Iraqis were also very co-operative, passing special legislation enabling them—the Iraqi Government—to requisition river craft of any kind and setting up tribunals to fix hire charges and so forth, and entering into an agreement with the British Government under which craft so requisitioned by them were handed over to the British Army authorities.

Lastly, under this heading of communications, I must refer to air transport. The Iraqis are very air-minded and have hopes of seeing their country not only a centre of international air communications but also well equipped with internal air facilities. Before the war, Baghdad was well situated indeed. Imperial Airways—as they then were—and the Italian Ala Littoria both had twice-weekly services to Europe. By the latter route it was possible to have one's breakfast in Baghdad one day and one's dinner in London the next. There were also weekly and even more frequent services by the French, Dutch and German lines. What the future of these long-distance services will be, who can tell? No one is more interested in this than the Iraqi. Will these lines still call at Basrah and, if so, will they still call at Baghdad? Or will they make straight for Bahrein or other airfields bordering the Gulf? Already the Baghdad aerodrome is too small for some of the modern aircraft, and so is the aerodrome at Basrah. This latter is a great disappointment, as in many ways the Basrah aerodrome, providing as it did landing facilities immediately next to the seaplane base, was ideal. The Iraqis were very proud of their Basrah air facilities, and rightly so. Now they have to ask themselves whether, with the uncertainty as to future long-distance flying routes, they are justified in spending some hundreds of thousands of pounds in enlarging the Basrah airport.

What about the future of Iraq? Here we have a country abounding in possibilities, a country which might be one of the richest in the world. A country in which the incidence of rainfall and river flooding is far more advantageous than is the case in Egypt, and which has a cultivable soil much better than that in Egypt. Indeed, irrigation engineers with long experience in Egypt and others with experience elsewhere can see no

reason why Iraq should not be able to support a population of, say, 15 millions instead of the present  $3\frac{1}{2}$  millions, and why revenues comparable with those of Egypt should not be obtainable. But, to secure this, well ordered development is wanted, and this can only derive from a long spell of good and stable government. Can opportunism give place to long-range planning? And can questions of political expediency be subordinated to the interests of the country as a whole? On the answers to these two questions will depend whether a golden prospect of profitable development is or is not to go begging.



## OUR SMALLEST ALLY

By AIR COMMODORE J. L. VACHELL

Reprinted in part from an article in *The Queen* of February 23, 1944, by kind permission of the proprietors of *The Queen* newspaper.

ON February 23 Air Vice-Marshal Champion de Crespigny lectured on the Assyrians and their present position in Iraq. Air Commodore Vachell's paper deals with this question at greater length, and he has kindly given permission to reprint it.

Air Commodore Vachell begins with a short recapitulation of the 1915-30 history of the Assyrians, which has been so often given in the *Journal* that it is not necessary to repeat it. It goes on to give the terms of the 1930 Treaty in Iraq, by which the Levies were to be reduced to a strength of 1,250. "They were to have British officers and be entirely at the disposal of the Air Officer Commanding, but were to form part of the forces of H.M. the King of Iraq. This was not disclosed at the time, and when it became known the Assyrians were dismayed at the prospect of again becoming subjects of a Moslem power. Like many others, they had never believed that Britain really intended to surrender her mandate. They decided to assemble the whole nation in the Amudia district, presumably with the idea of collective bargaining with the Iraqi authorities.

"A very difficult situation was created. The Iraqi authorities were naturally perturbed at the idea of a strong force of trained soldiers antagonistic to themselves being allowed to collect in one part of their territory. Moreover, the Assyrian officers of the Levies asked to be allowed to resign within thirty days, and their lead was followed by the men. This would have left our airfields unprotected, and so a British battalion was flown over from Egypt. The Mar Shimoun used his influence to counter this hasty decision of his people, and the trouble blew over in a few days and it became possible to send the British battalion back. This was the only occasion when there was any friction between us and the Assyrians, and was entirely due to their fear of losing British protection."

Then follows an account of the Simel massacre, and the story is taken up again in 1934. "For the next ten years the Assyrians, in spite of their disappointment at having remained Iraqi subjects, remained perfectly loyal to the British and their menfolk continued to protect the airfields of the Royal Air Force. It had originally been proposed that the Levies should be embodied in the Iraq army, but no settlement had been reached by the time this war broke out. At that time the force comprised H.Q. and four Assyrian companies, with one company of Kurds and one of Arabs to protect the base at Habbaniyah and one company of Arabs at Shaibah near Basrah. In the following year one of the Arab companies was disbanded and replaced by an Assyrian company.

"This was the situation in May, 1941, when the revolt organized by

Raschid Ali and the Germans broke out, and the Iraq army marched against the Royal Air Force base at Habbaniyah. The Levies remained staunch, and distinguished themselves in the fighting there and in the round-up of the Iraq army at Fellujah. Thereafter it was decided that in view of our increased commitments in Iraq and Persia and down the Gulf, the Levies should be increased to a strength of 11,000, over half of whom are Assyrians. This means that every able-bodied male Assyrian between the ages of 18 and 45 has volunteered for service with the British. In addition to the Levies in Iraq and Persia, strong forces have been sent to Cyprus and Palestine. One other interesting development is the formation of a company of paratroops. With the advance of the Axis troops into the Caucasus and the threat of a German invasion of Persia and Iraq, it became obvious that there would be a great opportunity to employ paratroops for demolition and sabotage. Neither British nor Indian troops would have been very suitable, since they would have been handicapped by their appearance, ignorance of the language, and lack of knowledge of the country. It was decided to form a Levy company of paratroops as an experiment. No special terms or privileges were offered, but for the 150 vacancies 850 volunteers came forward, two-thirds being Assyrians and one-third Kurds. Not one of them failed during training, and the company which is now included in a British battalion in the airborne forces in the Middle East bears comparison with any other in keenness, intelligence and efficiency."

What then should be the post-war settlement? "The Assyrians are a difficult people. They make no attempt to conceal their dislike of the Arabs. . . . The Kurds of Northern Iraq, though akin to them, are their traditional enemies. Apart from their religion the strongest trait of the Assyrians is their friendship for, and loyalty to, the British. The problems of the post-war settlement in the Middle East will be little less difficult than those in Europe, but it is clear that the Assyrian people are never likely to settle down as peaceful subjects of an Iraqi Government. They were unpopular with the people of Iraq before Raschid Ali's revolt, and the large part they played in the discomfiture of the Iraq army at that time will no doubt rankle for years. It should surely be possible to settle them in some other country where they would have a reasonable hope of security. The Caucasus has been suggested, and they probably have much in common with the people there. But their chief desire is to be settled somewhere under British protection, and in view of their past and present services to this country it would be more than unkind to disregard their wishes."

# NOTE ON WAR-TIME ARCHÆOLOGICAL ACTIVITY IN IRAQ

By H. F. SETON LLOYD, F.S.A.,

Technical Adviser, Directorate-General of Antiquities, Government of Iraq.

**A**S world communications become gradually less disordered, and the threads of contact with our pre-war colleagues consequently less attenuated, those of us who have remained in touch with Middle Eastern archæology should perhaps begin to give some account of what has been accomplished in the war years.

In Iraq we have been singularly fortunate. Our national museums have been closed for only a few brief weeks, in 1941, and it is plainly to the credit of the Government that the annual sum budgeted to the Directorate of Antiquities for restoration and research has never been appreciably cut. The museums, as a result, have increased in number and content, the preservation of ancient buildings has been on a considerable scale, and the winter seasons have seen excavations conducted with success at five different sites. Even the difficulties of publication in war-time have in some measure been overcome, the product of the local Government Press having been augmented by contributions from Egypt, India, America and England.

An account of this work should perhaps start with mention of the museums, of which there are now nine in the country altogether. First and foremost, the Iraq Museum itself is still, owing to the war, housed in the same building in which Gertrude Bell originally established it. A new wing is at present being built behind to accommodate our greatly increased library, and the upper floor of this will provide some much-needed supplementary museum-space. Meanwhile, partly for educational purposes, the national collection has been completely rearranged in chronological order and relabelled. A very complete Guide has been published, including a simple historical sketch and over a hundred illustrations. As a result, these famous Mesopotamian works of art have been seen to advantage by some tens of thousands of Allied servicemen. Our collection of Arab antiquities had also, until recently, been on view in the old fourteenth-century caravanserai known as the Khân Mirjân. Here a difficulty occurred owing to a rise in the level of seepage water from the Tigris during the spring floods, and it became necessary to find new accommodation at least for the architectural exhibits. This was provided by the ruins known as the "Abbasid Palace" in the Citadel. This building, which had acquired the erroneous name "Qasr al Ma'mun," undoubtedly dates from the last years of the Abbasid Caliphate, and is in many respects similar in style to the great college building of Al Mustansir Billah, now used as a Customs house. Its restoration was begun in 1934 and resumed in a more ambitious programme in 1941. Almost the whole of one façade, including the great central *iwān*, with

its ornamental brick vault and the honeycomb valuting of the colonnade, have now been restored by modern Arab masons, who have the traditional art of carving brickwork as a direct heritage from the craftsmen of the Middle Ages. The impressive result can be seen in photographs recently published by the *Illustrated London News*. Furthermore, the surviving chambers of the south and east wings make an admirable setting for the larger Arab antiquities of which we now have a considerable accumulation. As was mentioned above, they are mainly architectural. Sculptured *mihirabs* and doorways, ornament in plaster, decorative inscriptions and finely inlaid wooden doors have been rescued from religious buildings in outlying parts of the country which have fallen into a state of hopeless dilapidation. Much of the carved stonework derives from the thirteenth-century *floruit* of Mosul under the Atabeg Sultans. Of this period there is also a large section of painted gypsum wall ornament in high relief from Mosul's Jami-el-Kebir, which the Awqaf recently found it necessary to dismantle. A great quantity of earlier plaster-work comes from the Abbasid mansions of Samarra, which were excavated by the Directorate just before the present war and have since been published. Small shrines at Hit, Anah, Sinjar and elsewhere have contributed interesting items, and it is hoped in the near future to publish an illustrated catalogue of the entire collection.

Late in 1940 a Museum of Costumes was opened in an old building adapted for the purpose at Bab-ash-Sharqi, and has proved popular. National dress, ranging from the brocade *zibun* of a southern sheikh with its religious inscription woven into the pattern, to the elaborate ensemble of a Kurdish *agha* or a Yezidi bride, are displayed side by side with dioramic groups of peasants playing music, weaving or engaged in other characteristic domestic occupations. Between them are plaster heads of racial types modelled by various Iraqi sculptors. The museum garden also encloses two other buildings, one of which accommodates a memorial exhibition of relics of King Feisal I. The other constitutes the embryo of a national "gallery of modern art." The hundred or so pictures which at present hang upon the walls are the work of Iraqi painters and of the few European artists who have occasionally visited Baghdad during the war.

Another piece of restoration work completed in 1939 was the only surviving city gate of medieval Baghdad, known as the "Bab-al-Wastâni." It also contains interesting models and photographs of old Baghdad and a striking variety of ancient cannon and mortars. The list of Baghdad museums is completed by the great Assyrian archway at Baghdad West, which was to have been the entrance to a new National Museum, a project now unfortunately postponed. It is as nearly as possible a replica of the entrance to King Sargon II.'s Serai at Khorsabad, and incorporates the fine group of Assyrian sculpture found there by the University of Chicago in 1934. The great winged-bull monoliths, each weighing over twenty tons, and their attendant genii reached Baghdad without a scratch in November, 1939. The rooms on either side of the arch have been used to exhibit a selection of casts of Assyrian sculpture in the British Museum and a scale model of King Sargon's Palace at Khorsabad. It remains

only to mention two small local museums at Samarra and Babylon. These contain mainly explanatory plans, photographs and scale models calculated to assist visitors in understanding the ruins themselves. Also, outside Baghdad, a successful piece of preservation has been performed on the Arch of Ctesiphon, the famous Sassanian ruin near the village of Salman Pak. Over five thousand pounds has been spent in buttressing the surviving wing of the main façade, which was in immediate danger of falling, and in strengthening the crown of the great arch itself.

The choice for sites for excavation during the past four years has been determined not only by their individual merits but by a pre-arranged plan of research. In sequence, they in fact represent an almost unbroken continuum of history from the Neolithic period onwards, so that in the process of co-ordinating results it would now be practicable, for instance, to construct a complete *corpus* of Mesopotamian pottery solely from the material which our staff have themselves handled during our own excavations. The sites should, however, perhaps be mentioned in the order of their investigation.

The work in the 'Abbasid city of Sâmarra, which had been in progress since 1936, was concluded in the first weeks of the war and published in 1940.\* An additional examination of the plan of the northern mosque "Abu Dulaf," in 1941 was unfortunately made too late to be included. Excavations had also been in progress for some seasons at Wâsit, a capital of Iraq during the 'Omayyad Caliphate and seat of the tyrant governor Al-Hajjâj ibn Yusuf. These had to some extent proved inconclusive, since the famous mosque and palace of Hajjâj had not yet been identified. They were resumed with good effect in 1942. The Directorate's first work in the pre-Islamic field took place in the summer of 1939, when soundings were made in two sites in the Sinjar region. The mound called Grai Resh produced an interesting assemblage of domestic material from a small town of the "Uruk" period, including a quantity of "Uruk" pottery which had till then been lacking in the museum. In the oval walled city known as Tell Khoshi a little shrine of the Akkadian period was excavated. Both these were subsequently published in *Iraq*.† Next, in 1940, excavations began at the prehistoric mound called Tell 'Uqair near Tell Ibrahim, about fifty miles south of Baghdad.

Within a few days of starting work at 'Uqair we found ourselves tracing the walls and platform of the prehistoric shrine afterwards known as the "Painted Temple." This building, which dates from the "Uruk" period in the middle of the fourth millennium B.C., was found to be in a remarkable state of preservation. The walls of one range of rooms and part of the sanctuary remained standing to a height of over four metres in places, and the whole of the internal wall faces had been covered with elaborate painted frescoes. Some of these we were able to preserve and others to reconstruct, so that the scale model which was afterwards constructed in the museum workshops gives an impressive picture of a proto-historic temple, perhaps contemporary in time with the "Red Temple" at Warka, of which so tantalizingly little remained. In addition to the

\* *Excavations at Sâmarra, 1936-39*. 2 vols. Iraq Government Press. 1940.

† *Iraq*. Vol. VII, Part I. Spring, 1940. Pp. 13-19.

Uruk ruins, the lower slopes of the 'Uqair mound also provided an al 'Ubaid period village, with private houses and a larger building of crude brick. The domestic assemblage was most complete and included pottery beautifully ornamented with stylized birds and animals. A small sounding showed seven metres of similar occupations between the surface village and virgin soil. Meanwhile a small subsidiary chapel at the foot of a later temple platform had produced a collection of "Jemdet Nasr" pottery at least equal to that originally found at the type site, while an Early Dynastic cemetery, which represented the last occupation of the mound, was also profitably excavated. The whole of this work was accomplished in two short seasons' digging, the second of which was temporarily interrupted by the political events of May, 1941. Two preliminary notices of the finds at al 'Uqair were published in London\* and a fuller account in Chicago.

Simultaneously with our work at Tell 'Uqair in 1941, a season's excavating was undertaken by Sayid Taha Bakir, M.A., Curator of the Iraq Museum, at the site called Der, near Tell Abu Habba, the ancient Sippar on the modern Yusufiyah Canal. This site was chosen on the principle already mentioned, that it was likely to contribute to the sequence of historical periods represented by our excavating programme. It should be added that Der was identified by Langdon as Agade, the capital of Sargon of Akkad, but Budge, who excavated a great quantity of tablets there in 1891, was inclined to consider it as a suburb of Sippar.

A fairly large area in the centre of the city was excavated stratigraphically down to virgin soil, and produced a fine collection of cylinder-seals and a pottery sequence ranging from the Hellenistic period, on the surface, down to the Akkadian Dynasty, during which the site was first occupied. Over three hundred tablets made the dating of the different levels a fairly simple matter.

In April, 1942, it was decided to resume work at Wâsit for what we hoped might be a final season. This was undertaken by the Directorate's technical attaché, Sayid Fuad Safar, M.A. As already mentioned, several seasons' work had already taken place on this site. In the western half of the city the excavators had traced the ruins of a large mosque, whose courtyard was littered with the stone drums of fallen columns, but it remained uncertain whether this was actually the famous mosque of al-Hajjaj mentioned so often in Arabic literature. The problem was almost immediately solved by Sayid Fuad. Deep beneath the foundations of the surface building he found traces of an earlier mosque built directly on the clean ground and oriented diagonally to the one above. This was satisfactorily proved to be the original building of al-Hajjaj, and adjoining it on the *qibla* side were the remnants of his equally famous palace.

While investigating the foundations of the latter, a most important find was made in an upper stratum, dating from the time of the Ilkhânid governors of Iraq after the conquest of Hulagu. This was a group of over 400 terra-cotta figurines representing human beings, animals and birds, whose interest can best be assessed from the photographs of them published in the *Illustrated London News* of July 25, 1942. A complete

\* *Illustrated London News*.

report on the excavations at Wâsit, both in English and Arabic, is now in the press at the Institut Français in Cairo.

Since the completion of our work at Wâsit the excavation has been undertaken of two new pre-Islamic sites, in each case with considerable success. The first was Aqer Quf, the conspicuous ruins west of Baghdad which represent Dur Kurigalzu, capital of the Kassite kings. In three seasons' digging, Sayid Taha has traced the outline of the great ziggurat tower, excavated part of a complex of large temples near its base, and, at the other end of the city, has discovered and partly investigated the Palace of the Kings. In addition to impressive architectural results, he has already amassed a collection of inscribed material which should contribute a good deal to the elucidation of a notably obscure passage of history. It may be added that the site was partly chosen for its accessibility to visitors from Baghdad, and the excavations have in fact already been seen by some thousands of Allied troops. The first interim report of the Aqer Quf excavations is now being published by the Gertrude Bell Memorial Fund as a supplement to the journal *Iraq*, while a preliminary account of more recent finds is due to appear in the *Illustrated London News*.

The last but by no means the least interesting of the Directorate's excavations has just been concluded at Tell Hassuna, near Shura, in North Iraq. Two seasons' work on this little mound have set back the horizon of Mesopotamian pre-history from the enigma of a dozen scratched sherds found by the British Museum in 1931 (almost a hundred feet beneath the surface of the Kuyunjik mound at Nineveh), to a primitive settlement of the first Neolithic farmers, probably at the beginning of the fifth millennium B.C. Its seven metres of village plans undoubtedly represent the first settled community in this country and illustrate the very beginnings of agriculture. An outline communication on the subject has already been sent to the *London Times*, and a definitive report is to be published by the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* later in the year.

It remains perhaps only to mention two further publications, intended mainly to meet the demand among visiting Allied troops for archæological information: one is a guide to the principal ancient sites of Iraq, and the other a popular history of Iraq from the earliest times to the present day.\*

\* *Ruined Cities of Iraq. Twin Rivers.* Oxford University Press. Bombay, 1942, 1943. (Both by H. F. Seton Lloyd.)

# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE KURDISH PRESS

By BISHOP M. LAWRENCE RYAN

(American Mission, Beirut)

TWO decades ago, reading and writing among the Kurds was still the privilege of only a limited number. Since then enormous strides have been made. The vanguard of Kurdish progress has steadily combated illiteracy, with the result that what seemed normal twenty years ago begins now to be classed as a stigma.

Considering the scanty means at the disposal of the Kurds, and the short space of time in which the plague of illiteracy has been fought by purely Kurdish effort, the results attained certainly compel admiration!

The gradual replacement in Kurdish publications of the Arabic alphabet by a new Kurdish one adapted from the Latin alphabet has played an important part in the spread of literacy. Kurdish poetry has been resurrected, educational works have been written, dictionaries have been compiled, and lecture courses have been arranged. The Kurdish press has been steadily growing in importance both in quality and in quantity. It diffuses literature on every subject and leaves no stone unturned in the effort to extricate the Kurdish nation from the age-long gloom and darkness. It now points the way towards the world of tomorrow, in which a more dignified status among the nations will be accorded to the Kurds.

As there is no concise record of the Kurdish press in the hands of the public in general, English readers—particularly those interested in the evolution of nations—might be interested to know of the existence of a Kurdish press and something about its origin. Valuable information concerning the period 1920-36 may be found in an article entitled "A Bibliography of Southern Kurdish," by Major C. J. Edmonds (JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 1937, pp. 487-97). For the present historical summary we are mainly indebted to *Roja Nu*, the Kurdish newspaper published at Beirut, Lebanon, by Dr. Kamuran 'Ali Bedir Khan. *Roja Nu* gave its readers in its first number, dated May 3, 1943, a detailed record in French of the Kurdish press, due to a distinguished French scholar, M. Roger Lescot.

In 1897, Midhat Bey Bedir Khan first published his daily newspaper *Kurdistan* in Cairo, which was later continued by his brother, 'Abdul Rahman Bey, who edited it first in Switzerland, then in London and Folkestone. Subsequent to the promulgation of the Turkish constitution in 1908, *Kurdistan* appeared in Istanbul under Suraya Bey Bedir Khan, nephew of 'Abdul Rahman Bey.

In 1912, the Kurdish youth society known as "Hevi" published their monthly *Roja Kurd (The Kurdish Day)*, which later replaced its name by *Hetawe Kurd (The Kurdish Sun)*. In 1914, the Protestant missionaries in Urumiyeh (now Rizaiyeh) started the publication of another *Kurdistan*, whose existence was ephemeral.



In 1916-17, under the pseudonym of Ahmad 'Azizi, Suraya Bey Bedir Khan republished *Kurdistan* in Cairo, while *Jin (Life)*, another weekly (Kurdish, though written in Turkish), saw the light in Istanbul, together with a series of literary supplements.

After the British occupation of Iraq, a number of Kurdish newspapers and reviews appeared in the Kurdish provinces speaking Sorani dialect, between the years 1920-30, the principal of which were: *Pesqewtin (The Progress)*, Sulaimaniyeh, 1920-30); *Bane Kurdistan (The Appeal of Kurdistan)*, Sulaimaniyeh, 1929); *Bang e Haq (The Appeal of Truth)*, Sulaimaniyeh, 1923). (This last was the official organ of Shaikh Mahmud during his short-lived kingdom.) *Jiyanewe (The Resurrection)*, which was changed to *Jiyan (The Life)*, being the official publication of the Municipality of Sulaimaniyeh, whose first number appeared in 1924, is still in existence; *Zar e Kurmanci (The Kurdish Language)*, Literary Review (Rowanduz, 1926-32); *Diyaniy e Kurdistan (The Country of Kurdistan)*, Baghdad, 1925-26).

Since 1939, a group of Kurdish intellectuals has been active in Baghdad in the publication of a review known as *Gelavej*, which is considered the best literary review in the Middle East.

*Dange Kitiyi Taze (The Voice of the New World)* is another Kurdish magazine, still appearing in Arabic characters while initiating its readers in the use of the new alphabet in Latin characters. It is composed of more than fifty pages. It is published in Baghdad by the British Embassy, and its first number appeared in 1943. Prominent Kurdish writers and men of letters generously contribute to this magazine.

From 1933 to 1935, *Hawar*, a literary review, was published in Damascus, Syria, by Amir Djeladat Bedir Khan, first in both Latin and Arabic characters, subsequently in Latin characters only. *Hawar* was interrupted for six years, but reappeared in 1941. Since 1942, *Hawar* gave birth to *Ronahi (The Light)*, an illustrated supplement.

With the advent of *Roja Nu*, a Kurdish daily with a supplement in French, and of *Ster*, a Kurdish illustrated monthly whose first number appeared on December 6, 1943, both published in Beirut, the Kurdish press has added much to its growing prestige in the Eastern world.

In Erivan (U.S.S.R.), *Riya Taze (The New Road)* is the mouthpiece of the Kurds living in the U.S.S.R. It is printed in Latin characters.

In the province of Leheian, *Nishtiman (Country)* is a Kurdish organ.

We learn on good authority that the Kurds intend to unify the several slightly different systems which have been adopted for their Kurdish alphabet. To attain this aim, a cultural congress may be called to which editors representing the Kurdish press, together with men of letters from Iraq, Syria, Iran and the U.S.S.R., may be invited to attend as delegates.

# AN ARABIAN BIBLIOGRAPHY

By LIEUT.-COLONEL GERALD DE GAURY

SAUDI ARABIA having only recently come into being as a kingdom, books and papers which deal with it, with that part of Arabia now under the rule of Ibn Saud, are seldom classified under that heading. The following list of books and papers in the Western languages is one which may be useful to students of Saudi Arabia. In it have been included a few of the many books on Islam and the pilgrimage, and one or two on the sociology of early Islam. All the books known to me on Wahhabism, the state code of Saudi Arabia, have been included, and among them Henri Laoust's work on Ibn Taimiya, forerunner of Abdul Wahhab.

The account of European travel in Arabia was brought up to 1912 by Dr. Hogarth in his *Penetration of Arabia* and carried on by R. H. Kiernan in his *Unveiling of Arabia*, published in 1937.

The visit to Riyadh, the capital, of Her Royal Highness Princess Alice and Lord Athlone in 1938 is the culminating point of the tale of European travel.

The stories of the European travellers whom fate or inclination brought to Central Arabia in the wave of armies, as pilgrims, or in pursuit of some other aim than exploration for its own sake or in the interests of their Governments, have been outlined by Dr. Hogarth and Auriant. Strangest among these perhaps is that of Thomas Keith, the young private soldier in the Highlanders who, captured and enslaved, rose to become Governor of the second holiest city in Islam, Medina. Domingo Badia y Leiblich, a Jew from Cadiz, who travelled in Arabia for Napoleon in the guise of one of the last of the Abbasids, has written his own tale under his alias Ali Bey al Abbassi. Much to be admired among those who travelled for their Governments is Niebuhr, the only survivor of the first scientific expedition to Arabia, one sent by the King of Denmark.

Saudi Arabia remains at heart a Bedouin state. Even in the Hejaz and always in the oases of Nejd the townsmen announce with pride their tribal origin. Every spring many of them go out into the deserts to enjoy the life of the nomads, being possessed like the Bedouins themselves by the exhilaration of the waste. The life of the tribesmen has been incomparably described by Charles Doughty. Lawrence's account of the war in the deserts of the north-west will not be forgotten. The paraphernalia of the Bedouins has been described and illustrated by de Boucheman and that of the oasis dwellers by Euting in his account of his journey to Hail, the northern provincial capital. Wuestenfeld and Robertson Smith have contributed to the history of the tribes, and the Admiralty handbook has much information about them.

Little has been written about the tribe from which Ibn Saud is descended, but Count Carlo de Landberg has written a book on the dialect of the northern Anaza. Incidentally, Lady Hester Stanhope was enrolled as an "Anizy," as she relates in her letter to General Oakes of March 19, 1813, and Lady Digby, whose former husband was the Lord Ellenborough

who afterwards became Viceroy of India, married and stayed with an Anaza Sheikh. The blood grouping of the tribe has been described by W. R. Shanklin.

Routes in Arabia and the oases and villages are the subject of many details in the Admiralty handbook. Birds, flowers, plants, insects and animals found in Central Arabia have been recorded by H. St. John Philby in his books on his travels in Arabia, and by Cheesman. The luxuriant vegetation of Asir, the south-west province of Saudi Arabia, was noted by Varthema in his book of travel, and he gives a list of fruits and vegetables.

Archæological enquiry has so far been little. Jaussen and Savignac made an expedition to Medain Salih in the northern Hejaz, Halevy visited Nejran in the extreme south, Euting and Wallin travelled to Hail, and Huber to Tema in the Hejaz. Cuneiform tablets found in Mesopotamia referring to Arabia were the subject of a tentative work by Dougherty. Kammerer has contributed much to the summary of our knowledge of the history of the Red Sea provinces.

Geological survey has been limited in extent and carried out by employees of companies which have not yet published the result. Sir Richard Burton, Loth and Lamare have contributed material.

Except in Schoff's notes to his edition of the Periplus of the Erythræan Sea, hardly anything has been published upon the trade and caravan routes of Saudi Arabia in days gone by.

Works on the Sanean, Himyaritic and Minæan languages are few and scarce. There is no work on the spoken language of central Arabia today. There are no meteorological stations in central Arabia. There is an elaborate work in German on the fish in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, and Persian Gulf Pilots, published by the Admiralty, gave many particulars about the Saudi Arabian coastline.

It can hardly be hoped that this list is complete, but I believe that no important work has been overlooked and also that it may be of use to those interested in Arabia and in a summary of our published knowledge upon it.

#### A LIST OF SOME BOOKS ON THAT PART OF ARABIA NOW RULED BY IBN SAUD, ON THE PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA AND MEDINA AND ON CLOSELY CONNECTED SUBJECTS

The only well-known English travellers who have entered the Hejaz or Central Arabia and have written books which have survived are: Captain G. F. Sadleir (who crossed Arabia in 1819), Sir Richard Burton, William Gifford Palgrave, Charles Doughty, Wilfred Scawen Blunt and Lady Ann Blunt, Captain A. J. B. Wavell, D. Carruthers, St. John Philby, T. E. Lawrence, R. E. Cheesman. Bertram Thomas crossed the south-east Empty Quarter of Arabia and so went along the fringe of Saudi Arabia.

#### ABBREVIATIONS

- J.R.G.S. Journal of the Royal Geographical Society—*i.e.*, journal between 1830 and 1850.  
 G.J. Geographical Journal—*i.e.*, journal from 1893 onwards.  
 J.R.A.S. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.  
 R.C.A.J. Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society.  
 D.M.G. Deutsche Morganländische Gesellschaft.

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#### REVIEWS (CONTAINING CURRENT NEWS).

1. *Oriente Moderno*.
2. *Revue du Monde Musulman*.
3. *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*.
4. *L'Annuaire du Monde Musulman*. Paris (first issued 1924 for year 1923).

\* Note: The Rwala are a division of the Anaza, to which tribe Ibn Sa'ud belongs by descent, to which many of his subjects belong by descent, and which has Bedouin divisions in Saudia Arabia.

## ANNUAL MEETING

THE Forty-Third Annual Meeting was held at the Royal Society's Hall on July 12, General Sir John Shea, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN called on Brig.-General Sir Percy Sykes to read the Honorary Secretaries' report.

Brig.-General Sir PERCY SYKES: My Lord Hailey, Sir John Shea and Members of the Royal Central Asian Society,—During the past year, in spite of the heavy strain of the World War, we have elected 73 new members. Eight of our members have lost their lives for their country. The Council also deeply regret the deaths of twelve members, including Sir Francis Fremantle, Sir Ernest Hotson, Major F. F. Rynd, Sir Aurel Stein, and Mr. Lee-Warner. There are ten prisoners of war. There have also been ten resignations.

Twenty-eight lectures have been given. We owe grateful thanks to our lecturers, and we owe a special debt of gratitude to Sir Robert Clive for the three admirable lectures on China and Japan which he arranged. Many of our new members we owe to Lady Drower, whom we hope to welcome home shortly.

Before sitting down I deeply regret to have to announce that Miss Kennedy, who has served this Society with such striking success as Assistant Secretary and as Secretary for the past twenty-three years, is retiring at the end of the year. We all know that we are a poor if a worthy Society. Accordingly the Council has decided that a subscription list should be opened to purchase an annuity for Miss Kennedy. When she retires at the end of the year she will be succeeded by Miss Rachel Wingate, a member of a very distinguished family, who, for some years before the war, was Assistant Secretary of the Society. Before quitting this matter, I should like to add a tribute to the work of Miss Edwards.

In conclusion, on behalf of Colonel Newcombe and myself, I would thank the members of the Society for the strong, friendly support we invariably receive from them.

The CHAIRMAN called on Colonel Stewart Newcombe to read the Honorary Treasurer's report in the unavoidable absence of Major Edward Ainger.

Colonel STEWART NEWCOMBE read the following report in the unavoidable absence of the Hon. Treasurer :

The accounts, which are on pages 323-4, make a more satisfactory showing than those of last year. Subscriptions have risen by over £150, and as a result of our appeal to members to sign the Covenant we have received a considerably larger sum from the Inland Revenue. As a result we have eliminated the debtor balance of last year, and this year at any rate our finances are in a satisfactory position.

However, I shall once again add a word of warning. We must remember that after the war our expenses are bound to increase. We hope that the Journal will again be published four times a year, and our expenses generally are bound to rise in other directions also, as, apart from anything else, it is essential that our staff should be adequately paid. So you will see that unless we can increase our revenue we shall not be in a position to continue our work on the scale which we were able to do before the war. There are only two ways in which we can increase our revenue. The first is to increase our membership, and by so doing not only do we improve the financial position of the Society but we shall be able also to draw on a yet wider range of experience in the Central Asian field.



You know we are recognized by the Government as a learned Society, and in consequence if any of our members sign a covenant to pay their subscription for seven years we obtain this free of income tax. By doing this members double the value of their subscription to the Society and that at no cost to themselves. The Council are again making a special appeal with regard to this matter. If only one-third of our members signed the covenant there would be a very substantial increase in annual revenue.

In conclusion I would say that I hope that the next year's figures will again show a slight surplus of revenue over expenditure.

*The accounts are shown at the end of this section.*

#### ELECTION OF HONORARY OFFICERS AND COUNCIL, 1944-45

The nominations made by the Council for Honorary Officers and Council for the next session had been circulated to all members.

Brig.-General Sir Percy Sykes proposed that General Sir John Shea should be elected Chairman for the ensuing session. He had given much time and thought to the work of the Society and its prosperity and good feeling were largely due to him. Colonel Newcombe seconded the proposal, and Sir John was unanimously asked to remain in the Chair for the 1944-45 session.

The Honorary Secretaries, Brig.-General Sir Percy Sykes and Colonel Stewart Newcombe, were then re-elected to their posts and the grateful thanks of the Society were offered to them for the time and work which they give to the Society's welfare.

The CHAIRMAN announced that the Council had appointed Sir Eric Teichman, G.C.M.G., as an Honorary Vice-President in the place of the late Sir Aurel Stein, of happy memory. Lieut.-Colonel Sir Bernard Reilly, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., O.B.E., Mr. Humphrey Bowman, C.M.G., C.B.E., and Mr. Kenneth Williams as Vice-Presidents in the places left vacant by Sir Nigel Davidson, C.B.E., and Sir Charles Innes, K.C.S.I., who retired in accordance with Rule 16 and are not eligible for re-election.

The CHAIRMAN then put to the meeting the names of those members who had been nominated to fill the vacancies caused by the four retiring members of Council. They were Sir Josiah Crosby, lately H.M. Minister in Siam, Mr. M. Phillips Price, M.P., Miss Mildred Cable, author of *The Gobi Desert*, and for many years a missionary in China's North-west, and General H. G. Martin, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E. These would take the places left vacant by Lieut.-Colonel Sir Bernard Reilly, Mr. Humphrey Bowman, Mr. Kenneth Williams, who retired in accordance with Rule 25, and Sir William Battershill, who retired owing to pressure of work. These were proposed by Brig.-General Sir Percy Sykes and seconded and elected *nem. con.*

The meeting then adjourned.

# THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 8, CLARGES STREET, W. 1.

## INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1943.

EXPENDITURE.				1942				INCOME.								
				£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.							
				£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.				
To <i>Office Expenses:</i>																
Salaries and National Insurance	...	...	...	424	5	8	1,395			By Subscriptions received	...	...	...	1,558	16	3
Rent	...	...	...	230	0	0	1			„ Donation ...	...	...	...	0	0	0
Telephone	...	...	...	12	14	11	50			„ Journal Subscriptions and Sales	...	...	...	88	14	3
Stationery and printing	...	...	...	43	0	8	12			„ Interest Received (less tax)	...	...	...	17	17	8
Postage	...	...	...	76	4	7	6			„ Deposit Interest	...	...	...	7	5	2
Office cleaning	...	...	...	34	17	4	16			„ Income Tax Repayment receivable	...	...	...	129	0	0
Audit fee	...	...	...	5	5	0	25			„ Dinner Club (Contributions to expenses)	...	...	...	0	0	0
Insurance	...	...	...	11	13	11	2			„ Sundry Receipts	...	...	...	2	9	3
Bank charges	...	...	...	7	10	6										
Lighting and heating	...	...	...	28	6	10										
Sundries	...	...	...	56	8	0										
Repairs	...	...	...	0	0	0										
							930	7	5							
„ <i>Journal:</i>																
Printing	...	...	...	453	13	2										
Postage	...	...	...	40	6	1										
Reporting	...	...	...	5	17	0										
							499	16	3							
„ <i>Lectures</i>	...	...	...													
„ <i>Library</i>	...	...	...													
„ <i>Legal and Professional Expenses</i>	...	...	...													
„ <i>Balance</i> (being Excess of Expenditure over Income for the year carried to Balance Sheet)	...	...	...													
							113	7	1							
							<u>£1,804</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>7</u>					<u>£1,804</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>7</u>

# THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 8, CLARGES STREET, W. 1.

## BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 31, 1943.

LIABILITIES.		1942		ASSETS.	
		£	s. d.	£	s. d.
<i>Creditors</i> ... ..			197	6	11
<i>Capital Funds:</i>					
Life Subscription Fund ... ..		196	0	0	
Entrance Fee Account ... ..		293	3	0	
Legacy Account ... ..		100	0	0	
Lawrence of Arabia Medal Fund ... ..		96	11	0	
		685	14	0	
<i>Income and Expenditure Account:</i>					
Balance per contra ... ..			58	10	9
		£941	11	8	
		£807			

### PERSIA FUND.

Accumulated Fund:		£		s. d.		£		s. d.	
Balance, January 1, 1943 ... ..		369	18	8					
Add: Investment Income ... ..		8	3	8					
Deposit Interest ... ..		0	19	5					
		379	1	9					
Less: Persia Fund Lecture and subscription of "Iraq" ... ..			6	16	0				
		372	5	9					
<i>Sundry Creditors</i> ... ..			6	16	0				
		£379	1	9					

Investment:		£		s. d.		£		s. d.	
£467 8s. 3d. 3½ per cent. Conversion Loan at cost ... ..						331	17	3	
<i>Cash:</i>									
On deposit with Halifax Building Society ... ..							47	4	6
						£379	1	9	

### AUDITORS' REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY.

We have examined the above balance sheet, and have obtained all the information and explanations that we have required. In our opinion such balance sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the Society's affairs, according to the best of our information and explanations given us and shown by the books of the Society.

251-252, DASHWOOD HOUSE,  
 OLD BROAD STREET, E.C. 2.  
 July 10, 1944.

WILLIAMS, DYSON, JONES & CO.  
 (Chartered Accountants).

## REVIEWS

**A Survey of Russian History.** By B. H. Sumner. 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. 464. 5 Maps. 16 Illustrations. London: Duckworth. 16s.

Professor Sumner's *History of Russian History* is just what it professes to be—a survey—and it is a most valuable one, the perusal of which will enable the student to obtain a very clear and balanced perception of the manner in which Russia has developed from early times to the present day. A striking feature of the book is that throughout it Professor Sumner works backwards, taking the present condition of things as his starting-point and following the evolutionary process through one stage after another until the period of inception is reached.

The book is happily divided into seven chapters, of which the first deals with Russia's geographical features and her emergence from the "Russ" of before Peter the Great to become the immense empire with its population of 193,000,000 that she is to-day. Her colonial expansion, particularly her reliance on the Cossacks as the instrument for enlarging her boundaries in Europe and Asia, is described briefly but graphically. The second chapter outlines the building up of the State, and mentions the essential characteristics that have accompanied its growth from the days of Rurik the Varangian. Particularly valuable are the allusions to Peter the Great's reforms and the transformation that resulted from them, while the new phase in Russian history that the Revolution of 1918 brought about is depicted with wholly admirable objectivity. The third chapter sketches succinctly the different aspects of the agricultural question, touching particularly on the collectivization which Stalin has succeeded in forcing upon an unwilling peasantry; the fourth on the problem which has had so unsettling an influence on Russia's relations with her neighbours—that of the attitude of the Marxian régime to the Orthodox and other Churches. Then the Russo-Polish question is handled with the knowledge and broadmindedness that so thorny a question demands and with understanding of the qualities and weaknesses of the Poles that form its historic background. The sixth chapter touches on Russia's maritime connections and the influence they have had upon her history, while the seventh and last summarizes her relations at various periods with the West. There is a useful bibliography, giving all, or nearly all, the standard works which intending students of Russian history should read, but for some reason omitting not only Hakluyt, Camden, Karamzin and so forth, but so eminent a modern writer as John Baddeley, whose knowledge of Russia up to the days of the Revolution was outstanding. And there is a good chronological table, taking the reader back from June, 1941, to the days of Kiev.

The book throughout is characterized by wholly commendable objectivity, by great knowledge and a wise selection of material: the style is easy and fluid.

In a work of such *envergnre* agreement on all points is not to be expected, and it is submitted that Professor Sumner's wholesale condemnation of Russian leadership in the last war (p. 70) is not in accordance with facts. Samsonov, who commanded the army in East Prussia, was an excellent cavalry general, and had it not been for the fatuous incompetency of Jilinsky, ill-equipped and ill-prepared as he was, might well have held his ground. As it was, it was the Russian advance into East Prussia that saved Paris, just as a year later it was Brusilov's offensive in Galicia that saved Verdun. Alexeyev, Gurko, and Radko-Dmitriev, too, were brilliant soldiers. What brought about the collapse

was not the inadequacy of leaders in the field, but the rottenness and corruption in St. Petersburg. Nor is justice done by Professor Sumner to the Tsar Nicholas II, whose whole misfortune lay in the fact that he was cast for a rôle he was by nature quite unfitted to play. For his Anglophobia at the time of the Russo-Japanese War we certainly gave him every justification. These, however, are trifling blemishes in what on the whole deserves to be regarded as an excellent book, agreeably written, well documented and of real historical value.

R. M. HODGSON.

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**The Russian Army.** By Walter Kerr (*New York Herald Tribune*). 8" x 5". Pp. 140. Victor Gollanz. 1944. 7s. 6d.

It may be said at once that this is a really first-class publication, readable and informative. A surprisingly complete picture is compressed into comparatively few pages of about 500 words each. The author covered also the Finnish campaign of 1938, so that his acquaintance with the Russian Army is more than a nodding one.

The reader must not expect anything in the nature of a formal military handbook of Russian strength, organization and training. He will find, however, a brilliant canvas of what the Russian Army is and does, with detailed insets of the Moscow and Leningrad campaigns. The story deserves better maps of the fronts and either an index or table of contents. Perhaps the writer did not realize before the first edition how important his document will prove.

The layout plan of the chapters has been cleverly thought out to portray the facts in logical sequence. Those who attended the amazing extempore talk by General Martel on June 7 will be interested to note the confirmation of the salient points of difference between the Russian Army and any other. The General spoke of the astonishing strength and stamina of the Russian soldier being the secret of success against the massed formations of German military science. The author calls it "fighting heart, training, discipline and support." Perhaps the letterpress does not bring out as the lecturer did how organization and science in Soviet ranks still lag away behind the standards of Western Europe, though they are to some extent compensated by the less exacting requirements of fighters who have learned to thrive on improvisation. The General judged the individual soldier as a fighting animal out-matching his German counterpart, but showed how this advantage vanished when the Russian unit faced the far more highly developed Teuton formation. Both authorities dwelt on the "support" given by the nation to the Russian Army. Chapters I and XV especially bring out how the civilian must suffer, if need be to the death, rather than stint the Army. Time and again it is recorded how civilians were thrown ruthlessly into the breach that the front might be held at all costs. Logical thought would seem to show that any sacrifice of any section was justified in the desperate attempt to bridge the narrow margin between victory and permanent enslavement. Perhaps the root lies deeper than this—in the development of a classless society where everyone gets a share. In democracies, not to say fascist states, private enterprise enriches the individual. In Russia communal enterprise diverts all profits to the State, which can thus allot to social improvement, education and industrial progress all those millions which swell the balance-sheets in Western concerns. The State can even now afford to confer equal opportunity on every infant, whatever the colour, a goal to which even our most recent Colonial policy can hardly aspire for many years. Naturally the infant appreciates this advance from Czarist slavery and will fight to the death to ward off any German equivalent.

"*Otherwise*," says the author, "I found the Red Army much the same as other armies."

Perhaps the best pointer to the contents of this important work would be a short summary of the contents to show the pattern of thought. Chapter I starts with an intimate picture of the life of an average private of the infantry, his rigorous though not unpalatable life in barracks, of the return of discipline, saluting, uniforms and respect for officers, almost as in the old army, of the great purge in the high ranks of 1937 and 1938. Science and experience were lost, but as a result they have younger

Generals and no Fifth Column. The Generals are discussed in the next chapter, and then the High Command and the ultimate Soviet direction, all of which makes the reader feel that Stalin will rank high in world history. The next three chapters describe the battle for Moscow in 1941 and the successful counter-attack that December. But it was touch and go. And again one marvels at the ruthless calculation by which the High Command faced every sacrifice to achieve the right moment for the counter-blow. It was the same at Stalingrad (Chapters XVI to XIX), where the almost unbelievable ordeal of General Gurtiev's Siberians was the bait deliberately dangled before von Paulus to induce him to enmesh his Sixth Army.

In the chapter on cavalry the author traces the course of the mounted branch, how the Russians believe in mass formations of not less than two corps and still use the *arme blanche*. The infantry and artillery are shown as the backbone of the Russian defence, their two best arms, to oppose the superior German mechanized forces and aircraft. In the guns General Voronov found the answer to the tank. The Germans at first made the mistake of substituting mortars for light field guns, nor had they any answer to the Russian 45 mm. light gun moved in emergency by nine men.

By the way, it would help the reader if Mr. Kerr had quoted the gunner rule of multiplying by four and using common sense to convert the metric system to inches.

The German pattern changed in the second summer. His tank losses were so terrific in 1941, and in the following winter when they were not tuned to ultra low temperatures, that they had to limit themselves to a campaign in the south only, and even that with less generous tank forces.

Chapter XI deals with the war in the air. As one might expect, Soviet aeronautics is not yet comparable with Anglo-Saxon. They confine the air rôle to army co-operation, and that on a less ambitious scale. The planes themselves give good results in Russian hands, but are not such delicate instruments as our own. Russian unwillingness to allow any Allied man-power on Russian soil brought out this point, as they did not always handle our lend-lease planes properly. Our pilots were not even allowed to deliver by air, which meant that delivery by ship had to face unavoidable hazards in the Arctic convoys.

There is a logical explanation of the regimental commissars, how and why they came into being, and how their usefulness is now being continued in other forms. Follows a chapter on occupied Russia and the guerrilla movement, more thorough and carefully elaborated than is generally believed. Then a chapter on Allied aid, and finally the position of Russia *qua* Japan. At first the Soviet trod carefully. Now they can afford to be tough. Russians had no illusions about Japan.

This book is a pleasure to read. Mr. Kerr knows his Europe and avoids certain Americanisms which read well in the Middle West but are less in tune this side of the water. It is a volume no serious student of Russia or of war can afford to neglect.

G. M. ROUTH.

**Modern Persian Reader.** By A. J. Arberry. 7½" × 5". Cambridge University Press. 1944. 7s. 6d.

A book of this size, scope and price is very welcome in these days. To use a trite expression, it supplies a long-felt want. That the book is produced by a scholar like Dr. Arberry is in itself a guarantee of up-to-dateness and usefulness. The beginner in Persian will, however, probably think that Dr. Arberry has underestimated the difficulties of his selections. For our part we think that a student of Persian, whose mother tongue is English, will consider himself considerably more than a beginner if he can tackle any of the extracts with moderate ease.

The language of Iran is passing through the instability and unrest which prevail in many countries of the world, and particularly in Iran itself. It is unlikely that Iranians will agree that the specimens of literature in these selections give a true picture of modern Persian culture. For instance, some may object to the inclusion of Rahnuma; others may say that Ruhani is not a poet whose work merits three extracts. To the English-speaking student of Persian these considerations are not so important. What is important, however, is the accuracy of the text and the notes and the vocabulary. Unfortunately there are some errors, not all of which are mis-

prints. For example, the note on the text of page 63 line 4 confuses the idea of any "Tom, Dick or Harry" in the words "Mashhadi Riza" with the Iman Riza, who would never be referred to as "Riza-i Mashhadi." Or, again, the expression on page 26 line 6, "Haif o mail," is not, literally, "regret and longing," but "injustice and deviation." On page 66 the last two lines (ll. 9 and 10) of the poem by Ruhani and the vocabulary word on page 8 (wrongly translated) should be expunged as likely to cause offence. No doubt if the Reader runs to another edition corrections will be made. And, what is as important as anything else, the transliteration of the Persian words in the vocabulary and the diacritical pointing of the numerous Arabic expressions that occur throughout should be undertaken if the student of Persian is to get the maximum advantage from this valuable little book.

H. T. W.

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**Strangers in India.** By Penderel H. Moon. 7½" × 5". Pp. 212. London: Faber. 1944. 7s. 6d.

I have read this interesting book with care and several times, and I feel that it is one which all interested in India should read. It appears to be, in a sense, an autobiography, and explains the thoughts, doubts and, sometimes, the conclusions of the author. The plan is to relate the experiences of a junior Indian civilian (Greenlane), imbued with an interest in India and its peoples, put forward, generally in a conversation, with a more senior Indian civilian (Lightfoot), who attempts to explain the political and economic situation to the youngster in whom he is greatly interested. Possibly this is as good a way as any other to get over what the author desires; at times, though, it makes dullish reading. There is much in what is said on both sides, but the conclusions which lead to Greenlane deciding to take his hand from the plough are not convincing and are unwarrantably pessimistic.

I have ventured to discuss the book chapter by chapter (with the exception of one) and have commented on the views put forward to the best of my ability. I recognize, however, that a review, even of the length that I have written, suffers from compression, as a full review would run into a full book.

*Preface.* One can heartily agree with the author's suggestion that "it is time Englishmen learnt to review their record in India more objectively." There is no doubt that our habit of idealizing the results of our rule is very irritating to the Indians, who see many defects, and is quite unnecessary, as "the British achievement requires no euphemism or exaggeration." Again: "Neither the merits nor the defects of the British *raj* are attributed solely to the British . . . the Indian Empire is the product of joint endeavour."

*Chapter I. "Introduction."* The author draws attention to the undoubted fall in the standard of the candidates for the I.C.S. immediately after the last war, but there were other causes to which depreciation in the administration was due. Overwork of seniors during the war, lack of time and energy to instruct juniors properly, the fatal decision to allow those who felt the new conditions to be uncongenial to retire just when their knowledge and advice were so urgently required, excessive concentration of power in the Secretariat, the advent of the motor-car which tended to curtail the old and invaluable custom of continuous touring; all the above, among other things, tended to lower the standard of administration, especially with regard to keeping in touch with the people. A King's Indian commissioned officer made a very pertinent remark to the reviewer as regards the progress of Indianization of the Services: "Yes, you have given us far more opportunity, but too little sympathy!"

Indian writers who claim that India is a rich country but her people are poor, and that the English are responsible for this grim paradox, are certainly incorrect. Greenlane's remarks on this point are well made and instructive,

and the impressions he quotes on his own arrival in the country are identical with those gained by itinerant visitors who, so often, are ready to damn our administration. Sir Digby Dinwiddy is an example of the "die-hard" administrator with whom, unfortunately, India is often cursed.

"Complacency and resting on our oars" is how Greenlane describes our attitude. The reviewer would go further; in many cases the Civil officers are entirely apathetic, if not antagonistic, to the delegation of power to Indians. These officers realize that from being rulers they will be servants, and their attitude becomes obstructive, partly from the altruistic view that the change will not be for the benefit of India and partly from the point of view of self-interest.

To those of us who have served in India personally for a long time, and in many cases for generations, the open dislike that so many Indians have to the British personnel of the I.C.S. as a whole is truly deplorable.

Chapter II, "*The Peasant and Poverty*," is one of the most important chapters in the book and requires careful reading and thought, for so much of it is true. It is too exhaustive for me to tackle it in detail, but the outstanding point is that the system of subdivision of land is mainly responsible for the poverty of the peasant. Mr. Lightfoot's suggestions are a radical revision of our whole rural economy. Firstly, a great speed up of industrialization. This is being realized, and the scheme of the Bombay industrialists is a pretty clear indication of Indian opinion. Secondly, a more productive system of agriculture, abolition of each family cultivating a tiny holding of the often hopelessly fragmented land and in its place some form of large-scale co-operative farming. In this surely, in any form of state-aided cultivation in which grants of land are made, we should insist on primogeniture and endeavour to introduce large-scale farming, possibly on a village basis combined with a centralized township. This scheme has lately been put forward by a senior Civil officer investigating the question of land awards for ex-soldiers.

Chapter III. "*The Peasant and the Law*." Again a valuable criticism of our present system. All that is written in this chapter is well known. Lightfoot's suggestions are invaluable: firstly, more discretion in the hands of judges and magistrates; secondly, a closer association of the people with the administration of justice—that is, the encouragement of the village *panchayat* system; thirdly, a simplification of procedure.

Chapter IV. "*The States*." We are now getting on to very difficult ground. Of late years the Political Department has adopted an attitude of *laissez-faire*, and have found it "increasingly advisable to regard only actual rebellion as a criticism of gross misgovernment." There is no doubt that Indians like personal rule, and for that reason the States may have a greater significance for the future than is generally imagined. "They enshrine a valuable and truly Indian suggestion." As the author rightly suggests: "In the States, the presence of the British prevents the operation of self-acting checks." And again: "Once the British support is withdrawn, the standards of the Princes as a whole are likely to improve."

The root of the inefficiency of many of our Indian Princes has been a great deal due to our failure to impress on them in their youth and at their various colleges that a Prince has not only privileges, which we have upheld, but also serious duties. Of late years there has been a commendable improvement in our method of instruction; it has come, alas! very late, but we are now more on the right lines.

Chapter V is a good description of the difficulties of a Civil officer in the event of a communal riot.

In Chapter VI, Lightfoot attempts to tackle this all-important problem. As



he rightly says: "There *is* a communal problem, and it is the only serious obstacle to Indian independence." "In essence, the struggle is one for posts and political power between two communities distinguished by religion and culture." No amount of Congress argument, or camouflage, will do away with this fact.

The British did not create these problems, but our presence has helped to keep them alive, because we have been a more or less impartial third party. It is probably true that, left to themselves, some compromise would have been reached, but, as Lightfoot says, "under our rule both parties have been allowed to clamour, and found that clamouring paid." Subconsciously we have welcomed the effect that our action has tended to keep the communities apart, but it is fundamentally false that we created the problem.

It seems unfortunate that, in the past, when a Viceroy has attempted to bridge the gulf, to form a coalition, he has interviewed leaders of all parties *separately*. Unconsciously, such a method increased suspicion; each leader wondered what the others had been promised or what they had claimed, and, in consequence, increased their personal demands to such an extent that they became impossible. It is possible that a Round-Table Conference under the ægis of a sympathetic Viceroy might have results even now.

Federation is, at present, an unpopular solution, but it must come in some form or another. The fears of the Muslims, and indeed of all minorities, might be assuaged if the Upper House of the Legislature were framed on the pattern of the Senate of the U.S.A., where each State, no matter what its size, has an equal number of representatives.

There is a general hope that the problem of economic reconstruction after the war may bring the parties together. It has been suggested if the plan for educational reform is proceeded with, that in carrying it out all parties will see that there are bigger things than communal questions, and if they can work together in this very important policy, surely other forms of reconstruction may draw them together.

*Chapter VII. "The Peasant and Democracy."* There is so much that is true in this chapter that it is most depressing. We have no doubt made mistakes in the past and have been slow to rectify them. People in England cannot conceive the pace at which India has been moving forward as regards the ideas of the intelligentsia. The reviewer is inclined to say that the views of any man who left India ten years ago are so out of date as to be dangerous. Democracy may be unsuited to India but it is a policy that has come to stay, and many of the difficulties and absurdities that are quoted against its adoption in India are only those which existed in England a hundred years ago. The only solution is education, and though India may have considerable difficulties in the near future, yet education and time must have their effect and India will herself forge a constitution that will suit her, possibly not the same type of democracy as our own. It has been said: "The pangs of childbirth are very real to a woman, and India is going through a period of gestation possibly unequalled in history."

*Chapter VIII, "Mercenaries or Missionaries,"* is a disappointing one. There is again much truth in what Greenlane contends, but, whatever his personal feelings were, it would have been better to adopt Lightfoot's attitude to go on, and *serve*, rather than take one's hand from the plough.

In *Chapter IX* the ruling factor is Mr. Gandhi's futile policy of extreme pacifism, combined with his hegemony over the Congress; these facts have led to an equal degree of dictatorship on Mr. Jinnah's part. It does not seem unjust to say that these two men nailed their colours to their respective masts and that personal pride makes it difficult for either to make a compromise.

We must either wait for their disappearance from the political scene, which is procrastination absurd, or hope that both parties will break away from their respective dictators. There is hope that the unceasing efforts of Mr. Rajagopalachari may bring the parties to a sense of reality, and this will come about for certain when responsibility is the issue.

*Conclusion.* It is disappointing that Greenlane attributes so little value to the necessity for education as a prior necessity. The reviewer disagrees with this *in toto*, as will be seen by his comments on Chapter IV. We are forced to adopt some form of democracy, and unless it has an educated electorate, democracy is a farce. The reviewer has little to say on this chapter, which is really only a summary of conclusions already reached. But there is one point which he would like to emphasize: the author acknowledges, but only in two lines, "the long and helpful record of comradeship between Englishmen and Indians in the Indian Army." It is a sad fact that Civil officers know little of the Army; they rarely interest themselves in it, its doings or methods. Considering the importance that these soldiers will have in the new India this is a very unfortunate fact. Indians have shown in the field that they can compare with the finest soldiers in the world. Lack of openings in the past, due to conservatism of ideas as regards the ability of Indians as officers, has limited their opportunities. These have increased enormously and will be further increased in the future. It would be ideal if all officers of the I.C.S. spent at least a year, in peace-time, attached to selected Indian units, where they would learn the bonds of friendship which unite officers and men. Then, when they returned to Civil duty, they would realize what valuable members of society these officers and men could be.

One last word: the main factor in the political progress is the attitude of the Viceroy. India and the British Empire are fortunate in having Viscount Wavell in this crisis. Those who have read his book *Allenby in Egypt* will realize how he agreed with the sympathetic attitude of Allenby towards Egyptian independence. Such sympathy diverted to India would have great results. On this great man the hopes of the Empire, as regards India, largely rest, and if sympathy, decision, honesty and hard work bear any fruit, we may rest assured.

D. S. (PYEN-DUA).

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**India in Outline.** By Lady Hartog. 7½" × 5". Pp. 110. Map. 31 illustrations. Cambridge University Press. 6s.

This little book deserves high praise as a skilful and unprejudiced sketch of the Indian scene. The history of the sub-continent from the earliest times to the present day is concisely but adequately traced. In so wide a survey some doubtful points are inevitable. The statement that in A.D. 1001 the first Muhammadan invader, Mahmud of Ghazni, set foot on Indian soil ignores the conquest of Sind by the Arabs in 712, which had permanent and far from unimportant results; and Mahmud himself, as well as his father Sabuktigin, had entered India before 1001. Lord Wellesley did not attack Haidar Ali, who had died fifteen years before that Governor-General arrived in India. The view that the Indian village was allowed to govern itself through its *panchayat*, though often presented, is of very doubtful correctness. Except in the case of caste *panchayats*, which could punish their own caste fellows only, such bodies had no power. The very useful *panchayat* that adjudicated on civil disputes was only an arbitration, unless its findings were accepted and enforced by a Government authority.

These small points do not, however, detract from the value of a study marked throughout by entire impartiality. The clarity of outlook and expression is continued when modern relations and conditions are examined. The account of the Indian States, with their rights and their difficulties, is especially judicious.

Lady Hartog deals with the present political situation with entire fairness. She points out how much practical service has been rendered in the war by countless Indians, while the politicians have done little to help, and much to hinder and obstruct, the war effort. The book ends on a note, which all well-wishers will endorse, of the necessity for India and the Empire to work together.

Mention should be made of the excellent and representative illustrations. The tables of statistics, while not too many, are clear and accurate.

No better book could be commended to the many in this country who desire a readable and impartial survey of the position in India.

P. R. CADELL.

**Jungle Warfare.** By Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Hutchinson. 5s.

This little book covers, in condensed form, almost every aspect of a very comprehensive subject about which all too little has been written.

Since the Japanese war started a number of books of the descriptive variety have been published dealing with the operations in Malaya and Burma. Some of them have given a misleading account of our Far Eastern problem and do not bring out the extent to which we were stretched by our commitments in the Middle East and by having to make good the equipment and transport we lost at Dunkirk. General Rowan-Robinson puts the situation clearly and the reasons for many of our early failures then become apparent. He manages to combine interest and instruction. The book is, in fact, a concise little handbook on jungle warfare, useful alike to the layman and the soldier.

The author has drawn largely on articles by officers who have had recent experience of the subject and his book includes the most up-to-date methods in jungle fighting as taught and practised by the late General Wingate.

The book is quite well illustrated by photos which really do give an idea of what the jungle looks like.

I would make one criticism and one remark. When talking of "the Properties of the Jungle," the author says, ". . . fighting in the open, on the other hand, has been rendered supremely difficult by the advent of aircraft—a factor of minor influence in close country."

Actually there are few more alarming experiences in war for troops than to be heavily bombed in thick jungle, and I have seen a good battalion temporarily completely demoralized by such an experience. Such bombing demands, of course, good ground intelligence and the quick transference of the exact whereabouts of the target to the air.

The communications—whether road, rail or river—in the jungle are generally few and obvious. The approaching bomber cannot be seen approaching and the back areas are, therefore, particularly liable to fast fighter-bomber attack. We suffered a great deal from this in the early stages of the war when we were very inferior in the air and the Japanese are getting it back now with interest.

On the last page but one of the book the author states: "It will have been observed that, as jungle warfare gradually becomes mechanized, the conditions on which it is waged and the methods of its waging approximate more and more to those of open warfare."

Jungle warfare is a queer mixture in this respect. We were actually very much over-mechanized at the start of the Japanese war and the small mobile Japanese columns with their pack animals, ponies and cycles made rings round us. We had to unmechanize and go light.

If air supply and the use of airborne troops—which have absolutely revolutionized jungle war—can be classed as mechanization then the passage I have quoted is particularly apt.

Anyone who has a relative in the Far East or who may be sent there himself cannot fail to be interested and instructed by reading General Rowan-Robinson's book.

J. G. SMYTH.

**Burma Surgeon.** By Gordon S. Seagrave. 8" x 5½". Pp. 159. 9 illustrations. Map. Gollancz. 1944. 9s.

This book leaves one rather breathless, but full of admiration for a man who did a grand job of work. Dr. Seagrave took an active part in the medical work of the British and Chinese forces when they retreated through Burma in 1941-42, but he is a workman who sticks close to his own trade, and the real value of this book lies not so much in the war part of it as in that which concerns his life's work. The best parts of the book are those which cover his early struggles as a medical missionary at Namkham, 130 miles beyond Lashio on the Burma Road. He and his wife arrived there on a day in 1922 to find a miserable wooden hospital, dirty, neglected and containing just one patient. Sixteen years later they had completed—built, in fact, practically with their own hands—a fine new hospital of stone complete in all particulars, and always full to overflowing. With the war, destruction and ruin has overtaken Dr. Seagrave's great work at Namkham. As he tersely puts it, "Well, that is the end of all my dreams and hard work." But to a man of that type there is no finality either in dreams or work, and it is a safe guess that the Burma of the future will find him embarking on fresh projects for the good of the people as energetically as ever. For the interim, he tells us on the last page of this book how General Stilwell promised him, when new action developed against the Japs, to "save out the meanest, nastiest task of all" for him and his nurses, and we may be sure they are tackling that job in the best Namkham way.

Dr. Seagrave's style is forceful and picturesque—the surgical and obstetric details sometimes lurid—and he has a great knack of sizing up a situation and describing it in a few strong phrases. He rightly devotes a great deal of space to the subject of his nurses, and some of the most striking passages in his book are those where he describes how he and his wife turned the raw material of Kachin, Karen and Shan into efficient nurses, nurses moreover who were ready to face every kind of hardship and privation and unending toil on the great retreat. The chapter on "Our Nurses" is perhaps one of the best in the book. They started with a Shan and a Kachin. Language was a difficulty, as the doctor knew only Shan. So he taught the Shan girl in Shan and she taught the Kachin girl in Burmese. Burmese in the end turned out to be the only possible common language and it was in that language that Dr. Seagrave himself wrote a textbook on nursing. Yet in the whole history of the school only four nurses were actually Burmese. The party which accompanied him out to India comprised three Karens, three Kachins and two Shans. The story of their pluck and endurance is a wonderful one, to which it is clear that Dr. Seagrave's own personality contributed not a little.

There is something in the combination of hill origin and Christianity that seems to make good nurses. The same thing is seen in the hill tribes of Assam, where the American and the Welsh missionaries have succeeded in training, especially among the Khasis and Lushais, large numbers of admirable nurses, many of whom are serving in the Auxiliary Nursing Service far away from their homes. The hill woman, of course, has none of the inhibitions of the plains, none of the age-old traditions which forbid this, that or the other task to be done by any but the lowest classes of humanity. Dr. Seagrave's methods of teaching were unorthodox. One principle which contributed largely to his success was that he made them do every job. "We were determined," he says, "that any nurses we trained should be willing to do anything needed, however foul." If this principle could only be accepted in the hospitals of India it would do away with an immense superfluity of personnel and conduce greatly to the comfort of the patients. His relations with his nurses were based on "respect and affection"—and they were obviously successful. Lastly, he tolerated no nonsense in the way of cliques based on race or tribe—and here again he succeeded. "They are much bigger than their race," he is able to say. What an object lesson to those Indian politicians who put community first, last, and all the time. If India could throw up just one or two statesmen who were "bigger than their race," then the most formidable obstacle that stands in her forward path would be gone.

Altogether one of the better books about Burma, perhaps because the author is a cobbler (no reflection on his surgery!) who sticks close to his last, and writes only of things of which he has full knowledge.

**The Civil Defence of Malaya.** Compiled by Sir George Maxwell, K.B.E., C.M.G. Pp. 128. London: Hutchinson. 1944. 7s. 6d.

This book, which is published under the auspices of the Association of British Malaya, has been compiled by a committee under the chairmanship of Sir George Maxwell and is based upon information supplied by persons who were in Malaya at the time of the Japanese invasion. It is the only account of its kind which has so far appeared that is at all authoritative, and it embodies an admirably impartial narrative of the part played by the civilian population of Malaya in those days of crisis. Its appearance is to be welcomed, for it disposes convincingly of the cruel aspersions which have been cast upon that population, both European and Asiatic, by certain critics at home and abroad.

The report thus furnished shows conclusively that, though there may have been a few quislings—in what country are they not to be found?—the Eurasians and the great bulk of the Malays, Chinese and Indians, far from being disloyal, were friendly and helpful to the Europeans throughout, and that there can be no question of a fifth column having existed among them. The Chinese, in particular, rendered invaluable assistance. At the same time, the European population is shown to have by no means been composed of the enervated seekers after ease and pleasure whom a number of sensational journalists have been at pains to depict for us. Its members, men and women, participated energetically, and in some cases heroically, in the defence of the country. In this connection, the report refutes the suggestion that the continuance of dancing and gaiety at Singapore and elsewhere during this time was in itself a proof of the effete and irresponsibility of the Europeans. It is pointed out that many of these entertainments were organized to raise funds for charities, that people not unnaturally felt entitled to some distraction in the evening after a day of strenuous war work, and that, in any case, a tendency to restrict amusement would have been interpreted by the Asiatic communities as a sign of defeatism.

Whilst the civilian population as a whole is thus vindicated completely, the report does not spare entirely the conduct of affairs by the civil authorities. Good reasons are adduced to justify the decision of the Government that more harm than good would have been done by the construction of air shelters at Singapore, but some severe strictures are passed upon the authorities for their attitude over the question of civilian evacuation. It is suggested that subsequent confusion and ill-feeling would have been avoided if the Government had resolved sooner upon arrangements for the evacuation of all non-effective women and of children. (By "non-effective" is meant those who were unable for one reason or another to contribute to the general war effort.) But the most unfortunate feature of all was to be found in the preferential arrangements made for the evacuation southwards of European civilians as the enemy gradually drew nearer to Singapore. Here the report shares the responsibility between the military and the civil authorities for a policy which aroused great resentment among the Asiatic communities, a resentment the effects of which may be felt when British rule in Malaya is restored in due course. The Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, is quoted as having made the following statement to the Legislative Council at Singapore on December 16, 1941:

"In any withdrawal or movement of population, there will be no distinction of race. No European civilian male or female will be ordered by the civil government to withdraw. We stand by the people of this country, with whom we live and work, in this ordeal. We stand by the ship, gentlemen."

In spite of this statement, however, there had already been a secret evacuation by the Government of about 650 European women and children from Penang on December 13, whilst three days later (on the very day when the Governor made his statement) there was effected the military evacuation of Penang, when the European male civilians, the remaining European women and a few Asiatics accompanied the military forces to Singapore. With respect to the latter evacuation, the Governor was reported in the local press to have said on December 20 that "the evacuation of European civilians from Penang had been done without his knowledge or that of the Colonial Secretary." In this matter of evacuation we are told that co-operation between the local military authorities and the central Civil Administration at Singapore left much to be desired. The book makes it clear, however, that, when it came

to the final evacuation of civilians from Singapore itself, no discrimination whatever was made on grounds of race or colour.

The Governor is also reported to have given a public assurance on December 20 that, if it became necessary in the future to yield any district to the enemy, a sufficient number of Government officers would stay with the people to look after their needs. For some unexplained reason this assurance was not fulfilled.

A striking fact brought out in the book is the general confidence which was felt in Malaya, almost up to the last, that the Japanese would never succeed in occupying the country and, in particular, that they would never capture Singapore. Some of the European women evacuated from Northern Malaya as the Japanese troops advanced southwards believed that they would be able to return to their homes again in a very short time. As regards the civil authorities, it is stated on page 98 that the Government policy and publicity were based on a belief that the whole of Malaya was impregnable. That the military shared this view is proved by an "Order of the Day" issued by the General Officer Commanding the Troops, Malaya, and by the Vice-Admiral Commanding-in-Chief on the China Station on December 8, 1941 (the day when the Japanese invasion began), in which the following words occur:

"We are ready. We have had plenty of warning and our preparations have been made and tested. . . . We are confident. Our defences are strong and our weapons efficient."

Yet, on February 15, 1942, little more than two months afterwards, the whole of Malaya was in the hands of the Japanese and the fortress of Singapore was surrendered to them.

The book ends with the following obviously true statement: "The fall of Malaya was a military disaster. Nothing that 'Civil Defence' could have done could have availed to prevent that disaster."

J. C.

**Burma Pamphlets.** Longmans, Green and Co. 1s. each.

An excellent series and one for which everyone interested in the new Burma, so soon to come into being, must be grateful. Three are already published: *Burma Background*, by B. R. Pearn; *Burma Settling*, by O. H. K. Spate; *Buddhism in Burma*, by G. Appleton. Eight more are to come, and the whole will be reviewed in the next number of the Journal. There are roughly 40 pages in each booklet, and the type is good and the covers stiff and hardwearing.

**Teach Yourself Arabic.** By Professor A. S. Tritton. 7s. 6d.

A valiant heart is needed by anyone who sets out to learn Arabic without a tutor. Professor Tritton, who at the School of Oriental and Arabic Studies has guided so many to the higher branches of Arabic literature, has here attempted to give a working knowledge of the language to the beginner who is out of reach of any teacher. Our reviewer, who has lived for many years in Arabia, quarrelled somewhat violently with the Professor's title. It remains for those for whom the book was written to prove the reviewer was wrong.

# OBITUARY

## WINGATE

BY FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT WAVELL, P.C., G.C.B., G.M.S.I.,  
G.M.I.E., C.M.G., M.C.

I FIRST met Orde Wingate when I took over command in Palestine in 1937 and found him on my Intelligence Staff. The name drew my attention at once, since I had known and admired his relation, General Sir Reginald Wingate. I enquired about him and was told he was rather an oddity, clever but eccentric; he had been in the Sudan for some years and knew Arabic well, but since coming to Palestine had developed pronounced Zionist tendencies and was now learning Yiddish and Hebrew. When I met him I realized that there was a remarkable personality behind those piercing eyes and rather abrupt manner. He was obviously no respecter of persons because of their rank. I found him and his attractive young wife at Weizmann's house at Rehovoth when I lunched there one day. I left Palestine early in 1938, before he performed the exploits in defence of Jewish colonies which gained for him the D.S.O., but I carried away in a corner of my mind an impression of a notable character who might be valuable as a leader of unorthodox enterprise in war, if I should ever have need of one.

That memory was taken from its pigeonhole over two years later when I wanted someone to organize efforts from the Sudan to support the efforts of Colonel Sandford inside Abyssinia to fan into flame the embers of revolt that had smouldered in parts of the Abyssinian highlands ever since the Italian occupation. Wingate came in response to a cabled request. One of his earliest actions was to fly into the heart of Abyssinia in November, 1940, to interview Sandford. Luckily for his purpose, most of the R.A.F. machines in the Sudan—there were very few—were old enough and slow enough to land in a small space; even so, the exploit was an extremely hazardous one and only accomplished by the skill and daring of the pilot. It was a pregnant meeting for the future, and I have always wondered what impression the two made on each other. In appearance they were opposites. Sandford—stoutish, bespectacled and bland—did not look the part of a leader of irregulars, but was in his way as bold and as active as Wingate, who—dark, fiery and eager—might have sat for the portrait of a leader of Spanish partisans in the Peninsular War. For the next few months Wingate worked vehemently at organizing support for the rebellion; he was much too good a soldier not to know that irregular enterprises require just as much preparation as any other operations of war. The constant burden of his messages to me and my staff was "more men and more camels, or there will be no rebellion." The men he wanted were picked junior commanders and N.C.O.s, as leaders of minor enterprises and demolition squads—most difficult to obtain at short notice from a force already too small and engaged on at

least three other fronts. The camels were to transport supplies and weapons up on to the Abyssinian escarpment across the low ground which would become impassable when the rains broke. Camels, too, were not easy to come by, and Wingate used them lavishly. We did what we could. Wingate worked unsparingly of himself and others; and the results are there to show that though much had to be left undone, sufficient for the purpose was managed. Of Wingate's brilliant performances in Central Abyssinia I knew little till afterwards. The enterprise once launched had to take care of itself, while I directed the regular operations against the north and the south of the Italian East African Empire. These two regular wings eventually met near Amba Alagi in May, 1941, at about the same time that Sandford and Wingate's irregular forces emerged from the centre. And so ended the Italian Empire of East Africa.

After it was all over, Wingate sent in to my headquarters a vehement memorandum of protest at the grievances and injustices suffered by him and his officers. Knowing Wingate and guessing at the strain which his efforts had imposed on him, I refused to allow any answer to be sent till I had seen him personally. I had matters out with him at a long interview. A few of his grievances were real and could be remedied, a few were imaginary; most were due to the fact that he and his men had been out of touch with official correspondence for months and it had been impossible to resolve matters of pay and allowances. I could see on him then signs of the strain that resulted in a long spell of hospital shortly afterwards.

Nearly a year later, when I was struggling to hold the Japanese advance in Burma, I again summoned Wingate to organize enterprises against the Japanese communications. He arrived too late to undertake anything in Burma, but in time for his quick brain to grasp the essentials of warfare against the Japanese in jungle country. After the evacuation of Burma, he sent me a memorandum on the formation of a "Long Range Penetration Group" for action in the reconquest of Burma. I approved his proposals but warned him that I could give him no picked troops. Next time I met him was a day and a night spent with him to watch the training of his special brigade in Central India.

I decided at the end of 1942 to use the brigade in Upper Burma to penetrate behind the Japanese lines and cut their communications, as part of a large-scale incursion into the north of Burma. Just as the brigade was ready to start it was decided for certain reasons that the larger operation could not take place. Wingate's expedition would therefore have no strategical object, and there would be little to divide the strength of the enemy or to prevent him concentrating on the brigade. Was it therefore wise to despatch the brigade at all? I flew up to Imphal and had a long discussion with Wingate early in February, 1943. He was most anxious to carry on the enterprise in order to test his organization and methods and to obtain intelligence of Japanese dispositions and of the situation in Upper Burma; and was confident that he could lead the brigade in and out without undue loss. This fell in with my ideas and, greatly to his relief, I gave permission to proceed. Next day I inspected the brigade and they marched towards the Chindwin and Irrawaddy.



I was summoned to England not long afterwards and only heard the results of the raid at long range. Though losses were heavy, and the columns of the brigade were for the latter part of the five months they spent in Burma the hunted rather than the hunters, the result fully justified Wingate's ideas. I had, in fact, sufficient confidence in them to order the formation of another similar brigade as soon as the first had disappeared into Burma.

By the time I received Wingate's report on his operations—a remarkably frank and interesting document—I had ceased to be Commander-in-Chief. Wingate himself had been called home and went straight on to the Ottawa Conference to expound his ideas. His personality and proposals made a deep impression there. I saw him in London on his return, and talked over with him the past and future of his operations. He was as alert and imperative as usual.

Our last meeting was when he spent ten days' convalescence in the Viceroy's House at Delhi while recovering from a severe attack of enteric which he had contracted on his return journey to India. The trouble was to keep him from over-working during his convalescence. I never saw him afterwards. The manner of his death was in keeping with the manner of his life—swift, meteoric, headlong. He was returning from a visit to his forward troops behind the enemy's lines in Burma. He never admitted danger as a deterrent to a commander's first duty, to know the dispositions and temper of his troops; nor storm and darkness as reasons for delaying a journey by air. What caused the disaster will never be known. It lost us a great leader, but his work and example remain.

The above account of my dealings with Wingate shows only one facet of his character. My contacts with him were mainly official and in the haste of war; I cannot claim to have known much of the man apart from the soldier. He was not, I think, easy to know. His forcible challenging personality invoked antagonism—he often exasperated my staff by the vehement importunity with which his demands for priority of equipment and personnel were pressed; nor did his subordinates find him an easy man to serve. His troops had full trust in his ability, but he had not the power to win their affection, though his occasional addresses, which were vivid and compelling, could stir their imagination. The truth is, I think, that he had in him such a consuming fire of earnestness for the work in hand that he could spare no effort to soothe or conciliate those with whom he worked. He thought deeply on other subjects than war, and I had occasional glimpses of a mind with stormy and interesting views on many matters, but there was never time to explore them before the warlike business in hand came uppermost again. It was not till the later stages of our acquaintance that I knew of his kinship with T. E. Lawrence. There were obvious likenesses between the two and just as obvious differences. Both had high-powered minds which seemed when working—and they almost always were—unable to run in any but top gear, however rough the going; so that they impelled the *chassis* of their bodies at the expense of rest and comfort and with tear and wear beyond the ordinary. Both had keen minds which drove straight to the heart of a problem, cutting through conventional practice and tradition where necessary and caring

little for received forms. Both were widely read and had retentive memories, both had the gift of clear and forcible expression in speech or in the written word. Both had a consuming energy in action. But Lawrence, as I knew him, was certainly more restful than Wingate and had a keen sense of humour which I never found in Wingate. In their theories of irregular warfare Lawrence was the amateur. Wingate had a professional background. Lawrence, dealing with nomad Arabs, was apt to scoff at questions of transport and supply and to leave them to take care of themselves; Wingate, who had to use town-bred men for partisan warfare, supplied his forces by original methods, but he devoted the greatest care and attention to it. Both were men of remarkable power and genius, whose premature deaths were a grievous loss. Let us hope that Wingate's infant son will inherit a full measure of the fire and talent that inspired his father.

In reading military history not long ago, I found the following description of that eccentric military genius, the Russian General Suvorov :

“Suvorov was a leader quite out of and above the ordinary rules of military criticism. . . . His energy was as inexhaustible as it was audacious. He taught his followers to trample, as he did himself, on every difficulty in their way. Obstacles only provoked him to strike out new resources; and wild and irregular as he was, he possessed in a remarkable degree that intuitive sagacity in the hour of battle which is one of the highest qualities of military genius.”

The above passage would serve as no bad portrait of Wingate.

I may fitly end this short note with the last words of Wingate's order to his troops as they crossed the Chindwin on their great enterprise in February, 1943 :

“Finally, knowing the vanity of man's effort and the confusion of his purpose, let us pray that God may accept our services and direct our endeavours, so that when we shall have done all we shall see the fruits of our labours and be satisfied.”

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#### SIR ERNEST HOTSON, K.C.S.I.

“Horry,” as he was known to all his friends in Bombay, gave long and honourable service to India from the time he arrived to join the I.C.S. in 1900 till he retired in 1931, after acting as Governor of Bombay during the absence on leave of Sir Frederick Sykes. He spent much of his service at Headquarters, first as Under-Secretary, and later in life as Private Secretary to the Governor, Political Secretary, Chief Secretary and Member of Council. He thus acquired an unusually wide acquaintance with members of all services and Indians of all shades of thought. His courtesy and straightforward manner gained him the confidence of all who served with him. He was quick to resent attempted injustice to anyone, and certain members of the Provincial Legislature discovered how sharp could be his defence against ignorant or spiteful attacks on those who could not speak for themselves.

As Home Member he was called on to deal with the first great Civil Dis-

obedience movement of Mr. Gandhi; and it was possibly this that led to the attempt on his life by a student when, as Acting Governor, he attended a function at the Ferguson College in Poona. The pistol bullet was stopped by a pocket-book, and Hotty himself fell with a low rugby tackle on his assailant, thus saving him from the ready sword of the gallant A.D.C. in attendance.

During the first Great War, as a member of the I.A.R.O., he was called up and served in various capacities in Persia and Baluchistan. It was probably his experiences during this period that gave him his particular interest in Muslim culture and Muslim affairs, an interest that he retained after his retirement. He was for some years Honorary Secretary of the London Mosque Fund, and took an active part in the purchase by the Trustees of that Fund of the property in Commercial Road in the East End of London and its conversion into a mosque. The provision of this mosque was greatly appreciated by the Muslim community residing in that part of the City. He was also Honorary Secretary of the Indigent Moslems Burial Fund and of the British Red Crescent Society, and took a great interest in the work of both these organisations.

He maintained his interest in India and his contact with friends there. He had been for some years a member of the Council of the East India Association. His sympathy with Indian aspirations was deep and based upon an exceptional knowledge of the difficulties inherent in the problem of self-government. In spite of somewhat indifferent health he remained to the end an active figure in the campaign to spread knowledge of India among British audiences. The suddenness of his death, though it may be that it was what he would have wished for himself, came as a great shock to his friends and has left a gap which it will be difficult to fill.

G. E.

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### COLONEL FRANCIS HAYLEY BELL, D.S.O.

Colonel Francis Hayley Bell, whose death occurred on April 20, was a man of most varied experience and attainments. Going out to China in 1891, when no more than a boy, he joined the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs in 1893, learning the language and studying the life of the Chinese peoples as only those few do who live amongst them, away from the European influence of Treaty Ports and Settlements. His early service was in Central and Southern China, and his periods of leave were spent walking across country from Shanghai to Foochow, from Canton to Nanning, from Nanning to Pakhoi, from Canton to Hong Kong. Some of this early time has been presented to the public delightfully in the pages of *Blackwood's Magazine*. He was always a keen sportsman, and in those youthful days went after tiger with a boy's zest, sometimes untempered by even a modicum of discretion. To all that he did, he always brought that keenness and utter fearlessness which marked him beyond ordinary men.

In 1905, while on leave from China, he went to South Africa and joined the South African Mounted Police. In the following year he fought with the Natal Carabineers in the suppression of the Zulu insurrection. Thereafter returning to England after an absence of fifteen years, he characteristically stopped on the way at Madagascar in order to walk across the island. In 1907 he returned to China and the Customs Service, becoming in 1911 Chief Assistant to the Commissioner in Chefoo.

In 1913 he returned to England on leave in September and, feeling sure that war with Germany would inevitably come in the near future, he attached himself to the XIth Hussars, and was with them at Aldershot for a year. Then,

after a short course at the Staff College, he joined the 10th Queen's Royal Regiment as a Captain, going to France in 1915, where he was badly wounded at Flers near Passchendaele. In 1916, after a course at the Senior Officers' School at Aldershot, whence he passed out very high, he was given command of his battalion and took it to Italy when the 141st Division was rushed there to stem the Austrian attack. In February, 1918, he was sent back to France and was in the front line at Bapaume in that terrible March. Here he did magnificent work, was twice mentioned in despatches and received the D.S.O. A serious wound in the jaw then kept him at home for five months, but he returned in time to take the battalion from Mons into Germany, when it was one of the advance battalions to enter the country. Thereafter he was Commandant at Lindlah until demobilization in April, 1919.

September of that year saw his return to China and to the Maritime Customs. He served as Commissioner in Macao, Chefoo, Kowloon and Canton. During this period, when law and order were dissolving all over the Chinese Empire, these posts entailed grave responsibility and often personal danger. In Macao he was involved in disputes between Portuguese and Chinese, and during his service in Kowloon the anti-British boycott produced a very serious threat to all foreigners. The Commissioner in Canton, Mr. A. E. Edwards, received a bullet wound, and Hayley Bell was sent to take charge there. Shameen was under blockade and all foreigners were refused entrance to the city. The personnel of the Customs, chiefly of course Chinese, were subjected to violent intimidation by the Canton Nationalists and the influences exciting them. Colonel Hayley Bell's imperturbable courage and iron will kept the Customs organization together, inspiring his subordinates to remain at their posts, which meant living in the Customs Offices in a state of siege. For his work in this most difficult period he received, through the Inspector-General, the personal thanks of Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary.

Hayley Bell ranks to a high degree among the *chevaliers sans peur et sans reproche*. He knew not the meaning of fear nor even of excitement, for nothing moved his calm, nor could anyone influence him in the slightest degree to deviate from his principles, which were always the highest. He stood, four-square to all the winds that blow, a great Christian gentleman, whom to know was an inspiration.

In 1927, when peace with the Kuo-Min-Tang had been restored, he returned to Kowloon. In 1929 he was made Preventive Commissioner in Manchuria, which entailed the bitterest travelling in mid-winter, negotiating the settlement of trade disputes with the Japanese and also inspecting the coast in an effort to check piracy. In 1930 he was appointed to Tientsin, an extremely difficult post, for the desperate intrigues of the Chinese War Lords in their efforts to hold their own against the growing power of the Nationalists involved the Commissioner, whose orders came from the Inspector-General in Shanghai, then already in Kuo-Min-Tang hands. In 1930 he was appointed Resident Secretary in London of the Chinese Customs, and in 1931 he retired. In 1936 he was sent to Singapore as Defence Security Officer by the War Office. Here his lifelong knowledge of the Far East enabled him to grasp the appalling danger of the situation and the utter misconception of the entire scheme of defence. He foresaw the subsequent course of events to a remarkable degree, and had his advice been studied, so swift and terrible a catastrophe could hardly have occurred. In 1937, despairing of obtaining attention from the men on the spot, who regarded him as an alarmist, he sent a memorandum of his views to a friend in the War Office Intelligence, who was greatly impressed and sent it out again to the authorities in Singapore. This made Hayley Bell a person yet more *non grata* to those at that time in charge of affairs, and eventually led to

his recall in April, 1939. Thus was the curse of Isaiah once again fulfilled: "In hearing ye shall hear and shall not understand; and in seeing ye shall see and in no wise perceive."

In 1940 he joined the R.A.F. as a Pilot Officer to train recruits for what eventually became the R.A.F. Regiment. His age and failing health could not keep him from service, and during his last year he was a travelling lecturer under the War Office, Educational Branch. The Commanding Officer of this department has written very appreciatively of his very fine work, saying how the troops enjoyed his lectures and how fond they were of him personally.

M. P. R. CLEMENTI.

## CORRESPONDENCE

THE EDITOR,  
"JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY."

SIR,

I have been, naturally, greatly interested in reading the three papers contained in your May number about the Far East and, as I happened to be working at the Foreign Office in 1902 when the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded, Sir John Pratt's observations on that Alliance attracted my attention particularly.

Sir John is, of course, quite correct in saying that the Alliance had no connection with Germany, but this is the only point in his description with which I agree.

To people at the time, and to me now, the Alliance was merely the extension to Asia of the traditional policy of the balance of power which we had followed successfully in Europe. Russia was, in my opinion rightly, conceived to be the strongest and most aggressive Power in Asia and to threaten our vast interests there. We therefore sought an ally, as we had so often done in Europe in like circumstances. Sir John complains that we did not "join the weaker side" but chose a strong ally. Presumably he means we did not join China, but he does not explain what possible use she would have been to us. As a matter of fact Japan was the weaker side in 1902 as regards Russia.

In one passage Sir John states that "it was only after the crushing defeat of Russia in 1905 that it was perceived that the Alliance had effected a disastrous change in the balance of power in the Far East." In the first place, Russia was far from being defeated crushingly. The military result was little better than a stalemate for Japan, who in all probability would herself have been defeated had not internal disorder crippled Russia. In the second place, so far from its being recognized that the Alliance had upset disastrously the balance of power, the Alliance was subsequently renewed and strengthened.

Although the Alliance was primarily due to the desire to preserve the balance of power, it had the subsidiary but important advantage of confining the war to the two countries directly involved.

Yours faithfully,  
(Signed) F. O. LINDLEY  
(THE RIGHT HON. SIR FRANCIS LINDLEY).

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THE EDITOR,  
"JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY."

SIR,

May I correct a misunderstanding by your reviewer of my book *Judæa Lives Again*, which ascribes to me as my opinion a view I was questioning. The review represents me as claiming that "Palestine can readily accommodate another million Jews," who should be planted there "within a few years of the Peace." What I wrote was: "It is claimed"—*i.e.*, by the Jewish Agency—"that the country could receive that number." But I then went on to examine

the claim and question (a) the necessity for the large-scale exodus; (b) the necessity for concentrating the exodus in Palestine. I believe in a continuous stream of Jewish immigration to Palestine but not in a sudden mass-immigration.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

THE EDITOR,

"JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY."

SIR,

The Countess of Carlisle, in your last issue of January, 1944, asked Colonel de Gaury if he knew anything of the future of women in Arabia. To this the Colonel replied that "it would be a very long time before they marched in threes and looked like A.T.S." The Americans, he added, had sent lady doctors to the centre of Arabia, and they had been into the harems and had done a great deal of good in telling the people what they could do to improve their health, etc.

To realize what the future of women in Arabia will be, it may be necessary to allude to some phases of the rôle women played in Arab history. Al Maqrizi states that al Amir Shamsud-Din Sanqar al Sa'di built a Ribat "Hospice" in Cairo for women in 715 H (1315). Similar Ribats for women are known to have existed in the Moslem world. It is not improbable that these women in the Ribats performed much the same duties that the A.T.S. are now doing so successfully. Ribats were centres for seclusion and worship, but the inmates had a military object to perform when the mother country was in danger. Arab biographies are flooded with the names of prominent women in jurisprudence, poetry, tradition and philanthropy. Sakhawi, the well-known biographer, produces a list of as many as 1,078 of them in the ninth century of the Hegira (fifteenth century).

The Countess of Carlisle may be interested to hear that among those who welcomed Professor Florey during his recent visit to Jerusalem, at the dinner held in his honour at King David Hotel, were qualified Arab lady doctors of medicine and dentistry. Add to this that Arab lady doctors from Egypt have been to Hijaz and gave a helping hand.

It appears, therefore, that the future of women in Arabia is secure. There is more than one sign that they are following the footsteps of their great-grandmothers, moving, as we hope them to be, in the right direction.

Looking around us, and without being unduly optimistic, we see an increasing number of Arab girls studying, side by side with young men, medicine, pharmacy, arts, law, in colleges and universities of Cairo, Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad.

Yours sincerely,

AHMAD SAMIH AL-KHALIDI.

JERUSALEM.